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

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THE HISTORY OF

BRITISH INDIA.

FROM 1805 TO 1835.

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By HORACE HAYMAN WILSON, M.A. F.R.S.

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CONTENTS.

BOOK II.

FROM THE RENEWAL OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY'S CHARTER, 1813, TO THE CLOSE OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE MARQUIS OF HASTINGS, 1823.

CHAPTER I.

Page

Appointment of the Earl of Moira as Governor-General.—Entrance upon his office.—Financial embarrassments of the Indian Government.—Indications of hostility.—Situation and Extent of Nepal.—Sketch of its history.—Rise of the Gorkhas.—Succession of their Princes.—Their Conquests in the Mountains.—Aggressions on the British frontier.—Causes of the War.—Claims on Bhotwal in Gorakhpur.—Commissioners appointed.—Aggressions on the Saran frontier.—Villages in Bettia attacked and annexed to Nepal. —Right of the British Government to Bhotwal established. —Lord Minto's Letter to the Raja.—Military preparations. —Right to Lands of Bettia determined.—Return to Nepal of Gorkha Commissioners.—Disputed Lands occupied.—Outrage of the Nepalese.—War proclaimed.—Mode of warfare to be adopted.—Plan of the Campaign. —Disposition of the British Troops.—Advance of the Second Division.—First attack on Kalanga,—its failure.—Second attack,—repulsed.—Death of General Gillespie.—Third attack,—defeated.—Bombardment of the Fort.—Evacuation of Kalanga.—March to the Karda Valley.—General Martindell occupies Náhan—besieges Jytak.—Combined attacks by Major Richards and Major Ludlow,—defeated.—Operations suspended.—Proceedings of the first Division.—Nature of the Country.—Gorkha Forts.—Nalagerh evacuated.—General Ochterlony turns the Gorkha Lines at Ramgerh. —Affair with the Gorkhas.—Reinforcements required, and

Page

operations suspended,—resumed.—Gorkha communications cut off.—Attack on the British post at Dibu,—repulsed.—General Ochterlony marches to the north of Malaun.—Amar Sing moves from Ramgerh to its defence.—Ramgerh taken. Malaun invested. 1

CHAPTER II.

Operations of the Third Division.—March from Gorakhpur.—Stockade of Jitpur,—attacked,—attack repulsed.—General Wood falls back, remains on the defensive.—Frontier harassed on both sides.—Return of force to cantonments.—Operations of the Fourth Division.—Advanced detachment under Major Bradshaw.—Gorkha posts surprised.—Parsuram Thapa killed.—Tirai conquered.—March of main body delayed.—Outposts at Samanpur and Parsa,—surprised by the Gorkhas,—great alarm among the troops.—General Marley retreats,—reinforced,—leaves his camp.—General G. Wood appointed to the command.—Defeat of a Gorkha detachment.—Gorkhas abandon the Tirai.—Division broken up,—troops cantoned on the frontier.—Success of Major Latter's detachment.—Alliance with the Raja of Sikim.—Invasion of Kamaon.—Colonel Gardner's success. Captain Hearsay defeated and taken.—Lieutenant-Colonel Nicolls sent to Kamaon.—Gorkhas under Hasti-dal defeated.—Stockaded hill of Sitauli carried.—Almora surrendered.—Kamaon and Gerwhal ceded.—Fort of Jytak blockaded.—Operations against Malaun.—Positions of Ryla and Deothal carried,—the latter strengthened,—attacked by Amar Sing.—Valour of the Gorkhas,—their repulse.—Bhakti Sing Thapa killed.—Garrison evacuate Malaun.—Amar Sing capitulates.—The country West of the Jumna ceded to the British.—Negotiations for peace,—conditions imposed.—Delays of the Gorkha Envoys.—Insincerity of the Court. Hostilities renewed.—General Ochterlony commands.—Operations.—Churia-ghati pass ascended.—Action of Makwanpur.—Nepal Envoys arrive.—Peace concluded,—conditions.—Objections to the war,—to the mode of carrying it on,—considered.—Votes of thanks.—Results of the War.... 43

CHAPTER III.

Page

Transactions in Ceylon.—Embassy to the King of Kandy.—Aggressions by his people.—Declaration of War.—March of troops and capture of the Capital.—Mutu-sami made King.—Force withdrawn.—Major Davie left at Kandy.—Attacked by the Cingalese.—Kandy evacuated.—Europeans murdered.—Hostilities continued.—Suspended.—Tyranny and Cruelty of the King.—Fear and Hatred of his people.—British Subjects seized.—War resumed.—The Capital again taken.—The King captured, deposed, and sent prisoner to Madras.—Ceylon subject to British Authority.—Universal Discontent and Rebellion.—A Pretender to the Throne.—Great loss on both sides.—Rebels disheartened.—Leaders arrested, and the Pretender captured.—The Insurrection suppressed.—Change of system.—Affairs of Cutch.—Disputed Succession.—General anarchy.—Depredations on the Gaekwar's Territories.—Disturbances in Kattiwar.—Suppressed.—Troops ordered into Cutch.—Anjar surrendered.—Agreement with the Rao.—Operations against the Pirate States.—Intrigues at Baroda.—Occurrences at Hyderabad.—Disorderly conduct of the Nizam's sons.—Put under Restraint.—Disturbances in the city.—Critical position.—The Princes sent to Golconda.—Discussions with the Nawab of Oude.—Views of the Governor-General.—Death of Sádat Ali.—Succeeded by Ghazi-ud-din.—Visit to the Governor-General at Cawnpore.—Loan to the Company.—Complains of the Resident.—Retracts.—Submits final requisitions.—Principles of future Intercourse.—The Nawab an independent Prince in his own Dominions.—Second Loan.—Resident's Vindication of himself.—His Removal.—Observations.—Internal Disturbances.—House-tax at Bareilly opposed by the people.—Tumults.—Troops called in.—The Rioters defeated.—Contumacy of great Landholders in the Western Provinces.—Dayaram of Hatras.—Shelters Robbers.—Resists the Authorities.—A force sent against him.—Hatras taken.—Disorders on the South-western Frontier.—Insurrection in Cuttack.—Causes.—Excessive Assessments.—

Page

Sales of Lands.—Corruption of Authorities.—Oppression of the People.—General Rising.—First Successes of the Insurgents.—Puri taken by them.—Recovered.—Commissioners appointed.—Special Commission.—Cuttack tranquillized.... 84

CHAPTER IV.

Relations with Poona.—Designs of the Peshwa.—Influence of Trimbak Rao.—Claims on Baroda.—Mission of Gangadhar Sástri to Poona.—Coldly received.—Other Agents.—Change of treatment.—Apparent cordiality.—Offence given to the Peshwa.—Journey to Punderpur.—Murder of Gangadhar.—Inquiry demanded.—Trimbak implicated.—Resident demands his arrest.—Peshwa reluctant.—Compelled to give him up.—Trimbak confined at Thanna.—Discontent of Mahratta Princes.—Objection of the Raja of Nagpur to a Subsidiary Alliance.—His designs upon Bhopal.—Unites with Sindhia against the Nawab.—Siege of Bhopal. Gallant Defence.—Besiegers retire.—Preparations of Sindhia.—British interference.—Sindhia indignant, but suspends operations.—Alliance not formed.—Death of the Nawab, and of the Raja of Nagpur.—Apa Saheb Regent.—Subsidiary Alliance concluded.—Sindhia.—His intrigues.—Disorders of his Government.—His policy.—Son and successor of Mulhar Rao Holkar adopted.—Tulasi Bai Regent.—Balaram Seth Minister.—Put to death.—Troops Mutiny.—Flight of the Regent and young Raja.—Tantia Jóg Minister.—Reconciliation negotiated.—State of affairs in Rajputana. Chand Sing defeats the Mohammedans.—Defeated by them.—Jaypur ravaged by Amir Khan.—Rajas of Jaypur and Jodhpur reconciled by his mediation.—Fresh quarrels, and both States laid waste.—The Khan marches to Jodhpur.—Domestic intrigues.—The Minister and Family Priest of the Raja assassinated.—Man Sing feigns imbecility, and abdicates.—Continuance of Amir Khan's depredations.—Distracted state of Central India..... 146

CHAPTER V.

Organized plunderers termed Pindaris.—Their origin.—Settlements on the Nerbudda.—Sindhia Shahi, and Holkar

Page

Shahi.—Their leaders.—Cheetoo.—Karim.—Dost Mohammed.—Plan of their incursions.—Cruelty and brutality.—Annually plunder the territories of the Nizam, the Peshwa, and the Raja of Berar.—Invade the British territory.—Threaten Mirzapur.—Plunder the Masulipatam district.—Gantur.—The Northern Circars.—Their parties surprised or overtaken.—Many killed.—Defects of a defensive system.—Offensive operations contemplated by the former Government.—Policy of Lord Moira.—Total suppression of the predatory system.—Expected conduct of the Mahratta Princes.—Proposal to annul the 8th Article of the Treaty with Sindhia, and renew an Alliance with Jaypur.—Prohibition of the Board of Control.—Modified.—Opposition in the Council.—Perseverance of the Governor-General.—Raja of Jaypur seeks the renewed Alliance.—Hesitates.—Conclusion of Treaty deferred.—Alliance with the Rajput Princes, with Amir Khan, with the Nawab of Bhopal.—Sindhia's concurrence.—Coöperation of Nagpur.—Death of the Raja.—Succession of Apa Saheb.—Disposition of the Peshwa.—Regrets abandonment of Trimbak.—Requires the charge of him.—Many grievances.—Escape of Trimbak.—Insurrection raised by him.—Its existence denied.—Secretly encouraged by the Peshwa.—Subsidiary troops of Poona and Hyderabad in movement.—Insurgents dispersed at Maswan.—Lieutenant Warre murdered.—Insurgents routed in Kandesh.—Proceedings of the Resident.—Poona surrounded.—Peshwa promises to give up Trimbak and disband his levies.—Proclamation of rewards for Trimbak's apprehension.—Orders of of the Government.—New Treaty.—Conditions.—Additional Subsidiary Force.—Territorial Cessions.—Arrangements with the Gaekwar. 183

CHAPTER VI.

Plan and purposes of the campaign of 1817–18.—Disposition of British forces—in Hindustan.—Grand army.—Centre.—Right Division.—Left Division.—Subordinate Detachments.—Reserve.—Army of the Dekhin.—First Division.—Second, or Hyderabad.—Third.—Fourth, or Poona.—Fifth.—Reserve.—Events at Poona.—The Peshwa's dis

Page

content.—Poona division takes the field.—Force left in Cantonments withdrawn to Kirki.—Menacing appearances.—Explanation demanded.—Peshwa's ultimatum.—The Residency destroyed.—Battle of Kirki.—Peshwa defeated.—British Officers seized by marauding parties.—The Vaughans murdered.—Return of General Smith to Poona.—Flight of the Peshwa.—Poona occupied.—Advance of the third and fifth Divisions across the Nerbudda.—Pindaris driven from their haunts.—Union of the first and third Divisions under Sir T. Hislop, near Ujayin.—Conduct of Sindhia.—Advance of the centre and right Divisions of the Army of Hindustan towards Gwalior.—Treaty with Sindhia.—Ravages of Cholera in the centre Division.—Change of Position.—Disappearance of the Disease.—Pindaris cut off from Gwalior.—Fly towards Kota.—Overtaken by General Marshall.—Amir Khan intimidated.—Disbands his Troops.—Pindaris intercepted by General Donkin.—Return to the South.—Encountered by Colonel Adams.—Join Holkar's Army.—Cheetoo flies to Jawad.—Diminished strength of the Pindaris..... 226

CHAPTER VII.

Transactions at Nagpur.—Discontent of Apa Saheb.—Accepts publicly honorary distinction from the Peshwa.—Hostile indications.—Preparations for defence.—British force.—Situation of the Residency.—Sitabaldi Hills.—Residency attacked.—Action of Sitabaldi.—Mahrattas defeated.—Negotiations.—Arrival of General Doveton with the second division of the Dekhin army at Nagpur.—Advance of General Hardyman's division.—Action of Jabalpur.—Town occupied.—Affairs at Nagpur.—Terms offered to the Raja.—Apa Saheb comes into the British lines.—Action of Nagpur.—Mahratta army dispersed.—Contumacy of the Arab garrison.—City stormed.—Failure of the attack.—Terms granted, and Nagpur evacuated.—Provisional engagement with the Raja.—Policy of the Court of Holkar.—Intrigues with the Peshwa.—Professions of amity.—Violence of the military leaders.—Murder of Tulasi Bai.—Hostilities with the British.—Battle of Mahidpur—Advance of Sir Thomas

Page

Hislop.—Joined by the Guzerat division.—Sir John Malcolm detached in pursuit of Holkar.—Negotiations for Peace.—Treaty executed. — Prosecution of operations against the Pindaris.—Karim protected at Jawad.—Concentration of British divisions on Jawad.—Movements of General Keir.—Cheetoo returns to the Nerbudda Valley.—Surprised by Major Heath.—Takes refuge in Bhopal.—Proposes to submit.—Refuses the terms.—Again flies.—Karim's Durra surprised by Major Clarke.—Dispersed.—Many of the leaders surrender.—Lands granted them in Bhopal and Gorakhpur.—General Brown marches against Jawad.—Jeswant Rao Bhao surrenders.—Forts in Mewar recovered.—Troops under military Chiefs in Malwa dispersed.—Order restored in the territories of Holkar.—Operations against the Peshwa.—General Smith marches to Purandhar.—Peshwa retreats towards the sources of the Godaveri.—Joined by Trimbak.—General Smith cuts off his flight to Malwa.—He falls back towards Poona.—Captain Staunton detached to reinforce the troops at the Capital.—Falls in with the Peshwa's army.—Brilliant action at Koragam.—General Smith returns to Seroor.—Peshwa turns off to the East.—Pursued by the Reserve.—Joined by the Fourth Division.—Possession taken of Satara.—The Raja proclaimed.—Peshwa formally deposed.—Mahratta forts reduced.—Smith resumes his pursuit.—Overtakes the Peshwa at Ashti.—Cavalry action at Ashti.—Mahratta horse defeated.—Gokla killed.—The Raja of Satara rescued.—Baji Rao's followers leave him.—The Southern Chiefs submit.—He flies to the North.—Hemmed in between the British divisions—Passes to the East to join the Raja of Nagpur at Chanda.—Chanda covered.—Baji Rao pressed by General Doveton.—Falls upon Colonel Adams.—His whole force broken up.—He escapes.—Flies towards Burhanpur.—State of the Mahratta territories.—Ceded districts in charge of Colonel Munro.—His operations.—Organizes a Local Militia.—Reduces the neighbouring districts.—Reinforced.—Captures Badami and Belgam.—Assumes command of the Reserve.—Wasota taken.—Raja of Satara formally installed.—General Munro marches against Sholapur.—The Peshwa's Infantry defeated and

Page

dispersed.—The Fort surrendered.—Operations in the Konkan.—Reduction of Raigerh.—Country between the Bhima and Krishna Rivers occupied..... 259

CHAPTER VIII.

Dissolution of the armies of Hindustan and the Dekhin.—Divisions left in the field.—March of Sir T. Hislop with the 1st division to the South.—Contumacy of the Kiladar of Talner.—Fort stormed.—Murder of British Officers.—The Kiladar hanged.—Return of Sir T. Hislop to Madras.—Military operations in Kandesh.—Hill Forts surrendered or captured.—Arab mercenaries.—Siege of Maligam.—Storm of the Fort.—Repulsed.—Petta carried.—Garrison capitulate.—Operations in the Nerbudda Valley.—Movements of the left division of the Grand Army in Bundelkhand.—Rights of the Peshwa transferred.—Ságar annexed to the British Territory.—General Marshall advances to the Nagpur ceded districts.—Dhamani and Mandala taken.—Kiladar of the latter tried.—Acquitted.—Operations in Gondwana.—Proofs of Apa Saheb's hostile designs.—His arrest and deposal.—Baji Rao, a minor, made Raja.—Administration by the Resident.—Fatal error of the Peshwa.—Chanda taken.—Colonel Adams cantoned at Hosainabad.—Apa Saheb sent to Hindustan.—Makes his escape.—Peshwa overtaken by Colonel Doveton.—Prevented from crossing the Nerbudda by Sir J. Malcolm.—Negotiates with the latter.—Joins his camp.—His troops mutiny.—Are reduced to terms and dismissed.—Baji Rao marches towards Hindustan.—Governor-General disapproves of the terms granted to the Ex-Peshwa.—Confirms them.—Their defence by Sir J. Malcolm.—Baji Rao settled at Bithur.—Trimbak taken.—Confined at Chunar.—Mahratta power annihilated 327

CHAPTER IX.

Barbarian Races of the ranges of hills along the Nerbudda.—Gonds, Bhils, &c.—Measures against the depredations of the latter in Kandesh and Malwa.—Operations

Page

against the Gonds, and other adherents of Apa Saheb.—His refuge in the Mahadeo Hills.—Irregular bands in his service.—Desultory hostilities.—Defeat of a British detachment.—Death of Captain Sparkes.—Extension of the Insurrection.—Checked.—Many parties cut up.—Troops penetrate into the hills.—Gond villages destroyed.—Concerted plan of operations.—The Mahadeo hills ascended.—Apa Saheb leaves the hills, accompanied by Cheetoo.—Flies to Asir.—Not allowed to remain.—Assumes the disguise of an Ascetic.—Makes his way to Mundi.—Cheetoo not admitted into Asir.—Flies to the thickets.—Killed by a Tiger.—Asirgerh demanded from Sindhia.—Jeswant Rao Lar ordered to deliver up the fort.—Procrastination.—The fort besieged.—Lower fort taken.—Upper surrendered.—Documents proving Sindhia's insincerity.—Asirgerh retained.—Close of the War.—Its results.—Territorial acquisitions from the Peshwa.—System of management.—From Holkar—from Sindhia—from Nagpur.—Territorial arrangements with the Nizam—with the Gaekwar.—Political results..... 371

CHAPTER X.

Settlement of Central India.—Territories of Holkar.—Improvement in Population and Revenue.—Claims of the State—of its dependants.—Adjusted by British interference.—Rival Pretenders to the Throne.—Suppressed.—Settlement of Dhar and Dewas.—Relations with Sindhia.—Services of the Contingent.—His financial difficulties.—Engagements with Bhopal.—Islamnagar restored to the Nawab.—Death of Nazar Mohammed.—Killed by accident.—His Widow Regent.—Principality prospers.—Rajput Princes—secondary and principal.—Topographical situation of the former.—Engagements with Banswára.—Dungerpur.—Pertabgerh.—Sirohi and Krishnagar—with Bundi and with Kota.—Peculiarity of the treaty with the latter—its inconveniences.—Death of the Raja.—Aversion of Kesari Sing, his successor, to the Hereditary Minister.—Quarrels with Zalim Sing.—Raises Troops.—Action of Mangrole.—Kesari Sing restored under restrictions.—

Page

Death of Zalim Sing.—His Son succeeds as Minister.—Continued aversion of the Raja.—Treaty with the Rana of Udaypur.—Alienated and usurped lands recovered and restored to him.—Country improved.—Treaty with Jaypur.—Delay—finally concluded.—Interference necessary.—Death of the Raja.—Disputed succession.—Birth of a posthumous son.—Bhyri Sal made Minister.—Resident appointed.—Supports the Minister.—Treaty with Jodhpur.—State of parties.—Man Sing resumes the government—puts his adversaries to death.—Country prospers.—Treaty with Bhikaner.—Suppression of insurrection among the Bhattis.—Treaty with Jesalmer.—International tranquillity assured. Internal tranquillity imperfectly maintained 403

CHAPTER XI.

Miscellaneous Occurrences during and after the Mahratta War.—Affairs of Cutch.—Hostility of the Rao.—His intemperance and violence.—Force sent against him.—Bhuj taken.—The Rao surrenders.—Deposed.—His infant Son raised to the Throne.—A Council of Regency, under the superintendence of the Resident.—Subsidiary Treaty.—Amirs of Sindh unfriendly.—Causes.—The Khosa Robbers attacked.—Sindh Troops enter Cutch—withdrawn and disavowed.—Treaty with the Amirs.—Arrangements with Kolapur.—Outrages by Plunderers from Troops left at Kishme.—Consequences.—Defeat of a British detachment by the Beni-Bu-Ali Arabs.—Second Expedition.—Tribe almost exterminated.—Agency abolished.—Transactions at Mocha.—Town of Sawantwari.—A Force sent into the Country.—Treaties with the Regency.—Treaty with the Chief of Kolaba.—Piracies in the Persian Gulph.—Force sent against them.—Ras-al-Khaima again taken.—Treaty with the Arab Tribes.—Political Agent.—Treaty with the Imam of Senna.—Occurrences in the Eastern Archipelago.—Exclusive policy of the Dutch.—Defeated by Sir T. Stamford Raffles.—Lieutenant-Governor of Bencoolen.—His views on Sumatra.—Objected to by the Governor-General.—Offence not to be given.—Treatment by the Dutch of the Sultan of Palembang.—Determination of the Government

Page

of Bengal to secure the Straits of Malacca.—Negotiations with Malay Chiefs anticipated.—Settlement effected at Singapore.—Protested against by the Dutch.—Admitted by Treaty with Holland.—Prosperity of the Settlement.—Affairs of Achin.—Treaty with the Sultan.—Mission to Siam and Cochin China.—Relations with the Subsidiary States on the Indian Continent.—With the Gaekwar.—Death of Fateh Sing.—Prince Syaji made Dewan.—Death of Anand Rao.—Syaji succeeds.—Difficulties of position.—Arrangements.—Tranquillisation of Pahlanpur.—Of Kattiwar.—Relations with Hyderabad.—Mal-administration of Chandu Lal.—Interference of the Resident.—Dissatisfaction of the Governor-General.—Question of Interference considered.—Chandu Lal's Financial embarrassment.—Connection with the mercantile house of Palmer and Co.—Sanctioned by the Governor-General.—Disapproved of by the Court of Directors.—Dissolved.—Affairs of Oude.—Border Plunderers.—The Nawab Vizir allowed to take the title of King 438

CHAPTER XII.

Internal Administration of the Marquis of Hastings.—Progressive Legislation.—I. Civil Judicature.—Inefficiency of the Courts.—Injunctions of the Home Authorities to revert to Native Institutions.—Measures adopted in Bengal—at Madras and Bombay.—Result.—II. Criminal Justice and Police.—Reforms at the Presidencies.—Union of the Powers of Magistrate and Collector.—Extended Police Powers of the Revenue and Village Officers at Madras, and at Bombay.—III. Revenues.—Land Revenue.—Principles of Ryotwar Settlement to be universally adopted.—Perpetual Settlement prohibited.—Enactments in Bengal.—Village and District Native Accountants re-established.—Rules for Sale of Lands modified.—Settlement of ceded and conquered Provinces.—System of Village Settlement preferred.—Necessity of previous Inquiry.—Abuses to be remedied.—Fraudulent Transfers of Property extensive.—Discontent of the People.—Special Commission appointed.—Wrongs redressed.—Question of Perpetual Settlement of

Page
the Western Provinces re-considered.—Deferred Periodical Settlements continued.—Nature of Inquiries to be instituted.—As regarding the Land.—As regarding its Occupants.—Regulation to give effect to the Arrangements.—Revenue Surveys commenced.—Great delay anticipated.—Still greater experienced.—Merit of the Government.—Madras Village Settlements closed.—Ryotwar resumed.—With Modifications.—Lands for Sale in the permanently settled Districts bought on Public Account.—Bombay Revenue Arrangements.—Based on Native Institutions.—Inquiry found necessary.—Revenue Commission.—Revenue Survey of Broach.—Its Objects.—Similar Surveys in Guzerat.—Village Accountants made Public Servants.—Opposition of Heads of Villages.—Objections to the Arrangement.—Gradually relinquished.—Settlements of the Dekhin.—Combination of Village and Ryotwar Systems.—Survey commenced.—Other branches of Revenue.—Opium.—Difficulties respecting Malwa Opium.—Measures adopted.—Salt.—Customs.—Duties on British Goods remitted.—Finance.—Augmentation of Revenues—of Charges.—Surplus of Local Receipts.—Home Charges and Commercial Advantages insufficiently provided for.—Loans raised.—Public Debt increased.—Separation of Territorial and Commercial Accounts.—Debt contracted to the East India Company's Commerce.—Sufficiency of Indian Revenues for Disbursements in time of Peace.—Prospect of Financial Prosperity.—Changes of Social Condition.—Calcutta an Episcopal See.—Bishop Middleton.—Difficulties of his Position.—His Proceedings.—Foundation of Bishop's College.—His Death.—Establishment of Scottish Church.—Activity of Missionary Societies.—Increased numbers of Missionaries.—Attention turned to Native Education.—Defects of Native System.—Schools established—partly by Missionary Bodies—partly by Individuals for General Education; the latter assisted by the Government.—Censorship of the Press abolished.—Immediate Results.—Close of the Administration of the Marquis of Hastings 506

ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY BRANCH OF THE

HISTORY

OF

BRITISH INDIA

BOOK II.

FROM THE RENEWAL OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY'S CHARTER, 1813, TO THE CLOSE OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE MARQUIS OF HASTINGS, 1823.

CHAPTER I.

Appointment of the Earl of Moira as Governor-General. — Entrance upon his office. — Financial embarrassments of the Indian Government.—Indications of hostility.—Situation and Extent of Nepal. —Sketch of its history.—Rise of the Gorkhas.—Succession of their Princes.—Their Conquests in the Mountains. — Aggressions on the British frontier. —Causes of the War. — Claims on Bhotwal in Gorakhpur. — Commissioners appointed. — Aggressions on the Saran frontier. — Villages in Bettia attached and annexed to Nepal.—Right of the British Government to Bhotwal established. — Lord Minto's Letter to the Raja.—Military preparations. —Right to Lands of Bettia determined.—Return to Nepal of Gorkha Commissioners.—Disputed Lands occupied. — Outrage of the Nepalese. — War proclaimed.—Mode of warfare to be adopted.—Plan

of the Campaign. — Disposition of the British Troops.—Advance of the Second Division.—First attack on Kalanga,—its failure.—Second attack, —repulsed. —Death of General Gillespie. —Third attack, —defeated. —Bombardment of the Fort. — —Evacuation of Kalanga.—March to the Karda Valley.— General Martindell occupies Náhan — besieges Jytak. — Combined attacks by Major Richards and Major Ludlow, — defeated.— Operations suspended.—Proceedings of the First Division.— Nature of the Country.—Gorkha Forts. —Nalagerh evacuated.—General Ochterlony turns the Gorkha Lines at Ramgerh.—Affair with the Gorkhas. — Reinforcements required, and operations suspended;— resumed.— Gorkha communications cut off.—Attack on the British post at Dibu, —repulsed. — General Ochterlony marches to the north of Malaun.—Amar Sing moves from Ramgerh to its defence.—Ramgerh taken.—Malaun invested.

BOOK II. CHAP. I. 1813.

THE circumstances which recommended the Earl of Moira to the appointment of Governor-General of India have already been adverted to. After the death of Mr. Perceval, he had been authorised by the Prince Regent to attempt the formation of a cabinet which should combine the leading members of both parties in the state; and, although the negociation was unsuccessful, its failure was not imputed to any want of ability or zeal in the negociator. His long and close intimacy with the Prince, his distinguished rank and high personal character, were also considerations which duly weighed with the Administration; and he was accordingly entrusted

with the government of the British Indian empire. The office of Commander-in-chief was combined with that of Governor-General. Lord Moira arrived in Calcutta in the first days of October, 1813, and on the fourth of that month assumed charge of his important functions. 1813.

Although the economical system pursued by the Earl of Minto had permanently lightened the burthen on the public finances, yet the means by which much of the alleviation was effected were not unattended by temporary inconvenience. The establishments in general, and particularly those of the military department, had been reduced below the scale which the public security demanded; and the great exertions which had been made to pay off the remittable loan and supply the home treasury with funds for that purpose, as well as the necessity of furnishing the Governments of the new colonial conquests with pecuniary aid to enable them to defray the excess of their charges over their receipts, had drawn deeply upon the resources of Bengal. The new Governor-General consequently found the treasury exhausted, and presenting a balance scarcely equal to provide for the current expenditure. He was urgently pressed by the Court of Directors to continue the remittance of bullion to England, and was at the same time called upon to discharge bills to a large amount drawn upon Bengal by the Company's supracargoes at Canton for money which they had received from private merchants for application to the purchase of investments to Europe.[1]

[1] Financial Letter from Bengal, 30th October and 18th December, 1813. Papers relative to the Finances of India during the administration

BOOK II. CHAP. I.

1813. The prospect of preserving tranquillity began also to be overclouded. It was evident that contests, which had been threatening for many years, and which it had been the policy of the preceding administrations to evade or to defer, could not be delayed much longer with a prudent regard for the integrity of the British dominions and the reputation of the Government. Lord Moira was therefore called upon to engage in actual warfare while the immediate resources of his administration were in an extraordinary condition of inefficiency. The embarrassments were, however, merely temporary, and they were speedily surmounted by the activity and energy which the character and example of the Governor-General diffused throughout the Company's establishments.

1814. Omitting, for the present, any further notice of the financial difficulties, we shall proceed to describe the origin and object of the impending hostilities.

The territories of the kingdom of Nepal extended for a distance of more than seven hundred miles along the northern frontier of the British possessions. Stretching in an oblique direction from north-west to south-east, they skirted the provinces of Delhi, Rohilkhand, Gorakhpur, Saran, Tirhut, and Purnia, and included districts partly of ancient, partly of recent acquisition. Between Rohilkhand and Gorakhpur, a portion of the principality of Oude, conterminous with Nepal, completed the boundary line. The name, Nepal, was properly applicable to a valley of circumscribed extent embosomed in the Himalaya mountains, having on its south the first

of the Marquis of Hastings, printed for the Proprietors of East India Stock, March, 1824.

and lowest ranges of the chain, but girdled on the north by some of its loftiest and most majestic elevations; amid which, through passes scarcely lower than the limits of eternal congelation, a communication during the summer months lay open with Tibet. The people are mostly of the Bhot or Tibetan family; but they are intermixed with Hindus, colonies of whom immigrated from the plains at periods within the memory of tradition.[1] The leaders of the colonists seem to have been Rajputs, and, with their ordinary superiority in energy and courage, they soon established themselves as petty princes, or Rajas, in various parts of the valley. In the course of time, the number of independent chiefs decreased, the stronger devoured the weaker; and in the middle of the eighteenth century (1765) the valley of Nepal was partitioned among the three Hindu Rajas of Khatmandu, Lalita-patan, and Bhatgaon. Taking advantage of the feuds which arrayed these petty potentates against each other, Prithi Narayan, chief of a mountain tribe termed Gorkha, overpowered the triumvirate and made himself sole master of Nepal. He transmitted his sovereignty to his descendants, and they still reign over the country. The designation of the tribe of which the prince was a member came to be regarded as the national denomination, and

1814.

[1] According to local traditions, the Hindu Parbatiyas, or mountaineers, came originally from Chitore in the beginning of the 14th century. Probably the reigning family of Rajputs may have arrived about that date, but Nepal (Naipala) was a Hindu state in much more remote times. The Parbatiyas are more likely to be the relics of a primitive population, or immigrants from the adjacent low-lands of Oude: their language belongs to the Sanscrit family of dialects; but their physical conformation differs much from that of the Hindus of the contiguous plains, who are mostly tall, whilst the Nepalese, although robust, are below the average stature.

BOOK II. CHAP. I. the term Gorkha was applied to the government and the military population of Nepal.[1]

1814. Prithi Narayan died in 1771. He was succeeded by his son, Pratáp Sing, who reigned but four years. He died in 1775, and left an infant son, Rana Bahadur, under the care of his widow Rajendra Lakshmí, and his brother Bahadur Sah. During the regency, the system of aggression and conquest commenced by Prithi Narayan was vigorously pursued; and many Rajas, whose countries lay east and west of Nepal, were forced to acknowledge allegiance to the Gorkha Raja. An army was sent across the northern mountains against Lhassa, and the living type of Buddha was compelled to pay tribute to the Brahmanical ruler of Nepal. The enterprise nearly proved fatal to the nascent power of the invaders. The Emperor of China, incensed by the sacrilegious indignity offered to a religion of which he is the secular head, dispatched a large army to Nepal, which defeated the Raja's troops, and advanced to within a few miles of his capital, Khatmandu. The Gorkha prince averted the subjugation of his country by seasonable submission, by engaging to furnish the retiring army with pro-

[1] The name is generally said to be the name of a district in the mountains, as in Padre Giuseppe's account of Nepal, Asiatic Researches, ix. 307; so also Kirkpatrick, p. 123, and Hamilton. "The town of Gorkha is situated in the district of the same name."—Account of Nepal, p. 244. The latter also enumerates it as one of the Chaubisi or twenty-four hill states between the Gandi and Mursiangdi rivulets, the Rajas of which pretended to be members of the Pramara tribe of Rajputs; but he considers them to be of an inferior tribe, called Magars. Gorkha, correctly Gorakhsha or Gorakh, denotes a cow-herd; and the ancestors of the Gorkhas were not improbably of that caste, from the district below the hills known as Gorakhpur. The tutelary deity of Nepal is a form of Siva, denominated Gorakhnath, whose priests are Yogis; and the same sect and the same worship had formerly equal predominance in Gorakhpur. —As. Researches, vol. xvii. p. 189.

visions, and by promising payment of a yearly tribute to the Emperor of China. The Chinese army withdrew, the country of the Grand Lama was taken under the political protection of the Court of Pekin, and the Gorkhas were left to efface their discredit and compensate for their discomfiture by prosecuting schemes of aggrandisement at the expense of the Rajas of the mountains. Shortly after the Chinese invasion, an attempt was made by the British Government of India to establish a friendly intercourse with that of Nepal, and Captain Kirkpatrick was sent as envoy to Khatmandu. The mission was frustrated of all political benefits by the insuperable jealousy of the Gorkha ministers, but much interesting information was then for the first time made public respecting the topography and institutions of Nepal. 1814.

In 1795, Rana Bahadur took upon himself the authority to which his maturity entitled him, and avenged the thraldom in which he had been held, by commanding his uncle to be put to death. Becoming odious to his subjects through his dissolute habits and ferocious cruelty, he was obliged to abdicate in favour of his infant son, and withdraw from the country. He retired to Benares. After an exile of two years he recovered his station; but, relapsing into his former atrocious conduct, he provoked a conspiracy of many of his principal nobles, and was murdered by the conspirators, headed by his half-brother Shir Bahadur, in open Durbar. The murderers were immediately attacked and killed by Bhim Sah, of the tribe of Thápa, a faithful adherent of the Raja, who placed an illegitimate son of Rana Bahádur, still in

BOOK II. CHAP. I. 1814.

his minority, upon the throne, and assumed the office of Regent. Notwithstanding these internal convulsions, the tide of external conquest had continued to spread to the westward, and it received fresh impetus from the warlike propensities and ability of the Regent. Under his administration the Gorkhas extended their authority over the hill Rajas as far west as to the Setlej; they crossed the river, and were upon the eve of a contest with Ranjit Sing for the spoils of the Rajput princes[1] established in the hill country of the Punjab, when their ambitious projects in a different direction exhausted the forbearance of a more formidable antagonist, and brought upon Nepal the resentment and arms of the Government of British India.

A spirit of aggrandisement, which had been fostered by success, had long influenced the conduct of the Court of Nepal towards its neighbours of the plains; and its officers on the frontier had for many years been privately countenanced in a system of aggression and encroachment on the territories subject to the Presidency of Bengal. Their encroachments commenced as far back as 1787, and were persisted in, with occasional intervals, until 1813; being perpetrated along the whole of the borders from the frontier of Tirhut to that of the districts between the Setlej and the Jumna. They had given occasion to repeated representations and remonstrances on the part of the Government of Bengal, and had sometimes been suspended or disavowed by the Court of Khatmandu. They were in some instances, however, avowed and

[1] The Rajas of Mundi and Kotoch.—See Moorcroft's Travels, i. 129, 174.

justified, on the plea that they were directed to the re-occupation of tracts which had originally belonged to Nepal, or to chiefs whom the Gorkhas had subdued, and whose possessions they claimed by right of conquest. No case had hitherto occurred which was considered of sufficient magnitude to warrant forcible resistance or retaliation; although as early as 1807 the Governor-General intimated to the Raja, that, unless redress were granted for outrages committed on the frontier of Purnea, and lands which had been violently usurped were restored, "the British Government would be compelled to employ the means at its disposal for protecting the rights and persons of its subjects." The threat was carried into execution in 1809; a military force was then employed to expel the Gorkha officers from the disputed lands, and to replace the dispossessed Zemindar of Bhimnagar, whom the Company acknowledged as a subject, in his Zemindari.

The more immediate causes of the war which now took place were disputed claims to lands included within the limits of the British provinces of Saran and Gorakhpur. We shall first notice the latter of these, as they were made the earlier subject of authorised investigation. Gorakhpur, of which the northern boundary is contiguous to the lower range of hills, came into the hands of the British in 1801-2 as included in the cessions exacted from the Nawab-Vizir of Oude. The district in dispute had formed part of the landed possessions of the Raja of Palpa, a hill chieftain of consideration in the kingdom of Nepal; it being not unusual for the Rajas of the first ranges of the hills to hold lands along the borders of the ad-

1814.

jacent low country of Oude, either from immemorial succession, or usurpations connived at by the corrupt servants of the Oude Government. When the transfer of his lands was made, the Palpa Raja acknowledged his tenancy under the new authorities, and consented to pay a stipulated amount of revenue to the Collectorate of Gorakhpur. He was afterwards implicated in the conspiracy which ended in the murder of Rana Bahadur, and was seized and put to death by order of the Regent. His lands in the hills were confiscated to the state; and the Nepal Government, extending the sentence of confiscation to the district of Bhotwal, part of the Raja's possessions within the British boundary, made a grant of it to another hill chief, the father of the Regent, who, in order to secure his realisation of the benefaction, assembled a considerable body of troops upon the borders in 1804, and prepared to take forcible occupation. The pretensions of the Court of Nepal were resisted by Lord Wellesley; but, unwilling to involve the Government in a state of warfare upon the eve of his departure to England, he professed his readiness to enter into an amicable discussion of the claims in question, and proposed that Commissioners should be deputed on either side to investigate and adjust them. He also suggested that the Commissioners should at the same time determine other claims preferred by the Nepalese to the revenues of the district of Sheoraj, which was likewise situated within the limits of the Ceded Provinces, but had been usurped by the Gorkhas before the date of the cession. The Court of Nepal refused to entertain the latter proposition, but proposed that the chief to

whom Bhotwal had been granted should continue to hold it on the same conditions as the Palpa Raja, and pay the assessed revenue to the British authorities,—virtually recognising, therefore, the right of the Bengal Government to the sovereign property of the land. A Vakíl was sent with these replies to Calcutta, but no disposition was evinced to await the result of his mission, and a body of Gorkha troops took possession at once of more than two-thirds of the contested territory. They were unopposed. The negociation, which had been suspended by Lord Wellesley's relinquishment of office, was resumed by Sir G. Barlow, who offered to forego the claims of the Company on Sheoraj, on condition that the Gorkhas would relinquish theirs on Bhotwal. The disposition thus indicated to compromise the pretensions of the British, served only to confirm those of their opponents. Their proposal to farm the revenues of Bhotwal was declined, but no steps were taken to recover possession of the district, and the Nepalese remained in undisturbed occupation of the lands into which they had intruded, from 1806 to 1809. At the latter date, a remonstrance against the retention of the territory was addressed by Lord Minto to the Raja of Nepal, which was met by an evasive and unsatisfactory reply; but the Raja expressed a willingness to agree to the appointment of Commissioners to investigate the claims of both parties on the spot. The attention of the Governor-General being directed at this period to the disturbances at Madras, and the expeditions against the French and Dutch Islands, the communication was not immediately acted upon; but towards the

1814.

BOOK II. CHAP. I.

1814.

end of 1811, fresh encroachments having taken place, it became indispensably necessary to consider seriously how much longer they were to be endured. The Governor-General having accordingly deliberately reviewed the whole question, determined to accede to the proposed arrangement, although he anticipated little benefit from the result. He had in the first instance repeated the offer made by Sir G. Barlow, to permit the Nepalese to retain Sheoraj on the condition of their withdrawing from Bhotwal; but their persevering disinclination to assent to any compromise determined him to retract the offer, and to leave the right to both districts to be the subject of investigation. Major Bradshaw was nominated on the part of the British Government to confer with Commissioners appointed by the Court of Khatmandu with regard to the disputed lands on the Gorakhpur frontier, and conferences for the adjustment of the rights of the respective claimants were carried on through the greater part of the two following years.

While matters were thus circumstanced in Gorakhpur, aggressions of a like origin were committed on the British territory of Saran, lying to the east of Gorakhpur, and, like it, contiguous on its northern division, which constituted the district of Bettia, to the hills throughout the state of Makwanpur. Border disputes had always subsisted between the Raja of Bettia and his neighbour the Raja of Makwanpur. The former had become a subject of the British Government in 1765; the latter was conquered by the Gorkhas shortly before that date, and, adopting his quarrels, they descended into the low-lands and

seized upon part of the Bettia boundary. The aggression was promptly and vigorously repelled. In 1767 a military force under Major Kinloch drove the Gorkhas out of the province, and, following them into the hills, took possession of Makwanpur. When a good understanding with the Court of Khatmandu was restored, Mr. Hastings gave up that part of Makwanpur which was situated in the hills, but retained the low-lands on the Bettia frontier as a compensation for the cost of the military expedition which the Bengal Government had been compelled in self-defence to undertake. From that period the conquered tract had formed a portion of the Bettia Zemindari, and had paid revenue to the British Government without any question of its right having been agitated by Nepal. In 1811, however, emboldened by the obvious reluctance of the Government of Bengal to engage in hostilities,—a reluctance which, agreeably to the maxims of Gorkha policy, could only be accounted for by conscious weakness,—the Nepalese advanced a claim to the division of Nanore in Bettia; and the Gorkha governor of the adjacent hill district crossed the border with an armed force, burnt and plundered several villages, levied contributions on several, and called upon others, to the number of twenty-two in the aggregate, to acknowledge allegiance to his government. His incursion provoked resistance: the people of the country took up arms, and, as the Gorkha party was weak, defeated and expelled them. Their leader was killed in the affray. A stronger force was immediately dispatched from Nepal, against which no adequate means of resistance were at hand; and the whole of the lands

BOOK II. CHAP. I. originally separated from Makwanpur were forcibly reoccupied by the Gorkhas, without their condescending to give previous intimation of their pretensions or their purposes.[1]

1814.

After long and protracted discussions, the right of the British Government to the disputed lands on the frontier of Gorakhpur was established by documentary evidence, to rebut which no satisfactory testimony was brought forward by the Commissioners from Nepal. They nevertheless declined to recognise the claim of the British, or to direct the removal of the Gorkha officers from the usurped districts, without authority from Khatmandu, to which they required to refer. A suggestion was, however, made to Major Bradshaw, that the Raja of Nepal should cede the disputed lands in exchange for a tract, six miles broad, along the skirts of the hills, to be given up by the British Government. To this compromise Lord Minto refused his concurrence; he considered the proposal to be equivalent to an admission that the right of his Government to Sheoraj and Bhotwal was substantiated, as was truly the case, and that the Court of Nepal was not entitled to any compensation for the abandonment of unjust and violent usurpations. He regarded the proposition also as evasive and temporising, and as unlikely, even if ac-

[1] Besides the districts more particularly specified in the text, various encroachments had occurred almost throughout the whole of the border, from the Tista to the Setlej. In Tirhut, between 1787 and 1812, more than two hundred villages had, at different times, been appropriated by the Nepalese. In Bareilly, they had occupied five out of eight divisions of the Pergunna of Khyrapur. They claimed an extensive tract in the Zilla of Moradabad; and in 1813 they attempted to occupy several villages in the territory of the protected Sikh chiefs, but were prevented by the interference of the British Political Agent.—Nepal Papers, printed for the Court of Proprietors, Narrative of the War, by the Marquis of Hastings, 677.

quiesced in, to put a stop to the unfounded claims of the Gorkha Government. He consequently insisted on the unqualified restoration of the usurped territory; and, as the Commissioners pleaded want of powers, he addressed a letter to the Raja, reminding him of his promise to abide by the result of the inquiry, and calling upon him to fulfil his promise by ordering his officers to retire from the disputed districts,—expressing his earnest wish to remain upon terms of amity with the Nepal state, but declaring his intention of occupying the lands in question by force if they were not peaceably resigned. Military preparations were set on foot for carrying the menace into effect when the season should permit, as little expectation was entertained that the Court of Khatmandu would be induced by conciliatory representations to recede from its pretensions. Before a definitive answer was received from the Raja, the Earl of Moira had succeeded to the government of India. 1814.

When the aggressions on the Saran frontier were committed, strong remonstrances were addressed to the Court of Khatmandu, and a demand was made that the lands which had been seized should be immediately restored. It was conceded, however, that the right to them should nevertheless be investigated by the magistrate of Saran and the officers of Nepal; and it was promised, that, if the Gorkha claim to any of the villages should be made good, they should be restored. An investigation accordingly took place, the result of which was to disprove the Gorkha pretensions;[1] but a final decision was not insisted on un-

[1] A different story is, however, told by the Government of Nepal. In

BOOK II. CHAP. I.

1814

til the Commissioners in Gorakhpur should be able to extend their inquiries to Saran. It appeared, however, to the new Governor-General that the question of right had been so unequivocally decided by the previous proceedings, that it needed no further deliberation; and Lieut.-Colonel Bradshaw was authorised to proceed to the spot in company with the Gorkha Commissioners, for the purpose only of adjusting any minor points which might remain to be set at rest. The villages had in the mean time been conditionally evacuated by the Nepalese. Their own Commissioners disapproved of the temporary transfer, and, making their disapproval a plea for closing the conference, refused to hold any further communication with the British representative, and returned abruptly to Nepal.[1]

their instructions to an accredited agent who was to have been dispatched to Calcutta, and which document fell into the hands of Lieut.-Col. Bradshaw, they accuse Bir Kishore Sing (the Raja of Bettia) of having originated the encroachments, taken possession of a large portion of land, and committed an atrocious murder in the Nepal territories (referring to the death of the Gorkha officer mentioned in the text). The Raja proceeds: "You will state that in consequence of a letter which I received from Mr. Hawkins of Patna, assuring me that Bir Kishore Sing would be punished by the British Government, I did not punish him as I should otherwise have done; I, however, recovered possession of the twenty-two villages which he had seized. Mr. Young was afterwards sent to investigate the question respecting these villages. By his inquiries the right of this Government, and aggression of the Zemindar of Bettia, were fully established; the Bettia man could produce no documents whatever in support of his claim. Mr. Young has probably reported this to Government. You will state these observations in a proper manner."—Nepal Papers, 383.

[1] The abrupt departure of the Commissioners is referred by Mr. Prinsep to the receipt, by the Raja of Nepal, of the letter of the Governor-General declaring his resolution to occupy the disputed lands by force, if not given up within a specified period. According to the document last quoted, it arose from personal dissatisfaction with the British Commissioner. "They had an interview with the Major, who made use of improper language towards them; in consequence of which they remained silent, and, seeing no business brought forward, they came away."—Nepal Papers, p. 384. The state papers of Nepal appear to be no more veracious than those of more civilized nations.

It was evident, from the conduct of the Gorkha Commissioners, that the Court of Khatmandu had no serious intention to concur in any amicable settlement; but, unwilling to precipitate a quarrel, the Governor-General renewed in an address to the Raja the remonstrances and arguments that had been hitherto urged in vain, requiring him to acquiesce in the conclusions which had been established by the conferences of the Commissioners both in Gorakhpur and Saran, and to accede to the peaceable occupation of the lands by the civil officers of the British Government. A refusal to acknowledge the Company's rights was, after some delay, received. No alternative, therefore, remained but the relinquishment of the claims which had been substantiated, or their resolute vindication. The latter was adopted. The villages on the Saran frontier were retained, and a detachment was sent into Bhotwal and Sheoraj, before which the Nepalese authorities retired without attempting to offer any resistance.[1] 1814.

The promptitude and decision which characterized the measures of the British Government convinced the Court of Khatmandu that the crisis which it must have contemplated had now arrived, and that disputes respecting border lands had terminated in the alternative of peace or war. The question was deliberately considered in a council of the principal chiefs, and a summary of their opinions was transmitted to the military governors of the frontier. In deference to the sentiments of the Raja, or rather of the Regent minister, who advocated hostilities, the

[1] These details are taken chiefly from the Narrative of the War, by the Marquis of Hastings.—Nepal Papers, 673.

BOOK II. CHAP. I. 1814.

conclusion of the council was for war; but several of the chiefs entertained sounder views of its probable consequences, urged perseverance in the course of policy hitherto pursued, and recommended, if unavoidable, the ultimate concession of the disputed territory below the hills. To these prudent recommendations were opposed the uniform success which had hitherto attended the arms of Nepal, the powerful military force of the principality, and the natural strength of the country, which constituted an impregnable barrier against an English invasion. The small fort of Bhurtpore, argued the minister, was the work of man, yet the British were defeated in their attempts against it. How little, then, was it likely that they should storm the mountain fastnesses constructed by the hand of God![1] The determination, however unwise, indicated a lofty and patriotic spirit; but the mode in which it was announced was characteristic of a barbarous court.

The approach of the rainy season and the unhealthiness of the country at that period, as well as the seeming acquiescence of the Nepalese in the occupation of the disputed lands, induced the Government to withdraw the troops, leaving a civil force of arm-

[1] The opinions of the council, as communicated to the Raja of Palpa, fell into the hands of the English, and are printed by Mr. Prinsep. The Raja proposes war, and is seconded by Bhim Sen Thapa, the Regent; the strength of the country, and military power and reputation of Nepal, are the chief topics of reliance. On the other hand, some fear is expressed of the defection of the Hill Rajas, by which an opening into the mountains may be afforded to the enemy; and some of the chiefs do not hesitate to declare their opinion of the superiority of the British forces. We have hitherto, say they, but hunted deer; if we engage in this war, we must prepare to fight tigers. It is clear that the war was disapproved of by the most judicious of the Raja's advisers, and that it originated chiefly in the presumption and ignorance of the Regent.—Prinsep's Transactions in India, 8vo ed. vol. i. App. 457.

ed police at the frontier thanas or stations of Bhotwal and Sheoraj. On the morning of the 29th May, a party of Gorkhas, under the command of the late Governor of the district, attacked the post at Bhotwal. The police were overpowered, eighteen men were killed, and the head officer, or Thannadar, who surrendered himself, was tied to a tree and killed with arrows. The stations of Sheoraj were abandoned by the police, but not until one had been surprised and several lives had been lost. The lands were immediately taken possession of by the Gorkhas. Although this outrage demanded instant punishment, the season of the year delayed its infliction, and an opportunity was afforded to the Raja of disavowing the perpetrators of the offence. A letter from the Governor-General required him to fulfil the obligation, but it received an evasive and menacing reply. Hostilities were therefore evidently unavoidable; and, after an interval diligently devoted to preliminary arrangements, and the collection of information regarding a country but little known, war with Nepal was announced, in a manifesto detailing its causes and vindicating its necessity.[1]

War having been resolved upon, it became necessary to determine the principles upon which it should be carried on—whether a defensive or offensive system should be adopted, and in either case what course should be pursued. The former was open to weighty objections. It was clearly impossible adequately to guard a line of open frontier,

[1] It is dated Lucknow, 1st of November, 1814; and is addressed to the Powers in alliance and friendship with the Company.—Nepal Papers, 443.

BOOK II. CHAP. I. 1814.

extending seven hundred miles, at every assailable point; and the Nepalese would have it in their power to inflict injury and loss upon their enemy with little hazard of suffering retaliation. To maintain large bodies of troops in the field would be attended with the same expense, in whatever manner they might be employed; and the cost was likely to be heaviest in the end, if their inactivity was productive of a tedious and harassing prolongation of hostilities. It was also obviously advisable, not merely to defend the British territory against actual aggression, but to deprive the Gorkha Government of the means of repeating their incursions, by contracting the limits of their possessions, reducing their power, and humbling their ambition. The defensive system was therefore discarded, and it only remained to determine the plan of offensive operations—an advance to Khatmandu with a concentrated force; or a simultaneous attack on different points of the long line of the Gorkha conquests, throughout which the recently subjugated people and chiefs were ready to fall off from their oppressive rulers, and welcome and facilitate the approach of the British troops. To this political advantage was to be added the difficulty of moving large bodies of troops in so rugged a country, of providing them with supplies where the soil was so unproductive, and of keeping up a communication with the lowlands in consequence of the deadly miasmata which render the forests on the skirts of the hills utterly impassable during a considerable portion of the year. It was therefore determined by Lord Moira to prefer the latter plan, and operating upon

the Kali river, which severed the Gorkha possessions nearly in two, as a centre, to direct his first efforts against the western portion, whilst other divisions were to move against the eastern half, and advance into the valley of Nepal.[1] With these views four separate divisions were formed which were to ascend the hills at as many places as soon as the rains had sufficiently subsided to allow of their forward movement.

The first of the divisions, comprising about 6,000 men, under the command of Major-General Ochterlony, was destined to attack the Gorkha positions at the western extremity of their line. The second, 3,500 strong, commanded by Major-General Gillespie, was intended to occupy the Dehra Dún, a valley above the first range of hills, and besiege Jytak, the principal fortress of the enemy in the province of Gerhwal. The third division, of about 4,500 troops, was placed under the orders of Major-General John Sullivan Wood, and was to march from the Gorakhpur frontier through the long-disputed districts of Bhotwal and Sheoraj to Palpa. The fourth and most considerable divi-

[1] Lord Moira's Letter to the Chairman, 6th August, 1816.—Nepal Papers, 994. The military policy of the Court of Directors differed from that of his Lordship. In their estimation, the preservation of British honour and the integrity of the territories might have been secured "by the employment of one concentrated body of troops;" meaning, apparently in this place, their employment on the defensive. In a subsequent paragraph they advocate a similar mode of conducting offensive operations. "We are inclined to the opinion, from the nature of the resistance opposed by the enemy, that if, instead of dividing our force into so many detachments, a concentrated attack had been made, it might possibly have been the means of bringing the war to a successful conclusion, without looking to the issue of a second campaign."—Political Letter to Bengal, 13th Oct., 1815. At a later date, the Court profess their acknowledgment of the "wisdom of the plan on which Lord Moira had acted."—Political Letter to Bengal, 5th March, 1817; Ibid. 998.

BOOK II. CHAP. I. 1814.

sion, comprehending nearly 8,000 men, commanded by Major-General Marley, was to make the most effectual impression on the enemy, and was to march through Makwanpur directly to Khatmandu. Arrangements were made at the same time for the defence of the interjacent parts of the British frontier by local corps; and at the south-eastern end of the line east of the Kusi river, Captain Latter, commanding the Rangpur local battalion and a battalion of regular Native infantry, was directed to convert a defensive into an offensive attitude, should circumstances be favourable to the change. The whole force amounted to more than 30,000 men, with sixty guns.[1] To oppose so

[1] The details of the several divisions were as follows:—

1st Div. Artillery, European and Native	950	
Native infantry—(2nd battalion 1st, 2nd battalion 6th, 2nd battalion 3rd, 1st battalion 19th, and six companies of the 2nd battalion 19th)	4778	
Pioneers	265	
Ordnance, two 18-pounders, ten 6-pounders, four mortars and howitzers.	——	5,993
2nd Div. Artillery	247	
H.M. 53rd Reg.	785	
Native infantry—(1st battalion 6th, 1st battalion 17th, 1st battalion 7th)	2348	
Pioneers	133	
Ordnance, two 12-pounders, eight 6-pounders, four howitzers.	——	3,513
3rd Div. 8th Native cavalry	114	
Artillery	457	
H.M. 17th Reg.	958	
Native infantry—(left wings of both battalions of the 14th, 2nd battalion 17th, four companies 2nd battalion, 8th and 2nd battalion 12th)	2875	
Pioneers	90	
Ordnance, four 6-pounders, three 3-pounders, four mortars and howitzers.	——	4,494

formidable an armament, the Gorkhas in the beginning of the war could not muster more than 12,000 regular troops, which were scattered along the extended length of their frontier. They were augmented during the war by levies of local militia; but these were without discipline, imperfectly equipped, and were not always well-affected to their rulers, as they were often raised from the subjects of the conquered hill states. A few forts, strongly situated, but in other respects of little importance, commanded the principal passes of the mountains. The main strength of the Gorkhas consisted in the spirit of the Government, the bravery and devotedness of the regular troops, the impracticability of the country, the inexperience of their adversaries in mountain warfare, and their ignorance of the ground on which they were to move, and of the character of the people with whom they were to contend.

Major-General Gillespie's division was assembled at Saharanpur on the 18th of October. On the following day the advance, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Carpenter, proceeded by the Timli pass into the valley of the Dún. On the 22d, Lieut.-Colonel

4th Div.	Artillery	868	
	H.M. 24th Reg.	907	
	Native infantry—(1st battalion 18th, left wing 2nd battalion 22nd, 2nd battalion 15th, 2nd battalion 25th, Ramgerh local battalion, Champaran L. infantry)	5988	
	Pioneers	276	
Ordnance, four 18-pounders, four 6-pounders, four 3-pounders, twelve mortars and howitzers.		——	7,989
Total sixty-eight guns, and men			21,989

Considerable reinforcements joined the two first divisions, besides irregular troops and Native contingents, to the extent of above 12,000 men.—Nepal Papers, 197, 432.

BOOK II. CHAP. I. 1814.

Mawbey followed with the main body, and occupied the town of Dehra, which gives the valley its appellation. The Gorkhas fell back, as the British advanced, to the fort of Nalapani, or Kalanga, a small fort about five miles from Dehra, strongly posted on a steep detached hill, six hundred feet high, covered with jungle. The summit was a table-land above half a mile in length; and at the further extremity stood the fort, a stone quadrangular building of no great extent, but enlarged and strengthened by stockades. It was garrisoned by a body of six hundred Gorkhas, commanded by Balbhadra Sing, whom Amar Sing Thapa, the military governor of the western districts, had selected for his intrepidity to encounter the first onset of the enemy.

Lieut.-Colonel Mawbey, having marched upon Kalanga, summoned the garrison to surrender. An answer of defiance was returned to the summons,[1] and an attack was in consequence made upon the fort on the 24th October. With infinite labour guns were carried up the hill, and a battery was constructed; but, the place appearing to be too strong to be taken by these means, Colonel Mawbey suspended proceedings and awaited the orders of his superior. General Gillespie immediately moved with the remainder of the force, and joined the advance on the 26th. Heavy guns were brought up, a battery was erected, and preparations were made to carry the fort by storm. The assault took place on the 31st.

[1] The letter was delivered to Balbhadra Sing late at night; he observed, that it was not his habit to carry on a correspondence at such an unseasonable hour, but that he should shortly pay the writer a visit in his camp.

The troops had been distributed in four columns of attack and a reserve; and it was intended that the former should move against the several faces of the fort at the same moment, upon a signal being fired from the battery. Three of the columns, having to make a circuit of some distance over very rugged ground, marched before daybreak, but had not reached their appointed destinations at 8 A.M., when the signal-gun was fired. It was not heard by them.[1] In the mean time a sortie was made by the garrison, which was repelled by the remaining column; and General Gillespie, thinking that the retreating enemy might be followed into their own entrenchments by a brisk and vigorous pursuit, ordered the column, together with the reserve and a company of the 8th, or Royal Irish dismounted dragoons, to hasten forward and carry the place by escalade. The troops advanced steadily to the foot of the wall: but the commandant, besides manning the ramparts, had placed a gun in an outwork protecting the gateway in such a position as to enfilade the wall upon that side; the fire from which beat down the pioneers before the ladders could be applied, and destroyed the leading files of the assailants. Foiled in their attempt to scale the wall,

[1] According to Prinsep, (History of the Administration of the Marquis of Hastings, i. 88,) Gillespie's impatience anticipated the time proposed for the joint assault, which was ten o'clock. Major Thorn, in his Memoir of General Gillespie, says the time was to have been two hours after the signal, which was fired at seven. Mr. Fraser says that the signal was given some hours before the time intended, and was not heard, probably because it was unexpected.—Travels in the Himalaya. In Colonel Mawbey's official report it is said that the signal was fired at eight o'clock, two hours after which was the time for the assault. He also states that it was not heard by Major Kelly, Captain Fast, or Captain Campbell, commanding the other columns of attack.—Nepal Papers, 439.

BOOK II. CHAP. I. 1814.

which had sustained no damage from the previous fire of the battery, the men attempted to force the outwork and carry the gate. They were received with such a heavy fire, and suffered so severely, that it was found necessary to draw them off to the shelter of some huts at a little distance from the fort. Although the other columns had not yet come into action, General Gillespie, irritated by the repulse which had been sustained, persisted in renewing the attempt, declaring aloud his determination to carry the fort or lose his life. Accordingly, he placed himself at the head of three fresh companies of the 53rd regiment and of the dragoons, and led them again towards the gate of the fort. When within range of the enemy's matchlocks, the men of the 53rd hung back.[1] The General, in advance of the line, in vain called on them to follow him; and, while waving his sword to encourage them to come on, he was shot through the heart, and immediately expired. His aide-de-camp, Lieut. O'Hara, was killed by his side; Captain Byers, the Brigade-Major, was wounded; and many of the dragoons, by whom the General had been bravely seconded, were killed or wounded.[2] The fall of General Gillespie completed the discouragement of the men, and a retreat was ordered. One of the other columns, that which was commanded by Captain Campbell, arrived

[1] The men of this regiment were in a discontented and sullen mood, conceiving themselves to have been overworked by the unnecessary repetition of parade exercise.

[2] The total loss was five officers and twenty-seven privates killed, fifteen officers and two hundred and thirteen privates wounded. Besides General Gillespie and Lieutenant O'Hara, the officers killed were Lieutenant Gosling, Light Battalion, Ensign Fothergill, 17th N. I.; and Ensign Ellis, Pioneers. Of the hundred dragoons, four were killed and fifty wounded.

in time to cover the retreat. The loss had been, for the duration of the service, considerable: the temper of the men was unfavourable; little prospect existed of carrying the fort by assault; and, as the guns were insufficient to effect a breach, Colonel Mawbey, on whom the command devolved, deemed it prudent to return to Dehra, and there await the arrival of a battering-train from Delhi. 1814.

The requisite ordnance having been received on the 24th of November, the army moved on the following day once more against Kalanga. A battery of 18-pounders was constructed, and a practicable breach was effected by noon of the 27th. The storming party, consisting of the grenadier company and one battalion company of the 53rd, and the grenadier companies of the 6th, 7th, and 13th Native infantry regiments, covered by the light infantry of the 53rd, and supported by the rest of the force, was commanded to advance. The assailants were ordered to move with their muskets unloaded, and to carry the breach by the bayonet alone; —an order which seems to have been ill-timed, as after the previous repulse, and in the prevailing disposition of the soldiery, confidence in their display of that calm courage and desperate determination which such a method of attack implies, could scarcely have been warranted. Either from the discouraging influence of this order, or from causes unexplained, the troops, although they moved without hesitation to the breach, manifested little resolution or perseverance in their attempts to force an entrance into the fort. They suffered considerable loss on their approach; and, on arriving at the breach,

BOOK II. CHAP. I. 1814.

they found that within it was a precipitous descent of about fourteen feet, at the foot of which stood a part of the garrison, armed with spears and sharp-pointed arrows, supported by another portion provided with matchlocks and various missiles. After a feeble effort the assailants recoiled, and drew off to a short distance from the wall; where they remained for two hours, exposed to a heavy fire and an unceasing shower of arrows and stones. The example and instigations of their officers were in vain exerted to animate them to a second attack; and, finding that their backwardness was insurmountable, it became necessary to withdraw them from their position. They were accordingly recalled, after sustaining serious loss.[1]

The project of carrying the fort of Kalanga by assault was now relinquished, and recourse was had to a bombardment, which was attended with almost immediate success. The fortress, which was little more than an open enclosure within stone walls, afforded no shelter to the besieged, and speedily became untenable. In the course of three days the place was strewn over with the killed, the stench from whose unburied bodies became intolerable; and the commandant abandoned the place with no more than seventy survivors out of the six hundred of whom his garrison had been composed. Balbhadra Sing effected his escape unperceived, and joined a detachment of three hundred fresh troops which

[1] Four officers and thirty-three privates were killed, seven officers and six hundred and thirty-six privates were wounded. The officers killed were Captain Campbell, 6th N.I.; Lieutenant Harrington, his Majesty's 53rd; and Lieutenant Luxford, Horse Artillery. As observed by Prinsep, the British loss exceeded the number of the Gorkha garrison.

had been sent to his relief, but had been unable to make their way through the British posts. The party was pursued by Major Ludlow, who, by great activity, came upon them suddenly on the night of the 1st of December. A brief but smart action took place, in which the Sipahis in some degree redeemed their reputation, and put the Gorkhas to the rout. The enemy disappeared among the recesses of the mountains, and their pursuers returned to camp. The fort of Kalanga was demolished.[1]

The repeated checks and the heavy loss suffered at Kalanga gave an entirely new aspect to the war. The assailants had been unprepared for such resolute resistance, and, from the evidence which the siege had afforded of the extraordinary gallantry of the enemy, learned to look forward with diminished confidence to the result of subsequent conflicts. On the other hand, the Gorkhas were highly elated by the glory of having, with a mere handful of men, so long kept at bay a well-appointed and numerous body of their foes, and of having made them purchase an insignificant entrenchment with the death of many distinguished officers, and the fall of a celebrated commander. The moral effect on the minds of both parties was a principal cause of the protracted continuance of the war. Nor was the loss of time, considered in itself, an evil of slight moment, as it had deranged the whole plan of the campaign. The result was the more to be regretted, as it was obvious that it might have been easily avoided, and that, had the assailants condescended at first to

[1] For the official reports of the occurrences before Kalanga, see Nepal Papers, pp. 460, 490.

BOOK II. CHAP. I. 1814.

employ the powerful means which European science placed in their hands, and, instead of rushing headlong against stone walls, effectively demolished them, or driven out those whom they sheltered, reputation and life would not have been unprofitably sacrificed. The impetuosity of General Gillespie frustrated his own designs; and his daring courage, failing to awaken a corresponding ardour in his followers, proved fatal to himself, and mischievous to his country. His death was, however, in harmony with the whole course of his life; and, if he exhibited some want of the prudent foresight and steady self-possession required in a commander, he displayed that disdain of danger in the discharge of his duty which constitutes one of the highest qualifications of a soldier.[1]

During the interval that elapsed before the repetition of the attack on Kalanga, Colonel Mawbey detached Lieut.-Colonel Carpenter with his division to a position on the right bank of the Jumna, where he might command the fords of the river, and intercept the communication between the Gorkha commanders in the east and west. The same position was favourable for his giving aid to the hill tribes, should any of them show a disposition to rise and throw off the Gorkha yoke. The people of Jounsar in consequence took up arms, and so much alarmed the Gorkha garrison of Barat, a stronghold in the mountains, that they hastily

[1] A monument to the memory of General Gillespie was erected at Meerut by the officers who had served under him; and a public monument, voted by Parliament, was placed in St. Paul's Cathedral. Two obelisks on the hill of Nalapani mark the spot where he and his companions fell; no vestige of the fort remains. — Memoir of General Gillespie, 240; Mundy's Sketches of India, i. 192; Moorcroft's Travels, i. 26.

evacuated a fort which could not have been reduced without trouble and loss. After the capture of Kalanga, Colonel Mawbey was directed to march to the westward into the adjacent Dún, or valley, of Karda, in order to carry out so much of the original plan as to effect the co-operation of the division with that under the command of Colonel Ochterlony. The force descended into the low-lands, to avoid the ridge separating the Dehra from the Karda Dún, and returning northwards entered the latter by the pass of Moganand. On the 19th of December the division was within seven miles of Náhan, the capital of the small state of Sirmor, the Raja of which had been dispossessed by the Gorkhas. Their army in this quarter was commanded by Ranjor Sing Thapa, the son of Amar Sing, whose head-quarters were at Jytak, a fort on the top of a mountain lying north from the town, strongly situated in an angle where two mountain ridges met, and perched at the height of five thousand feet above the sea. On the 20th of December, the force was joined by Major-General Martindell, who had been appointed to the command.[1] 1814.

After occupying the town of Náhan, General Martindell moved to the foot of the range, on the highest peak of which the fort of Jytak was placed; the approach to it was defended by stockades at various heights; the ascent was rough and difficult, as the hills rose throughout the whole acclivity by steep and abrupt elevations, separated by loose crumbling soil, and deep and precipitous ravines, and afforded no level ground for the evolutions of

[1] Nepal Papers, 498.

BOOK II. CHAP. I.

1814.

regular troops. The position having been carefully reconnoitred, it appeared that the garrison depended for their supply of water upon wells situated exteriorly to the fort, and some way below it; and the General consequently resolved to make an attempt to cut off the supply, and at the same time dispossess the enemy of a strongly stockaded post, erected for its defence about a mile to the west of the fortress. With this intention two columns were formed: one, under Major Ludlow, to move against the post on the left and nearest side; the other, under Major Richards, to make a *détour*, and assail the stockade in the rear. The effect of the combined attack was disappointed; and the two columns, being successively overpowered by a superior force, were compelled to retreat.

The party under Major Richards left the camp at midnight.[1] They had a march to make of sixteen miles, by paths rarely admitting two men abreast. It was eight o'clock in the morning before they reached the foot of the hill on which they were to establish themselves; and they halted till ten, to allow the whole of the men to join and rest. They then ascended the mountain, and, having gained the summit, advanced to within three hundred yards of the fort of Jytak. The enemy offered no opposition, being at the time engaged with their other assailants.

The division commanded by Major Ludlow[2]

[1] It consisted of the 1st battalion of the 13th N. I., the light companies of his Majesty's 53rd, and 7th, 26th, and 27th N. I., and of a company of pioneers. The companies were weak, and the whole mustered little more than six hundred strong.—Nepal Papers, 504.

[2] It was formed of the grenadier company of the 53rd, three companies

marched an hour later than the column under Major Richards, but, having a much shorter interval to traverse, came earlier in contact with the Gorkhas. Their picquets were encountered about three in the morning, and driven back. The column advanced to the summit of a hill, on which stood the ruined village and temple of Jamta, from which the leading files, consisting of the grenadiers of his Majesty's 53rd, dislodged a small Gorkha post. Elated by their success, and attributing the retreat of the enemy to fear, the grenadiers insisted upon being led against a stockade at no great distance, and apparently of no formidable strength. Conceiving that it might be carried by a vigorous attack, Major Ludlow permitted the attempt to be made, and the advance rushed onward without waiting till the whole of the detachment had come up and could be formed. The Gorkha commander, Jaspao Thapa, was prepared for their reception. As soon as the first firing was heard, he had been detached from Jytak with the main body of the garrison, and had stationed them not only behind the stockade, but on the commanding points of the hills on either flank; so that, when the assailants reached the foot of the stockade, a sudden and destructive fire was poured upon them from every quarter. Before they could recover from the disorder thus occasioned, they were charged by superior numbers, sword in hand, and driven back in confusion to the point at Jamta, whence they had so confidently advanced. The Native troops were still in disarray, and, having

of the light battalion, and nine of the 6th N. I., with a company of pioneers, mustering about nine hundred.—Ibid.

BOOK II. CHAP. I.

1814.

but few European officers to keep them steady,[1] they gave the fugitives no support; on the contrary, sharing in the disorder, and struck with panic, they fled precipitately down the hill, closely chased by the Gorkhas, who inflicted severe loss with their semicircular and heavy swords. The pursuit was, however, arrested by the necessity of returning to encounter the more successful advance of Major Richards. The British detachment, completely disorganized, regained the camp by ten o'clock.[2]

The garrison of Jytak, having thus so easily disposed of one attack, proceeded with augmented confidence and courage to get rid of the other; but some interval elapsed before they were in a condition to resume offensive operations. In the mean time, Major Richards had accomplished the duty entrusted to him, and had taken up a station which, approaching the fort and commanding the wells, must soon have straitened the garrison and accelerated their surrender. It was therefore of vital importance to Ranjor Sing to dislodge the English before they should be strengthened sufficiently to render the attempt hopeless. At one o'clock he descended from the fort with all his available force, and with intrepid resolution. The detachment stood its ground bravely, and the Gorkhas were repulsed. They renewed their attacks and displayed the greatest courage, advancing to the very muzzles of the muskets, and endeavouring to

[1] There were but three officers with the nine companies of the 13th N. I.

[2] Lieutenant Munt of the 1st N.I. was killed, three officers were wounded; thirty-one Europeans and one hundred and twenty Natives were killed and wounded.

1814.

hew down their opponents with their swords. The struggle was continued for six hours, until it grew dark, and the ammunition of the Sipahis began to fail—so that they were obliged at last to defend themselves with stones. At seven in the evening a message was received from General Martindell, commanding the detachment to retreat. Previous messages of the same tenor had been dispatched, but the messengers had been intercepted. Although confident, if furnished with supplies, of being able to maintain his position, Major Richards found himself obliged to comply with the General's positive orders, and commenced a retreat under the most unpropitious circumstances, from the nature of the ground and the exhaustion of the men. Moving slowly in single file along narrow, rough, and precipitous paths, the whole must have fallen a sacrifice to an enemy familiar with the locality, and experienced in mountain warfare, had not the retreat been covered with singular devotedness by Lieut. Thackeray and the light company of the 26th N.I. The whole Gorkha force was kept in check and repeatedly repulsed by this officer and his small party, until he and his next in command, Ensign Wilson, and many of the men, were killed. The retreating body were then overtaken by the Gorkhas, but they had nearly cleared the most difficult and exposed portions of their path; and although much confusion ensued, and many of the officers and men were separated from the column, yet most of them subsequently found their way to camp, and the loss proved less serious than there was reason at first to apprehend. The darkness of

BOOK II. CHAP. I. 1814.

the night and the ruggedness of the surface were as unfavourable for pursuit as for flight, and the Gorkha general did not care to commit his men too far beyond the vicinity of the fortress.[1]

It was admitted by the Governor-General that the object proposed by General Martindell was highly important, and justified an effort for its attainment; and the judiciousness of the plan was proved by its partial success. It is evident, however, that serious mistakes were committed in its execution. The movements of the divisions must have been ill concerted to have allowed an interval of so many hours between attacks intended to have been simultaneous; and the omission of any arrangements to succour or support Major Richards—the absence apparently of all knowledge of his proceedings—indicated a want of common activity and precaution. The failure of the entire project was, however, mainly owing to the unsteadiness of the Native troops of Major Ludlow's division, and that may in a great degree be ascribed to a deficiency of European officers.[2] This repulse, also,

[1] Three officers were killed—Lieutenant Thackeray, and Ensigns Wilson and Stalkart; five were wounded. Of the men, seventy were killed, two hundred and twenty-eight wounded; forty of the light company of the 26th and a Subahdar were taken, but were released by Ranjor Sing on condition of not serving again during the war.

[2] Prinsep says, the disasters of the day were owing solely to the irretrievable error of Major Ludlow, in allowing himself to attempt the stockade before he had formed his men and secured the post he was intended to occupy. He admits, however, that Jamta might have been held if the force had been adequately officered. i. 103. Mr. Fraser and General Martindell, in his report, affirm that the officer in command did all in his power to restrain the impetuosity of the men and prevent their rushing against the stockade in advance. Both Prinsep and Fraser intimate that Richards might have been reinforced, and that he would then have been able to maintain the advantageous position he had gained. According to General Martindell's report, Major Ludlow was to have been accompanied by some artillery for the purpose of throwing shot and

had a most mischievous effect upon the progress of the campaign, as General Martindell did not think himself competent to resume offensive measures until he was reinforced; and military operations in this quarter were consequently arrested. 1814.

The campaign further to the west, where General Ochterlony was opposed by the most celebrated of the Gorkha leaders, Amar Sing Thapa, although not unchequered by disaster, was unsullied by disgrace, and was equally honourable to both the combatants. The scene of action was a rugged country, inclosed in the angle which is traced by the Setlej river, where it turns abruptly from a westerly to a southerly course. From the left bank of the southern arm of the stream rises a succession of lofty mountains, which run in an oblique direction towards the south-east, and are separated into nearly parallel ranges by rivers, which, springing from their summits, work themselves a passage at their base into the bed of the Setlej. On three of the ranges the Gorkha general had constructed the forts of Nalagerh, Ramgerh, and Malaun,—stone structures, the approaches to which, sufficiently arduous by the steepness and irregularity of the hills, were rendered still more difficult by strong timber stockades. Beyond the third range, and upon the bank of the Setlej, stood Bilaspur, the capital of the Bilaspur Raja, who remained faithful to the Gorkha cause, and kept Amar Sing well supplied with both provisions and

shells into the stockade; but the guns as well as the spare ammunition were left behind, not being ready to move with the detachment. "Had I known this," he adds, "I should have certainly countermanded the march."—Nepal Papers, 504. It was fortunate that the guns were not carried up the hill, to have served as trophies to the victors.

BOOK II. CHAP. I. 1814.

men. On this side of the mountains lay the petty Ráj of Hindur, and its capital Palási. The Raja of Hindur was the hereditary enemy of the Raja of Bilaspur, and had suffered much oppression from the Nepalese. He, therefore, became the willing ally of the British, and rendered them valuable service. North-east from Malaun, about thirty miles, was situated the town of Arki, the head-quarters of Amar Sing.

General Ochterlony's division ascended the hills at the end of October, and on the 2nd of November arrived before the first and lowest of the mountain ridges occupied by the Gorkhas. Here stood the fort of Nalagerh, with the outwork of Taragerh, higher up the hill, commanding the entrance into the mountains. The posts were inconsiderable, both as to extent and strength, and were not numerously garrisoned. With much labour the guns were raised to an elevation whence they could be brought to play effectively upon the walls of the fort; and, by the 4th, batteries were opened, which did such execution, that, on the 6th, the garrison, despairing of successful resistance, surrendered. Taragerh was at the same time given up.[1]

From the summit of the pass of Nalagerh, but towering far above it, rising to an elevation of four thousand six hundred feet above the sea, appeared the mountain on which the fort of Ramgerh was situated. As soon as Amar Sing was apprised of General Ochterlony's advance, he had marched thither, from Arki, with a force of about three thousand regular troops, and had encamped on the

[1] Nepal Papers, 452.

1814.

ridge. The Gorkha right rested upon the fort; the left about two miles distant, upon a strongly stockaded hill; and stockades protected the intervals along their front. After a careful examination of the position of the Gorkhas, it appeared to the cautious and experienced judgment of the British commander that the nature of the ground precluded an attack in front; and, having received information that the northern face of the range was less broken and precipitous, he resolved to turn the left of the enemy, and assail their position from the rear. He, therefore, moved to the heights of Nahar, an eminence seven miles north-east from Ramgerh, commanding a complete view of the Gorkha lines. As this seemed to be the most assailable point of their defences, General Ochterlony determined to erect batteries against it. A road over the hills for the conveyance of the heavy ordnance from Nalagerh was constructed with great labour; in accomplishing which, twenty days were consumed. When the battery opened, it was found to be too distant to fire with effect, and a position more within the range of the guns was therefore to be sought for. A small party under the engineer officer, Lieutenant Lawtie, sent to explore the ground nearer to the stockade, had selected an elevation fit for their purpose, and were on their return to camp, when they were surrounded by a numerous body of Gorkhas, by whom their movements had been observed, and who came down in great strength to intercept their retreat. Availing themselves of a small stone enclosure, the party defended themselves with steady resolution until

BOOK II. CHAP. I. 1814.

the failure of their ammunition compelled them to give way: some reinforcements, sent from the battery, shared in their discomfiture; and the whole were routed with much loss before their retreat was covered by a strong detachment dispatched to their succour from the camp.[1] The affair was of little moment, except from its tendency to confirm the confidence, and animate the courage, of the enemy.

Notwithstanding the check thus sustained, General Ochterlony persisted in his plan of carrying the stockaded works of Ramgerh, when news of the second repulse at Kalanga arrived; and anticipating the moral effects of this disaster, both upon his own troops and those of his antagonist, he considered it prudent to suspend offensive operations until his

[1] Lieutenant Williams commanding the reinforcement was killed; seventy Sipahis were killed and wounded.—Nepal Papers. Prinsep says the whole party was surrounded, and obliged to cut their way through the enemy.—Transactions, &c., i. 107. According to Fraser, the chief cause of the disaster was the defective construction of the cartouch-boxes, by which they could not be turned so as to render the cartridges in the under part of the box available when those in the upper part were expended. A cessation of the firing being thus caused, the Gorkhas rushed in and put the Sipahis to the rout.—Tour in the Himalayas, 18. The author of Military Sketches of the Gorkha War, an eyewitness, attributes the defeat to the misconduct of the troops. According to him, the party, having reached a neighbouring eminence without molestation, came suddenly upon a breastwork, from which a heavy fire was opened upon them. The men, in obedience to the commands of their officer, rushed forward and dislodged the Gorkhas with great gallantry; but when the latter were reinforced, and "came back in superior numbers, the Sipahis could not be prevented from wasting their ammunition by keeping up a useless fire. The upper layer of their cartridges being expended, some voices called out for a retreat, alleging that they would not have time to turn their boxes. The place appeared tenable with the bayonet; the Gorkhas were, however, now at hand, and arguments, threats, and entreaties proved equally vain; our men broke in confusion, and turned their backs; the enemy, plunging among the fugitives, cut to pieces all whom their swords could reach. At this time a small reinforcement, all that could be spared from the battery, was ascending the hill, under Lieutenant Williams of the 3rd N. I. It appeared the intention of that young officer to throw his party between Lawtie's and their pursuers, but he had the mortification to see his Seapoys turn about and join the flight, just before he perished himself."—Sketches, &c., p. 9.

1814.

strength should preclude the possibility of failure. He therefore applied for reinforcements, and, while awaiting their arrival, employed himself in extending his information, and improving his means of offence. The mountain countries forming the first steps of the Himalaya range, had hitherto been unvisited by Europeans; and scenes, destined at no remote period to become their peaceable and familiar haunts, were now for the first time to be explored by them for the purposes of war. It was of indispensable necessity to ascertain the topography of the adjacent regions, the base on which the movements of the Gorkha general rested, the sources whence his supplies were drawn, and the expedients by which the latter might be cut off. Roads were also to be made practicable for artillery, as well as for troops; and something like organisation was to be given to the irregular levies of the adherents to the British cause. In these occupations a month was advantageously spent; when, the force being joined by the 2nd battalion of the 7th N. I., with a train of field artillery, and by a Sikh levy, General Ochterlony immediately resumed active operations. On the day following their junction, Colonel Thompson was dispatched to prosecute the plan of spreading along the enemy's rear, and intercepting his communications with Arki and Bilaspur, by occupying the Dibu hills, a low range on the north-east of Ramgerh. A lodgement was effected; the consequences of which being distinctly comprehended by the Gorkha general, he made a desperate but a fruitless effort to drive the detachment from its new position.

27 Dec.

BOOK II. CHAP. I.

1814.

The division was attacked at dawn of the 28th with so much impetuosity, that some of the enemy forced their way into the camp. The difficulties of the ground, however, impeded their concentration; and the resolution with which the attack was received, completed their discomfiture. They returned to their position in connection with the fort of Ramgerh, but changed their front so as to oppose the British, now upon their north; their right, as before, resting upon the fort. On the other hand, General Ochterlony, leaving a division under Brigadier Arnold to watch the enemy's movements, marched in a direction which was to place him on the north of the last range of hills between Malaun and the Setlej. On the 6th of January he ascended the bed of the Gambhira river, and, crossing the mountains on which Malaun was situated, took post at Battoh, on the north bank of another mountain stream, the Gamrora, nearly opposite to the centre of the range, sending forward two thousand Hinduris under Captain Ross to occupy the heights above Bilaspur. This movement effected his object. Amar Sing, alarmed for the security of the communications upon which his being able to maintain his mountain posts depended, withdrew his main body from Ramgerh, and, leaving a garrison in the fort, concentrated his force on the ridge of Malaun. Colonel Arnold, in consequence of his retreat, moved round the opposite extremity of the ridge to co-operate with General Ochterlony on its northern base; and after marching through a very rough country, in which he was further delayed by a heavy fall of snow, he turned the north-west-

ern extremity of the line, and there received the submission of the Government of Bilaspur, as well as possession of the fort of Ratangerh, divided only by a deep and extensive hollow from Malaun. A detachment, under Lieut.-Colonel Cooper, dislodged the Gorkhas from Ramgerh and other posts which they had continued to hold to the south, and then advanced to co-operate with the main body. These subsidiary movements, with the state of the country, and the severity of the season, prevented the completion of the investment of Malaun until the 1st of April. In the mean time, the armies acting at the eastern extremity of the line of operations had been engaged with the enemy, but had made little progress towards accomplishing the objects of the campaign.

1814.

1815.

CHAPTER II.

Operations of the Third Division. — March from Gorakhpur.— Stockade of Jitpur,— attacked, — attack repulsed. — General Wood falls back,—remains on the defensive.—Frontier harassed on both sides.— Return of force to cantonments. — Operations of the Fourth Division. — Advanced detachment under Major Bradshaw.—Gorkha posts surprised.—Parsuram Thapa killed.— Tirai conquered. — March of main body delayed.—Outposts at Samanpur and Parsa,—surprised by the Gorkhas,—great alarm among the troops. — General Marley retreats,—

reinforced,—leaves his camp.—General G. Wood appointed to the command.—Defeat of a Gorkha detachment.—Gorkhas abandon the Tirai.—Division broken up,—troops cantoned on the frontier.—Success of Major Latter's detachment.—Alliance with the Raja of Sikim.—Invasion of Kamaon.—Colonel Gardner's success.—Captain Hearsay defeated and taken.—Lieutenant-Colonel Nicolls sent to Kamaon.—Gorkhas under Hasti-dal defeated.—Stockaded hill of Sitauli carried.—Almora surrendered.—Kamaon and Gerwhal ceded.—Fort of Jytak blockaded.—Operations against Malaun.—Positions of Ryla and Deothal carried,—the latter strengthened,—attacked by Amar Sing.—Valour of the Gorkhas,—their repulse.—Bhakti Sing Thapa killed.—Garrison evacuate Malaun.—Amar Sing capitulates.—The country west of the Jumna ceded to the British.—Negotiations for peace,—conditions imposed.—Delays of the Gorkha Envoys.—Insincerity of the Court.—Hostilities renewed.—General Ochterlony commands.—Operations.—Churia-ghati pass ascended.—Action of Makwanpur.—Nepal Envoys arrive.—Peace concluded,—conditions.—Objections to the War,—to the mode of carrying it on,—considered.—Votes of thanks.—Results of the War.

BOOK II. CHAP. II.

1815.

THE third division of the British forces, commanded by Major-General J. S. Wood, was assembled at Gorakhpur early in November, but was not ready to take the field before the middle of December. The destination of the division was the district of Palpa, lying beyond Bhotwal, and acces-

sible by a difficult mountain pass. Being informed that the pass was strongly stockaded, but that it might be turned by a different route, General Wood marched on the 3d of January to reconnoitre the stockade of Jitpur, which was situated at the foot of the Majkote hills, one mile west of Bhotwal, which it would be necessary to carry. Detaching Major Comyn with seven companies to turn the left flank of the position, the General himself proceeded with twenty-one companies to attack it in front and on the right. The latter detachment had expected, on clearing a wood through which lay their march, to come out upon an open plain at some distance from the stockade; but the information was either erroneous or deceptive, as the General, with his staff and part of the advance, found themselves, upon emerging from the thicket, unexpectedly within fifty paces of the defences. A heavy and galling fire was at once opened upon them, which was followed by a sortie of the garrison. The arrival of the head of the column preserved them from destruction, and the Gorkhas were driven back. The main body then attacked the works in front, while one company of H. M.'s 17th, under Captain Croker, carried a hill to the right which commanded the enemy's stockade. Major Comyn meanwhile effected a passage between the stockade and Bhotwal, and approached the eminence on which the latter was situated. There appeared to be every reasonable probability of success, when General Wood, apprehensive that it would be impossible to drive the Gorkhas from the thickets at the back of the stockade, the possession of which rendered the

BOOK II. CHAP. II.

1815.

post untenable, determined to prevent what he considered a fruitless waste of lives, by commanding a retreat.[1] Nor did his distrust of his chances of success here terminate. Conceiving his force to be inadequate to offensive operations, he confined his measures to arrangements for the defence of the frontier, concentrating his force at Lautan, covering the road to Gorakhpur. The border line was, however, too extensive and too vulnerable to be thus protected; and the Gorkhas penetrated repeatedly at various points, inflicting serious injury, and spreading alarm throughout the whole tract. As the division moved to repress incursions in one direction, they took place in another. The town of Nichoul was burnt to ashes, and at one time Gorakhpur was scarcely considered to be safe. Reinforcements were supplied, but no better plan could be devised for counteracting the irruptions of the enemy than the retributive destruction of the crops in the low-lands belonging to them, and the removal of the population of the British territory to a greater distance from the hills.

After harassing his troops by unavailing marches against an enemy whose activity eluded pursuit, and retaliating upon the Gorkhas by wasting their fields and burning their villages, General Wood was compelled by the injunctions of the Commander-in-chief to undertake a forward movement, and attempt the occupation of the town of Bhotwal. Having advanced to that place in the middle of April, he made some ineffectual demonstrations against it, and then returned to the plains. As exposure to the

[1] In this affair several officers were wounded, of whom Lieutenant Morrison, of the Engineers, died of his wounds.

insalubrity of the climate had begun to affect the health of the troops, they were withdrawn in the beginning of May into cantonments at Gorakhpur. 1815.

The chief reliance of Lord Moira for the success of the entire plan of the campaign rested upon the division which was to be directed against the Gorkha capital. The troops were assembled at Dinapore, and commenced their march towards Bettia on the 23d of November. A local corps, the Ramgerh battalion, had been previously detached under Major Roughsedge, to join Major Bradshaw, commanding on the frontier of Saran. Thus reinforced, Major Bradshaw proceeded to clear the frontier forests of the Gorkha posts. He moved on the night of the 24th of November, with three companies of the 15th N.I., two companies of the Champaran light infantry, and a troop of Gardner's irregular horse, to Barharwa, a plain on the west bank of the Bhagmati river, where Parsuram Thapa, the governor of the district, was encamped with four hundred men. The surprise was complete; and, although the Nepalese behaved with their usual intrepidity, they were entirely routed. Their commander was killed, with fifty of his men, and many were drowned in the Bhagmati. One officer, Lieutenant Boileau, commanding the Commissioners' escort, was wounded in a personal encounter with a Gorkha chief, who fell by his hand. Detachments under Captain Hay and Lieutenant Smith took possession of the posts of Baragerhi and Parsa, in advance of Barharwa, without opposition, and the tract known as the Tirai was occupied, and annexed by proclamation to the British territories.[1]

[1] Nepal Papers, 307.

1815. The main army arrived at Pachraota on the frontier on the 12th of December, and the remainder of the month was spent in preliminary arrangements for ascending the hills, and in waiting for the junction of the battering-train; a delay which was contrary to the tenor of General Marley's instructions, as it was intended that he should leave the guns in the rear until he had established a solid footing in advance. This suspension of operations allowed the Gorkhas time to recover from the alarm which had been spread among them by the defeat and death of Parsuram Thapa; and they were emboldened to undertake an enterprise, the successful execution of which had a material influence in paralysing the movements of the division, and frustrating the purposes of its equipment.

With a view to preserve the occupation of the Tirai until the arrival of the main body, Major Bradshaw had stationed Captain Hay, with the head-quarters of the Champaran light infantry, at Baragerhi; Captain Blackney, with the left wing of the second battalion of the 22nd light infantry, at Samanpur, about twenty miles on his right; and Captain Sibley, with about five hundred men, at Parsa, about as many miles on Captain Hay's left. General Marley encamped near Lautan, two miles west of Baragerhi. The outposts at Samanpur and Parsa were unsupported, and no precautions were taken to secure either position by temporary defences, although they were situated in the immediate proximity of the enemy, who, as the month advanced, began to exhibit signs of increasing activity. This negligence, originating in an undue contempt

of the Gorkha detachments, was signally punished. Both posts were attacked by the Gorkhas in force on the 1st of January. Captain Blackney was taken completely by surprise, and, with his second in command, was slain at the first onset. The tents were set on fire, and the troops were killed or dispersed, with the exception of a few, who were kept together by Lieut. Strettell, and conducted to Gorasahan. At Parsa, Capt. Sibley had suspected an approaching attack, and applied for reinforcements. Four companies of the 15th N.I. were consequently detached on the evening of the 31st, but they arrived only in time to cover the retreat of the fugitives. That any of the party effected their escape was owing to the Gorkhas having been engaged in plundering the tents, as the camp had been surrounded before day-break by an overpowering force. Capt. Sibley and more than half his detachment were killed, and the whole of the stores and magazines were in possession of the enemy. The result of these two affairs seems to have struck the men and their commander with unreasonable panic. Desertions were numerous; doubts were felt if much dependance could be placed on those who stood by their colours; and General Marley, impressed with the opinion that the Gorkhas were both so numerous and so daring, that, in place of advancing against them, it would be difficult to maintain a defensive attitude and protect the borders, made a retrograde movement to the westward, in order to guard the depôt at Bettia, and provide for the security of the Saran frontier, leaving a strong division with Major Roughsedge at Baragerhi. The same feeling of alarm infected the

BOOK II. CHAP. II. 1815.

authorities of Gorakhpur and Tirhut; and the approach of a Gorkha army, of irresistible strength and valour, was universally apprehended. The Gorkhas, however, were neither sufficiently numerous, nor sufficiently well apprised of the pusillanimity of their opponents, to follow up and improve their success; although they recovered the whole of the Tirai, with the exception of the country immediately protected by the military posts, and made various predatory and destructive incursions into the British territories.

Great exertions were made to add to the strength of General Marley's division; and reinforcements of troops and artillery, the former comprising his Majesty's 17th and 14th regiments, were immediately dispatched to the frontier, raising the amount of the division to thirteen thousand men, a force more than adequate to encounter the whole Gorkha army, even if its numbers had approximated to the exaggerated estimates to which they had been raised by vague report and loose computation.[1] The General, nevertheless, hesitated to move; and, after spending the month of January in mischievous indecision, suddenly quitted his camp.[2] Colonel Dick assumed temporary command, until the arrival of Major-General George Wood, towards the end of February.

[1] The Gorkhas were calculated by General Marley to be twelve thousand or even eighteen thousand strong.—Nepal Papers, 540. The real number seems to have been seven or eight thousand, of which the greater part were new and ill-armed militia. The whole regular force of the Gorkhas was computed, upon authentic information, not to exceed twelve thousand, of which one-half at least was in the Western provinces.—Lord Moira's Narrative; Nepal Papers, 724.

[2] He left in a rather singular manner. "He set off before daylight in the morning, without publishing any notification of his intention to the troops, and without taking any means of providing for the conduct of the

On the 20th of that month a smart affair with the enemy took place, which redeemed the character and revived the spirit of the Native troops. Lieut. Pickersgill, while surveying, and attended by a small escort, came unexpectedly upon a party of four hundred Gorkhas. By skilful manœuvring he drew them from the cover of the forest towards the camp, from whence, as soon as the firing was heard, a troop of one hundred irregular horse was dispatched to his succour, while Colonel Dick followed with all the picquets. Before the infantry could come up, the cavalry, joined by a number of mounted officers, charged the Gorkha detachment, when the commander, a chief of some note, and a hundred of his men, were killed; fifty were taken, and the rest fled across a rivulet, in which many were drowned. The action struck so much terror into the Nepalese, that they hastily fell back from their forward positions, and again abandoned the Tirai. The road to Makwanpur was now open. A month remained for military operations before the unhealthy season commenced, the army was reinforced with European troops and artillery, and the confidence of the Native soldiery was beginning to revive. General Wood, however affected by the same spirit of caution and procrastination which had retarded the operations of his predecessor, and entertaining similar notions of the difficulties opposed to offensive movements, pleaded the advanced season of the year as an

ordinary routine of command."—Prinsep, i. 129. He was, no doubt, influenced by the unqualified disapprobation expressed by Lord Moira; first, of his unnecessary delay for his battering-train; and next, of his neglect in leaving distant and exposed outposts without support or reinforcements.—Lord Moira's Narrative; Nepal Papers, 745.

1815.

excuse for confining his operations to the plains; and after a march to Janakpur, on the Tirhut frontier, and back, by which it was ascertained that the Gorkhas had entirely evacuated the low-lands, the army was broken up and distributed in cantonments, in convenient situations along the borders, from the Gandak river to the Kusi.[1]

While the two divisions in Gorakhpur and Saran disappointed the calculations upon which they had been organised, the smaller body, under Major Latter, in the same direction, had surpassed expectation, and accomplished more than it was destined to attempt. Not only had the boundary east of the Kusi river been protected from insult, but the Gorkhas had been driven from all their positions: occupation had been taken of the province of Morang, and an alliance had been formed with a hill chief, the Raja of Sikim, a small state east of Nepal; which, while it rescued him from the risk of being crushed by his ambitious neighbour, gave the British a useful confederate, and additional means of acting upon the resources of the enemy.[2]

Another element in the plan of the campaign, intended to take but a subordinate and contingent share, was equally attended with success, and was productive of highly important consequences. The province of Kamaon, forming the central part of

[1] Nepal Papers, 560. As Captain Sutherland observes, "the results of the first campaign must have confounded the calculations of the noble Marquis and every one else. That portion of the army with which it was meant to make an impression on the enemy in the seat of his power remained inactive, whilst the skirmishes on the left flank, which could have been only intended to produce a diversion, succeeded to an extent that shook the Gorkha on his throne." Pol. Relations, 37.

[2] Nepal Papers, 560.

1815.

the Gorkha conquests, was under the authority of a chief, Chautra Bam Sah, who was known to be disaffected to the ruling dynasty of Nepal; while the people of Kamaon, and the adjacent province of Gerhwal, who had been subject to the Raja of Srinagar, but had been alienated by his tyrannical conduct, and had consequently facilitated the Gorkha invasion, were now as hostile to their new and not less oppressive rulers, and were anxious to transfer their allegiance to the British. No serious obstacles were thought likely, therefore, to impede the British possession of the country, and its occupation was strongly recommended by its central situation. The want of a disposable force delayed for some time any attempt to enter the district, and it was at length determined to commence operations with a body of irregulars, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Gardner, an officer of merit, who had risen to notice and distinction in the service of the Raja of Jaypur. On the 15th of February, Colonel Gardner ascended the hills; the Gorkhas fell back, occasionally skirmishing with the detachment, but offering no resolute resistance. The gallant bearing of the irregulars, consisting chiefly of natives of Rohilkhand, and the judicious dispositions of their leader, dislodged the enemy from every position, until they had concentrated their force upon the ridge on which stands the town of Almora.

During the advance of Colonel Gardner, another body of irregular troops, commanded by Captain Hearsay, entered the province by the Timli pass, near the Gagra river, in order to create a diversion

BOOK II. CHAP. II. 1815.

in Colonel Gardner's favour, and prevent Gorkha reinforcements from crossing the river. This movement, also, was at first successful. Captain Hearsay took possession of the chief town of the district, and laid siege to a hill-fort in its vicinity: here, however, he was attacked by Hasti Dal Chautra, the Gorkha commander of the adjoining district of Duti, and was defeated and taken prisoner. He was conducted to Almora, to which the Gorkhas repaired to assist in its defence.

The importance of securing and extending the advantages obtained in Kamaon determined the Governor-General to send a regular force into that quarter; and Lieutenant-Colonel Nicolls, of his Majesty's 14th regiment, was dispatched thither to take the command, with three battalions of Native infantry and a proportion of field artillery.[1] Colonel Nicolls joined the troops before Almora on the 8th of April. The Gorkhas were nothing daunted by his arrival; and, whatever inclination Bam Sah had originally manifested to join the invaders, no indication of any disposition to surrender the fortress entrusted to his charge was exhibited: he had been taught, no doubt, by the little progress which the British arms had yet made, to question the probability of their ultimate triumph, and to adhere to the safer path of fidelity to his sovereign. Almora was resolutely defended, and measures were taken to render the position of the besiegers untenable. On the 21st, Hasti Dal marched from Almora to occupy a mountain pass on the north of the British

[1] The 2nd battalion of the 14th, 2nd of the 5th, flank battalion from the Dún; four 6-pounders, two 12-pounders, and four mortars.

camp. He was immediately followed by Major Paton, with five companies of the 2nd battalion of the 5th, as many companies of the light battalion, and a company of irregulars: the enemy were overtaken on the evening of the 22nd of April, and, after a spirited action, put to flight with the loss of their commander. No time was suffered to efface the effects of this discomfiture. On the 25th a general attack was made on the stockaded defences of the hill of Sitauli, in front of Almora, which were all carried after a short resistance, and the troops, following up their success, established themselves within the town: a vigorous effort was made at night by the garrison to recover possession of the posts, and, for a time, a part was regained, but the Gorkhas were finally repulsed. On the following morning the troops were advanced to within seventy yards of the fort, and mortars were opened upon the works; the effect of which was soon discernible in the desertion of great numbers of the defenders. A flag of truce was sent out by the commandant, and, after a short negociation, the Gorkhas were allowed to retire across the Kali, with their arms and personal property; and the fort of Almora, with the provinces of Kamaon and Gerhwal, were ceded to the British. They were permanently annexed to the British territories.[1]

The conquest thus achieved was the first blow of importance suffered by the Government of Nepal, and intimated to it, in intelligible terms, the con-

[1] Nepal Papers, 570. The total loss in the Kamaon campaign was one hundred and eighty killed and wounded. The only officer killed was Lieutenant Tapley of the 27th N. I., doing duty with the flank battalion, who was shot on the night of the 26th of April.

BOOK VI. CHAP. II. 1815.

sequences to be anticipated from a prolongation of the contest. The celerity with which it was effected, although ascribable in some degree to the favourable temper of the inhabitants, was still more to be attributed to the gallantry and activity of Colonel Gardner, and the vigour and judgment of his successor in the command. The moral influence of character in the leaders, upon the courage of the troops, was strikingly exemplified in this short campaign: the victory was won by Native troops alone: and the same men, who had in other places behaved with unsteadiness or cowardice, here, almost invariably, displayed personal firmness and intrepidity.

While these transactions occurred upon the eastern line of operations, others, of varying influence upon the objects of the campaign, took place in the west. Little progress had been made by the division of General Martindell. This division had continued to be encamped against the fort of Jytak, but no serious impression had been effected. Heavy ordnance had been carried up the mountain with prodigious labour and protracted delay; and, on the 20th of March, a battery, having been opened upon the first of the stockades, levelled it, in the course of one day, with the ground. No attempt was made to advance the batteries sufficiently near to bear upon the remaining defences, the General being apprehensive that it would bring down the whole garrison upon his positions. He therefore decided to try the result of a blockade. In furtherance of this project, Major Richards was sent on the 1st of April to occupy a station on the ridge east of the fort. He accomplished the duty assigned

him, and, pursuing his advantage, drove the Gorkhas from several stockades, until he reached the point which he judged best adapted to intercept all communication in that direction with the fort. Other advantageous stations were occupied with equal success; and Jytak would probably have been reduced by famine, had not its fall been accelerated by the brilliant results of General Ochterlony's contest with Amar Sing.

Having reduced all the detached Gorkha posts, and confined them to the heights of Malaun, and having all his force disposable, General Ochterlony judged that the time had arrived to straiten the enemy still further by breaking through his defences, and taking such positions in the line as should cut off the communication between the two forts on which it rested, Surajgerh and Malaun. The British camp was pitched at Battoh, on the northern bank of the Gamrora, a small stream running immediately at the foot of the Malaun range. Looking southward from the encampment, the Gorkha posts were descried stretching along the summit of the mountain, having the fort of Malaun on the extreme right, that of Surajgerh on the extreme left: most of the intermediate peaks being occupied, and stockaded. The stockades were strongest in the vicinity of Malaun; and directly below the fort, on the slope of the hill, lay the Gorkha cantonments, similarly protected. On the right of Malaun, upon an eminence of somewhat less altitude, and separated from it by deep ravines, was situated the fort of Ratangerh, which had been occupied, as has been mentioned, by Colonel Arnold. The fort of Surajgerh

BOOK II. CHAP. II. 1815.

was observed by a detachment under Captain Stewart, stockaded upon a contiguous elevation. In the course of the works upon the top of the ridge there appeared to be two assailable points: one of them, named Ryla, was unprotected, except by the posts on the adjacent peaks; the other, termed Deothal, lying more to the right and nearer to Malaun, was defended by a stockade, but not in great strength. As the possession of these two points would separate Malaun from most of its dependent outworks, General Ochterlony determined to attempt their capture, distracting at the same time the attention of the enemy by an attack upon the cantonments.

For the occupation of Ryla, a detachment of two companies of light infantry, and a considerable body of irregulars, under Lieutenants Fleming and Grant, ascended the mountain on the night of the 14th of April, and effected a lodgement. Before they could be attacked, they were joined by a division under Captain Hamilton, and a grenadier battalion from head-quarters; and the whole, under Major Innis, established themselves firmly in their position. At the same time, day-break of the 15th, Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson, with two battalions of the 3rd N. I. and two field-pieces, left the camp for Deothal; and Major Lawrie, with the 2nd battalion of the 7th and a body of irregulars, moved in the same direction from the village of Kali, on the right of the camp. From the latter column, a detachment under Captain Bowyer, of two hundred and sixty regular and five hundred picked irregular troops, diverged to the right towards the Gorkha cantonments, to co-operate with Captain Showers,

who was to march upon the same point from Ratangerh, with a force of equal strength, similarly composed.

The columns under Colonel Thompson and Major Lawrie ascending the hill united about ten o'clock, and, moving briskly to Deothal, quickly carried the post. Colonel Thompson, leaving Major Lawrie at Deothal with the rest of the force, put himself at the head of the light infantry, and advanced to the right with the intention of seizing a stockade within battering distance of the fort of Malaun. The Gorkhas, lurking behind rocks and bushes, kept up an annoying fire upon the column, but failed to arrest its progress until it had neared the stockade, when a small but resolute body of the enemy rushed suddenly from their lurking-places among the leading files, and, attacking them with their heavy swords, cut down many, and filled the rest with so much terror, that, in spite of the exertions of their officers, they fell back in confusion to the point they had recently quitted. Fortunately, the men left with Major Lawrie stood firm; and, the foremost of the pursuers falling under their fire, the pursuit was checked, and the fugitives were rallied. The Gorkhas then retired: defences were immediately thrown up, and this post also was secured.

The attack upon the cantonments, although it completely answered the object for which it was undertaken, and, by the powerful diversion which it created, materially facilitated the occupation of Ryla and Deothal, was repulsed by the Gorkhas with some loss both of life and credit to the assailants. The division under Captain Showers had

1815.

nearly reached the Gorkha stockades when it was encountered by the enemy, whose resolute charge shook the steadiness of the men. The officer commanding the hostile party being in advance, Captain Showers hastened to meet him; and a single combat took place, in which the Gorkha champion fell. His troops immediately fired a volley, by which Captain Showers was killed: his detachment fled in irrecoverable confusion, and were followed by the victors, who destroyed all whom they overtook, until they were checked by a party under Lieutenant Roughsedge, which had been sent by Colonel Arnold from Ratangerh. The fugitives also rallied, and the Gorkhas were compelled to retrace their steps up the hill. The party under Captain Bowyer met with better fortune. He had made some way towards his destination, and taken up a position in the village of Malaun, before he was attacked by the Gorkhas. The irregulars fled upon the approach of the enemy, but the regular troops were steady, and made good their footing: but, observing the discomfiture of the detachment which was to have joined him, Captain Bowyer confined himself to a defensive attitude until the evening, when he was withdrawn; no further benefit being attainable from his advance.

As the British position at Deothal was not likely to be long held with impunity, great exertions were made during the 15th to render it as strong as possible: reinforcements were dispatched; defences of the nature of a stockade, as strong as circumstances permitted, were constructed; and two field-pieces were sent up, and planted in the embrasures. On

the other hand, Amar Sing, anticipating the fall of Malaun from so near an approach of the British, resolved to make a desperate attempt to drive them down the mountain again; and for this purpose placed his whole force under the command of Bhakti Sing Thapa, the commandant of Surajgerh, a leader of known intrepidity, whilst he supported the attack in person. At day-break on the 16th, the Gorkhas advanced to the assault in a semicircle along the ridge and the declivity on either hand, so as to turn both flanks of the position. Bhakti Sing headed the charge; while Amar Sing with his youngest son took his station within musket-shot with the Gorkha standard, urging the backward, and animating the bold. The Gorkhas displayed the most undaunted resolution, advancing to the very muzzles of the guns, and endeavouring to strike down their opponents over their bayonets. Although repeatedly swept away by the discharge of grape from the two field-pieces which commanded the approach, they returned to the attack with such obstinacy, and kept up so close and destructive a fire upon them, that all by whom the guns were served were either killed or disabled, except three privates and as many officers, by whom alone they at last were worked.[1] The action had lasted two hours, when reinforcements from the post of Ryla having joined, and it being evident that the spirit of the enemy was beginning to fail, while that of the Sipahis rose with the continuance of successful resistance, Colonel Thompson commanded a charge

1815.

[1] The officers were Lieutenant Cartwright of the Artillery, Lieutenant Armstrong of the Pioneers, and Lieutenant Hutchinson of the Engineers.

BOOK II. CHAP. II.

1815.

with the bayonet to be made by the regular troops, and the irregulars to fall on, sword in hand. The charge was led by Major Lawrie. The Gorkhas gave way and fled, leaving their brave commander, Bhakti Thapa, dead on the field. Amar Sing collected the fugitives, and retired into the fort.[1] The body of Bhakti Sing, when found, was decently wrapped in shawls, and sent to his countrymen. On the following day, two of his wives burnt themselves with his corpse in the sight of both armies.

The repulse of their attack upon the post of Deothal so completely depressed the courage of the Gorkha army, that little opposition was offered to the subsequent arrangements of General Ochterlony for the closer investment of Malaun. Most of the exterior works had fallen during the last half of April. On the 8th of May a battery of heavy guns had opened upon the principal redoubt, and preparations for storming were commenced, when the main body of the garrison quitted Malaun without arms, and gave themselves up to the nearest British post,—unable longer to endure the hardships which

[1] The slain of the enemy exceeded five hundred. The loss of the British was two hundred and thirteen killed and wounded: Lieutenant Bagot, of the Pioneers, died of his wounds. Although not included in the loss on this occasion, a short subsequent period deprived the army of one its most efficient officers, in the death of Lieutenant Lawtie, the field-engineer, whose public deserts were thus recorded by the Commander-in-chief: "It is painful to think that an individual, whose skill, whose judgment, and whose animated devotion materially forwarded the proud result, should not have survived to share in the triumph; but the grateful recollection of his fellow-soldiers and of Government will associate the memory of Lieutenant Lawtie with all the trophies which he so eminently contributed to raise." Lieutenant Lawtie died at the early age of twenty-four of fever, brought on by the fatigues and exposure he had undergone. The army went into mourning, and afterwards erected a monument to his memory in the Cathedral Church of Calcutta.—Nepal Papers, 581; Military Sketches of the Gorkha War, p. 33.

they suffered from the blockade, seeing no prospect of being relieved, and being unsuccessful in their endeavours to prevail on Amar Sing to surrender. As the chief with a few of his adherents still maintained a show of resistance, guns were opened on the 10th of May upon the fort, and their fire continued during the day. On the following morning Amar Sing sent his son to intimate his father's desire to negociate; and a convention was finally concluded with him, by which he consented to give up all the possessions of the Gorkhas on the west of the Jumna, and to send orders for the evacuation of Gerhwal. Amar Sing with the garrison of Malaun, Ranjor Sing with part of that of Jytak, and all members of the Thapa family, were allowed to return to Nepal with their private property and military equipments. The men were left the choice of departing for Nepal, or taking service with the British; and, most of them having preferred the latter alternative, they were formed into battalions for duty in the hills, for which they were peculiarly fit.

The discomfiture of their most distinguished officers, and the loss of their most valuable conquests, lowered the confident tone of the Government of Nepal, and induced it to sue for peace. Bam Sah Chautra was authorised to communicate with the British Commissioner in Kamaon; and Gaj Raj Misr, the spiritual teacher or Guru of the late Raja, was summoned from his retirement at Benares, and sent as a more formal envoy to treat with Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw, who had been empowered by the Governor-General to conclude a pacification on prescribed conditions. These were, 1, the relinquish-

1815.

ment of all claims on the hill Rajas[1] west of the Kali river; 2, the cession of the whole of the Tirai, or low-lands, at the foot of the hills along the Gorkha frontier; 3, the restoration to the Sikim Raja of all territory wrested from him, with the cession of two stockaded forts, and, 4, the admission of a Resident at Khatmandu. The first and third conditions were submitted to, and the mission of a Resident reluctantly acquiesced in; but the cession of the Tirai was a demand which the Court of Nepal pertinaciously resisted.

The Tirai, or low-lands of Nepal, extends from the Tista river on the east, to the Ganges on the west. It forms a grassy plain at the foot of the hills, which are fringed by a belt of forest, and divided into various irregular portions by the numerous and large rivers which cross it, from north to south, on their way from the mountains to the main stream of the Ganges. It is in general not above twenty miles in breadth, but is, with local intervals, above five hundred in length. From the copiousness of its natural irrigation, the soil is peculiarly fertile, is clothed throughout the year with a rich carpet of verdure, and, where cultivated, is productive of abundant crops of rice: and although from the same cause it is at different seasons of the year especially insalubrious, yet during the healthy months much cultivation is carried on, and grain is raised for exportation;[2] while spots least favourable for agriculture afford a coarse but

[1] They were the Rajas of Kahlur, Hindur, Sirmor, Bisahar, Keonthal, Bagul, Jubal, and Gerhwal.—Prinsep, 177.

[2] Hamilton's (Buchanan) Account of Nepal.

exuberant pasture for the herds and flocks from the adjacent hills. From these circumstances the Tirai yielded a valuable revenue to the Court of Nepal, of which it could not afford to endure the deprivation; and the interests of the state were powerfully enforced by those of influential individuals, as the principal chiefs and military leaders derived their subsistence mainly from Jagirs situated in this quarter.[1] On the other hand, an exaggerated opinion of the productiveness of the Tirai rendered the British Government equally anxious to retain it in their possession, as the only source whence any compensation for the charges of the war could be expected. It was also considered desirable to hold it, in order to preclude the repetition of those border quarrels in which the recent hostilities had originated.

The negociations, which began in May, were protracted through the rainy season, when military operations were necessarily suspended. The Court of Nepal appeared disposed to concede the points demanded, and letters from the Raja and the Regent gave to the Nepal Commissioners full authority to conclude the negociation.[2] Although nothing was

[1] It was stated by the Gorkha chiefs to Mr. Gardner, the British Commissioner in Kamaon, that most of the military leaders and their followers derived their support from lands in the Tirai; that the Raja's household expenses were defrayed from the same source; and that of twenty lakhs of rupees a-year, the revenue of Nepal, Tirai alone yielded ten lakhs.—Nepal Papers, 776 and 810.

[2] The letter from the Raja was thus expressed: "The country of Kamaon on the west, and the Tirai, have been conquered by the British Government. With regard to those conquests, whatever may be the result of these negociations will be approved by me. Do not entertain any doubt on this head, but pursue the course which shall establish friendship between the two states." And Bhim Sen, while he notices that there is a party opposed to the peace, adds, that whatever the Commissioners should do or say, he would advocate the same with the Raja, and obtain his confirmation.—MS. Records.

BOOK II. CHAP. II. 1815.

definitively settled, the Government of Bengal, under an impression that the Nepal Government was sincere, professed a willingness to make some modifications of the original plan : the low-lands from the Kali to the Gandak were insisted on; but from the Gandak to the Kusi, along the frontiers of Saran and Tirhut, only those portions were to be retained into which the British authority had been already introduced. The district of Morang, between the Kusi and the Michi, was to be given up, leaving a narrow tract east of the Michi, between it and the Tista, to preserve a communication with Sikim. Pensions to the annual extent of two lakhs of rupees were offered as an indemnification to the chiefs who had Jagirs in the districts which were to be separated from Nepal.[1] These terms were made known to the Court of Khatmandu in the early part of September, but no answer was received until the 29th of October, when the commutation of the proposed pensions for further portions of the Tirai was stipulated for. This was declared by Lieut.-Colonel Bradshaw to be inadmissible, and the negociation to be at an end; but the Commissioners solicited for a delay of a few days, until a reference could be made to the Court. The delay was granted, but the answer was delayed beyond the time proposed, and, when it did arrive, was unsatisfactory. The Commissioners then proposed to repair themselves to Khatmandu, engaging to return in twelve days with a definitive reply. They accordingly departed, and rejoined the British Agent at Sigauli on the 28th instant, bringing with them authority to ter-

[1] Draft of Treaty, Nepal Papers, 835.

minate the negociation on the basis proposed. On the 2nd of December the treaty was duly executed; the Commissioners promising that its ratification under the red seal, the signet of the Raja of Nepal, should be delivered in fifteen days. The treaty was ratified by the Governor-General in council on the 9th December, but the promised ratification from Khatmandu failed to make its appearance; and in its stead a private agent from the Regent apprised the Gorkha Commissioners that the war-party, headed by Amar Sing Thapa, prevailed in the councils of Nepal.[1] Another effort was made to procure the ratification of the treaty, and hopes were held out, authorised by the instructions of the Governor-General, that, if it were agreed to, its execution would not be rigorously enforced.[2] The emissary of the Regent returned to Khatmandu, but no further communication was received; and on the 28th of December the two negociators set out also for the Gorkha capital. It could no longer be doubted, that, although the Court of Nepal had at first been inclined to purchase peace on any conditions, its courage had been reanimated by the chiefs who had returned to the capital from the west, and that its policy was now to defer the definitive conclusion of the treaty until the season should be too far ad-

[1] Although apparently averse to the beginning of the war, Amar Sing was unwilling to purchase peace by ignominious concessions. A very remarkable and characteristic letter from him to the Raja was intercepted, and is given in the Appendix.

[2] It had been, in fact, determined to give up the lands of Bhotwal and Sheoraj, the whole cause of the war. Their cession Lord Moira considered indispensable to the satisfaction and honour of the British Government; but, this object being effected, the lands themselves were not worth keeping.—Nepal Papers, 840.

1815.

vanced for hostilities to be resumed with effect, and the losses and expenses of an unprofitable campaign should induce the British Government to relax in its demands.

As soon as the purpose of the Gorkha Government was detected, active preparations were set on foot for a vigorous renewal of hostilities. Upon the abandonment of the provinces west of the Kali by the Gorkhas, the regular troops employed in that quarter had been marched to their stations, with the exception of small garrisons in the principal forts, and the irregulars had been dismissed, except the Gorkha battalions, to whom principally the defence of the conquered provinces was entrusted. The Gorakhpur and Saran divisions had, however, been held in readiness on the frontier, or at Dinapore, in anticipation of the possibility of a second campaign; and they were quickly collected under Major-General Sir David Ochterlony,[1] who was invested with the chief political as well as military authority. The Gorkhas, on their part, strongly fortified the passes by which an army might penetrate into the hills, on the route towards Makwanpur, and the valley of Nepal.

By the beginning of February Sir David Ochterlony had taken the field with a force of nearly seventeen thousand men, including three King's regiments. This he disposed in four brigades,[2] severally com-

[1] General Ochterlony had been created a Baronet after the surrender of Malaun; he had previously been gazetted a Knight Commander of the Bath. All the field-officers serving at Malaun were made Companions of the Bath.

[2] They were composed as follows: 1st brigade of his Majesty's 24th, 1st battalion 18th N.I., divisions of the 2nd battalion and the Champaran L.I.; 2nd brigade of his Majesty's 66th, 5th and 8th grenadier battalions N.I.; 1st battalion of the 8th and 2nd of the 18th; 3rd brigade of his

manded by Colonel Kelly, of his Majesty's 24th; Lieutenant-Colonel Nicoll, of the 66th; Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, of the 87th; and Lieutenant-Colonel Burnet, of the 8th N. I. The first was detached to the right, to penetrate by Hariharpur; the second to the left, to enter the hills at Ramnagar; General Ochterlony, with the other two brigades, marched on the 12th of February from Simlabasa through the forest to the foot of the Bichu-koh, or Chiria-ghati pass, formed by the bed of a mountain torrent. Whilst encamped at this place, the Gorkha Commissioners arrived from Khatmandu; but, instead of the ratified treaty, they brought repeated demands for territorial concession, and a proposal that the pecuniary compensation should be paid to the Raja, not to his officers. As they were informed that the ratification of the treaty must precede all subordinate arrangements, they shortly left the camp.

The Chiria-ghati pass, in addition to its own difficulties, was defended by successive tiers of strong stockades, and could not have been forced by an attack in front without disproportionate loss. After some delay, another access to the mountains was discovered, and which, although difficult and dangerous, was undefended. It was, in fact, little better than a dark and deep ravine, between lofty and precipitous banks clothed with trees, whose intermingling branches over head excluded the light

Majesty's 87th, 2nd battalions of the 13th, 22nd, and 25th N. I.; 4th brigade, 2nd battalions of the 4th, 8th, 9th, and 15th N. I., and part of the 1st battalion of the 30th, with details of artillery, pioneers, and irregular horse. Two other divisions were also formed: one at Sitapur, in Oude, under Colonel J. Nicolls, intended to enter the district of Dúti, between the Kali and Rapti rivers; the other at Gorakhpur, under Major-General J. S. Wood, intended as a reserve.—Nepal Papers, 983.

1815.

of day. The General, leaving the fourth brigade on the ground, and his tents standing, marched at night on the 14th of February, with the third brigade, and wound his way slowly and laboriously up the pass, almost in single file; Sir David Ochterlony marching on foot at the head of the 87th regiment, leading the column. After proceeding some distance, the troops emerged into more open, but broken, ground, whence they again entered into a water-course: this led to the foot of a steep acclivity, about three hundred feet high, up which the advance clambered with the assistance of the projecting boughs and rocks.

It was eight in the morning before the advance reached the summit, and nine at night before the rear-guard ascended; the day being spent in getting up the remainder of the men, with a couple of field-pieces. The troops marched five miles from the top of the pass before they found a supply of water, when the brigade halted, while the pioneers were busily employed in rendering the ascent practicable for laden cattle, and stores, and ammunition, which was the work of three days.[1] On the fourth the General moved to Hetaunda, on the bank of the Rapti, where he was joined by the fourth brigade, which had mounted the hills by the Chiria-ghati pass, from the stockades of which the Gorkhas retired when they found that the position had been turned.

After making the arrangements necessary for se-

[1] Besides the official despatches, particular and graphic descriptions of the ascent of the Balukola ravine are given by the author of Military Sketches of the Gorkha War, p. 39, and by Lieutenant Shipp, a Lieutenant of the 87th regiment.—See his Memoirs, ii. 63.

curing the communications in his rear, General Ochterlony advanced, on the 27th of February, to the fortified heights of Makwanpur, and encamped on a piece of level ground two miles to their south. The town and fort lay to the right of the camp: opposite to its left was the village of Sekhar-khatri, held by a strong detachment of the enemy; but they evacuated it on the following morning, and it was immediately taken possession of by three companies of the 25th N. I. and forty men of the 87th. They were not long unmolested. At noon the Gorkhas returned in greater force, and endeavoured to recover the position; they drove in the picquets, and fell upon the village with great impetuosity; but the flank companies of the 87th, and the rest of the 25th, having been dispatched to reinforce the post as soon as the firing commenced, arrived in time to check the fury of the assailants. Fresh numbers of the enemy poured along the summit of the heights from Makwanpur, to the extent of, at least, two thousand men: reinforcements were also sent from the camp, of two companies of the 87th and the 12th Native corps, and, after repeated attacks, the Gorkhas were finally repulsed. Although forced to retreat, they fell back only to a neighbouring eminence, from which they kept up a galling fire, until they were dislodged by the bayonets of the 8th N. I. The action lasted from noon till five o'clock, when it became dark. The Nepalese loss was computed at five hundred: of the British, forty-five were killed, and one hundred and seventy-five wounded.[1] On the following day the division was

[1] Lieutenant Tirrell, of the 20th regiment, was killed in the first assault

1815.

joined by the first brigade under Colonel Nicoll, who had ascended the mountains by a pass on the north of Ramnagar, and marched up the valley of the Rapti without encountering an enemy.

The second brigade, commanded by Colonel Kelly, succeeded in ascending the mountains to the south of the fort of Hariharpur, by a route which had not been stockaded. Finding the fort unassailable on the quarter by which he had advanced, Colonel Kelly moved round to a village on its west. The approach to the fort was protected by a strong semicircular stockade with two guns, the flanks of which rested on perpendicular rocks. This defence was, however, commanded by an eminence at a distance of about eight hundred yards, which the Gorkhas had neglected to occupy in strength, and which was therefore carried without much difficulty by a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel O'Halloran. The party was scarcely in position when it was attacked by a superior force, and an obstinate struggle ensued, which continued for five hours, when some field-pieces having been carried up decided the contest. The Gorkhas fled from their fire; and the result seems to have so disheartened the garrison, that on the following day the fort was abandoned by the commandant, Ranjor Sing Thapa, the chief who had so gallantly defended the fort of Jytak in the previous campaign.[1]

Immediately after the action at Sekhar-khatri, preparations were set on foot for erecting batteries

on the village.—Nepal Papers, 987. A Gorkha chief was killed in single combat by Lieutenant Shipp.—Memoirs, ii. 102; Prinsep's History, i. 199.

[1] Nepal Papers, 940.

against the stockades and fort of Makwanpur; but, before they were well opened, operations were arrested by the apprehensions of the Government of Nepal. The commandant, who was the brother of the Regent, sent word to Sir David Ochterlony that he had received the ratified treaty from his court, and requested permission to send an authorised agent in charge of it to the British camp. The envoy was received accordingly on the 3rd of March; but the treaty was not accepted without the additional stipulation, that the cession of territory exacted from Nepal should comprehend the country conquered in the actual campaign, and the valley of the Rapti. The Commissioner and the Governor of Makwanpur acceded to the conditions, and their acquiescence was confirmed by the Raja. Peace between the two states was consequently re-established.

The principal conditions of the treaty have already been adverted to; but, in their execution, the British Resident appointed to Khatmandu, the Honourable Mr. Gardner, was authorised to commute the proposed annual pensions for restoration of a portion of the Tirai conveniently separated from the British boundary. The proposal was gladly accepted. A line of demarcation generally was agreed to, to be determined by subsequent survey; and a considerable tract between the Michi and Gandak rivers, exclusive of a small space on the Saran frontier, but comprehending Bhotwal, was restored to the Nepalese. A treaty was at the same time concluded with the Sikim Raja, by which he was guaranteed in the possession of his territory on

BOOK II. CHAP. II. 1815.

condition of his submitting all disputes between him and his neighbours of Nepal to the arbitration of the Government of Bengal, joining its troops when employed in the mountains, and affording protection and encouragement to merchants and traders from the Company's territories. On the west of Nepal, the provinces of Kamaon and Gerhwal, the valleys above the first range of hills, and some military posts were annexed to the British possessions; while the petty hill Rajas lying still more to the west and north, were mostly re-established in their principalities under the general stipulation of allegiance and subordination to the British authority. The Raja of Nepal died shortly after the close of hostilities, and was succeeded by an infant son. The regency continued in the hands of Bhim Sen Thapa, and the event occasioned no change in the relations established between the two Courts; which, although no cordiality has been manifested by the Nepal Government, have ever since continued undisturbed.

Thus terminated a war which presented many features of a novel aspect, and which in its outset threatened to tarnish the splendour of the British military character in India. The causes of disappointment rested, in some cases, with the commanders of the several divisions, who, alarmed by discomfiture brought on by precipitation, or by injudicious arrangements, fell into the error of exaggerating the resources of the enemy, and, with the exception of Sir David Ochterlony, distrusted their ability to cope with the Nepalese. In some respects, also, the Native troops failed to maintain their reputation. Unaccustomed to a country

the broken surface of which often rendered it impossible for them to observe the compact order on which they had been trained to rely for support, and startled by the unusual charge of the Gorkhas, who, like the Highlanders in North Britain, rushed, after firing their matchlocks, sword in hand, and in fierce though disorderly masses, upon the ranks of their adversaries, they exhibited, in some of the early actions, a want of steadiness which proved fatal to themselves, and embarrassing to their leaders. With experience came a juster appreciation of their own strength, and of that of their opponents; and on the heights of Malaun and Makwanpur the Sipahis gallantly redeemed their reputation.

The occurrence of hostilities so immediately after the renewal of the Company's charter, and the diversion to military expenditure of the funds with which many of the members of the Court of Directors had confidently expected that the competition to which the Company's trade was now exposed might be advantageously encountered,[1] produced in the Court a strong feeling of opposition to the war, and induced a considerable and influential party to

[1] In the Letter of the Court, of the 13th October, 1815, they write: "We find, with extreme concern, that the effects of the Nepalese war are so strongly felt in your financial department, as to induce the apprehension that the advances to be issued for our European investment will be reduced to a very small sum indeed. . . . If the advances for the investment are to be withheld, the sales at this house for Indian goods will soon be brought to a stand; in which case, not only will the operations of our home finances be impeded, but it will also involve the impossibility of our being able to afford to India the assistance, in the event of the continuance of warfare, which would be so necessary, and which we should be so desirous to furnish."—Nepal Papers, 548. The necessity of supplying funds from home was little likely to arise, unless those which were available for political disbursements were absorbed in the purchase of commercial investments.

1815.

deny its necessity,[1] and to condemn the mode in which it had been conducted. We may pause to consider briefly how far they were warranted in their conclusions.

The encroachments of the Nepalese were not the sudden growth of a recently awakened spirit of presumption, or a transitory ebullition of overweening pride. They were the deliberate and progressive crop of a long series of years, and had not even yet attained their full development. They were the result of a uniform and consistent design against the integrity of the Company's dominions. They had been long leniently dealt with; calm expostulations and menacing remonstrances had been tried repeatedly; and, finally, an amicable adjustment by an appeal to evidence and proofs of various kinds, had been attempted, but all conciliatory measures had been tried in vain. Aggressions were committed almost in the presence of the Commissioners professing to conduct a friendly and impartial investigation, and promises to abide by their

[1] The Court of Directors expressed a confident hope that, "as the result of the local inquiries had satisfied you of the Company's right to the disputed lands, the Government of Nepal would yield to your application for the surrender of those lands, without your being under the necessity of having recourse to more decided measures."—Letter to Bengal; Nepal Papers, 547. The expectation was based upon a very inaccurate knowledge of the temper of the Gorkha Government, and the necessity of having recourse to arms was recognised by the Court in a dispatch, dated 18th July, 1814. The necessity of the war was further demonstrated by Lord Hastings in a letter to the Chairman; and, as there stated, he was pledged to a definite course by the measures of his predecessor. The alternative of hostilities was the decision of Lord Minto. Lord Moira observes: "In this state I found things: I certainly had an option; I might shrink from the declaration plighted by Lord Minto, abandoning the property of the Company, sacrificing the safety of our subjects, and staining the character of our Government, or I had to act up to the engagements bequeathed to me, and to reprove the trespass of an insatiable neighbour. That I should have chosen the latter alternative will hardly afford ground for censure."—Nepal Papers, 992.

decision were evaded or disregarded. It was evident that forbearance only gave audacity to insult, and boldness to usurpation; and the only questions that remained for consideration were, the relinquishment of the disputed lands, or the assertion of the right to them by arms.

All history records the impolicy of yielding to the demands of barbarians. Concession invariably inspires them with presumption, and stimulates them to fresh exactions. It would have been contrary to all experience to have relied upon the pacific effects of giving way to the pretensions of Nepal, to have expected that the Court of Khatmandu would have been soothed into moderation by acquiescence in its claims. Such an expectation was in an especial manner unwarranted by the known character of the Gorkha Government, whose whole policy for half a century had been the extension of their possessions, and who were confirmed in their notions of the wisdom of their policy by the success with which it had been almost invariably pursued. It might have been thought likely that they would nevertheless have paused before they provoked the enmity of a power so superior as the British to the unwarlike and disunited principalities over which they had triumphed; but an accurate comparison of resources, and appreciation of means, were scarcely to be expected from a cabinet so imperfectly instructed as that of Khatmandu in the circumstances of its neighbours, so strongly impelled by personal interests, and so deeply swayed by arrogance and passion. We have seen that the war-party anticipated little more peril from

BOOK II. CHAP. II. 1815.

hostilities with the British, than with a petty Raja of the hills; and that, confiding in their past fortunes, the courage of their troops, and the strength of their country, they entertained no doubt of keeping their antagonist at bay until he should be weary of the contest. Nor did they depend solely upon their own means of resistance. They calculated upon the co-operation of still more powerful allies; and, endeavouring to interest Ranjit Sing, Sindhia, the Raja of Bhurtpur, Mir Khan, and even the Pindaris, in their quarrel,[1] they sanguinely anticipated that the reverses experienced by the British arms would be the signal for a general rising of the Princes of Hindustan.[2] The crisis was not altogether impossible; and a continued repetition of the disasters of the first campaign might have seriously compromised the peace and security of the British empire in India.

A danger of a less formidable nature presented

[1] A mission was also sent, in the beginning of 1816, by Amar Sing to Ava. His death, which happened in the early part of the year, put an end to the activity of these intrigues, although they were not entirely abandoned by the court of Nepal until the breaking out of the Pindari war.—MS. Records.

[2] Proofs were obtained by the Resident at Gwalior that these several powers had been addressed by the chief officers of Nepal: to Sindhia accredited agents were deputed. Letters from Namdar Khan, the Pindari, to Sindhia, were detected, mentioning the application made to him and Mir Khan.—MS. Records. A Vakil, sent by Amar Sing to Ranjit Sing, offered to pay largely for his assistance, and to place the fort of Malaun in his hands. He affirmed that the Nawab Vizir, the Mahrattas, and the Rohillas, were all ready to rise as soon as they heard of the Sikh chieftains joining the Gorkhas. Ranjit was too shrewd to be caught by these assertions, and inferred from the offers made to him that the Gorkhas were hard pressed.—Nepal Papers, 559. That some of the Native Princes looked anxiously to the course of the war, and built upon it hopes of being enabled to resist the British power in the collision which was at this time menaced, was established by subsequent events. A correspondence between Sindhia and the Gorkha Government was intercepted.

itself in the interposition of the Government of China, to which the Court of Khatmandu had earnestly appealed at an early period of the war, ascribing its origin to the refusal to give a passage through Nepal to a British force intended to take possession of Lassa. The Court of Pekin, although suspecting the truth of the story,[1] appears to have been seriously alarmed; and troops were dispatched to reinforce those stationed in Tibet: a considerable body was assembled at Digarchi, and moved towards the frontier; but as its advance occurred no sooner than August, 1816, hostilities were at an end. Explanations had also been exchanged between the Chinese authorities and the Governor-General, which furnished the former with a reasonable plea for discontinuing their hostile indications.[2] They

[1] A letter from the Government of Pekin observed: "If your statement be true, if the English be the aggressors, they shall suffer; if the Gorkhas, the country shall be swept clean."

[2] The Chinese Commander-in-chief professed to be satisfied with the explanation of the causes of the war, and the conduct of the English, as furnished by his correspondence with the Governor-General and the British authorities on the frontier. At the request of the Court, however, he so far interfered in their behalf as to suggest the withdrawal of the British Resident. "You mention that you have stationed a Vakil in Nepal. This is a matter of no consequence; but as the Raja, from his youth and inexperience, and from the novelty of the thing, has imbibed some suspicions, if you would, out of kindness to us, and in consideration of the ties of friendship, withdraw your Vakil, it would be better, and we should feel very much obliged to you."—Letter from Shi-Chuin-Chang, Vazir. To this it was replied, that a Resident on the part of some civilized power was necessary, in order to investigate and suppress at once any border quarrels that might be occasioned by the unrestrained violence of a barbarous people; and that, if the Emperor of China would appoint an officer on his part to preside at Khatmandu, that would equally well answer the object. The Vazir on this acquiesced in the arrangement; for as to the alternative, he observed that it was not the custom of the Court of Pekin to depute their officers to foreign Courts, as the traders at Canton could inform the Governor-General. This was the only allusion to the Company's establishment at Canton, although a dispatch had been forwarded through the supracargoes to the Court of Pekin on the breaking out of the war. The conduct of the Chinese officers towards the Indian Government, in a

BOOK II. CHAP. II. 1815.

adopted the safe course of venting their displeasure upon their allies, and treated the Nepalese envoys sent to their camp with great indignity.[1] Their overbearing demeanour excited the apprehensions of the Court of Khatmandu, who were glad to deprecate the anger of the Emperor by a penitential mission to Pekin.

To return, however, to the consideration of the general question: Admitting that war was inevitable, it became a subject of question whether it was judiciously carried on. The comparative merits of a defensive or offensive system have already been considered; and it has been attempted to shew that the latter realized the advantages and avoided the inconveniences of the former, and was alone likely to lead to a speedy termination of the disputes between the two powers. It is only necessary here to observe, that practical demonstration was afforded of the futility of the defensive plan, by the actual occurrences on the frontier of Saran and Gorakhpur. With two large armies, those of General Wood and General Marley, in the field, but acting on the defensive, the Gorkhas ravaged the borders almost in sight of them with impunity;

somewhat protracted communication, as it did not close till the beginning of 1818, when presents were interchanged, was uniformly temperate and judicious.—MS. Records; see also Prinsep, i. 213.

[1] In the interview with the Chinese authorities, the Nepal envoys were asked by the Chun-chun, "What number of soldiers have you, and what is the amount of your revenues? The former, I suppose, do not exceed two lakhs (200,000)." The envoys replied, the number of troops was correct, and the revenues were five lakhs and a half of rupees. "Truly," said the Chinese officer with a sneer, "you are a mighty people!" and he observed, that they merited the chastisement they had received; adding, that their statements were manifestly false, as, if the English had wished to invade the Chinese dominions, they could have found a nearer route than that through Nepal.—MS. Rec.

1815.

and no more efficacious arrangement for the protection of the Company's subjects could be devised than driving them into the interior, beyond the reach of the enemy, leaving their fields and homes to the spoiler. No such injury or insult was suffered where the British armies carried on the war within the confines of Nepal.

The objections to the advance of a concentrated British force, in preference to assailing the Gorkha line at different points, have also been adverted to. Testimony to its judiciousness was borne by the best authority,—the Government of Nepal. The Raja expressed his fears that the British would endeavour to obtain a footing in the centre of his country, in which case both extremities would be thrown into disorder.[1] This was the main object of the first campaign; and although its complete execution was disappointed by the unfortunate failure before Kalanga, yet the extremities of the Gorkha state were disordered: the east was kept in a state of alarm by the demonstrations of the British divisions; in the west the best generals and troops of Nepal were hemmed in, and finally overpowered; and a secure footing was obtained with little difficulty in the centre by the occupation of Kamaon. Although, therefore, the instruments employed by the Governor-General were not in all cases of the most perfect description, yet it could not be said that his plans failed because they were radically defective; as in truth, although their success was delayed, they did eventually succeed,—and succeeded, too, in a single campaign: for when the renewal

[1] Nep. Papers, 533.

1815.

of hostilities was provoked by the vacillation of the cabinet of Khatmandu, the whole of the Gorkha conquests and the disputed territories were in the hands of the British, and little accession to their conquests was claimed or sought for when peace was at last established.

Whatever doubts might have been entertained by the authorities in England of the necessity of the war, or the wisdom with which it was conducted, they were finally dissipated by the close of the contest. Unanimous resolutions of the Courts of Directors and Proprietors recognised the prudence, energy, and ability of the Governor-General, combined with a judicious application of the resources of the Company, in planning and directing the operations of the late war against the Nepalese.[1] Thanks were also voted to Sir David Ochterlony and the officers and men engaged in the war. To the honours conferred upon General Ochterlony by the Prince Regent, the Company added a pension of a thousand pounds a year. The Earl of Moira was elevated to the rank and title of Marquis of Hastings.

Although the territory acquired by the British Government was not of great extent or financial value, yet few accessions have been obtained of deeper interest or greater prospective importance. The territories actually appropriated, or those held under British authority by the dependent hill Rajas, have given to British India the command of

[1] Resolutions of the Court of Proprietors, 11th December, 1816, and Court of Directors, 16th Nov. 1816, communicated to the Government of Bengal.—Pol. Letter, 4th March, 1817; Nepal Papers, 991.

an impenetrable barrier on the north, and of a path across the loftiest mountains of the Old world to the regions of Central Asia. Countries before unknown have been added to geography; and Nature has been explored by Science in some of her most inaccessible retreats, and most rare and majestic developments. The elements of civilization have been introduced amongst the rude inhabitants of the mountains, and they have been taught the value of industrious habits, and the advantage of social intercourse. Roads have been cut along the sides of precipices; bridges constructed over mountain torrents; stations have been formed which have grown into towns; and the stir and activity of human life have disturbed the silence of the lonely forests, and broken the slumber of the eternal snows. Still mightier changes are in progress. Barren as are the rocks of the Himalaya, they are not wholly unproductive; and they are fringed at least by fertile valleys that want only cultivators to become the seats of prosperous cultivation. Under a climate more congenial to European organisation than the sultry plains of India, and with space through which they may freely spread, the descendants of a northern race may be able to aggregate and multiply; and if British colonies be ever formed in the East, with a chance of preserving the moral and physical energies of the parent country, it is to the vales and mountains of the Indian Alps that we must look for their existence, —it will be to the Gorkha war that they will trace their origin.

1815.

CHAPTER III.

Transactions in Ceylon.—Embassy to the King of Kandy.—Aggressions by his people.—Declaration of War.—March of troops and capture of the Capital. —Mutu-sami made King.—Force withdrawn.—Major Davie left at Kandy.—Attacked by the Cingalese.—Kandy evacuated.—Europeans murdered. —Hostilities continued.—Suspended.—Tyranny and Cruelty of the King.—Fear and Hatred of his people.—British Subjects seized.—War resumed.—The Capital again taken.—The King captured, deposed, and sent prisoner to Madras.—Ceylon subject to British Authority.—Universal Discontent and Rebellion.—A Pretender to the Throne.—Great loss on both sides.—Rebels disheartened.—Leaders arrested, and the Pretender captured.—The Insurrection suppressed.—Change of system.—Affairs of Cutch.—Disputed Succession.—General anarchy. —Depredations on the Gaekwar's Territories.—Disturbances in Kattiwar.—Suppressed.—Troops ordered into Cutch.—Anjar surrendered.—Agreement with the Rao.—Operations against the Pirate States.—Intrigues at Baroda.—Occurrences at Hyderabad.—Disorderly conduct of the Nizam's sons.—Put under Restraint.—Disturbances in the city.—Critical position.—The Princes sent to Golconda.—Dicussions with the Nawab of Oude.—Views of the

Governor-General.—Death of Sádat Ali.—Succeeded by Ghazi-ud-din.—Visit to the Governor-General at Cawnpore.—Loan to the Company.—Complains of the Resident.—Retracts.—Submits final requisitions.—Principles of future Intercourse.—The Nawab an Independent Prince in his own Dominions.—Second Loan.—Resident's Vindication of himself.—His Removal.—Observations.—Internal Disturbances.—House-tax at Bareilly opposed by the people.—Tumults.—Troops called in.—The Rioters defeated.—Contumacy of great Landholders in the Western Provinces.—Dayaram of Hatras.—Shelters Robbers.—Resists the Authorities.—A force sent against him.—Hatras taken.—Disorders on the South-western Frontier.—Insurrection in Cuttack.—Causes.—Excessive Assessments.—Sales of Lands.—Corruption of Authorities.—Oppression of the people.—General Rising.—First Successes of the Insurgents.—Puri taken by them.—Recovered.—Commissioners appointed.—Special Commission.—Cuttack tranquillized.

THE successful termination of the war with Nepal enabled the Government of India to prepare for a contest of a still more formidable description, with improved resources, and augmented reputation: but before we describe the occurrences which then took place, it will be convenient to notice the transactions of foreign and domestic interest which originated in the intervening period, and were unconnected with the events of the Pindari and Mahratta war. 1815.

Ceylon, although a dependency of the Crown, and

BOOK II. CHAP. III. 1815.

unaffected by the political circumstances of the Indian continent, may yet be considered, from its geographical position and the general analogy of its connexion with Great Britain, as a part of the British Indian Empire, and some notice of the transactions of which it was at this time the scene, may therefore be consistently offered. The island, first colonised by the Portuguese, and subsequently by the Dutch, was finally taken from the latter, as identified with the Republic of France, in 1796, by an expedition fitted out from Madras, and was for a short interval subject to the government of Fort St. George. In 1798 it was annexed to the colonial dominions of the British Crown, and the Hon. Frederick North was nominated Governor on the part of Great Britain. The settlements which were thus transferred extended along the sea coast, forming a narrow belt round the centre of the island, where native princes continued to rule over the remnants of an ancient kingdom, whose origin was traceable, through credible records, for above two thousand years.[1] Deprived of a valuable portion of their ancestral domains by races which they despised as barbarians while they hated them as conquerors, the kings of Kandy had been almost always at variance with their European neighbours, and had been principally protected against their military superiority by the deadly atmosphere of the forests which interposed an impenetrable rampart between the interior of the island and the coast. The

[1] See Turnour's Translation of the Mahawanso,—a Buddhist Chronicle of Ceylon, and various tracts by the same eminent Pali scholar in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal and the Ceylon Almanack.

last but one of these princes co-operated with the English in their attack upon the maritime provinces held by the Dutch, in expectation of advantages which were never realised. He died shortly after the establishment of the British power. Leaving no children, he was succeeded by the son of a sister of one of his queens, who was elected to the throne by the head minister, or Adigar, with the acquiescence of the other chief officers of the state, the priests of Buddha, and the people.[1] 1815.

Shortly after the accession of the new Sovereign in the beginning of 1800, the Governor of Ceylon deputed the commanding officer of the troops on the island, General Macdowall, on an embassy to the court of Kandy. The avowed purpose of the mission was the establishment of a friendly intercourse with the King; but there were objects, also, of a political nature, the precise purport of which does not appear, but which seem to have been based upon an imitation of the policy of the Indian Government, and to have had in view the formation of a subsidiary alliance in Ceylon. In order to fulfil this project, advantage was to be taken of the intrigues which agitated the Kandian Court. The Minister who had raised the Sovereign to his present rank, is said thus early to have plotted his deposal, and the usurpation of his crown. For the accomplishment of his treacherous designs, he sought the assistance of the British Government, and, although his overtures were at first rejected,

[1] Davy, 310; also Turnour's Epitome of the History of Ceylon. The new King, Sri Wikrama Rajasingh, ascended the throne in 1798. Adigar is a provincial corruption of the Sanscrit word Adhikára, a superintendant.

BOOK II. CHAP. III. 1815.

he was admitted to a conference with the Governor's Secretary, and the mission to Kandy was the result. To elude the arts of the Adigar, and place the King, with his own consent, in security, are declared to have been the chief objects proposed: but the security intended was to be provided for by the removal of the King to Colombo; and while his person was safe in British keeping, the real power was to be exercised by the Governor of Ceylon, through the agency of the faithless Adigar.[1] That these designs could not be accomplished without a display of force, was manifested by the equipment of the mission, the strength and quality of which denoted hostile, rather than friendly, intentions.[2] Whatever might have been the real objects of the plot, it was frustrated by the timidity and suspicion apparently of both the Minister and the King. Although met on the fron-

[1] According to Cordiner the chief Adigar, to whom the King owed his elevation, was plotting against his power and his life, and had endeavoured to persuade the English Government to assist in deposing him. Apparently, the only difficulty was that of finding a pretext, as the acting Secretary to the Government declared to the Adigar, that "the Governor would never consent to depose a prince who had not made any aggression on him. The Adigar then asked what would be considered an aggression, and whether an invasion of the British territories by the Kandians would not come under that description." Inferring that the King's life was in danger, it was determined to elude the arts of the Adigar by a more perfect knowledge of the Court, and to send General Macdowall with a sufficient force to maintain his Majesty's independence. It was at the same time proposed, that if the King should approve of it, he should transport his person and his Court, for greater safety, into the British territories, there to enjoy his royal rights, and depute to Pilima Talawé (his treacherous minister) the exercise of his power in Kandy; also that a British subsidiary force should be maintained there, and a sufficient indemnification for its expense given by the Kandian Government either in land or produce.—Cordiner's Ceylon, ii. 162. Notable expedients for maintaining the King's royal rights and independence!

[2] The ambassador's suite consisted of five companies of the 19th regiment, as many of Sipahis, and as many of Malays, with four field-pieces, two howitzers, artillery and pioneers.—Percival, Account of Ceylon, 376.

tier by the Minister, the troops were made to advance by a circumscribed and difficult route: every step of their progress was watched with extreme jealousy; no communication with the country was permitted; and finally, the greater part were obliged to halt, and General Macdowall proceeded to Kandy with a much less numerous, but a more appropriate, retinue. He was received with civility, but without cordiality; his audiences were few and formal; and he returned to Colombo without having made any progress in the purposes of his mission, secret or avowed. On the contrary, the proceedings of the British Government seem to have excited the suspicion and ill-will of both the King and the Adigar, and to have united them against a common enemy; while an excuse for an appeal to arms seems to have been solicitously sought for by the British. At length some Cingalese traders from the British territories, having been despoiled of a parcel of Betel nuts which they had purchased, complained to the Governor. Their case was advocated by him with the King; its truth was admitted, and redress was promised but never granted. In the mean time reports reached Colombo that the people of the villages on the frontier were in training, and practising archery, and that active preparations, of a menacing tenor, but rather of a defensive than an offensive character, were in progress. Upon these occurrences Mr. North determined to make war upon the King, unless he subscribed to a treaty promising compensation for the expenses of military equipments, and the plunder of the Betel nuts; to permit the formation of a military road

1815.

1815.

from Colombo to Trincomalee, and suffer Cinnamon peelers and woodcutters to follow their calling in the Kandyan districts. It was intimated at the same time, that the aggressions which had been perpetrated, had left the Governor at perfect liberty to recognise and support the claims which any other Prince of the family of the Sun might form to the diadem worn by his Kandyan Majesty.[1] The intimation was not likely to conciliate his accession to a friendly convention, and was replied to by predatory incursions into the British frontier, and the plunder and murder of its subjects. To repress and avenge these injuries, a force under General Macdowall was dispatched from Colombo, and another under Colonel Barbut from Trincomalee. The two divisions encountering no serious opposition on their march, met on the Mahavali-ganga, three miles from Kandy, and on the 21st of February entered the capital. The town, which was completely deserted, had been set on fire by the inhabitants, but the flames were speedily extinguished, and Kandy was in the occupation of the British.

As the reigning monarch had been so little sensible of the benefits to be derived from the British alliance, a more tractable sovereign was brought forward in the person of Mutu-sami, a brother of the late Queen, and a competitor for the throne, who had been obliged to seek refuge in the colony. A treaty was concluded with him, by which he ceded certain districts and immunities, and in requital was acknowledged as monarch of Kandy,

[1] Proclamation by the Governor of Ceylon, Jan. 29th, 1803, also Letter to the King..—Papers printed for Parliament, 5th April, 1804.

and promised, as long as he might require it, the aid of an auxiliary force. Mutu-sami was conducted to the capital, where he arrived on the 4th of March. He brought no accession of strength, as the people were either afraid or disinclined to support his cause; and hence perhaps its sudden abandonment by the Governor, who presently afterwards engaged to invest the Adigar with regal authority, on condition of his delivering up his master, assigning a pension to Mutu-sami, and making the same cessions which that unfortunate Prince had consented to grant.[1]

1815.

After a short stay at Kandy, during which several skirmishes took place with the Cingalese, invariably to their disadvantage, but without any decisive results, the prevalence of jungle-fever, generated by the pestilential vapours of the surrounding forests, to which many of the men and officers fell victims, compelled the retirement of the greater part of the survivors; and, finally, the protection of Kandy, and of Mutu-sami, was consigned to Major Davie, with a body of 500 Malays and 200 Europeans of the 19th regiment,—the latter almost incapacitated for duty by sickness, and the former speedily thinned by frequent desertions. In this state they were attacked on the 24th of June by the Cingalese in immense numbers, headed by the King and the Adigar,

[1] Parliamentary Debate, 14th March, 1804. The engagement is not mentioned by Cordiner, although he observes that at this time Pilame-Talawé had the effrontery to carry on a deceitful correspondence, under the mask of friendship, with the Commander of the British forces, and no art was left untried which might dupe or cajole our Government. The engagements with the Adiger are specified upon the authority of Major Forbes.—Eleven Years in Ceylon, i. 25.

1815.

and encouraged by their knowledge of the enfeebled state of the garrison: a severe conflict ensued, which lasted for seven hours, when Major Davie was under the necessity of proposing a suspension of hostilities. The proposal was acceded to, and a capitulation agreed upon, by which the garrison, accompanied by Mutu-sami, were to be permitted to retire with their arms, on giving up Kandy and all military stores. It was promised that the sick, who were incapable of being removed, should be taken care of until they could be sent to a British settlement. Upon these stipulations Major Davie evacuated Kandy, and marched to the banks of the Mahavali-ganga, which, being swollen by the rains, was no longer fordable: no boats were at hand, and the enemy showed himself in force in different quarters. On the following day a mission came from the King, demanding that Mutu-sami should be given up, when boats would be furnished to the English. After some hesitation, the demand was complied with. The unhappy Prince, with several of his kinsmen, were immediately put to death. That his abandonment, and the disgrace which it entailed upon the British faith, might have been avoided by a greater display of resolution than was exhibited, is not impossible; but a determination to preserve the Prince at all hazards, even if it had been entertained by the officers, was little likely to have been acquiesced in by the men, consisting almost wholly of Malays, who saw in his surrender their only hope of safety. The hope was fallacious, as might have been expected from the treachery of the enemy.

The King commanded the destruction of the whole party. The Adigar is said to have manifested some reluctance to violate the capitulation; but at last consented to become the instrument of his master's revenge. He prevailed upon Major Davie and his officers to accompany him out of sight of the men, who were then told that their officers had crossed the river, and that, upon laying down their arms, they would be also ferried across to join them. Conducted in small parties to the edge of the river, at a spot where they could not be seen by their comrades, they were successively stabbed, or butchered in various ways, and their bodies were thrown into a contiguous hollow. At the same time the whole of the sick, a hundred and fifty, of whom a hundred and thirty-two were British soldiers, were barbarously put to death, the dead and the dying having been thrown promiscuously into a pit prepared for the purpose.[1] Most of the officers were also murdered, or died shortly afterwards. Major Davie survived till about 1810, when he died at Kandy, latterly unmolested and almost unnoticed.[2]

The recovery of his capital and the destruction of the garrison inspired the Kandyan Monarch with the ambition of expelling the Europeans from the island; and during the remainder of 1803 and the ensuing year, repeated efforts were made to penetrate into the colony. At first, during the exhausted state of the troops, some advantages were obtained by the enemy; and on one occasion they penetrated

[1] Davy's Ceylon.

[2] Forbes, i. 34. Heber's Travels, ii. 256.

BOOK II. CHAP. III. 1815.

to within fifteen miles of Colombo. Their attempts were, however, repulsed. Reinforcements were sent to the island,[1] and the British became strong enough to retaliate. Several spirited incursions were made into the Kandyan territories, which served to check and intimidate the enterprises of the enemy. In 1805 the first Adigar acquired additional authority by the indisposition of the King; and a cessation of hostilities ensued, which was continued by mutual acquiescence, without any express armistice, for several years.[2]

Whatever may have been the designs of the Adigar, Pilame Talawe, in his negotiations with the English, he remained apparently faithful to his Sovereign, until the King's tyranny and cruelty taught him fears for his own life. He then engaged in open rebellion—was unsuccessful—was taken and beheaded. He was succeeded in his office by Ahailapalla, who in his turn incurred and resented the suspicion and tyranny of the King. He instigated a rebellion in the district of Jaffragam, over which he presided; but his adherents fell from him upon the approach of a rival Adhikar with the royal forces, and he was obliged to fly. He found refuge in Colombo; but many of his followers were taken and impaled. The King's savage cruelty now surpassed all that can be imagined of barbarian inhumanity. Among a number of persons who were seized and put to death with various aggravations of suffering, the family of the

[1] In 1804, two regiments of volunteer Sipahis went from Bengal. Native levies were also made in the Madras districts. A regiment of Caffrees was formed, and his Majesty's 66th regiment arrived.

[2] Cordiner's Ceylon, ii. 259.

fugitive Minister, which had remained in the tyrant's grasp, were sentenced to execution; the children, one of them an infant at the breast, were beheaded, the heads were cast into a rice-mortar, and the mother was commanded to pound them with the pestle, under the threat of being disgracefully tortured if she hesitated to obey. To avoid the disgrace, the wretched mother did lift up the pestle, and let it fall upon her children's heads. Her own death was an act of mercy. She, her sister-in-law, and some other females, were immediately afterwards drowned. These atrocities struck even the Kandyans with horror; and for two days the whole city was filled with mourning and lamentation, and observed a period of public fasting and humiliation. The King's ferocity was insatiable: executions were incessant, no persons were secure, and even the Chief Priest of Buddha, a man of great learning and benevolence, fell a victim to the tyrant's thirst for blood. A general sentiment of fear and detestation pervaded both chiefs and people, and the whole country was ripe for revolt.

The urgent representations of Ahailapalla, and a knowledge of the state of public feeling in the Kandyan provinces, induced the Governor, Sir Robert Brownrigg, to prepare for a war, which was certain to occur, in consequence of the disorders on the frontier, and the insane fury of the King. Occasion soon arose: some merchants, subjects of the British Government, trading to Kandy, were seized by the King's orders as spies, and so cruelly mutilated that most of them died; and about the same time a party of Kandyans ravaged the villages on the

1815.

British boundary. The Governor immediately declared war against the King, and sent a body of troops into his country.[1] They were joined by the principal chiefs and the people, and advanced, without meeting an enemy, to the capital. They arrived there on the 14th of February. On the 18th, the King, who had attempted to fly, was taken and brought in by a party of Ahailapalla's followers.[2] On the 2nd of March he was formally deposed,[3] and the allegiance of the Kandyans was transferred to the British Crown. Vikrama Raja Singha was sent a captive to Vellore, where he died in January, 1832.

The change of authority, and the substitution of a new and foreign dominion for that of the ancient native rulers, however acceptable under the influence of popular terror and disgust, began to lose their recommendations as soon as apprehension was allayed, and the chiefs and people were able calmly to consider the character of the revolution to which they had contributed. The chiefs found that their power was diminished and their dignity impaired; the priests felt indignant at the want of reverence shown to them and to their religion: and the people, sympathizing with both, had also grievances of their own to complain of, in the contempt displayed for their customs and institutions, and the disregard mani-

[1] Proclamation, 10th Jan., 1815. As. Journal, Feb., 1816. Account of the War in Kandy. Parl. Papers, 17th May, 1819.

[2] Narrative of Events in Ceylon.

[3] By a convention made between the Governor of Ceylon on the part of the King of Great Britain, and the Adigars, Dessaves, and other principal chiefs of the Kandyan provinces, on behalf of the inhabitants, in the presence of the head men and of the people, 2nd March, 1815.—Davy's Ceylon, Appendix, i. Parl. Papers, 17th May, 1819, No. 3.

fested for their prejudices and feelings by the English functionaries and their subordinates. A general rebellion was the consequence. It broke out at the end of 1817, and was headed by Kapitipalla, the brother-in-law of Ahailapalla, who, notwithstanding the protection he had received from the English, was suspected of having secretly fomented the insurrection, and was consequently arrested. 1817.

In the beginning of 1818 most of the Kandyan provinces were in arms against the British; and a pretender to the throne was brought forward in the person of an inferior Buddhist priest, who was falsely represented to be a member of the royal family. Troops were sent against the insurgents, but for some time with little success; as although they rarely met with open resistance, they were perpetually harassed by the natives, waylaid and cut off in detail; and this system of warfare, combined with the difficulty of the country, and the unhealthiness of the climate, inflicted so much loss and discouragement, that, after some months of unavailing exertion, it became a question whether the contest should not be abandoned.[1]

Reinforcements were earnestly applied for from the Presidencies of Bengal and Madras; and although the state of affairs on the continent of India rendered compliance with the requisition inconvenient, yet the urgency of the case compelled the Indian Governments to make an effort for the purpose; and one regiment of Europeans and several bat-

[1] Dr. Davy estimates the loss of the British at one thousand men. That of the natives at fully ten times that number.—p. 331.

BOOK II. CHAP. III.

1818.

talions of native troops were dispatched to Ceylon. Other circumstances contributed to encourage the Government to persevere: the people of the country had suffered even more severely than the British; their villages were burnt, their fruit-trees cut down, their crops laid waste, and they were driven to the thickets and mountains, among the wild tribes in the interior of the island. Exposure, hunger, and disease were equally fatal as the sword, which descended heavily upon them in retaliation of the cruelty they showed to stragglers who fell into their hands. Equally disheartened by the aspect of affairs, the chiefs quarrelled among themselves. The pretender was disavowed and exposed, and even put in the stocks by one of his former adherents. Three of the leaders of the insurrection were taken,—two of them, Kapitipalla and Madugalle, were tried and beheaded; the third, the son of Pilama Tulawe, was banished to the Mauritius, as were Ahailapalla and several other chiefs of inferior note. With their apprehension the disturbances ceased; for although the pretender escaped and remained at large until 1829, his cause found no supporters.[1] When ultimately seized, he was tried and condemned to death, but received a pardon from the Crown. Upon the restoration of tranquillity, various alterations were made in the mode of managing the Kaṇdyan provinces calculated to conciliate the good will of their inhabitants. The

[1] Another event which contributed to the pacification of the island was the recovery of the *dalada*, or tooth of Buddha, a sacred relic carefully preserved in the principal temple at Kandy, and occasionally exhibited to the devout. According to the superstitious belief of the people, the possession of this tooth ensures sovereignty.—See an account of its exhibition in Forbes, i. 290.

power of the Adigars and Desawes was circumscribed by associating with them European civilians in the administration of justice, and the collection of the revenue. The appointment of head men of the districts was taken from the chiefs, and reserved to the Government. All taxes were merged into a tax of one-tenth of the produce of the rice-fields, payable in kind.[1] Several minor provisions were enacted of a similar purport. The immediate effect of these arrangements was beneficial; and the people gradually came to be reconciled to the altered circumstances of their political condition.

Returning to the continent of India, we find that hostilities were carried on almost simultaneously with the Nepal war in a different and distant quarter, in consequence of which a political connexion was first established with the state of Cutch. The country had long been the scene of disorder. The authority of its nominal ruler, or Rao Raidhan, had been superseded by that of two adventurers,—the one, Hans-raj, a Hindu merchant, the other, Fatteh Mohammed, an officer of the Arab mercenaries in the service of the Rao. These two disputed the post of Minister, and divided between them the power of the Prince. Application had been frequently made by each of the competitors for the interference of the British Government; but as no advantage appeared likely to result from such interposition, it was declined. The quarrel was terminated by the death of Hans-

[1] Proclamation by Sir Robert Brownrigg, 21st Nov., 1818.—Davy's Ceylon, App. No. II.

1815.

raj, the Hindu, in 1809; and his rival, Fatteh Mohammed, continued in possession of the office of Minister until 1813, when his death, and that of the Rao, his master, left affairs even in a more troubled condition than had prevailed during their lives.

The Rao, under the influence of Fatteh Mohammed, had apostatized to the Mohammedan religion; and left a son, Manuba or Bharmalji, by a wife of the same faith. The Jhareja Rajputs, of whom the Rao was the head, and the other military tribes of Cutch, disputed Manuba's succession, holding him to be illegitimate and an outcast; and raised to the throne his cousin Lakhpati, or Ladhuba, the nephew of the late Rao.

Each of the competitors was supported by a party sufficiently powerful to neutralize the efforts of his opponents, and to prevent the establishment of any recognized authority. The slender control to which the chiefs had ever submitted was annulled, and a general state of anarchy prevailed in the province. No attempt was made to repress the disorder, until it became necessary to prevent its effects from extending to the territories, of which the defence was a duty imposed on the British Government by the terms of its alliance with the Gaekwar. The peninsula of Kattiwar is separated from Guzerat by the Ran, an extensive tract of low saline land, inundated partially by the sea, but at times capable of being traversed. It was crossed at all times by marauding bands from Wagar, the eastern portion of Cutch, the people of which, when the Ran was dry, came over to Kátti-

war in strong bodies of both horse and foot, and burnt the villages, carried off the cattle, and murdered the inhabitants. When the sea was in, they crossed it in boats, and committed similar depredations. The points of access were too numerous to be all sufficiently guarded; and the movements of the plunderers were too sudden and rapid to be effectively counteracted by the few troops stationed on the frontier. Remonstrances and threats were alike unavailing in preventing the repetition of these inroads, and the people exposed to them contemplated abandoning the country; when it was resolved to give them efficient protection by sending a body of troops against Bhooj, the capital of Cutch, where Bharmal-ji had been established in some degree of power by the acquiescence of the contumacious Jharejas, and had been reconciled with his cousin, who was a mere youth, and who resided also at the capital. Rao Bharmal-ji, however, manifested no inclination to endeavour to repress the incursions of the Wagar banditti, but on the contrary, contracted an alliance with their chiefs, and ordered the British native Agent to retire from Bhooj. 1815.

Under the settlement made by Major Walker in Kattiwar, the turbulent Rajputs of that province continued for some years peaceable and submissive; but towards the year 1814, the intrigues of the Peshwa generated a spirit of insubordination, which hurried some of the subordinate chiefs into acts of violence and rebellion. The troops of the Gaekwar, sent against them, were defeated, and Colonel East with part of the subsidiary force marched against

35228

1816.

the rebels.[1] They were afraid to encounter the British. The chief of Juria, one of the most considerable, gave up his fort, and the rest following his example, order was quickly restored.[2] So easy a suppression of the disturbances disappointed the policy of the Court of Cutch, which had dispatched a body of Arabs to the aid of the Khwas of Juria, and to punish this act of hostility, as well as effectually to put a stop to the depredations of the plunderers from Wagar, Colonel East was directed to advance into Cutch; and accordingly crossed the Ran, in December, 1815.

The first operations of the British were directed against Anjar, of which Hasan Meya, one of the sons of the late minister Fatteh Mohammed, had possessed himself. On the approach of the force, this chief professed to entertain friendly sentiments; but it was discovered that he had directed the wells and tanks of the neighbourhood to be poisoned, and in punishment of his treachery batteries were opened against the fort. When a practicable breach was effected, Hasan Meya gave up Anjar and the port of Juner on the Gulph of Cutch, one of its dependencies, which were occupied by a detachment of British troops. The force then proceeded towards Bhooj, but was met by a pacific deputation from the Rao, and an agreement was concluded, guaranteed by five chiefs, by which the Rao promised to indemnify the parties who had rights in Kattiwar for the losses suffered from the Wagar banditti, to reim-

[1] The force was his Majesty's 17th light dragoons and 65th foot. The (Bombay) European regiment, and the 6th, 7th, and 8th N. I., with a train of artillery, with above three thousand of the Gaekwar troops.

[2] See Government Gazette, Jan., 1816.

burse the British Government the expenses of the expedition, to prevent the commission of acts of piracy and plunder, and to receive an agent of the Bombay government at Bhooj. The fort and district of Anjar were ceded in perpetuity, and an annual payment of two lakhs of cowries (about 70,000 rupees) was pledged to the British Government. On their part, they undertook to assist the Rao in re-establishing his power over those places which had been alienated from him by the insubordination or treachery of his officers, and to chastise the robbers of Wagar and demolish their strongholds. A definitive treaty to this effect was executed on the 16th of January, 1816.[1] The latter stipulations were soon realised. The officers of the Rao hastened to relinquish their usurpations, and the plundering tribes of Wagar, retired to the north to the great sandy desert of Parkur before a British detachment. To prevent their return, the troops of the Rao were posted in commanding situations, and the marauders were for some time deterred from a repetition of their destructive inroads. 1816.

Having thus restored tranquillity in Cutch, and brought the principality within the pale of the system of subsidiary alliances, Colonel East was directed to take the only measure which experience had shown to be effective for the final suppression of piracy on the southern coast of the Gulph of Cutch by dispossessing the chiefs of the district of Okamandel of their forts and towns, and placing them

[1] Treaties with Native powers, published by order of the House of Commons, 27th May, 1818, p. 32.

1816.

under British authority. Little opposition was offered. The fort of Dingi was taken by storm; batteries were opened against the sacred city of Dwaraka, but the chief surrendered himself before the assault was given, and a Sipahi garrison took the place of his Sindhian mercenaries. The Raja of Bate also gave himself up on condition of an adequate provision being made for himself and family, and protection being assured to private property and the religious establishments on the island. At Wasaye a skirmish occurred in which Nur-ud-din, a notorious pirate and ringleader, was slain,—an event which materially accelerated the submission of the district. Colonel East then proceeded in the beginning of March to Junargerh, where order was in like manner speedily restored. The objects of the armament were thus accomplished, and the force returned to cantonments early in May. The district of Okamandal was in the following year transferred to the Gaekwar.

The connexion with the Court of Baroda had undergone no material alteration. The debts of the Gaekwar, for which the British Government had become the guarantee, although considerably reduced, had not yet been liquidated, and the incapacity of the Prince still continuing undiminished, the administration of affairs by Fatteh Sing, under the general superintendance and control of the Resident, remained unaltered, with the express sanction of the Court of Directors.[1] The administration had been

[1] Letter to Bengal, 19th March, 1815. "We have no hesitation in declaring that at least the time of our ceasing to interfere in the internal affairs of the Baroda State should be extended to the period when the debt should be liquidated."

strengthened by the addition of Gangadhar Sastri, Colonel Walker's able native assistant, as the associate of Fatteh Sing.

Active intrigues were kept on foot by a powerful party in the Court for the restoration of the discarded minister Sitaram Raoji to power, and every proposal to send him to a distance was successfully resisted, although his removal to Bombay was at length consented to. In the mean time, he had opened secret communications with the Peshwa, in which the Raja himself was implicated, the consequences of which were fatal to the head of the Mahratta state, as will be hereafter described.

Passing to the Mohammedan allies of the Company, with whom the existing relations were unaffected by the subsequent hostilities, we find that the friendly intercourse with the Court of Hyderabad was threatened with some interruption towards the close of 1815. The Nizam and the minister of his nomination, Munir-ul-Mulk, had alike withdrawn from all concern in public affairs, and devoting their whole time to low and sensual gratifications, committed, with sullen indifference, the charge of the state to the minister's nominal deputy Chandu Lal, who, depending for his power entirely upon British support, was assiduous in cultivating the good will of the Resident. Excluded from offices of credit and activity, the sons of the Nizam, abandoned to their own discretion, followed the example of the Court, and became notorious only by their excesses. The two youngest, Samsam-ud-dowla and Mubarik-ud-dowla, distinguished themselves in this outrageous career; and, surrounded by a band of profligate retainers

BOOK II. CHAP. III. 1816.

prompt to execute whatever their masters enjoined, these young men filled the city with tumult and alarm, and excited the aversion and terror of the peaceable citizens by their contempt for all authority and law.[1] Repeated representations of the evil consequences of their conduct were made by the Resident, and the Nizam was, after some time, prevailed upon to direct that they should be placed under restraint and that guards should be stationed at their dwellings. Captain Hare, with a party of the Nizam's regular infantry, was commanded to execute the order; but, on his approach to the palace, he was received with a heavy fire of matchlocks from the tops of the houses, by which several of his men and Lieutenant Darby, an officer of the Resident's escort, were killed. The party made their way nevertheless to the palace and blew open the gates, but the resistance they encountered from the Prince's adherents was too formidable to be overcome, and Captain Hare deemed it prudent to retreat. He was reinforced by 100 European and 400 native troops, who took up their station for the night at the residence of the minister. Much alarm was felt by the Nizam and his principal courtiers at the advance of the European detachments; but this subsided when its weakness was known, and some of the principal Omras urged the Nizam to fall upon the Residency

[1] Among other lawless acts, they established a tribunal of their own, in which judgment was avowedly given in favour of those who most liberally bribed the judges, notwithstanding the groundlessness of their claims. The rightful owners of houses and gardens were dispossessed of their property in behalf of any one who chose to assert a claim to them, and who purchased the award of the Prince and the services of his myrmidons. The Nizam himself and the members of his family were not safe from their insolence, and the immunities of the Resident were invaded by the seizure and corporal castigation of one of his servants.

and exterminate its defenders. A general ferment pervaded the city, and a popular sentiment was expressed that Mubarik-ud-dowla was alone a worthy descendant of Nizam-ul-Mulk, and that if he would hold out he should not want support. The moment was critical. The subsidiary force had been sent into the field and a small division only remained in cantonments. In addition to the numerous population of Hyderabad there remained in the neighbourhood ten thousand Patan soldiers, whom the minister was engaged in disbanding, and who would gladly have joined in any tumult. The firmness of the Nizam who, on this occasion, showed that, when roused to action, he did not want ability, and the prudence of the Resident prevented a collision. The Europeans were withdrawn from the city—no movement of the people or of the chiefs was sanctioned or encouraged, and measures were promptly taken to obtain reinforcements. General Doveton was summoned from Akole, and troops were also required from Bellari. Although Chandu-Lul was afraid to press the confinement of the Princes, the measure was insisted on, and, with some reluctance, was acceded to by the Nizam. The interval that elapsed before the troops could arrive, allowed the Princes an opportunity of discovering the dangerous predicament in which they stood, and they no longer opposed the Nizam's pleasure. They were sent off to Golconda, where were the remains of a palace of the Mohammedan kings of the country and an extensive fort. Tranquillity was restored before the arrival of the additional troops, and their march was countermanded—an extensive rising of the Mohamme-

1816.

BOOK II. CHAP. III. 1814.

dans of Hyderabad, headed by the princes or by the Nizam, would at this season have seriously embarrassed the Government of India.

The discussions which took place with the Nawab of Oude during the latter years of Lord Minto's administration have been described. Approving entirely of the manner in which the Resident had urged the reforms which the Government of Bengal pressed upon the Nawab's adoption, one of that nobleman's last acts was, as we have seen, the expression, in strong terms, of his determination to uphold the measures and enforce the recommendations of the Governor-General's representative at the Court of Lucknow. Nothing seemed to be left to the Nawab but to submit, when the arrival of Lord Moira suggested the hope that a less unrelenting policy might be pursued. He was not disappointed. The habits of his past life had taught the Governor-General to sympathise with royalty in distress: and although he concurred in the principle of reform, and in the expedience of the particular arrangement which had been devised for the administration of Oude, he conceived that the Nawab had been treated with less deference than was due to his rank, or was consistent with the nature of the connection which united him with the East India Company. He determined, therefore, to adopt a tone of conciliation,[1] and enjoined the Resident to refrain

[1] Major Baillie ascribes the change of purpose which took place in the counsels of the Government, to private influence and intrigues at Calcutta; a negotiation was carried on there, he says, for his removal, for effecting which, the Vizir offered twenty-five lakhs of rupees. An English gentleman was noticed as an agent in the negotiation without mention of his name.—Letter from the Resident, 3rd Nov., 1815. Oude Papers, printed for the use of the Proprietors of India Stock, June, 1824, p. 563.

from agitating questions of minor consideration, which, while they led to no important result, could not fail to excite irritation and dissatisfaction in the mind of the Nawab. Finally, perceiving that the Nawab's consent and co-operation in the proposed measures of reform were not to be hoped for, and believing that to insist upon their being carried into effect without his cordial concurrence, would amount to a dissolution of the existing relations between the two states, the Governor-General determined to relinquish the specific plan proposed by Lord Minto, and confine the object of the Government to obtaining from the Nawab such measures of reform as he should himself propose, although of more limited scope and efficacy. Compliance with such suggestions, coming from the Prince himself, would, his Lordship expected, have a beneficial effect, and would prepare the way for more advantageous innovations. A letter to this purport was addressed to the Nawab Vizir, and for the remainder of his life, which was not long protracted, the question was at rest. Sadat Ali died on the 11th of July, 1814. He was succeeded by his eldest son, who assumed the designation of Ghazi-ud-din Hyder.[1]

The gratitude which was felt by the new Sovereign towards Major Baillie for the prompt and judicious arrangements by which upon the demise of Sadat Ali he had guarded against all risk of op-

[1] The success with which Sadat Ali prosecuted his favourite project of amassing wealth, was proved by the accumulated treasure found in his coffers; his hoards amounted to thirteen millions sterling, the accumulation of eleven years. — Comm. Committee, 1832. Political Evidence of Col. Baillie.

1814.

position[1] to the succession, rendered the Nawab at first amenable to the advice of the Resident. His Ministers were chosen upon the recommendation of that officer, and as they looked to him for support, they were ready to become the instruments of accomplishing his wishes. No time was lost in instituting the revenue reforms which he had so strenuously advocated. The Principality of Oude was portioned out into Zillas and Mahals, and Collectors on the part of the Government were deputed to the latter, subject to the superior authority of the Zilla-dar Nazim, or Lieutenant-Governor of the larger district. Arrangements for the administration of justice were also proposed, and an attempt was likewise made to introduce an armed police; but the opposition of the villagers to this part of the project was so universal and vehement, that its prosecution was suspended. The new system of collection was scarcely less unpopular, and was far from realising the benefits which were expected to result from it. It was in fact an injudicious repetition of the mistake committed in the Company's territories, that of prematurely forcing upon the people institutions foreign to their habits, strange to their notions, and repulsive to their feelings. Troops were still required, therefore, to compel payment of the revenues, and their collection was as uncertain and

[1] Some had been expected from Shams-ud-dowla, the second and favourite son of Sadat Ali, who, during his father's life-time, had been appointed the Deputy (Naib) and Representative (Kaim Mokam) of the Nawab, and to whom Sadat Ali had apparently desired to bequeath his power. No time was given for a party to be formed in his favour. To prevent subsequent dissension he was persuaded to retire to Benares upon a pension from Lucknow, guaranteed by the British Government.—Oude Papers, 869.

irregular as before; while to the imperfect apprehension of the Nawab the payment of the collectors by a per-centage rate upon the amount collected, appeared to be an unnecessary and unreasonable deduction from his own receipts. Ghazi-ud-din, therefore, soon withdrew his confidence, both from the Resident and from his own Ministers, looking upon them as the creatures and spies of the former. There were not wanting in his court intriguing individuals to aggravate the Nawab's dissatisfaction, and, he became no less anxious than his father had been to accomplish Major Baillie's removal from his councils.

The Earl of Moira, in order to be near the scene of action in the Nepal war, had repaired to the Upper Provinces, and arrived at Cawnpore in October 1814. He was immediately visited by the young Nawab, and returned with him shortly afterwards to Lucknow. On this occasion the Nawab offered to the Company, as his free gift, a crore of rupees, about a million sterling.[1] Acceptance of the gift was declined; but the money was received as a loan, which the charges of the approaching campaign rendered highly opportune. The amount was accordingly registered as an item of the public debt, bearing interest at 6 per cent.,—the current rate; the interest being applied to the acquittance of sundry pensions which were payable by the Nawab, under the guarantee of the government of Bengal.

[1] Political Letter from Bengal, Aug., 1815.—Papers, 846. The offer was not, however, an original idea. The Resident says, "I was instructed to open a negotiation with the Vizir for the loan of a crore of rupees to the Honourable Company, to appear as a voluntary offer to Lord Moira."—Papers, 952.

BOOK II. CHAP. III.

1815.

The arrangement was advantageous to the pensioners as well as mutually convenient to the contracting parties. On this occasion[1] the Nawab presented a paper, which, although obscurely worded, manifested some degree of dissatisfaction with his actual condition; expressed a desire that the system of collection should be suspended in favour of a plan to be subsequently proposed; and clearly intimated the wish of the Nawab to be made more independent of the Resident's control, although professing a personal attachment to Major Baillie, and a firm reliance upon the reciprocity of his regard.[2]

Private information having reached the Governor-General that the Nawab had not unreservedly and sincerely communicated his wishes and sentiments with respect to the Resident, having been deterred from so doing by Lord Moira's having recommended to him to place implicit reliance upon Major Baillie's counsels, some pains were taken to induce him to be more explicit. Several conferences ensued, not only with the Governor-General, but with members both of his civil and military staff.[3] From the former the Nawab continued to withhold his entire confidence; but to some of the latter he imparted with different degrees of explicitness his anxiety for Major Baillie's removal. He also delivered to Mr. Ricketts, the chief secretary, and to the Governor-General two several statements, alike in tenor, in which he preferred a number of complaints against

[1] Minute of the Governor-General, 30th Nov., 1814.—Oude Papers, 920.

[2] 13th Oct.—Papers, 870.

[3] Conversation with Captain Gilbert, about 29th Oct., Oude Papers, 922. Conference with Mr. Ricketts, 31st Oct., ibid. p. 875. Ditto with Messrs. Ricketts, Adam, and Swinton, 4th Nov. Ibid. 885.

the conduct of the Resident on various occasions, as disrespectful and vexatious, or as encroaching upon the rights and derogatory to the dignity of the Nawab. Both these documents were presented in the course of the 31st of October. On the 1st of November they were retracted. A confidential agent was sent by the Nawab to disavow the averments of the preceding day—declaring that the statements delivered by him did not express his sentiments, and that they had been prepared and put into his hands by European gentlemen attached to his service, who had persuaded him that any representations unfavourable to the Resident would be agreeable to Lord Moira. A similar disavowal was repeated by the Nawab, in a letter to Lord Moira, and in a conference with Mr. Ricketts, Mr. Adam, and Mr. Swinton, in which the principal subjects of complaint, as exhibited in the papers, were deliberately canvassed. They were all disowned, and were referred to the advice of evil counsellors, who had led him to believe that their tenor would be acceptable to the Governor-General. Inferring, however, from the language and deportment of his Lordship, that this information was erroneous, and actually entertaining no cause of complaint against the Resident, the Nawab hastened to withdraw the accusations which had been put into his mouth, and declared his readiness to punish his prompters by their immediate dismissal.[1] They were accordingly dismissed, although they unequivocally denied having had any concern in preparing the documents, or in having influenced the Nawab to present them to the Go-

[1] Papers, 885

BOOK II. CHAP. III. 1815.

vernor-General. It cannot be doubted that their assertions were true, although they had been repeatedly the confidants of the Nawab's grievances; had apparently sympathized with him; and had assured him that a candid and open exposition would command the Governor-General's attention.[1] The motives of the Nawab's sudden change of purpose are among the worthless secrets of an intriguing Court: his first representations may not have been free from sinister influences, but there is no reason to question the reality of his desire to get rid of the Resident, or to doubt that he sacrificed both his friends and his veracity to a sudden and ungrounded dread of having incurred the Governor-General's displeasure by the open avowal of a wish which, contrary to his expectation, appeared to be unacceptable to his Lordship.[2] The manner in which he pursued and abandoned his design is characteristic of Asiatic duplicity, as well as of unsteadiness of purpose and irresoluteness of execution.

The charges made by the Nawab were communicated to the Resident, and were shown by him to be, in many instances, frivolous, unfounded, or

[1] Papers, 905.—The Resident ascribes this attempt to have him removed to a conspiracy set on foot by Hakim Mehdi Ali Khan, who had been removed from the office of Prime Minister to the late Nawab, at the Resident's suggestion, as he was a principal opponent of the plan of reform, being a farmer of the revenue to a considerable extent. His object was to be restored to his appointment, which he knew was impossible while Major Baillie held office.—Papers, p. 955. On the other hand, it appears probable the Nawab's retractation was owing to a panic inspired by the Aga Mír, a personal friend of the Nawab, who, besides his apprehensions of the consequences of his master's complaints, since they had failed to impair the Resident's credit, probably expected by this means to secure the Resident's support in his appointment as the successor of Mehdi Ali. The interested rivalry of these two persons seems to have been the pivot round which the other parts of the plot revolved.

[2] See Baillie's account.—Oude Papers, 957.

false.[1] Some originated, apparently, in misunderstanding, and others out of the ungracious duties inseparable from his office under the instructions of the Government. As, however, they were withdrawn, no further investigation was considered necessary. A final representation was made by the Nawab, the objects of which were to secure the integrity of his dominions, and to reserve the right of ruling his own territories, of determining the course to be followed in his fiscal and judicial administration, and of electing the persons to be employed; to deprecate the attention of the Government to complaints against his measures preferred by his relations and dependants, to be allowed permission to bestow charitable endowments, and to have the privilege of going out on hunting-parties whenever so inclined. The requests were generally granted, and, in communicating the correspondence to the Resident, instructions were added with regard to the spirit in which his functions were to be exercised, and the connexion with the Nawab maintained. According to Lord Moira's view of that connexion, the right to interfere with advice or remonstrance upon any mismanagement of affairs within the Nawab's reserved dominions was confined to such occasions as might injuriously affect the British interests. In all other respects the administration of the Nawab was to be absolutely free, for it seemed evident to the Governor-General, from the whole tenor of the treaty, that an uninterrupted exercise of his own authority within the reserved dominions was assured to him in order to qualify the

[1] Letter from the Resident, 9th Nov.—Papers, p. 96.

BOOK II. CHAP. III. 1815.

very strong step of appropriating, in exchange for the subsidy, so large a portion of his territories. The Nawab was consequently to be treated in all public observance as "an independent Prince."[1] Agreeably to this recognition, the conduct of the Resident was to be regulated by the deference due to regal rank, and to be characterised by a respectful urbanity and a strict fulfilment of established ceremonials. In an especial manner he was to refrain from countenancing or encouraging any servant of the Nawab in contumacious opposition to his master, and from recommending any person from his own household for reception into the Nawab's immediate service. By adherence to these, and similar injunctions, the Governor-General hoped that both the actual Resident and his successors would obtain from the Nawab a willing compliance on every occasion where it might be necessary to interpose advice. With these monitory instructions the inquiry terminated, and cordiality was apparently restored. It was not of long duration.

In the month of March following, as the war expenditure still continued, recourse to the hoards of Sadat Ali again became convenient, and the Resident, acting in obedience to the orders of the Governor-General, extracted from the Nawab a second crore of Rupees. Although Ghazi-ud-din complied with the application, his unwilling consent seems to have confirmed his estrangement from the Resident, and rendered him still more than ever hostile to all projects of reform. The Resident, ascribing their imperfect success to underhand oppo-

[1] Papers, 919.

sition, offended by the removal from the Nawab's councils of persons whom he supported, and upon whom he relied, and weakened in influence as well as wounded in feeling by the distrust implied in Lord Moira's private inquiries, and public injunctions, could no longer restrain his indignation. A letter, dated the 29th of April, but not transmitted till the 20th of September, was addressed by him to the Governor-General, in which he vindicated his conduct, and ascribed the proceedings of the Nawab to factious intrigues, encouraged by the prejudice cherished against him by Lord Moira. The Governor-General thought it incumbent upon him to reply, and exonerate himself from the imputation of unfairness, or prejudice against the Resident: doing justice to the character of that officer for integrity and zeal, but avowing his conviction of his having, in his intercourse with both the late and present Nawab, exhibited a grasping and domineering disposition, which justified the jealousy and resentment felt by both the Princes. As it was impossible that the confidence and harmony which should subsist between the Governor-General and his representative at the Court of Lucknow could longer be maintained, the Governor-General, with the concurrence of his council, removed Major Baillie from his office, and left the Nawab of Oudè to the uncontrolled constitution of his own cabinet, and the absolute direction of his own domestic administration.

Thus terminated a dissension which is deserving of record for the illustration it affords of the incidents likely to trouble the equable current of a connection of the nature of that established with the sovereign

BOOK II. CHAP. III. 1815.

of Oude. That Major Baillie should be an object of dislike to Sadat Ali and his successor was inevitable, from the irksome duties he was appointed to discharge, and the zeal with which he engaged in them: it was impossible, whatever they might profess, that these Princes could have felt a sincere regard for an individual who pressed upon them, with unchanging pertinacity, reforms which they were secretly resolved never to carry into operation. They might, perhaps, have made a distinction between the individual and the functionary, and felt for Major Baillie the regard which they witheld from the Resident; but it is clear from Major Baillie's own language, as exhibited in his correspondence, that he took little care to soften the harshness of his public acts by the suavity of his private manners. He is ever importunate and dictatorial; not unfrequently disrespectful; and occasionally insulting. This is most manifest in his intercourse with Sadat Ali. The evidence is less ample in regard to Ghazi-ud-din, but the precipitancy with which the projected reforms were set on foot, and the interference exercised with the court patronage, combined with his ordinary deportment to intimidate and offend the Nawab. The want of candour and consistency in the latter, which nullified his own purposes, were in part inseparable from the Asiatic character, but were in part also attributable to his inability to discriminate between the private feelings and public principles of an individual exercising the high office of Governor-General. Undoubtedly Lord Moira was prejudiced against Major Baillie, and had imbibed and strengthened

his prejudices from sources scarcely worthy of his exalted station—the private information of unofficial persons. This bias was not, however, derived solely from this cause, and was taken, in part, from the tone of the Resident's correspondence which jarred with his high sentiments of loyal deference to princely rank. Whatever were his prepossessions, however, he founded upon them no public proceedings injurious to the Resident; and, entirely satisfied with that officer's ability and uprightness, retained him in his post, and recommended to the Nawab to place entire confidence in his judgment and friendship. It was not to be expected, however, that the degree of independence which he had acknowledged in the Nawab, would dispose that Prince to follow his recommendation, or would be palatable to the political representative who, long fortified by the unqualified confidence of the Government, had possessed little less than regal sway throughout the principality of Oude. His retirement was, therefore, unavoidable for the preservation of a good understanding with the Court of Lucknow, and was followed by a perfect cordiality which was cemented by the events of succeeding years.[1]

The internal tranquillity of the British dominions suffered at this time partial interruptions, which, although not affecting the permanent preservation of public order, or impairing the credit and authority of the Government, exhibited characteristic illustrations of the difficulty of legislating for a people

[1] The second loan was commuted by treaty with the Nawab for Khyraghur and the country between the Gogra and the North Eastern Boundary of Oude, 1st May, 1816.

BOOK II. CHAP. III. 1815.

imperfectly known by those who enacted or administered their laws, and who as imperfectly appreciated the real objects and intentions of their rulers; in other words, of the difficulty of governing a people without admitting them to any participation in the conduct of their own affairs. Disturbances, which for a time assumed a serious aspect, broke out in the Western provinces, and in Cuttack. The former were speedily repressed by a prompt and vigorous exertion of the power of the Government: the latter were of more protracted continuance, and were at last quelled rather by conciliatory than rigorous measures.

It was noticed on a former occasion, that in consequence of the opposition made to the imposition of a tax on houses, the Government of Bengal had adopted a different mode of providing for the cost of the municipal police,[1] and had empowered the chief inhabitants in several of the towns to assess themselves in the amount necessary to defray the support of a sufficient number of watchmen, or choukidars. The plan being found to succeed in the cities in which it was first introduced, was extended in the beginning of 1814 to other towns in the Lower Provinces, and in the course of the same year to those places in the districts of Benares and Bareilly which were the stations of the magistrates, to whom was entrusted the duty of effecting the requisite arrangements.[1]

The regulation thus enacted by the Government was not at all palatable to the towns to which it was to be applied, but after some little delay the

[1] Reg. iii., 1814, and xvi., 1814.

repugnance of the people was overcome everywhere, except in Bareilly. This city was the residence of a considerable population, many of whom were of Afghan descent, and were notorious for their military propensities and impetuous disposition. Among them, also, were the representatives of families formerly of rank and consideration, which were reduced to comparative insignificance by the change of Government, and the members of which were consequently discontented with the present state of affairs. A similar spirit pervaded this class of Mohammedans throughout the province; and, although no acts of oppression or injustice could be charged against the Government, yet a system that sought to render all alike amenable to public justice was peculiarly distasteful to men who regarded themselves superior to all law, and able to protect their own rights and avenge their own wrongs. The defects of the judicial administration—its expensiveness and delay—the unrelenting, and, in some instances, excessive assessments on the land, and the procrastination of a settlement either for a stated period, or in perpetuity, enhanced the unpopularity which difference of origin and religion affixed to a foreign Government. Neither was the past forgotten; and the defeat of the Rohillas at Bithora, twenty-two years before, which was currently attributed, not to the superior valour or discipline of the victors, but to the treachery of their own leaders, still rankled in the hearts of the people of Rohilkhand. Local causes of popular animosity also prevailed. The Kotwal, or head of the Police, was a Hindu of an overbearing and tyrannical disposition, and the European magistrate, by re-

1815.

BOOK II. CHAP. III. 1815.

served and uncourteous manners, had given so much offence to the most respectable of the inhabitants, that they avoided as much as possible all private and friendly intercourse with him. He had thus deprived himself of the most natural and efficacious means of influencing the feelings and conduct of the people.

In this temper of men's minds the new regulation was promulgated. The repugnance felt by the natives of India to any new impost was immediately displayed, although in the present instance it could scarcely be regarded as a novelty, as in those parts of the town, where the principal shops were situated, the inhabitants had been long accustomed to assess themselves with a moderate rate for the express purpose of maintaining a municipal police. The only grounds of objection were, therefore, the augmented amount of the tax, and its universal application, falling upon those who had been hitherto exempt, and who were chiefly the more respectable and influential householders—the impoverished gentry of Bareilly. To these circumstances were to be added the fear, that if this impost were introduced, it would be a prelude to others, and the knowledge of the success with which resistance to the house tax had been attended at Benares, further encouraged the people of Bareilly to resist the execution of the law. Few of the principal men would undertake the apportionment and collection of the tax in their respective divisions, and those who at first assented, were compelled by pasquinades and popular songs, by abuse and threats, to evade or decline the fulfilment of the duty. Frequent assemblages of the people were

held, especially at the house of the Mufti Mohammed Aiwaz, an individual of great age and reputed sanctity, who was held in profound veneration throughout Rohilkhand, and who was induced by the persuasions of some designing and discontented persons of consideration in the town to countenance the popular excitement. The proceedings of the people seem at first to have been modelled after those at Benares; business stood still, the shops were shut, and multitudes assembled near the magistrate's office to petition for the abolition of the tax; but as their application was unavailing, they were soon weary of such moderate means of seeking redress, and in harmony with their natural temperament, assumed a more menacing and formidable attitude.

Finding that the opposition of the people was not to be overcome through the agency of the higher classes, the magistrate, Mr. Dumbleton, commanded the assessment to be made by the Kotwal, who aggravated the popular indignation by threatening the lower orders with the stocks, and the superior with chains and imprisonment, if they continued refractory. The actual collection of the tax was commenced by the magistrate in person, and by his orders the shop of a recusant trader was forcibly entered, and property to the amount of the sum assessed was distrained for sale. In the execution of his commands, a woman in the shop received a wound from some of the Police Peons, and as soon as the Magistrate had withdrawn, she was placed on a bed, and carried by the people to the Mufti. By his direction she was conveyed to the residence of the Magistrate, who ordered that she should lodge

BOOK II. CHAP. III. 1816.

her complaint in due form in the chief criminal court. The people carried her back to the Mufti, who exclaimed, that if such was the Magistrate's justice, no man's life or honour was safe in Bareilly; and that it was high time for him to leave the town. It does not appear that the injury inflicted on the woman was very severe, but the little regard paid to the case exasperated the angry feelings that prevailed.

As the excitement continued to increase, and numerous mobs of both Mohammedans and Hindus, assembled in the streets of Bareilly, and in the vicinity of the Mufti's residence, the Magistrate apprehended a serious breach of the public peace, and deemed it necessary to disperse the multitude. For this purpose he repaired on the 16th of April to the city, attended by a few horsemen and about thirty Sipahis of the provincial battalion. Upon his approach a rumour spread abroad that he was coming to apprehend the person of the Mufti, and place him in confinement; and the old man, either apprehending, or feigning to apprehend, the disgrace of being dragged to prison, left his home to take sanctuary in a shrine in the suburbs of the city, held in peculiar reverence by the Mohammedans. The mob fell back as the magistrate's party advanced, but when near the Mufti's residence they turned, and in order to cover his flight, barred further access. The horsemen who were sent to clear the passage were resolutely resisted by the people, who were armed with swords and pikes, and two of the troopers were killed and several wounded. The Sipahis then fired, but, although many fell, the rioters stood their ground

until the escape of Mohammed Aiwaz was secured: they then dispersed. The Mufti received a slight wound in the affray, but he effected his retreat to the shrine of Shahdara, and there his associates hoisting the green flag of Islam, proclaimed that the religion of the faithful was in danger. He was immediately joined by a great part of the armed population of the town, and letters having been dispatched to the surrounding districts, numbers of resolute and enthusiastic Mohammedans flocked to his rescue, particularly from the towns of Pilibhit, Shahjehanpur, and Rampur, the two last being comprised in the independent Jagir of Ahmed Ali Khan, the Nawab of Rampur. Religious enthusiasm, national aversion, and the love of tumultuous excitement, thus combined to attract recruits to the standard, and, in the course of two days, assembled some five or six thousand men, armed with swords and matchlocks, scarcely knowing for what they were about to contend, but not the less resolved to peril their lives in the contest.[1]

On their part, the European functionaries were active in preparing for the encounter. The force at their disposal consisted only of about two hundred

[1] Great exaggeration prevailed in the reported numbers of the insurgents. They were said to amount to five thousand matchlockmen, seven thousand swordsmen, and a large body armed with spears and clubs. One thousand five hundred matchlocks were said to have come from Pilibhit alone, the whole of the Pilibhit party not exceeding three or four hundred. About the same number moved from Rampur, but did not all arrive in time. There is nowhere any exact report of the number engaged, but that stated in the text seems to be most probable. Had time permitted, the multitude would have greatly increased, as many bodies were on the march, when news of the result of the action sent them back.—Asiatic Monthly Journal, Jan. 5, 1817. In the evidence of Major Macan, he states that ten or fifteen thousand men assembled in 1816 at Bareilly.—Comm. Comm. Evid. Military, p. 209.

BOOK II. CHAP. III. 1816.

and seventy men of the 2nd battalion of the 27th regiment of Native infantry, with two guns, under Captain Boscawen, and one hundred and fifty of a Provincial Battalion commanded by Lieut. Lucas. Two companies of the former were immediately posted near the mosque to keep the Mufti and his adherents in check, while the cantonments and European residents were under the protection of the remainder. Application for reinforcements was dispatched to the nearest stations, and Captain Cunningham, with a regiment of irregular horse, and Major Richards, with the 2nd battalion of the 13th N. I., marched immediately from Moradabad; both corps made forced marches, and the former arrived on the ground on the 19th, the latter on the 21st. In the mean time, repeated conferences were held with the Mufti and his chief adherents by officers deputed by the magistrate. The Mufti would willingly have listened to terms, but he could not allay the storm which he had been so instrumental in arousing; and many of the more respectable individuals, including the members of the family of Hafiz Rehmat, who had at first joined the insurgents, withdrew, and left them to the ungovernable passions, which listened to no controul. The rioters declared that they would not be satisfied, nor retire, unless the Choukidar tax was abolished—the Kotwal was delivered up to them to suffer the law of retaliation for the blood shed on the 16th; provision was made for the families of those who fell on that occasion, and a general pardon was proclaimed. As compliance with these demands was refused, they hastened to a decision of the struggle before the junction of the

13th, of the approach of which they were aware. On the morning of the 21st they signalized their purpose by murdering a young gentleman, the son of Mr. Leycester, one of the Judges of the Court of Circuit, as he passed peaceably and unarmed from one military post to another. This was followed by an onset upon the troops who were drawn out to receive them. A short distance divided the encampment of the infantry from that of the irregular horse; the intervening space, a plain covered with Mohammedan tombs, was occupied by the rioters. Their first attack was made upon the Sipahis, whom they greatly outnumbered and surrounded. Being formed in a square the troops repulsed every charge, although the assailants fought with fury; some of them making their way into the square, where they were cut down or bayoneted. On his side, Captain Cunningham's horse charged the masses of the multitude, and threw them into confusion. Repulsed in their forward movements, they took up their ground in a grove defended by a low wall, but were soon driven out of it by the troops, who pursued them into the old town and set fire to the huts in which they had taken shelter. This put an end to the conflict. The insurgents dispersed, leaving between three and four hundred dead, and a greater number wounded and taken prisoners. The loss of the troops was inconsiderable.[1] The arrival of the 13th soon after secured the victory. The result of this engagement was a legitimate subject of congratulation, as the success of the rioters would, in all probability, have been a signal for the rising of the whole province, and

[1] Twenty-one killed, sixty-two wounded.

1816.

the commencement of an insurrection, which could not have been suppressed without much loss of life and the aggravated hatred of the people. The town submitted peaceably to the regulations. Of the rioters, the Mufti and some of the principal ring-leaders quitted the Company's territories, and were never allowed to return. A few of those who were apprehended were brought to trial before the Court of Circuit, but were dismissed, after some detention, for want of evidence to convict them; the greater number were at once pardoned, and set at liberty on promise of good behaviour at the suggested intercession of their countrymen in the ranks both of the Provincial corps and the Rohilla horse, who had faithfully discharged their duty, although in deadly conflict with many of their relatives and friends; the principles of military honour and allegiance silencing, in a remarkable manner, on this occasion, the promptings of natural affection. Great courage and constancy were displayed in the suppression of the tumult, but it would probably not have occurred had the people of Bareilly been taught to regard those placed in authority over them with confidence and good-will.[1]

The other proceedings in the western provinces, although of a more imposing character, involved considerations of inferior importance, as popular feeling was rather in unison with, than arrayed against, the measures of the Government. The for-

[1] A Committee of Inquiry was appointed by the Government to investigate the causes of the disturbance, the conduct of the public officers, and the state of public feeling in Rohilkhand. The details in the text are taken chiefly from the report made in consequence in August, 1816, and from the accompanying documents furnished.—MS. Records.

bearance or negligence of former administrations had allowed a few of the great Talukdars of the Doab to retain many of the privileges which the most considerable of their order had usurped, during the preceding times of anarchy; and although the districts, for the revenues of which they were held accountable, were not intended to be exempted from the jurisdiction of the Company's officers, yet, no measures had been formally adopted to bring them within the sphere of the regulations. The Talukdars were silently suffered to exercise supreme judicial authority within their own estates, to regulate their own police, to keep up large bodies of military followers, and to convert their places of residence into fortresses of formidable extent and strength. Of these petty chieftains, one of the most considerable was Dayaram, Talukdar or Zemindar of a number of villages in the Doab, in the district of Aligerh. His residence was at the fort and adjacent walled town of Hatras. The fort was of the usual construction of similar strongholds, built of mud, or rather of sun-dried clay, having walls of great height and thickness, with towers at the angles, mounting a number of guns, and defended by a very broad and deep ditch. The town was also protected by a wall and a ditch. The force kept up by Dayaram was about eight thousand strong, of which three thousand five hundred were horse. 1816.

The consequences of possessing so many of the attributes of independence were a belief in its reality and a spirit of opposition to any interference with its exercise. While professing obedience to the will of the Government, the authority of its officers

BOOK II. CHAP. III.

1816.

was perpetually evaded or defied, and although the revenue was duly discharged, yet the means by which it was collected were often oppressive and tyrannical, and the villagers in vain appealed to the protection of the paramount power: any attempt to enforce either civil or criminal justice within the Taluk was baffled or resisted: criminals were either openly sheltered, or covertly enabled to escape from punishment, and gangs of robbers were permitted to fix their head-quarters in the country of the Talukdar, on condition of paying him a share of the spoils, levied from the adjacent districts. These evils had been frequently noticed by the Government, the Landholders menaced with its displeasure, and the judicial officers directed to carry the regulations into effect; but the demolition of their forts was an indispensable preliminary to the humiliation of their possessors, and this it had not hitherto been found convenient or deemed prudent to attempt. The Governor-General in Council now determined to take advantage of the concentration of troops in progress in the Western Provinces, and to accomplish the extinction of the power of the contumacious landholders, if necessary, by military operations. Dayaram, as the most powerful and most audacious, was accordingly required to testify the sincerity of his profession of allegiance, by disbanding his troops and dismantling his fortress of Hatras; and a strong division,[1] under the command of Ge-

[1] It consisted of the 8th and 24th light dragoons, 3rd and 7th N. C., 1st and 2nd Rohilla horse and rocket troop; his Majesty's 14th and 87th regiments, and of Native Infantry, the 2nd battalion of the 1st, 1st battalion of the 11th, 2nd battalion of the 12th, 2nd battalion of the 15th, 2nd battalion of the 25th, 21st battalion of the 29th, and 2nd grenadier battalion.

neral Marshall, took the field in the beginning of the year, to show that the requisition was not to be trifled with.

The troops employed against Hatras marched from the several military stations of Cawnpur, Muttra, and Meerut, early in February, and the fort was completely invested by the 12th of that month. Overtures of submission were made by Dayaram, but the demolition of his strong hold was a condition to which he could not be prevailed upon to yield, and recourse being necessarily had to compulsion, batteries were opened against the town and fort, and a vigorous bombardment was kept up upon the latter. A practicable breach was effected in the walls of the town by the 23rd, but the garrison avoided a storm, and evacuated the place on the following morning. The bombardment of the fort continued with increased activity, and most of the buildings were in ruins. On the 2nd of March, a shell made its way into the powder magazine, and was followed by a tremendous explosion, which completed the work of desolation within the ramparts. The besieged still maintained a show of resistance, and returned the fire of the batteries; but Dayaram, now convinced of the futility of resistance, and alarmed for his safety, effected his escape at midnight with a small body of retainers. They were encountered by a party of the dragoons, but made good their retreat, after inflicting more loss than they suffered, being armed with back and

Besides artillery and pioneers, the ordnance comprised seventy-one mortars and howitzers, and thirty-four battering guns (24 and 18-pounders), besides 12-pounders for enfilading; the whole under the direction of Major Anbury as chief engineer.

BOOK II. CHAP. III. 1816.

breast-plates and gauntlets of steel. The alarm being given, the troops were immediately ordered to the gates, and, after overcoming some resistance from those of the garrison who were endeavouring to escape, they gained possession of the fortress. The capture of Hatras secured the ready submission of the other refractory landholders; and such anomalous structures, as mud forts, and fortified villages, disappeared from among the dwellings of a peaceful population. Dayaram took refuge with Amir Khan, but, in the course of two years, was allowed to return to the Company's territories, upon his promise of submission, and ultimately received a pension in lieu of the emoluments he had formerly derived from his fiscal agency between the village community and the state.

The countries extending along the Western frontier, from the south of Behar to the Northern Circars, partake of the same general character, and consist, for the most part, of low ranges of hills, offshoots from the Vindhya chain, covered with dense forests, and thinly inhabited by barbarous tribes. The inhabitants, under various designations, may be regarded, perhaps, as fragmentary remnants of the original occupants of India, dispossessed of the level lands by foreign races, and driven to contend with the beasts of the forest for a scanty sustenance, and with the pestilential malaria of the thickets for a brief and precarious existence. Nor had they been suffered to enjoy these haunts in peace; adventurers from the conquering stock had penetrated into the most accessible spots, and established their sway over petty principalities, the lands of which were

distributed among their adherents on the tenure of military service. On the habits of the savage and the hunter were thus grafted, the turbulence and insolence of military adventure; and the communities were only prevented from degenerating into utter anarchy by the personal consideration enjoyed by those who were descended from the original leaders, and were regarded as their natural chiefs. The Rajas, although often at feud with each other, or with their own dependents, formed the main cement of the ill-combined structure. It was among these people, with very little knowledge of their character, or of their wants, that it was attempted to introduce judicial and fiscal arrangements, borrowed from the principles and practice of highly civilized society. The consequences were perpetual breaches of the public peace, insurrections on a petty but mischievous scale, and the employment of troops in districts where the climate was the most formidable enemy to be encountered. At the time at which we are arrived, the attention of the Government of Fort St. George was occupied by three different risings in the Northern Circars, while that of Bengal was called upon to suppress a violent but short-lived outbreak in Ramgerh, and a still more extensive and protracted disturbance in Cuttack.

The northern Circars were generally in the occupancy of such chiefs as have been above noticed, hereditary Rajas or Zemindars, claiming political as well as territorial rights, and paying a tribute to the government of the day, but never acknowledging themselves as its functionaries in the collection of revenue. They had been so treated by the British Go-

1816.

vernment, and a permanent settlement was made with them for the amount of their tributes. With the settlement, however, came arrears, the sale of their lands, and the consequent insurrection of the chiefs, powerfully abetted by their adherents and tenants. There came, also, the introduction of the judicial system and the Daroga Police, and the infliction of fraud and violence upon a rude and barbarous race. Resistance and disorder were the necessary results, and after fifty years occupation the authority of the Government could scarcely be considered as established. There was constantly some petty rebellion on the part of the Rajas, or there were disturbances arising out of their mutual quarrels, or intrigues among their own people, which it was necessary for the Government to suppress. The task was arduous, for a great part of the country, consisting of hill and thicket, was as fatal as inaccessible, and order was never re-established, without a prodigious sacrifice of life. In the first of the transactions under remark, the hereditary manager of Kimedi had been driven out by an adverse party, and his removal had been confirmed by the Government. In defiance of the sentence he endeavoured to recover his authority, and a civil war distracted the district, which led to serious outrages, and was only tranquillized by the seizure of the ringleaders and the confinement of the manager. In the Moheri estate, the Rani, the representative of an ancient family, had been dispossessed by a fraudulent sale of the lands she inherited: although she was personally engaged in no commotion, yet her tenants took up her cause, and not only expelled or mur-

dered the people of the intrusive purchaser, but the officers of the Police, and committed extensive depredations on the neighbouring lands. The Raja of the hill country of Gumsar, in like manner was irritated by the attempts of the Police to bring him before the tribunal of the Company's courts, and, in the frenzy of his resentment, perpetrated acts of violence which led to his forcible imprisonment. The people of Gumsar, a highly barbarous race, continued, nevertheless, in arms, and committed the most atrocious excesses upon the peaceable population of the lowlands, which were retaliated by the dispatch of troops into the district. These disturbances were not repressed without the employment of five battalions of infantry and a regiment of cavalry, under the command of General Rumley; and, although the presence of so large a force deterred the insurgents from assembling in any strength, yet they long lurked in the impenetrable thickets on the borders of Cuttack and Ganjam, prepared to resume their depredations in the latter, and lending their aid to the troubles which agitated the former province in 1817.[1] 1817.

The wish of the Government to be relieved from the irksome task of managing the turbulent Cherus and Kharwars, the military cultivators of Palamu, upon the sale of the Zemindari for arrears of revenue, induced them to transfer it, in 1816, to a neighbouring Zemindar, who consented to be responsible for the revenue at a reduced rate, and

[1] Reports on the State of the Northern Circars, by Mr. W. Thackeray, in March, 1819. Selections from the Records, i. 974. Visit of Sir Thomas Munro to the Northern Circars, January, 1823. Ibid. iii. 556; also MSS. Records.

1817.

to superintend and manage the police. The villages were generally held by tenants who had been accustomed to consider themselves permanent occupants, at a fixed rate of assessment. Their new chief began his reign by raising the rents of some and wholly dispossessing others: a general rising ensued: the officers of the Zemindar were attacked, some were killed, the police stations were demolished, and the riot was not put down without the employment of a military force. As rights sanctified by long prescription and popular estimation had undoubtedly been invaded, contrary to the intention of the Government, the Renter was removed, and the management of the district taken under the immediate superintendance of the Company, by which means order was, for a season at least, restored.

In Cuttack the insurrection was more extensive, and its suppression longer delayed. It arose out of the operation of the revenue enactments of the Government; but its immediate and exciting cause was the manner in which those enactments were executed, the flagrant extortion and cruel oppression practised by the subordinate functionaries of every department of the state. The natives of Orissa had always been proverbial for mental dullness, and their inaptitude for public duties occasioned, even under their own princes, while the country was yet a Hindu kingdom, the employment in all offices of trust of foreigners from the neighbouring countries of Telingana and Bengal. The latter chiefly filled the public stations under the English magistrates and collectors, and, under a succession of superiors, who seem to have exercised little vigilance or activity in con-

trolling their subordinates or in punishing corruption, preyed with impunity upon the helpless and bewildered population of the province, and rendered the Government itself dreaded and detested. 1817.

The rigorous exaction of the Government assessment on the land everywhere calculated, in combination with the improvidence of the Zemindars, to lead to their impoverishment and ruin, was peculiarly mischievous in Cuttack. The amount, originally calculated on an erroneous principle, was excessive, and,[1] in order to discharge it, the Zemindars were compelled to raise their demands upon the people, who were generally wholly unable to pay them. The Zemindars consequently fell speedily[2] into arrears, and their estates were sold to new men, either to the revenue officers themselves, or their Bengali countrymen, whose means of gratifying the cupidity of the public functionaries rendered many of their sales wholly collusive and fraudulent;[3] and sacrificed the original proprietor not so much at the shrine of public good as of private emolument.[4]

[1] The original assessment was computed on an average of that which appeared to have been paid for some years to the Mahrattas, but the Mahratta assessment was liable to many deductions which were not admitted into the British. Even then it exceeded the average amount by 1,65,000 rupees, the Mahratta being Rs. 10,15,000, the British Rs. 11,80,000. Under the periodical and progressive assessments, however, this amount had been raised, in 1816-17, to Rs. 13,82,000. The augmentation had been made at random. In Khurda the highest assessment under the former system never exceeded five anas per biga; under the later arrangement it amounted to seven and a half.

[2] Of 3000 Zemindars who had contracted for the revenue in 1803, only 1450 were in possession in 1817-18.

[3] The Munshi of one of the Collectors purchased an estate, assessed at an annual Jumma, of 50,000 rupees, for 23,000 rupees,—less than half a year's purchase.

[4] The estate of Hamishpore, although one of those held at a quit-rent, was sold for arrears and bought by an opulent Bengali; the dispossessed Zemindar was, of course, one of the leaders of the insurrection.

1817. The intrusive Zemindars, odious from their very intrusion, and the sinister course well known to the people, by which their end was attained, eager to make the most of their purchases, incurred by their unsparing extortions still more intense hatred. By their exactions the rents of the tenants were raised to the highest possible amount, and those who claimed to hold their lands on easy terms, in lieu of certain services, were either fully assessed, or were turned adrift.[1] These latter were, for the most part, the only persons in the province familiar with the use of arms; the Paiks, or militia and police of the country under the Native Government; and they were little inclined to submit with patience to the loss of their property and annihilation of their privileges.

To these subjects of public distress and discontent was added another pressure upon the people, in the extreme enhancement of the price of an article of first necessity, Salt, in consequence of the precipitate introduction of the Company's monopoly. The price was injudiciously fixed at a rate far beyond the means of the inhabitants of the province, being six or seven times that at which it had been ordinarily sold.[2] The state benefited but comparatively little, for smuggling was almost openly practised by the very

[1] Such were the effects of these measures that the people sold everything, even to their wives and children, to obtain sustenance, and when all was insufficient they abandoned their homes and fled into the forests. In the course of 1816 between five and six thousand houses were thus deserted, and the country was becoming depopulated.

[2] On the extension of the monopoly to the southern divisions of Cuttack, the price in Khurda rose from about fourteen anas to six rupees per maund. This was peculiarly oppressive to the people of Orissa, as they were accustomed to eat their boiled rice on the second day, when it was stale and more than originally insipid.

persons appointed to prevent it. Yet, as the illicit traders kept up the prices, the people suffered severely, and were ripe for revolt against a Government, by whose measures and whose agents, they were deprived of the means of procuring the necessaries of life. Nor were the judicial arrangements of their new rulers less obnoxious to the simple and ignorant inhabitants, accustomed to summary and informal decision. Unacquainted with the very language of the regulations,[1] and incapable of comprehending the forms of the courts, they found themselves entirely at the mercy of the public officers, and were made to pay heavily for justice, which, in the end, they seldom attained. The police was a still more insufferable grievance; in lieu of the native Paiks, Darogas and their myrmidons were introduced, and were as rapacious as they were inefficient. Property was annihilated, and little security for person survived.[2]

The province of Cuttack was distributed between two classes of occupants; those who cultivated the Mogulbandi, the open and most productive part of the country, and the people of the Rajwara, which, on one side of the Mogulbandi, extended in a narrow

[1] They were in Bengali.

[2] The police Daroga of Khurda contrived, in the course of a few years, to extort a lakh of rupees (10,000*l.*) from the villagers. The Serishtadar of the Civil Court of Cuttack was convicted of having taken bribes to the extent of about 60,000 rupees (6000*l.*) in a few cases, and had realised a very large property by an unchecked course of similar corruption. It is worthy of note that the officers of the courts who were punished for their malpractices were all Mohammedans. Hindu functionaries would not probably have been more honest under such a system, but they would have been less daring, less tyrannical, and might have been less insatiable; at any rate, they would have been less obnoxious to the Uriya population, although a dislike of Bengalis seems to have been a national feeling. One of the grievances urged by the insurgents was, that "a parcel of Bengalis pretended to be their masters."

BOOK II. CHAP. III. 1817.

slip along the sea coast, and, on the other, spread westward over a broad expanse of hill and wilderness. The estates of the Mogulbandi were assessed on the same principles as those in Bengal; the Rajwara estates, consisting of tracts ill adapted to cultivation, were held at a low quit rent, and on the condition of military service.[1] One of the most considerable was the district of Khurda, lying a short distance west of the celebrated shrine of Jagannath. It was the Zemindari of the Raja of Khurda, who was dear to the people, as the hereditary descendant of the once powerful Gajapati kings of Orissa, the acknowledged head of the several petty chiefs, and who was invested with additional sanctity from his having the hereditary privilege of being the sweeper of the temple of Vishnu. The estate of Khurda had been held under the Mahrattas, at a light quit rent; under the English authorities, it was assessed at a rate at which the Raja declined to hold it,[2] and he was accordingly allowed to reside at Puri, in discharge of his duties in the temple, upon a yearly malikana, while his lands were taken under the management of the revenue officers. Their management, in the course of a few years, reduced the people to poverty and despair, and this province was consequently the seat of the first and most violent disorders.

The dispossessed Paiks and Ryots of Khurda

[1] Account of Orissa, by A. Stirling.—Asiatic Researches, vol. xv.

[2] The Raja paid to the Mahrattas, when they could compel him to pay anything, 15,000 rupees a-year, but he often evaded the payment. He was willing to engage for double the amount to the British Government, but a lakh, or 100,000 rupees was demanded. This he declared himself unable to discharge. It was, however, raised, and in 1816 augmented to 1,38,000 rupees, of which 25,000 rupees were paid to the Raja for subsistence.

found a bold and active leader in Jagbandhu, who was the hereditary Bakhshi, or paymaster and commander of the Raja of Khurda, and proprietor of a landed estate in the province. By a course of chicanery and fraud, in which the native officers were chiefly concerned, he was deprived of his patrimony, and told to seek redress in the courts of law. He was too poor and too impatient of wrong to appeal to such tardy and uncertain protection, and rashly, though pardonably, attempted to vindicate his own rights by the instrumentality of popular insurrection. Assisted by a body of the wild tribes of Gumsar, and joined by a number of Paiks and unhoused Ryots, he appeared in the chief village of Khurda, attacked and put the police to flight, and killed some of the people; set the station on fire, and plundered and burnt the office of the government collector. No injury was done to any one unconnected with the Government. The success of this attack was soon spread abroad; the whole province was in a state of insurrection, and Jagbandhu, in a few weeks, was at the head of above three thousand rioters, armed with swords, spears, bows and arrows, and a few matchlocks. 1817.

As soon as news of the tumult reached Cuttack, a detachment of troops was dispatched to Khurda; a party from which, sent out to collect provisions, was surprised at the pass of Ganjpura, and was driven back on the main body, with the loss of an officer, Ensign Faris, commanding it. The rest of the detachment fell back to Pipli, losing their baggage and cattle. A second attempt made by the magistrate, with a military guard, to enter Khurda, failed,

BOOK II. CHAP. III. 1817.

and the party retreated to Cuttack, harassed by the insurgents. Jagbandhu was, in consequence, emboldened to advance to the town of Jagannath, of which he took possession. The only force at this place consisted of about eighty Sipahis, while the rioters were estimated at four thousand. The town was plundered; the fort, buildings, and bungalows were set on fire, and the troops stationed for the defence of the collector's house and treasury, were attacked; they repulsed the assailants, but the officer commanding judged it expedient to retreat with the public treasure to Cuttack. This affair contributed to extend the insurrection, and every district in which the ancient proprietors had been deprived of their estates, was in arms. The triumph of the rebels at Puri was short-lived. One of their objects in marching thither had been to place their Raja at their head; but his fears or his prudence deterred him from connecting himself with the disturbance, and one material element of opposition was thus defective. At the same time, Capt. Le Fevre, with the greater part of the 1st battalion of the 18th N. I., marched from Khurda to recover Puri. At Devendra, the battalion was encountered by the Uriyas, and an action ensued, which speedily terminated in their defeat. Puri was re-occupied, and the person of the Raja being secured, he was removed to Cuttack.

Although the affair at Devendra showed that the insurgents were wholly unable to cope with the regular troops, the disturbances were far from being allayed. Khurda was entirely in their possession, and in the beginning of May, a body of above two thousand made an attack upon a detachment at

Pipli, in the neighbourhood. It was repulsed, and the rebels never afterwards appeared in force; but risings took place in Limbai, Kurdes, and Kujang, which the civil power was unable to restrain, and to suppress which it was necessary to station troops in the provinces. Martial law was proclaimed, reinforcements were dispatched to Cuttack, and General Sir Gabriel Martindell was ordered to take the command, with additional authority as joint commissioner with the judge and magistrate. By the military dispositions which were made, and, in a still greater degree, by the assurances held out to the people by the military commissioner, that their grievances, if peaceably represented, would be listened to and redressed, tranquillity, through the greater part of the troubled districts, was restored by the end of the year. Jagbandhu, and some of the leaders, still, however, kept aloof, and lurked for a while in the wild tracts along the upper course of the Mahanadi; but driven from thence by the combined operation of detachments sent from Cuttack to Boad, and others from Sambhalpur, they retreated to Khanpur, in the south-west angle of the province, where the Khunds of Gumsar gave them shelter; and, although large rewards were offered for their apprehension, none of their adherents proved treacherous; none of the people of the country were tempted to betray them.

The tranquillity of Cuttack was confirmed by the appointment of a special commissioner,[1] with exten-

[1] Mr. Ker, and afterwards, upon his death, Mr. Blunt. Besides the functional benefits derived from this arrangement, through the employment of intelligent and upright Commissioners, we owe to it a descriptive and

BOOK II. CHAP. III. 1818.

sive powers; and by the measures and enactments of the Government, adopted at his suggestion, large remissions of arrears and reductions in the assessment were made,[1] and the revenue officers were authorized, at discretion, to suspend the sale of the estates of defaulters, and rather subject their persons to imprisonment.[2] A new settlement was made for three years:[3] such of the native officers as had been most notorious for extortion and oppression, were deservedly punished, and such of their European superiors as were considered to be implicated in the causes of the insurrection were removed. Some of the unhappy people who had been driven into rebellion lost their lives in action, and others, taken with arms in their hands, suffered death under the operation of martial law: when that ceased, the offenders were transferred to the civil power, and many were condemned to a prolonged period of confinement and hard labour. By these several means of severity and conciliation, the province was so entirely tranquillized, that in August, 1819, a general amnesty was proclaimed, with the exception of a few

historical account of Orissa, of great interest and value, drawn up by the Secretary to the Commission, Mr. Andrew Stirling, a member of the civil service of Bengal, and one of its brightest ornaments, although his career was cut short by a too early death. The account is printed in the Asiatic Researches, vol. xv.

[1] When the Commissioner reached Cuttack the balance of arrears exceeded nineteen lakhs of rupees, (£190,000.) of which about six were remitted; the consequence was the realization of the revenues of the year 1818-19, with a very trifling balance, and with a very limited recourse to the measure of a public sale. The revenue on the tributary Mehals was reduced from Rs. 333,000 to 206,000. More attention than heretofore was paid to the tenures, and in the estates held under the Government, settlements were made with the Ryots. Revenue Letter from Bengal, 30th March, 1121. Selections from the Records, iii. 68.

[2] Reg. x. of 1818.

[3] Reg. xiii. of 1819.

of the leaders. Some years elapsed before they were considered to be objects of clemency; but, in 1825, Jagbandhu was induced to surrender himself, and was allowed to reside in Cuttack upon a pension from the Government. This event extinguished the last spark of a rebellion, in which the people were much less to blame than the functionaries of the state, whether native or European, the former having remorselessly aggravated, by corruption and tyranny, intolerable burthens; the latter having permitted free scope to their subordinates, neglected to make themselves acquainted with the institutions of the country and the circumstances of the people, and having omitted to bring to the knowledge of the Government the utter inapplicability to Cuttack of arrangements which, whether applicable or not, had been imposed upon the agricultural population of Bengal.[1]

1818.

These transactions, however illustrative of the state of Indian society, and instructive to the British Government in regard to their future relations with their native subjects, attracted little notice; and may, perhaps, excite little interest amidst the more momentous political and military transactions which, about the same period, convulsed the whole of Hindustan.

[1] Printed Correspondence relating to Cuttack, Selections from the Records, iii. 66; and MS. Records.

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CHAPTER IV.

Relations with Poona.—Designs of the Peshwa.—Influence of Trimbak Rao.—Claims on Baroda.—Mission of Gangadhar Śástri to Poona.—Coldly received.—Other Agents.—Change of treatment.—Apparent cordiality.—Offence given to the Peshwa.—Journey to Punderpur.—Murder of Gangadhar.—Inquiry demanded.—Trimbak implicated.—Resident demands his arrest.—Peshwa reluctant.—Compelled to give him up.—Trimbak confined at Thanna.—Discontent of Mahratta Princes.—Objection of the Raja of Nagpur to a Subsidiary Alliance.—His designs upon Bhopal.—Unites with Sindhia against the Nawab.—Siege of Bhopal.—Gallant Defence.—Besiegers retire.—Preparations of Sindhia.—British interference.—Sindhia indignant, but suspends operations.—Alliance not formed.—Death of the Nawab, and of the Raja of Nagpur.—Apa Saheb Regent.—Subsidiary Alliance concluded.—Sindhia.—His intrigues.—Disorders of his Government.—His policy.—Son and successor of Mulhar Rao Holkar adopted.—Tulasi Bai Regent.—Balaram Seth Minister.—Put to death.—Troops Mutiny.—Flight of the Regent and young Raja.—Tantia Jóg Minister.—Reconciliation negotiated.—State of affairs in Rajputana.—Chand

Sing defeats the Mohammedans.—Defeated by them. —Jaypur ravaged by Amir Khan.—Rajas of Jaypur and Jodhpur reconciled by his mediation.—Fresh quarrels, and both states laid waste.—The Khan marches to Jodhpur.—Domestic intrigues.—The Minister and Family Priest of the Raja assassinated.—Man Sing feigns imbecility, and abdicates. —Continuance of Amir Khan's depredations.—Distracted state of Central India.

THE political relations established with the Court of Poona, had borne as we have remarked, for some time past, an uneasy complexion. The claims of the Peshwa upon Baroda and Hyderabad, still remained unadjusted, and he ascribed the delay to the purposed procrastination of the British authorities. Their intervention also protected the estates of his feudatories, from his secret or open encroachments, and his title to be regarded as the head of the Mahratta confederacy, which the other leading members were willing to acknowledge, was avowedly withheld from him by the British Government. Notwithstanding the unequivocal tone in which their determination to disallow the resumption of this supremacy was declared, Baji Rao had never desisted from unavowed intrigues for its attainment, and, in violation of the terms of the treaty of Bassein, had constantly maintained agents at the Courts of Gwalior, Indore, and Nagpur, and carried on, with little affectation of concealment, negotiations with the Bhonsla, Sindhia, and Holkar. It may be doubted, however, if he ever entertained a design to engage

1814.

BOOK II. CHAP. IV. 1814.

in any serious collision with the British Government. Although bold in plotting, and tenacious of his purposes, Baji Rao was utterly deficient in personal intrepidity, and trusted rather to persevering and secret intrigue, than to resolute and open defiance. The Peshwa was not without ability, nor incapable of exertion, but his abilities were counteracted by habits of vicious indulgence, and a disposition naturally indolent, rendered his fits of activity unfrequent and of short duration. His ambition might have overcome his love of pleasure and ease, had not his excessive timidity deterred him from enterprises involving a hazard of personal safety, and induced him to have recourse to profound dissimulation for the furtherance of his designs. Suspicious and jealous of his principal officers, the Peshwa gave them but a partial and imperfect confidence, and placed his sole reliance upon individuals of low origin and inferior station, who were entirely dependant upon his favour for distinction, and who repaid his patronage with unhesitating submission to his will. Although arrogant and self-sufficient in general, he allowed himself sometimes to be controuled by the boldness of his advisers, and to be hurried into actions which were contrary to his own plans, and repugnant to his nature. Not unfrequently feeble and capricious, Baji Rao was remarkable for his adherence to any favourite project, and for the perseverance with which he pursued it, although it might be laid aside occasionally for such considerable intervals, that it seemed to have been abandoned or forgotten. Nor

was he less constant in his malignity—an offence was never forgiven, however remote the suspension of his resentment, and his vengeance was sure, however long its infliction might be delayed. When not under the influence of vindictive feelings, he was mild and rarely cruel: he was scrupulous in his pecuniary dealings, frugal though not parsimonious, cautious in his conduct, and dignified in his deportment, and gifted with singular powers of insinuation and persuasion. As a Brahman he professed a strict observance of the forms of the Hindu faith, and a slave to the grossest superstition, he devoted a large portion of his revenue to the support of religious individuals and institutions; and a large portion of his time to the practice of religious rites and pilgrimages to various holy places within his dominions, to the great interruption of the public affairs and diminution of the public resources. The latter were also seriously impaired by the vicious system which prevailed of farming the revenues; but, upon the whole, the country was not badly administered, and the people were prosperous and contented under the Peshwa's government. It was only necessary for this ruler to have submitted resignedly to a condition from which he could not hope to extricate himself, to have been one of the most opulent and independent of the princes who had been compelled to submit to British supremacy. 1814.

The prospects which clouded the commencement of the administration of Lord Moira, and the possibility that the war with Nepal might lead to hostilities on a wider scale, emboldened some of the con-

BOOK II. CHAP. IV. 1814.

fidential advisers of Baji Rao to assume a more lofty style of language, and to talk of their master's rights, not only to the first place among the Mahratta chiefs, but even to the tribute which former Peshwas had levied from Bengal. At the head of the party was Trimbakji Danglia, the principal favourite of Baji Rao, and a devoted servant, though a most unfit and mischievous counsellor. He had been originally a courier and spy, in which capacities he attracted the notice of Baji Rao by his intelligence and activity: he rose rapidly to wealth and authority—became the associate of Baji Rao in his private pleasures, and the confidant of all his feelings and designs—and the object—the only one—of his affection. In requital of the Peshwa's attachment, Trimbak adopted unhesitatingly, all his views and sentiments, imbibed all his aversion for his allies, and in the fervour of his devotedness, as well as in the ignorance of his origin, and the presumption generated by his sudden elevation, dropped the veil of Mahratta diplomacy, and gave utterance to his opinions, with a degree of hardihood which, however, gratifying to the Peshwa's pride, was most detrimental to his interests.[1] The licence of expression which was allowed to Trimbak by the Peshwa, was a vicarious expression of the thoughts which were cherished in the bosom of the latter.

The adjustment of the Peshwa's claims upon the Gaekwar, described in a former page, although yet undetermined, was still professedly under inves-

[1] It is mentioned by Mr. Prinsep that in a conference at which the rights of the Peshwa were discussed, this man asserted their comprehending the Chouth of Bengal ceded by Aliverdi Khan, and that of Mysore, agreed to by Hyder Ali.—Transactions, 2, p. 320, note.

tigation, and about this time other claims were advanced. A participation in the tribute payable by the chiefs of Kattiwar, had always been demanded by the court of Poona, and had been, in some cases, realised through the Gaekwar, as the Peshwa's representative. It was now insisted that the collection should be made direct, and in what manner, and to what extent, the government of Poona should think proper; but this was held to be inconsistent with the engagements which had been entered into by the British Government with the chiefs of Kattiwar; and although the right to a defined amount of tribute was recognised, yet a claim of an indefinite extent was denied; and in order to prevent any unauthorised exactions, the Peshwa was told that the collection would be retained in the hands of the British officers. Another subject of dispute was, the farm of a portion of the revenues of Ahmedabad, which had been held by the Gaekwar of the Peshwa for ten years, expiring in 1814. The court of Baroda desired its renewal in perpetuity, in order to obviate the chance of disputes arising from a division and conflict of authority, and the object was too reasonable not to be supported by the British Government. On the other hand, it was the policy of the court of Poona to keep open so fertile a subject of contest, and so plausible a plea for negotiation with the Gaekwar, and the Peshwa, therefore, declined to renew the lease. In the hope of adjusting this matter, as well as of accelerating an amicable settlement of the other points in dispute, the dispatch of an agent from Baroda to Poona was sanctioned by the government of Bengal, and Gangadhar Sastri,

BOOK II. CHAP. IV. 1814.

who was familiar with the subjects in dispute, and who possessed the confidence of the British residents at both courts, was selected for the office. The formal guarantee of the British Government was engaged for his personal safety,—a precaution with which he thought it necessary to be armed, before he trusted himself within the treacherous circle of the court of Poona.

The choice of the negotiator was by no means agreeable to the Peshwa and his advisers, as they well knew the acumen and firmness of Gangadhar, and his steady devotion to the British. His reception was accordingly cold and discouraging, and, for some time, no disposition was shown to enter into any communication with him upon the subjects of the mission. Nor had the Sastri to complain alone of the unfriendly spirit manifested by the Peshwa and his ministers,—a powerful party in his own court, with the concurrence of the imbecile sovereign of Guzerat himself, undertook to counteract his negotiations; and Govind Rao Bandoji Gaekwar, an agent of the discarded minister Sitaram,—with Bhagavant Rao Gaekwar, an illegitimate brother of Anand Rao, and representative of the interior of the palace of Baroda, also in the interest of Sitaram, were sent to Poona, almost simultaneously with the Sastri, to assure the Peshwa, that if he would bring about the restoration of Sitaram to the office of Dewan, all his claims should be immediately complied with, and his supremacy be acknowledged. The bait was tempting, and although success was little probable, yet an additional inducement was thus supplied to treat the Sastri with neglect, and

the very institution of the intrigue was too congenial to the Peshwa's character, for him to resist the temptation of plunging into its dark and dangerous labyrinth.

Well acquainted with the counteracting forces which were secretly at work, and despairing of obtaining an audience, Gangadhar applied for permission to return to Baroda, when afraid of exciting the serious displeasure of the British Government by the abrupt close of negotiations, undertaken at their earnest recommendation, and recalled to a sense of the risk, by the earnest remonstrances of the British Resident; projecting too, even at this season, apparently, the catastrophe which finally closed the transaction,[1] the Peshwa's advisers adopted a total change of conduct, and exhibited towards the Sastri a degree of cordiality, which constituted a marked contrast to their previous inattention. Private interviews took place between Trimbak and Gangadhar, in which the former avowed that he had been actively opposed to the latter, and had even listened to devices against his life; but he asserted that the Peshwa had now become convinced, that it was for his advantage to have the Sastri for his friend, and was willing to pay that deference to his opinions to which they were entitled by his acknowledged sagacity and experience. Great pains were taken to act upon the negotiator's vanity—which was as remarkable as his ability—and, for a time, with success. He was made to believe that the

[1] Reports were current at Poona that designs were on foot against the life of the Sastri. An intercepted letter to Sitaram from one of his correspondents at Poona, dated August 1814, remarks, "Every one here says the Sastri cannot come back again."—MS. Records.

BOOK II. CHAP. IV. 1815.

Peshwa was most anxious to engage his services, and nominate him as his own minister; and a matrimonial alliance was concerted between his son and the sister of the wife of Baji Rao. On his part, he engaged that the Gaekwar should assign to the Peshwa lands yielding seven lakhs a-year in lieu of his claims, and should conclude a treaty of amity with Poona, without the intervention of the British Resident. The question of territorial cession was, however, referred to the government of Baroda, and pending the reference, Gangadhar accompanied the Peshwa to the sacred shrine of Nasik,[1] where extensive preparations were made for the celebration of the nuptials.

Whether it was the result of his own reflections, or of the suggestions of his friends, Gangadhar Sastri soon became apprehensive that he had been cajoled into communications incompatible with the interests of his court, and injurious to his reputation, and was not displeased, therefore, when he received the refusal of the Gaekwar to ratify the proposed territorial concession. As the conditions of the treaty could not be fulfilled, he considered it incumbent on him also to decline the honour of the intended alliance. The defeat of his intrigues was even less galling to Baji Rao, than this indignity to his person and connections; and the affront was aggravated by the Sastri preventing his wife from visiting the ladies of the Peshwa's family, in consequence of the

[1] Nasik is a place of considerable sanctity, as the reputed scene of one of Ráma's adventures, when in exile, and is said to derive its name from his cutting off the nose (Násiká) of a Rakshasí or Ogress. It appears under the same name, Násiká, in Ptolemy, and its importance is therefore of some antiquity, as well as the legend.

licentious orgies which, it was said, were commonly enacted in the interior of his palace. The destruction of the offender was no doubt, immediately decreed, and impunity and assistance were assured to the instruments of the Sastri's enemies, who had come from Baroda to frustrate his negotiation, to effect his disgrace, and to prevent, by any means, his return to power: — an opportunity was soon afforded. 1815.

Notwithstanding the acerbity of the resentment with which the Sastri's rejection of the alliance with Baji Rao had inspired the Peshwa and his agents, no feeling of dissatisfaction was manifested. On the contrary, Trimbak was more profuse than ever in his professions of regard, and in the display of unimpaired cordiality and confidence. A visit to the shrine of Wittoba, a form of Vishnu, at Punderpur being undertaken, Gangadhar was invited to accompany the Peshwa, and accepted the invitation; leaving behind him the principal part of his followers, and his colleague, Myral Bapú, a cautious man, who had vainly endeavoured to put the Sastri on his guard against the machinations of Trimbak and the Peshwa. The invitation was not extended as usual to the British Resident. Soon after the arrival of the party at Punderpur, a report was raised that the life of the Peshwa was threatened by assassins from the territory of the Nizam, and on this pretext the guards were increased, and precautions were taken for Baji Rao's safety. On the evening of the 14th of July, Gangadhar, after returning home from an entertainment given by a Mahratta chief to the Peshwa, complained of indis-

BOOK II. CHAP. IV.

1815.

position, and was about to retire to rest, when a messenger came from Trimbak to invite him to repair to the temple and perform his devotions there; as on the ensuing morning it would be engaged for the Peshwa and his attendants. The excuse of being unwell was pleaded for declining the invitation, when it was more urgently repeated by a second messenger. The excuse was repeated, but two of the Sastri's friends repaired to the temple and were requested by Trimbak to use their influence and induce Gangadhar to come. Unwilling to give personal offence, the Sastri yielded to their importunity, and with a few attendants walked to the temple. After performing his devotions he proceeded on his return home, escorted by a small party of Trimbak's soldiers, about twelve paces in advance, and preceded and followed at short intervals by his own servants, some of them bearing torches. Suddenly three men came running from behind, and forcing their way past the servants in the rear, struck the Sastri with the swords with which they were armed, and threw him on the ground; two more came to their aid and wounded some of the Sastri's people, when the whole of the latter fled and left their master to the assassins, by whom he was barbarously mangled. Before any effective assistance was procured the murderers had escaped. The body was afterwards removed, and burned by the Sastri's people, and application was made to Trimbak and the Peshwa for the apprehension and punishment of the assassins. Whatever professions and promises were made, no measures, whatever, were taken for the discovery and seizure of the culprits; nor was any

sorrow expressed for the unhappy fate of the Sastri.[1]

1815.

The connexion which subsisted between the British Government and the Gaekwar, and the special guarantee under which Gangadhar Sastri had consented to trust himself within the reach of individuals so notoriously treacherous and revengeful as the Peshwa and his minister, rendered it the imperative duty of the Resident to insist upon a full investigation of the circumstances of the murder, and the detection and punishment of the murderers. An enquiry, conducted with the means at the command of the Peshwa, could not fail to bring the truth to light; and it was called for, no less by the reputation of the British Government, than by the honour of the Peshwa himself. An accredited minister had been murdered in his immediate vicinity, almost in his presence; and such an outrage, under such circumstances, could not be perpetrated with impunity, without involving his Highness in a suspicion of having sanctioned its commission. The remonstrances of the Resident were backed by a letter of admonition to the Peshwa from the Governor-General, but nothing could induce either him or his counsellor to institute a serious enquiry. It was affirmed that no clue to the perpetrators could be obtained, that the Sastri had many enemies, and acted imprudently in moving abroad so scantily attended; in short his death was the work of destiny, and no good could result from

[1] Letter from the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone to the Governor-General, 11th August, 1815.—Papers respecting the Pindari and Mahratta war, printed by order of the Court of Proprietors, p. 75.

BOOK II. CHAP. IV. 1815.

further investigation. European notions of public obligations were not so easily satisfied. Although it was probable that the active instruments in the murder were the emissaries from Baroda, one of whom, Bandoji, was known to have been in Punderpur at the time of the assassination; yet it was clear that Trimbak, at least, was deeply implicated in the occurrence. His repeated and earnest invitations to the Sastri to repair to the temple, could be accounted for only by his being a party to a scheme for affording to the murderers an opportunity of executing their design; and the indifference with which he received the intelligence, his private conferences with Bandoji, both before and after the assassination, and the entire absence of any attempt to discover the murderers, were unequivocal proofs of his participation in the crime; of the participation, indeed, of the Peshwa himself;[1] but as the punishment of the latter was embarrassed by obvious political considerations, the agent and accessory was made responsible for the act; and the arrest of Trimbak, and his delivery to the British Government,

[1] Trimbak on one occasion, after his apprehension, accused the Peshwa of having instigated the murder, as part of a plot to secure the restoration of Sitaram to office, on condition of his subservience to the interests of the Peshwa, at Baroda. At another time, he professed not to know who the author was, but he believed Bandoji was chiefly concerned. The truth seems to have been that Bandoji was the principal instrument of the crime, but no one would have dared its commission, unless assured of the concurrence of the Peshwa and the coöperation of Trimbak. The share of Bandoji in the murder was not doubted at Baroda; he was known to have gone secretly to Punderpur with armed followers, about the time, and to have given a considerable sum of money to his servants, professedly for their expenses on the journey; to have held also several secret interviews with Trimbak, both at Punderpur and Poona. A letter from him to the Rani, Takht Bhai had, shortly before, conveyed the intimation that "the Sastri would never return to Baroda." On his return to the Gaekwar territory he was confined for life in irons, in the fort of Gundiswari on the Tapti. Bhajavant Rao was also imprisoned.—MS. Records.

were declared to be the indispensable conditions of preserving undisturbed amicable relations with the Peshwa.

The demand made for the delivery of his favourite was for some time strenuously resisted by the Peshwa, who urged that the imprisonment of an individual against whom no proof could be produced, was an act of manifest injustice, and professed his readiness to place Trimbak in confinement himself, could the charge of his being accessory to the murder of the Sastri be substantiated against him. However plausible the objection, it was not entitled to any consideration, for Baji Rao well knew that none of his people would venture to prefer an accusation against his minister while at large: upon his being removed, the Resident pledged himself to bring forward the evidence which had seemed to the British Government sufficient to involve Trimbak in the transaction. It was with great difficulty that the reluctance of the Peshwa was overcome, and for a moment he seemed to contemplate the alternative of open hostility. His fears of the result, however, prevailed, and he consented to give up the person of Trimbak, on condition that his life should be spared, and that his imprisonment should not be attended with any unnecessary severity. Trimbak was accordingly delivered to a detachment of the Poona brigade, on the 17th of September, and was immediately marched off to Thanna, where he was confined. The emissaries from Baroda were at the same time apprehended, and sent to Guzerat.

The communications which had been carried on

BOOK II. CHAP. IV. 1815.

by the Peshwa, with the several Mahratta courts, had not been unattended by consequences unpropitious to the continuance of tranquillity, and the maintenance of British influence. The chiefs were generally discontented with their position. Forgetting the peril in which their former enmity had involved them as its effects ceased to be felt, and misunderstanding the motives of the forbearance which the victors had exercised, they were alone sensible of the comparative insignificance to which they had been reduced, and impatient of the restraint which the predominating power of the British imposed upon their career of universal spoliation. The instigations of the Peshwa fomented these feelings, and rendered them more than ever anxious to concentrate and combine their strength under the direction of a prince, whom they acknowledged to be the legitimate head of the Mahratta federation. Various subjects occurred about this period to aggravate their dissatisfaction and excite their animosity.

The obligation of maintaining a military division permanently in the field, for the protection of the frontiers of Berar from the incursions of Amir Khan, and the ravages of the predatory bands, known as Pindaris, in consequence of the inefficiency of the troops of the Bhonsla, imposed an extraordinary burthen upon the government of Bengal, which Lord Minto had conceived it incumbent upon the Raja of Nagpur to defray. The charge was incurred for his benefit, and the defence was an act of voluntary aid, unprovided for by any subsisting engagements. The most ready method of reciprocating the service and the cost would be a subsi-

1815.

diary alliance, and, with the entire concurrence of the home authorities, the British Government had, for some years past, endeavoured to prevail upon the Raja to contract a connexion of this description. Raghuji Bhonsla, however, felt assured that he would not be left to fall a sacrifice to hordes of plunderers, who would then, with additional credit and resources, be brought more immediately into contact with the British possessions. He was possibly of opinion, that even if unassisted, he might by policy or force, provide for his own protection; and he prized too highly the privilege of exemption from foreign control to barter his independence for military succour. The submission of his internal relations with other native princes to the interposition of a British Resident, would also have put a stop to the execution of his designs against the principality of Bhopal, a portion of which he expected to be able, in concert with Doulat Rao Sindhia, to annex to his own dominions.

Shortly after the repulse of Amir Khan, and the withdrawal of the British forces, Raghuji Bhonsla entered into an alliance with Sindhia, for the annihilation of the Nawab of Bhopal, and the partition of his country between the confederates; and at the end of the rainy season of 1813, an army from Nagpur, commanded by Sadik Ali, and a force from Gwalior, led by Jaggú Bapú, entered the Bhopal territories. Unable to face such superior forces, Vizir Mohammed threw himself, with such troops as he could assemble, into the city of Bhopal, where he determined to defend himself to the last extremity. Bhopal was situated on high and uneven ground,

1815.

not far from a portion of the Vindhya range of mountains, and was about four miles in circumference. It was surrounded on three sides by a tolerable wall, but was without a ditch, or other defences. The south side was protected by a citadel, placed on the high bank of an artificial lake, formed by embankments, connecting contiguous hills, extending on the west of the town, about five miles in length, and one in breadth. Most of the inhabitants had been sent away. The garrison, including a body of three thousand Pindaris, amounted at first to eleven thousand men, but when the besiegers had occupied most of the approaches to the city, the deficiency of forage compelled the retreat of the Pindaris, and other mounted troops, leaving no more than five or six thousand men to defend Bhopal, against the united armies of Sindhia and Nagpur, exceeding, at least, ten times that number.[1] The siege commenced at the end of October, 1813. The operations of the besiegers were tardy, and their fire of little effect; but in the course of December they had completed the investment of the town, except on the side of the lake, across which supplies were for some period longer conveyed to the garrison. In the course of December and January, repeated attempts were made to carry the place by escalade, but they were met by Vizir Mohammed, and his son Nazar Mohammed, with undaunted intrepidity, and resolutely repulsed. The most formidable enemy the garrison had to encounter was famine, for the Mahrattas had

[1] According to native authority, cited by Sir J. Malcolm, the united armies amounted to seventy thousand, which, however, he thinks may be exaggerated by ten or fifteen thousand men, but "the force," he adds, "is acknowledged by all to have been very great."—Central India, i. 398.

bribed the boatmen who had been employed to carry provisions across the lake, and this source of supply being cut off, the troops were exposed to the severest suffering. The Mohammedans assuaged their hunger by the flesh of the animals that perished of want, while the Hindus endeavoured to appease the cravings of nature with decayed vegetable matter — bruised Tamarind stones, and the leaves of trees;—numbers, unable to endure these privations, deserted; and the desertions, with the casualties of the siege, reduced the garrison from about six thousand to as many hundreds.

In the month of March, 1814, the death of Jaggú Bapú, and the ceremonies which followed, suspended the operations of the besiegers, and afforded the garrison an interval of repose, and an opportunity of repairing the walls of the town. In the following May, one of Vizir Mohammed's officers, a Rajput, was tampered with by Sadik Ali, and introduced a party of five hundred of the Nagpur troops by night into the post which he commanded. Conceiving themselves already masters of Bhopal, the Mahrattas awaited day-light for the resumption of their operations, and, halting at the mausoleum of one of the Nawabs of Bhopal, put aside their arms, and laid down to rest. Their entrance was discovered, and reported to Vizir Mohammed, who, perceiving that no time was to be lost, immediately attacked the enemy, although not having more than thirty men about his person. The attack was led by Nazar Mohammed; the Mahrattas were taken by surprise, and many fell under the first fire of the Patans, who allowing them no time

1815.

to recover from their confusion, rushed among them with their swords, and put them to flight. They evacuated the post with precipitancy, leaving behind above a hundred killed and wounded. Either the failure of this attempt, or some motives unavowed, induced Sadik Ali to weary of the enterprise; and pretending that he had been prohibited from its prosecution by a dream, he broke up his camp, and deaf to the remonstrances of Sindhia's officers, marched back to Nagpur. The secession of Sadik Ali, and the losses which the Mahrattas had suffered, left them little prospect of continuing the siege with advantage, and a fortnight afterwards they withdrew to Sarangpur, where they were cantoned for the rains.

Although Bhopal, after a siege of nine months, was relieved from present danger, the peril was not passed. Great exertions were made by Sindhia to recruit his forces, and an army, more efficiently equipped, was prepared to resume operations as soon as the weather permitted. They were further delayed by a quarrel between the Mahratta leaders, Jeswant Rao Bhao, and Jean Baptiste Filoze, a person of mixed European and Indian descent, who had succeeded to the command of one of Sindhia's disciplined brigades, consisting of eight battalions with forty guns. The quarrel came to blows, when the Bhao was defeated, and driven to take shelter under the walls of Bhopal. The forces of Baptiste, however, were of themselves adequate to the reduction of the city, when the interposition of the British Government saved Vizir Mohammed from destruction. The interposition was based upon a double motive,

gratitude for past, and expectation of future service. That the march across central India by General Goddard, in 1778, was successfully accomplished, was in main attributable to the friendly treatment which the detachment experienced from Hyat Mohammed, the Nawab of Bhopal.[1] The position of the principality, its contiguity to Berar on one hand, and to the chief seats of the Pindaris on the other, rendered the coöperation of the Nawab of essential importance in the measures which were contemplated by the British Government for the suppression of the predatory system. Vizir Mohammed earnestly entreated to be taken under British protection, and a prudent regard for British interests recommended compliance with his request. A negotiation was accordingly entered into with the Nawab, of which notice was given to the Mahratta princes. The Peshwa and the Raja of Nagpur professed their cordial concurrence, but Sindhia received the announcement with a greater manifestation of resentment than he had ever expressed upon any similar occasion. He declared that the Nawab of Bhopal had been tributary to the Peshwa, and that the tribute had been transferred to him; that he would not submit to any interposition in his behalf, and that he would pursue his designs against the Nawab, be the consequence what it might. His opposition was, however, restricted to these menac-

[1] In the published Journal of General Goddard's march, it is mentioned that the detachments halted at Bhopal seven days, and found provisions cheap and plentiful. No obstruction to their march occurred after entering the Bhopal territory. See also the notices of this transaction in Malcolm, Grant, and Prinsep, as collected by Major Hough in his Brief History of the Bhopal Principality, p. 13.

BOOK II. CHAP. IV. 1815.

ing declarations. A force was assembled at Bellari, under Sir Thomas Hislop, and a division in Bundelkhand, under General Marshall, while detachments from the subsidiary forces of the Nizam, the Peshwa, and the Gaekwar, were moved towards the frontiers of their respective territories; and these movements, with the successes which had followed the first reverses of the Nepal war, induced a change of tone, and a silent acquiescence in the arrangements of the British Government. The meditated alliance did not at this season take place. Vizir Mohammed, with genuine Afghan duplicity, adopted the perilous policy of playing one negotiation against another; and when by the interference of the British Government its intentions towards him were notorious, entered into secret negotiations with Baptiste to induce him to retire, recalling at the same time his agents from Delhi and Banda, and showing no disposition to contract an alliance, which involved the appropriation of part of his revenues to the support of a foreign force, and some diminution of his independence and credit. Whether the terms demanded by Baptiste were more unreasonable than the Nawab expected, or whether he began to doubt the sincerity of the Mahrattas, Vizir Mohammed again intimated a desire to resume the negotiation with the British, but the Governor-General, indignant at his want of faith, declined to receive his agents, and announced to the Courts of Gwalior and Nagpur that, although he held himself at liberty to enter into any engagements with Bhopal, which might consult the interests of his Government, as well as those of the Nawab, yet that at present all intercourse

with that state was at an end. This determination was in accordance with the policy of the home authorities, from whom a positive prohibition of any alliance with Bhopal was about the same time received, and in conformity to the injunctions of the Secret Committee, the Resident at Gwalior was instructed to throw no obstacle in the way of any projects which Sindhia might set on foot against Bhopal; but before he could avail himself of the license thus granted, events occurred which occupied and perplexed the counsels of the Gwalior cabinet, and ultimately placed the principality of Bhopal beyond the reach of its Mahratta enemies. Vizir Mohammed died in the beginning of 1816, and was succeeded by his second son, Nazar Mohammed, the gallant partner of his dangers and his glory.[1]

Whatever might have been the real feelings with which Raghuji Bhonsla received the intimation that he must forego his hostility to Bhopal, and whatever projects he may have concerted with the other Mahratta princes, his death, which occurred immediately after that of Vizir Mohammed, removed him timely from the troubled scene which was about to ensue. He was succeeded by his son, Parswaji; but as this prince was of infirm body and weak intellect, although of years to conduct the Government, it was necessary to entrust the authority to more competent hands. Parties at Nagpur were divided, but after a short struggle, Modaji Bhonsla, commonly

[1] Malcolm's Central India, i. 412, Prinsep's History of Transactions in India, i. 245. Summary by the Marquis of Hastings, printed by order of the Court of Proprietors, 23rd June, 1824, p. 10.—Hough, 89.

1816. called Apa Saheb, the nephew of the late Raja, obtained the ascendancy, and, with the concurrence of the British envoy, assumed the office of Regent. As the opponents of Apa Saheb, who were persons of considerable influence, were opposed also to the British alliance, he considered that he should best secure his newly acquired honours, by adopting a different policy, and by entering into an intimate connexion with the British Government. The subsidiary alliance which it had so long been the object of the latter to effect, was now, therefore, concluded without further difficulty or delay; and in the same month, May, in which Apa Saheb was firmly seated in the Regency, the treaty was signed by him in the name of the Raja. It was stipulated that the subsidiary force should consist of one regiment of native cavalry, six battalions of infantry, one complete company of European artillery, with the usual proportion of ordnance; and that the cost of it should be defrayed by an annual payment of seven lakhs and a half of Nagpur Rupees. That a commutation of territory for the pecuniary payment should be demanded, if the latter fell into arrear, not else, although the expedience of such an exchange might be reserved as the subject of subsequent consideration. That the British Government should protect the Raja against all foreign and domestic enemies, and that, on the other hand, the Raja should never commit any hostilities against the British allies, nor commence or pursue any negotiations with any other state whatever, without giving previous notice to, and entering into mutual consultation with, the Company's Government. That the Raja should

maintain at all times, and in a state of efficiency, a force consisting of not less than three thousand cavalry, and two thousand infantry, with their necessary equipments; and to attend and conform to whatever advice and recommendation might be afforded by the Resident respecting the Contingent, allowing it to be mustered and inspected, or reviewed by that functionary, or the officer commanding the subsidiary troops, whenever the former should think fit. The Raja was further to maintain such a number of troops as he might think necessary, and the resources of his country might enable him to support, to be at all times ready to assist the British Government. The treaty was ratified by the Governor-General in the following month, and, to all appearance, Nagpur had become identified in political interests with British India.[1]

Although taking no ostensible or personal share in the distractions which pervaded Malwa and Rajputana, Doulat Rao Sindhia was unworthily busied with intrigues, tending to promote their perpetuation and extend their mischief. The disappointment of his views upon Bhopal rankled deeply in his breast, and confirmed his natural disposition to coöperate in any scheme which proposed the diminution of the British power. Active, though secret negotiations were carried on with the ministers of the Holkar State, with the Bhonsla, and with the Peshwa, for the establishment of the supreme authority of the latter, and the consolidation of the remaining fragments of the Mahratta empire,—

[1] Treaty of perpetual defensive alliance with the Raja of Nagpore, 27th May, 1816.—Collection of Treaties, 27th May, 1818. See also Report, Committee House of Commons, 1832.—Pol. Ap. p. 236.

1816.

vakils were received privately from Nepal, and from Ranjit Sing and constant communications were maintained with the Pindari leaders, who promised implicit obedience to Sindhia's orders, and declared themselves ready, with his sanction, to carry fire and sword into the Company's possessions. His own circumstances were, however, most unpropitious to any military undertaking. His dependants and tributaries were everywhere in a state of contumacy and rebellion, and his own troops ill-paid and ill-governed, were mutinous and disobedient. His chief commanders yielded him little more than nominal allegiance, and receiving their pay in assignments upon impoverished and exhausted districts, they aggravated the discontent of the people, and drained the resources of the state by their oppression and extortion. Converting their commands into a plea for pillage, they moved through the country at their pleasure, and levied contributions at will upon their sovereign's subjects, and dependants; or when these failed, carried their bands into the territory of the princes of Rajputana, and, under pretext of assisting one or other of the contending parties, plundered both friends and foes. To add to these sources of disorder, the mountaineers on the south and west of Malwa, the Bhils and Mhers, and the petty Hindu chiefs on the south and east of the same country, were committing unchecked ravages in retaliation for invaded rights, or disregarded claims. A weary contest was also in progress with the Rajputs of Kychewara, whose prince Jaysing, the Raja of Raghugerh had been dispossessed by Sindhia of his patrimony, and at the head of a resolute troop of

followers, laid waste the adjacent country, surprised Sindhia's forts, and occasionally worsted his disciplined brigades. All these embarrassments paralysed Sindhia's power.

Although he could not resist the temptations of mixing himself up in the intrigues that were so rife, and no doubt had sufficient nationality to desire their success, Sindhia was evidently aware of the danger of provoking the resentment of the British Government, and, in all probability, never entertained any settled purpose of exposing himself to its irresistible infliction. However incompatible with his secret practices, his professions of unwillingness to incur the displeasure of his allies were probably as sincere as they were earnest, and reiterated. His policy was naturally and excusably unfriendly,—but he saw the consequences of its prosecution too distinctly to defy them.

All intercourse with the court of Holkar had been suspended for several years, during which it had been but little in communication with the other native powers of Central India. Its transactions were almost entirely domestic, and exhibited a career of disorder and infamy seldom paralleled even in the annals of the most profligate Indian Durbar. Tulasi Bai, having no child, adopted before the death of Jeswant Rao, and with his presumed sanction, his son by Kesari Bai, a woman of an inferior station in his household. As the boy Mulhar Rao was yet an infant, his adoptive parent continued to hold the reins of government, being assisted in the civil administration by Balaram Seth as minister, and by Ghafur Khan, the brother-in-

1816.

law and representative of Amir Khan, as the head of the military department. Tulasi Bai was a woman of natural intelligence, and of a resolute spirit, but of profligate inclinations, and remorseless vindictiveness. The former qualities extricated her from repeated dangers, arising out of intrigues against her authority, or the insubordination of the troops. The latter lost her the respect and adherence of the firmest friends of the Holkar family, and ultimately caused her ruin.

A breach soon occurred between the Bai and the minister,—Balaram Seth had provoked her resentment, by his plain spoken expostulations against the licentiousness of her conduct and had excited her fears by being suspected of secretly instigating the mutinous clamours of the soldiery, the violence of which had endangered the safety of the Bai, and compelled her to fly for refuge, with the young prince, to the fortress of Gangraur. The like suspicion extended to Amir Khan, who had always given Balaram his support: the former was beyond her power: the latter was summoned at midnight to her presence, and in her sight, and by her orders, was cruelly murdered. The crime aroused the indignation of Ghafur Khan, and the Mohammedan leaders in the service of the Holkar State, whose troops were encamped on the outside of Gangraur; and they assembled in arms, and threatened to storm the fort. They were anticipated by Tulasi Bai: she sallied from the town with the Mahratta horse, who were attached to her person, and an action ensued, the result of which was for some time doubtful. The Bai displayed remarkable self-possession, until a

cannon ball struck the *houda* of the elephant on which the young Raja was riding. This shook her courage, and mounting a horse, while she placed the child upon another in charge of Ganpat Rao, her treasurer and paramour, she gallopped from the field to Allote, a town sixteen miles distant, where she and the Raja found shelter. Her troops dispersed, Gangraur was stormed, and plundered by the Mohammedan mercenaries. 1816.

The authority of Balaram devolved, after his death, upon a Brahman named Tantia Jóg, who had been originally employed by Balaram, but had subsequently connected himself with Ganpat Rao. Although personally obnoxious to Tulasi Bai for the reasons which had excited her displeasure against his first patron, and which had, at one time, compelled him to fly to Kota, the abilities and resources of Tantia Jóg, rendered him necessary to her favourite and to herself, and he was therefore suffered to take an active part in the administration. He became the head of the national or Mahratta party, in opposition to that of the Mohammedans headed by Ghafur Khan, or rather by Amir Khan, of whom the former was the agent. Amir Khan, who was occupied in Rajasthan, was desirous of effecting a reconciliation, and offered, with the Bai's concurrence, to come to her aid, and prevail upon the brigades to be contented with a portion of their arrears. The Bai, however, declined to receive his visit, unless Ghafur Khan were at once recalled, and the mutinous troops reduced to subordination. Both parties at length agreed to refer their differences to the arbitration of Zalim Sing. Negotiations were in

BOOK II. CHAP. IV. 1816.

progress at Kota for the friendly settlement of the dispute, when the advance of the British armies diverted the attention of all the parties to objects of more vital importance.[1]

The death of the princess of Udaypur, although it had removed the immediate cause of quarrel, had failed to restore to the Rajput principalities the blessings of peace. A state of confusion and discord was indispensable to the maintenance of the "Free Companies," whom Amir Khan, and other soldiers of fortune, both Mohammedan and Hindu, commanded; and the establishment of order and tranquillity was hopeless as long as these predatory bands moved over the face of the country, like flights of locusts, leaving famine and desolation in their track. A plea for their ravages was never wanting. The feebleness of the Rajput princes compelled them to bribe the forbearance of the mercenary chiefs by promises, which they could only imperfectly fulfil; each breach of promise generated fresh exactions; engagements were again made, and again broken, and the failure was followed by repeated retribution. There appeared to be no prospect of shaking off the vampires that had fastened themselves on the princes of Rajputana, as long as a drop of blood continued to circulate in the veins of their victims.

After completing his arrangements at Udaypur, Amir Khan marched towards Jaypur, levying contributions by the way, on the Rajas of Krishnagerh and Bundi, and other petty princes, as well as upon the principal towns and feudatory chiefs of Jaypur.

[1] Malcolm's Central India, i. 289.

Large sums were thus collected, but either the funds were so wasted by malversation, or the expenses of the battalions so much exceeded the contributions, that the troops were constantly in a state of mutiny for arrears of pay; and, detaining their commanders in the sort of arrest termed dharna, treated them with indignity, and menaced them with violence, until some settlement could be effected. Every such transaction was a signal for the reiteration of pecuniary demands upon the princes and people near at hand, and for fresh exactions from both friend and foe.

In the middle of 1812, the absence of Amir Khan in Jodhpur, whither he had been summoned by the Raja Man Sing, and the reduction by mutiny and desertion of the division in Jaypur under his colleague, Mohammed Shah Khan, encouraged Chand Sing, the commander of the Rajput forces to assume the offensive. Falling unexpectedly upon Mohammed Shah, he defeated that officer, and compelled him to seek refuge in Tonk, a town which belonged to Amir Khan, and where he had constructed a fort, named after him, Amir Gerh, to which Chand Sing laid siege. The siege was soon raised by the approach of another of Amir Khan's leaders, Raja Bahadur, and the troops of the Mohammedan captains having effected a junction, pursued the retreating Rajputs into the Jaypur territories, which they ravaged without mercy. Amir Khan soon after joined and took the command, and the army of Jaypur retired to the shelter of the capital, leaving the rest of the country undefended. It was everywhere plundered and occupied by the invaders, and the neigh-

BOOK II. CHAP. IV. 1816.

bouring principality of Shekhavati was obliged to purchase, by a large sum of money, exemption from the devastating incursions of Amir Khan's brigades.

Having thus brought the Raja of Jaypur to the brink of destruction, Amir Khan, with his usual policy, refrained from completing the work of extirpation. He agreed to accept an annual tribute of twelve lakhs of rupees, on the realisation of which, the forts that had been taken were to be restored. Chand Sing, the only officer by whom the Mohammedans had been encountered with any success, was to be expelled the city, and dismissed from all concern in public affairs. Amir Khan also promoted negotiations for an alliance between the Rajas of Jodhpur and Jaypur, which were in progress, and which ended in Man Sing's agreeing to give his daughter to Jagat Sing, and to espouse that prince's sister. The Rajas met at Mirwa and Rúpnagar, and the double nuptials were solemnized with suitable pomp and festivity. Amir Khan was present at the ceremonial, at the invitation of the Raja of Jodhpur, who received him with every mark of honour. At his instance, also, the Raja of Jaypur, although very reluctantly, consented to meet the Khan as an equal; and the Afghan adventurer, who had commenced his career as a trooper, took his seat on the same throne with the two haughty potentates who derived their titles to sovereignty from a long line of royal ancestors, and from a dynasty claiming a descent from celestial progenitors.[1]

[1] The insolence of Amir Khan was fully a match for Rajput pride. In his own account of the transaction, it is said, "The Amir sat on the Musnud with both Rajas, and the Jaypur chief deemed it an honour, and a proud day for him and his destinies, so to be placed with the Amir." This may, however, be a rhetorical flourish of his panegyrical amanuensis.—

1815.

The apparent cordiality which united Amir Khan and the two Rajput princes was of no long duration. The ordinary occasion of a rupture, failure in the discharge of pecuniary engagements beyond their means, carried the Mohammedan brigades in less than a twelvemonth from this scene into the territories of both the Rajas. Their first operations were directed against Jaypur. The Amir advanced, plundering the country according to custom, to within ten miles of the capital, when his further progress was arrested by the payment of a portion of his demands. He then marched to Jodhpur, whither Mohammed Shah had preceded him, on a like errand, and had taken possession of Merta. To redeem this place, the ministers of Jodhpur made a present payment of three lakhs of Rupees, but the withdrawal of the troops was suspended by the illness and death of their leader, and by the arrival of Amir Khan, who, assuming the command, applied the contribution to the discharge of the pay of the army. The sum being sufficient but for a short period, the troops were quartered in various places, with instructions to provide for their own subsistence, while Amir Khan proceeded with a strong division to Jodhpur, where he was received by the Raja as a friend.

The march of Amir Khan to Jodhpur was, in fact,

Memoirs, p. 424. This seems to have been the period of Amir Khan's highest prosperity. According to his own account, his reputation had extended so widely, that his assistance was earnestly implored by Shah Shuja of Kabul, by the widow of a dispossessed chief in Baluchistan, and by one of the Talpura princes of Sindh, who was at variance with the rest. He was, however, too cautious, or too well advised, to engage in enterprises which promised more peril than profit, or his accession might have given the ascendency to whomsoever he befriended. His muster-roll at Merta exhibited a strength of fifty thousand foot and twelve thousand horse, well provided with ordnance.—Ibid, 432.

BOOK II. CHAP. IV.

1815.

connected with a domestic intrigue, which threatened the authority and life of the Raja. The exclusive and infatuated reliance which Man Sing placed on the counsels of his minister, Induraj, and of his spiritual guide, Deonath, and the arrogance and rapaciousness of the latter, had excited against them a powerful party in the court of Jodhpur, at the head of which were the Rani and the Raja's son. The reputation of Amir Khan for dexterity in schemes of assassination, suggested to the discontented nobles the purchase of his services for the removal of the objects of their detestation and fear, and an offer of a considerable sum[1] secured his aid, on condition that the Rani and the prince should join their solicitations to those of the Thakurs; the condition was promptly complied with, and hence the meeting between Amir Khan and the Raja, the latter little suspecting the real object of the visit, which the former professed originated in the hope of coming to an amicable adjustment of his claims upon Man Sing.

After some days of seemingly friendly discussion, Amir Khan contrived to persuade the minister and the priest, that their personal representations would easily pacify the discontents of his soldiers, and that he should then be able to withdraw his army. They consequently agreed to admit a deputation of the Amir's leaders, and two of his captains, with a dozen resolute followers, waited upon Induraj, at his official residence, where the Guru, Deonath, was also present.

[1] Tod says seven lakhs of rupees, Amir Khan himself thirty-five, he actually received but ten (£100,000), but he made up the balance, at least in part, by contributions from the country.—Mem. 440.

After some altercation, the Mohammedans appeared to become indignant, and, pretending ungovernable wrath, drew their swords and put both the Jaypur functionaries to death. They then secured themselves in the building, which the Rajputs attempted in vain to force, and remained on their defence, until Amir Khan came to their rescue, threatening to fire and plunder the city if his men were harmed. The chiefs who had instigated the perpetration of the crime were also earnest with the Raja to sanction the dismissal of the murderers, lest the city should be sacked; and Man Sing, alarmed for his own safety, allowed them to act as they pleased, and they restored the troopers to their chief. The Rajput nobles paid the Amir a portion of the stipulated sum, and prevailed upon him, by entering into engagements for the remainder, to march out of the Jaypur territory. Man Sing, conscious that he was surrounded by domestic enemies, more dangerous than those he had encountered in the field, thenceforth simulated intellectual imbecility, and withdrew from all participation in the government in favour of his son, Chatur Sing; abdicating the sovereignty of Mewar until the death of the prince, and his alliance with the British, restored him to personal security, to his senses, and revenge.[1]

[1] According to the report of the Resident at Delhi, the Vakils of Jodhpur asserted that the murder of Induraj and Deonath was perpetrated with the knowledge and concurrence of the Raja, but they belonged to the usurping party. Tod, in his Personal Narrative, adverting to a surmise that Man Sing was privy to the murder, observes, that there are but two who, in this life, can reveal the mystery—the Raja and the bourreau-en-chef of Rajputana, Amir Khan; the latter has spoken out in his Memoirs, and exonerated the Raja. Man Sing, when he thought it safe to lay aside his assumed idiotcy, inflicted severe punishment upon the members of the faction, as we shall hereafter have occasion to notice.—Memoir of Amir Khan, 433.—Tod's Rajasthan, i. 715, ii. 150.

1816. From Jodhpur, the Amir led his forces into the Shekawati country, where he levied contributions, and then returned towards Jaypur. The administration of affairs was here, also, the object of dispute between two powerful factions, at the head of one of which was the Purohit, or family priest of the Raja: his competitor for the ministry, and the nobles opposed to him, repaired to Amir Khan and encouraged him to advance to the capital. The minister, Manji Das, with Amir Khan's former opponent, Chand Sing, made a vigorous defence, and resolutely refused to purchase the Amir's retreat, and calling upon the Thakurs for their contingents, they collected a respectable force, and harassed the besiegers with repeated, and often successful, sallies. Irritated by their opposition, Amir Khan ordered a bombardment of the town, by which extensive injury was done to the besieged, and the shot reached even the palace of the Raja. Jagat Sing was now seriously alarmed, and was preparing to evacuate his capital when his Rani, the daughter of Man Sing, of Jodhpur, availing herself of the connexion which had subsisted between her father and Amir Khan, sent an humble message to him to supplicate his forbearance. Not sorry, in all probability, to have a fair excuse for desisting from a siege in which success was distant, if not doubtful, Amir Khan retired from before Jaypur, and placed his troops in cantonments for the rains. The following season witnessed a repetition of the same course of predatory warfare, but the operations of Amir Khan, with his principal division, were confined to the siege of Madhurajpur, a dependency of Jaypur.

After several repulses in his attempts to carry the fort by storm, the siege was converted into a blockade, which had lasted for nine months, when the policy of the British Government interfered to put an end to the sufferings of Rajputana. 1816.

The state of affairs had come to a crisis. Central India presented a chaotic mass of social disorganization; order was no where attempted, and the only semblance of substantial power that remained was exercised by roving armies, belonging to no one government, but controlling and distracting all. In Malwa, the troops of Sindhia and Holkar acted independently of their nominal masters; and, provided with assignments on the revenues of the provinces, in liquidation of their pay, employed them as an excuse for despoiling the agricultural and commercial classes of the products of their industry. Whatever scanty residue was spared by them, was gleaned by the dependents and tributaries of the state, armed to defend themselves from the extortionate demands of the prince, and his unsparing instruments, to lay waste the lands of which they had been despoiled, or to inflict retaliation upon the spoilers. The princes of Rajputana were in a still more helpless condition, and aggravated the evils of political humiliation by personal incompetency. The Raja of Udaypur, indolent and improvident, was bearded in his capital by military adventurers, and robbed of his domains by his own feudatory chiefs and clansmen. The Raja of Jodhpur, affecting idiotcy, abandoned the reins of Government to the hands of a dissolute prince, whose career was soon after cut short by the hand of an assassin. The Raja of Jaypur, a slave to

1816.

an infatuated attachment to a Mohammedan dancing girl, preserved only a portion of his hereditary possessions, by the sufferance of Amir Khan. All three princes were objects of contempt to their nobles, who were split into factions, and struggled with their sovereign, or each other, for the miserable relics which the rapacity of the Mohammedans had left to be scrambled for. The country was everywhere a prey to numerous bands of merciless marauders, who, moving about in all directions, demanded the revenues which were due to the crown, and appropriated or wasted the resources from which the revenues were payable. Every vestige of regular and orderly government had disappeared, and a complete dissolution of the bonds of society must have ensued, had not the Government of British India obtained, by persevering representation and remonstrance, from the authorities in England, a reluctant and qualified permission to effect the extirpation of that part of the predatory system which consisted in the peculiar organization of the plunderers, termed Pindaris, as preliminary to the overthrow of the whole scheme of military depredation.

CHAPTER V.

Organized plunderers termed Pindaris.—Their origin.—Settlements on the Nerbudda.—Sindhia Shahi, and Holkar Shahi.—Their leaders.—Cheetoo.—Karim.—Dost Mohammed.—Plan of their incursions.—Cruelty and brutality.—Annually plunder the territories of the Nizam, the Peshwa, and the Raja of Berar.—Invade the British territory.—Threaten Mirzapur.—Plunder the Masulipatam district.—Gantur.—The Northern Circars.—Their parties surprised or overtaken.—Many killed.—Defects of a defensive system.—Offensive operations contemplated by the former Government.—Policy of Lord Moira.—Total suppression of the predatory system.—Expected conduct of the Mahratta Princes.—Proposal to annul the 8th Article of the Treaty with Sindhia, and renew an Alliance with Jaypur.—Prohibition of the Board of Control.—Modified.—Opposition in the Council.—Perseverance of the Governor-General.—Raja of Jaypur seeks the renewed Alliance.—Hesitates.—Conclusion of Treaty deferred.—Alliance with the Rajput Princes, with Amir Khan, with the Nawab of Bhopal.—Sindhia's concurrence.—Coöperation of Nagpur.—Death of the Raja.—Succession of Apa Saheb.—Disposition of the Peshwa.—Regrets abandonment of Trimbak.—Requires the charge of him.—Many grievances.—Escape of Trimbak.—Insurrection raised by him.

—Its existence denied.—Secretly encouraged by the Peshwa.—Subsidiary troops of Poona and Hyderabad in movement. — Insurgents dispersed at Maswan.—Lieutenant Warre murdered.—Insurgents routed in Kandesh.—Proceedings of the Resident.—Poona surrounded.—Peshwa promises to give up Trimbak and disband his levies.—Proclamation of rewards for Trimbak's apprehension.—Orders of the Government.—New Treaty.—Conditions. — Additional Subsidiary Force. — Territorial Cessions. — Arrangements with the Gaekwar.

BOOK II. CHAP. V.

1816.

THE freebooters, known as Pindaris, although frequently acting in detached bodies, along with the predatory cohorts of the Mahratta and Patan leaders, had a loosely independent activity of their own, and were little implicated in the outrages committed upon the Rajput princes. Their field of action lay more commonly on the south of the Nerbudda, where they perpetrated frequent and destructive ravages on the territories of the Nizam, the Raja of Berar, and the Peshwa. They were bold enough at last to trespass upon the boundaries of the British frontier, and passing to the east and south-east, spread terror and desolation over the villages and towns, that had till then reposed securely under the protection of a civilized and powerful government. These daring incursions proved the signal of their destruction.

The Pindaris, as a body of irregular horse, serving without pay, and receiving in lieu of it, license to plunder, appear to have originated in the south of

India, constituting an element in the composition of the armies of the last Mohammedan dynasties of the Dekhin. After their downfall, the services of the Pindaris were transferred to the Mahrattas, with whom they served against Aurangzeb, and at a still later date, they shared in the disastrous defeat at Panipat. After that event, their leaders settled chiefly in Malwa, and, attaching themselves respectively to Sindhia and Holkar, became distinguished as Sindhia Shahi, and Holkar Shahi Pindaris, receiving grants of land chiefly in the vicinity of the Nerbudda, for the maintenance of themselves and their followers in time of peace, on the condition of gratuitous coöperation in time of war. 1816.

As the power of the Mahratta princes declined, the distinctions drawn from either became little more than nominal, and the Pindaris were not unfrequently engaged in hostilities against the chief of whom they were professedly retainers. When first known to the British authorities, the Sindhia Shahi Pindaris, who were by far the more numerous of the two,[1] were under the leading of a number of Sirdars, of whom Cheetoo, Karim Khan, and Dost Mohammed were the principal. None of the Holkar Shahi chiefs were leaders of much note. Cheetoo was by birth a Jat, and, when a child, was purchased during a famine, by a Pindari horseman,

[1] In 1812 the Sindhia Shahis were estimated at four times the number of the Holkar Shahis. The whole number of the Pindaris was at different times differently reckoned, but the most probable computation made them about twenty or twenty-five thousand horse, of whom six or seven thousand were effective Cavalry, about three or four thousand middling, and the rest bad. Memorandum by Captain Sydenham, 1809, and 1814. Papers Pindari war, p. 24. Also *Memoir of the Pindaris* and account of their leaders and settlements, by Mr. Jenkins, resident at Nagpur 1812. Ibid. 25.

BOOK II. CHAP. V. 1816.

by whom he was brought up to a similar line of life. His patron rose to the command of the troop to which he belonged, and Cheetoo shared with his two sons, the elder and younger Rajan, the succession to his command. His superior abilities gave him the ascendency, and brought him to the notice of Doulat Rao Sindhia, who, in 1804, conferred upon him a Jagir, and the title of Nawab. This did not prevent his being thrown into confinement by Sindhia, two years afterwards, and detained a prisoner for four years, until he paid a heavy ransom,[2] on which he was restored to favour and to his Jagir. Sindhia also, subsequently enlarged the latter, conferring upon Chetoo five districts lying east of Bhopal, commanding several of the fords of Nerbudda. Satwas, near Hindia, was Cheetoo's usual place of residence.

Karim Khan was by descent a Rohilla, the son of a Pindari leader; he early entered the service of Doulat Rao Sindhia, and was present at the battle of Kardla, where he collected much valuable booty. He, equally with Cheetoo, obtained the title of Nawab from Sindhia, with some territorial assignments on the Nerbudda, in which situation he had previously received grants of land from the Nawab of Bhopal. These possessions he extended by successful encroachments on the districts of both Sindhia and Holkar; and in 1805 had attained a degree of power, which only required consolidation to have become the foundation of a substantive state. It was not, however, Sindhia's policy to permit such a

[2] He is said to have paid conjointly with Karim, who had been also in durance, and was liberated at the same period, ten Lakhs of Rupees. Papers Pindari war, p. 1.

result; and having, by professions of friendship and esteem, induced Karim Khan to visit him, he caused the Pindari to be apprehended, and confined him in the fortress of Gwalior. The camp of Karim was attacked and plundered, but his principal treasures were carried off by his aged mother, who found an asylum with Zalim Sing, of Kota. His districts were all sequestrated, but his followers were kept together by Namdar Khan, his nephew, with others of his leaders; and they maintained themselves by the indiscriminate plunder of Sindhia's territories. Karim Khan, after four years detention, was liberated upon payment of a considerable sum of money; and an effort was made to efface the memory of his degradation by additional honours. The resentment of the Pindari was not to be thus appeased, and settling himself at Shujawalpur, he was soon in possession of lands more extensive than those which he had occupied before his captivity. In his measures of retaliation he was at first joined by Cheetoo, who had similar injuries to avenge, and their united force presented an array sufficiently formidable to awaken the serious apprehensions of the Mahratta chiefs.[1] Jaggu Bapu was sent against the Pindaris by Sindhia, and he and the Raja of Nagpur prevailed upon Cheetoo to separate himself from his colleague and rival. Karim thus deserted, was entirely defeated at Manohar Thana, and obliged to fly with a few followers to the camp of Amir Khan. He accompanied Amir Khan to Bampura, and was there placed, with his

1816.

[1] The Dasahara of 1811, was celebrated by an assemblage of not fewer than twenty-five thousand cavalry, besides several battalions of infantry. Prinsep, 1, 45. Malcolm makes the number still more considerable, not less than sixty thousand horse. Cen. India, vol. 1, p. 456.

BOOK II. CHAP. V.

1816.

own consent, under seeming restraint with Ghafur Khan, with whom he remained three years longer, when he was allowed to depart.[1] During his absence, his Pindaris, under the same leaders as before, assisted Vizir Mohammed, of Bhopal, and Durjan Sal, of Kichi, in their hostilities against Sindhia, and committed unsparing havock upon his estates. Their head quarters still continued in the neighbourhood of Bhopal, and Karim joined his adherents at Barsia, not long before the might of British India was arrayed for the destruction of his race.

Dost Mohammed and Wasil Mohammed were the sons of Hiru, at one time a leader of distinction in the service of the Raja of Berar. They succeeded to their father's command, and added considerably to their followers by the misfortunes of Karim. They commanded about 7,000 horse of all descriptions, and occupied districts in the neighbourhood of Bhilsa. The several chiefs of the Holkar Shahi Pindaris were cantoned chiefly in the neighbourhood of Cheetoo's possessions, and looked up to him, notwithstanding his nominal connection with Sindhia, as their friend and ally.

[1] Prinsep says the strong representations of Sindhia and Holkar, obliged the Patan to place Karim in a kind of restraint, in which he remained till 1816. According to Malcolm, 1, 457, Amir Khan pretending to recommend him to Tulasi Bai, made him over to Ghafur Khan, with whom he remained under confinement. Amir Khan's own story is that Karim was placed with Ghafur Khan under nominal restraint with his own consent,—as being in safety, whilst his nephew and chief Sirdars continued their depredations at the Amir's recommendation as the allies of Bhopal and Raghugerh, Mem. 409. That he was actually detained by Tulasi Bai, was, however, the notion entertained by the Government of Bengal, and the Residents with Sindhia and the Peshwa were instructed to prevail upon them to exert their influence with Holkar's court, to prevent Karim's release. The Resident at Delhi, also, was directed to communicate with the Bai's vakiels at that City, and urge the detention of the Pindari. Letter from Bengal, 15th Aug. 1811. Papers Pindari war, p. 14.

The resources of a Pindari chief were not to be estimated by the lands which he occupied, nor were the numbers of his Durra, or company, restricted to any particular limit. The principal means of maintaining both himself and his followers, consisted of plunder levied in periodical incursions into those territories which were considered likely to yield the most abundant booty; and the numbers of his retainers depended especially upon the frequency and success of the predatory excursions which he instigated or conducted. The Chief himself rarely headed a merely plundering foray, but when not engaged with his main body in the service of a regular state, delegated to his Sirdars the plan and conduct of the excursion, expecting a portion of the prey as the price of permitting what he had neither the will nor the power to prevent. The direction of an inroad was generally concerted at the Hindu military festival of the Dasahara, when the leaders met and consulted upon the course to be pursued during the ensuing cold season. As soon after the cessation of the rains, as the roads became practicable, and the rivers fordable, the leader who had been chosen for the expedition, moved out with his immediate adherents generally well armed and mounted. In proportion to his reputation he was joined as he proceeded by plunderers from every quarter and of every caste, by disbanded soldiers and fugitives from justice, by the idle and profligate and unprincipled of every country and creed: some of them were respectably mounted and equipped, and formed an efficient body of Cavalry, but the greater part rode ponies or horses

BOOK II. CHAP. V. 1817.

of inferior quality, and were indifferently armed with pikes, swords, or even with clubs and sticks pointed with iron: a few had matchlocks. When four or five thousand horse were thus assembled, the party marched to the destined scene of spoliation.* The men carried no baggage of any description, and supported themselves and their horses on the grain and provision which they plundered, both horses and men being trained to endure great privation and fatigue. Correct information of the state of the country, and its means of defence having been previously obtained, the Pindaris moved with great secrecy and celerity to a centrical spot in the proposed sphere of action, where those best armed and mounted remained round the person of the leader, to constitute a rallying point, while the mass, in parties of a few hundred each, were dispatched to sweep the country through a circle of many miles, and to bring in with the least delay, whatever valuables they could collect. The object of the incursion being pillage, not fighting, an encounter with regular troops was carefully shunned, and attempts to overcome prolonged resistance were seldom persisted in. Great loss of life therefore seldom attended the movements of the Pindaris, but their haste and rapacity tolerated no hesitation, and whoever was supposed to possess property, and was either unable or unwilling to satisfy the demands of the robbers, was put to the most cruel torture, and not unfrequently died under its infliction.[1]

[1] One mode of torture, was to enclose a person's head in a bag of ashes or dust, and beat them on his face till he was suffocated; sometimes hot ashes were applied, and occasionaly pounded chillies were mixed with them. A couple of heavy pestles or yokes were taken, and

Their brutality was equal to their cruelty, and the women escaped violation and murder only by a voluntary death. What the Pindaris could not carry away they destroyed, and their movements were to be tracked by the flames of the villages which they had set on fire after they had rifled them. As soon as the plunder was brought in, and the party reassembled, it moved off with the same secrecy and rapidity with which it had advanced, and all were safe within their accustomed haunts, before an adequate force could be collected for pursuit. 1817.

The depredations of the Pindaris were, during many years, confined to the neighbouring frontiers of the Nizam, the Peshwa, and the Raja of Berar, and in these they were in general annually repeated. The presence of the subsidiary force, although it could not prevent their ravages, yet limited the range of them in the dominions of the two former, but the territories of Nagpur, defended alone by the inactive and inefficient troops of the Raja, lay entirely at their mercy. Their depredations were carried with fearless audacity to the immediate precincts of Nagpur, and the Raja was repeatedly alarmed for his own safety, and that of his capital.[1] For a long time they refrained

one being placed under the back of the prostrate victim, the other was crossed upon his breast, and a Pindari seated himself at either end, whilst a severe beating was inflicted. Boiling oil was sprinkled over the naked body, or straw was tied round the limbs and set on fire. Infants were torn from their mothers' arms, and thrown into wells, or dashed on the ground, and an instance is mentioned of a child having been tossed up into the air and sabered as it was falling. Report of Commission. Papers 55.

[1] In November 1811, the main body of the Pindaris estimated at five thousand horse, and drawn up in regular order, was visible from the

BOOK II. CHAP. V. 1816.

from trespassing upon the British boundary, but the desolation which they had spread in the adjacent countries, obliged them to seek for harvests more remote, and a confident belief that they would not be unsupported by the native potentates, and a persuasion that the British government was unable or disinclined to oppose an energetic resistance to their inroads, induced them to make an experiment, how far they might venture to plunder its villages, and murder its subjects with impunity. In January, 1812, a body of Pindaris[1] belonging to the party of Dost Mohammed, penetrated through Bundelkhand and Rewa, plundered and destroyed a number of villages under British authority, and excited great alarm for the safety of Mirzapur, a town of great commercial wealth. They desisted from the attempt upon learning the advance of troops from Benares and Allahabad, and turning to the south, passed through South Behar, into the province of Sirguja, a dependency of Nagpur, whence they safely reached their homes, with such an amount of booty, as to hold out an irresistible temptation to repeat the foray. Extensive mischief was inflicted, many lives were lost, and a general feeling of terror pervaded the population of the province of Bahar.

The complete success of their incursion encouraged the Pindaris to project its early repetition. Reports of their design were received by the Government of

British Residency. Papers 26. On that occasion they set fire to one quarter of Nagpur. Papers 2.

[1] The number was variously computed from one thousand two hundred, to twelve thousand. Letter from Bengal, 25 March, 1812. Papers 9.

Bengal, divisions of troops were arrayed in such positions as were thought likely to cover the frontier, but it was impossible to station detachments along the whole line from the limits of Bundelkhand to the Gulph of Cambay, and the constitution of regular troops unfitted them for competing with the unincumbered, rapid, and desultory movements of the Pindari horse. The Government of Bengal, however, had not yet fully learned the futility of the precautionary measures which had been adopted, and, in their communications to the Court of Directors, expressed themselves relieved from the apprehension of a second Pindari inroad, on any part of the frontier, from Bundelkhand to Cuttack.[1] The arrangements were not wholly nugatory, as the attempt to ravage the Bengal frontier was not renewed in the following season; although this was partly attributable to the diversion of the operations of the plunderers in other directions. A party under Cheetoo, between four and five thousand in number, proceeded westward, and laid waste the dependencies of Surat, while other bodies burst into the dominions of the Nizam and the Peshwa, and menaced the districts subject to the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras. Their depredations were, however, arrested by their own dissensions, ending in actual hostilities between Cheetoo and the Sirdars of Karim Khan, in which the former was defeated and obliged to take shelter in Ujayin.

The domestic quarrels of the Pindaris having been composed, and the vigilance of the British

[1] Letter from Bengal, 18th November, 1812. Papers Pindari war, p. 15.

BOOK II. CHAP. V. 1816.

Government somewhat intermitted, they again made their appearance within the British frontier. At the end of 1815, they advanced southwards to the banks of the Krishna, and entered the confines of the district of Masulipatam, whence they carried off a valuable booty. Early in March of the following year, a still more formidable body, estimated to be five thousand strong,[1] penetrated to Gantur, Cuddapa and Masulipatam, and for a series of ten days committed fearful destruction, aggravated by the worst features of Pindari ferocity. They spread themselves in different directions, but moved rapidly at the rate of thirty or forty miles a day, never halting long enough in one spot to allow the regular troops to come up with them, and finally quitted the scene of their devastations without suffering any material loss; although they were occasionally repulsed by the firmness of the provincial guards, and by the resolution of the villagers, or their cruelties were disappointed by the despair of the inhabitants.[2]

During their short stay the Pindaris plundered above three hundred villages, and wounded, tortured, and murdered above four thousand individuals of both sexes and of all ages. The barbarous atrocities which they perpetrated filled the whole country with terror, and distrusting the ability of the Government to provide for their security, the

[1] These seem to have belonged to one of three divisions which had at this time invaded the territories of the Nizam, one body was reported to be ten thousand strong, the two others five thousand each. Papers Pindari war, p. 40.

[2] At Ainavote in Gantur, where the people after a desperate defence were overpowered by their assailants, they set fire to their own dwellings, and perished with their families in the flames. Papers, p. 37.

people in many places unvisited by the plunderers, abandoned their villages and repaired to the principal stations for protection.[1]

The impunity with which this inroad was attended, stimulated the marauders to venture upon a second attempt, and in December of the same year, a considerable body suddenly appeared in the northern Circars, and sacked and burned the town of Kimedi and the adjacent villages. They were checked in the midst of their operations by the approach of a detachment of the 6th Madras N. infantry, under Major Oliver, and hastily retreating from his pursuit, moved towards the north where they succeeded in laying waste nearly the whole of the district, and in partially plundering the town of Ganjam. The alarm was universal and the population generally fled to the neighbouring hills and thickets, and hid themselves until the danger had passed. Apprehensions spread even to the town of Puri and temple of Jagannath, the sanctity of which would have been no defence against Pindari rapacity. The plunderers, however, having intelligence that troops were advancing against them, suddenly quitted the province, and disappeared for awhile amid the rugged country north-west of Kuttack, until they emerged

[1] A commission was appointed to ascertain and report upon the extent of the mischief committed. They reported the number killed to be one hundred and eighty-two; wounded, some severely, five hundred and five; and tortured, three thousand, six hundred, and thirty-three. It is scarcely possible that these numbers should be as accurate as their minuteness of detail would represent them, but they may be taken as a probable approximation. The report specified various cases of atrocity: in many places the women either to avoid pollution, or unable to survive the disgrace, threw themselves into wells and perished. Papers Pindari war, p. 37.

BOOK II. CHAP. V. 1816.

in the vicinity of their haunts along the upper course of the Nerbudda. Their retreat was not unmolested. In Kuttack, Lieut. Borthwick, with a detachment of the 2nd Bengal N. infantry, followed close upon their rear, cut off their stragglers, and repeatedly put the main body to a precipitate flight; and when they had arrived between Sohagpur and Mandala, they were surprised by a detachment from the division commanded by Colonel Adams, consisting of a squadron of the 5th N. C., under Captain Caulfield. He came upon their bivouac on the night of the 24th of January, 1817, killed above four hundred, and dispersed the rest. The fugitives fell upon the main body of the cavalry under Major Clarke, and again suffered just retribution. Similar disasters befel other parties of these plunderers.

The invasion of Kuttack was simultaneous with other movements of the Pindaris which had been directed against the territories of the British allies. Notwithstanding that the chief strength of the Nagpur subsidiary force, consisting of five battalions of foot and a regiment of cavalry, had been moved into the valley of the Nerbudda, and occupied positions considered most favourable for protecting the frontier, a numerous party of Pindaris turned the right of the line, and, about the middle of November, made their way into Berar. They then separated into two bodies: the one marching eastward behind the subsidiary force was that which ravaged Ganjam; the other, said to be six thousand strong, proceeded to the south, and passing within twenty miles of Nagpur crossed the Warda into the territories of the Nizam,

and pursued a westerly direction with the purpose of laying waste the British districts south of the Tumbhadhra. The march was, however, retarded by the indecision of the leaders, and opportunity was afforded to a detachment of the Hyderabad subsidiary force, commanded by Major Macdowall, to come unexpectedly upon the freebooters, in the vicinity of Beder. The division reached the Pindari camp before daylight, on the 15th of January, and a volley was the first intimation which the plunderers had of their approach;—an immediate and total rout ensued: many were killed, and a thousand of their best horses were captured.

A division from the Durra of Cheetoo had about the same time passed to the westward of the British posts, and, following the road by Burhanpur, had penetrated through the passes into Berar, proceeding thence between Jalna and Aurangabad towards Ahmedabad. Unluckily for the invaders, it happened that Major Lushington, with the 4th Madras Cavalry, was on his return from the Peshwa's country to the cantonments at Jalna, and on the 25th of December, heard on his arrival at Pipalwar, of their presence at Logam. He moved in pursuit of them at one in the morning of the 26th. The Pindaris had been repulsed from Logam, and had retreated towards the East, whither they were followed by the cavalry. After a rapid march of above fifty miles, Major Lushington came upon them at one P.M., when they were engaged in preparing their noon-day meal. They were about three thousand strong, but attempted little opposition. They fled in all directions, and were pursued for ten miles,

BOOK II. CHAP. V. 1816.

when the fatigue which the troops had undergone compelled their recall. About two hundred of the best mounted of the Pindaris escaped, but the main body was completely broken up with the loss of between seven and eight hundred killed, and of a still greater number of their horses captured. The only casualty on the side of the British was that of an officer, Captain Drake, who was run through by a spear.[1] The transactions that now took place put an end for ever to Pindari incursions.

The impossibility of permanently guarding against the predatory inroads of the Pindaris, by a system purely defensive, had not escaped the observation of the late Governor-General, and in his address to the Secret Committee of the 2nd of October, 1812, the Government of Bengal distinctly declared their conviction that "the arrangements and measures of defence which they had adopted were merely palliatives," and that "they anticipated the necessity, at some future time, of undertaking a system of military and political operations calculated to strike at the root of this great and increasing evil."[2] As, however, they considered that any system of measures adapted to the effectual attainment of the object must be of a complicated and extensive nature, they could not be undertaken without much previous preparation, and the subject was therefore left for further inquiry and deliberation. The evil could not be denied, but the Board of Control clung to the notion that it might be checked by defensive arrangements, and, in a letter from the

[1] See official dispatches, Asiatic Journal, December, 1816, pp. 186, 120.

[2] Papers Pindari war, p. 14.

Secret Committee, the Government of Bengal was prohibited "from engaging in plans of general confederacy and offensive operations against the Pindaris, either with a view to their utter extirpation, or in anticipation of an apprehended danger."[1]

The sagacity of the Governor-General, the unusual knowledge of the condition of India which he had brought with him, the minuteness of the information with which he was furnished by the Residents at the native courts, comprehending some of the ablest men who have done credit to the Company's service, and the soundness of the advice which he received from competent authorities, early enabled him to take a just and comprehensive view of the policy which the circumstances of the time imperiously demanded.[2] The tranquillisation of central India, the restoration of order and good government in Malwa and Rajputana were considered by the Earl of Moira to be as indispensable for the happiness and prosperity of the native states as for the safety and advantage of the British possessions. Neither were attainable as long as the predatory system subsisted, as long as Pathan and Pindari were suffered to create an unnatural state of anarchy and disorder, in which the peaceable and industrious members of society were the prey of lawless hordes of plunderers, who grew up and gathered vigour amidst the chaos which they caused and perpetuated. As affecting British

[1] Secret letter to Bengal, 29th September, 1815. Papers Pindari war, p. 41.

[2] See the opinions of Mr. (now Lord) Metcalfe, the resident at Delhi, and of Mr. (now Sir Richard) Jenkins, resident at Nagpur. Commons Report, 1832. Political Appendix, 229.

1816.

interests alone the evil called for a decisive remedy, which the native princes were indisposed or unable to apply, and which therefore the British Government had a right to seek for in its own resources: nor was it only a right: it was a duty imposed upon us by the supremacy of our power, no longer to permit the predatory system to devastate the various states who supplicated for British protection, and were entitled to receive it. The settlement most conducive to the happiness of India, as well as the security of our interests, was THE ESTABLISHMENT OF UNIVERSAL TRANQUILLITY UNDER THE GUARANTEE AND SUPREMACY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

That the extension of British influence based upon the destruction of the predatory system, would be attended with no additional risk and would be practicable without difficulty, were also maintained by the Governor General. Undoubtedly the individuals interested in the continuance of disorder and violence, would strenuously resist all interference intended for their suppression, and such was the short-sightedness and self destructive policy of some of the native courts, that it was probable they would contemplate in the overthrow of the system, only the loss of a share of the spoil and of the contingent employment of the predatory bands, in their own service, in case of war with the British. To take the princes of Rajputana and the petty chiefs of Malwa under the shield of British protection would deprive Sindhia, Holkar, and Amir Khan of victims on whom they had long preyed, and from whom they would be loth to withdraw their

grasp; and the annihilation of the Pindaris would deprive the Mahratta leaders of auxiliaries whose services might be of use in time of peril. But would they risk hostilities in defence of their participation in precarious plunder, or for the protection of such uncertain and unsafe dependents as the Pindaris,—and if they did, was their hostility to be dreaded?

Although the Governor-General admitted that the measure of establishing peace in India by British influence, would be exceedingly unpalatable to the Mahratta princes, he maintained that it would not alter the real character of our relations with the native states who were interested in the continuance of the system. Whether professed friends or allies, they were already hostile to the British government, and if they were desirous of preserving in their entireness bodies of armed men, it was only that they might expect their co-operation in an extensive combination, which had for some time been agitated against the British ascendency, originating in the intrigues of the Peshwa. If such a collision were inevitable, it had better be at once encountered, while the finances of British India were in a prosperous state, its armies effective, and its force unbroken by harassing and unavowed aggressions upon the frontier, wasteful and exhausting in their consequences, and impossible to be avoided by any defensive arrangement. From these considerations, therefore, the Governor General urged immediate interposition, by announcing to Sindhia that the British government could no longer continue its observance of the article[1] in the treaty which pre-

[1] The 8th Article of the Treaty of 1805.

1816.

cluded it from forming alliances with other native states; that it should consequently accede to the application made to it so urgently by the Raja of Jaypur, and require the recal of Sindhia's troops from the Raja's territory, as well as prohibit Amir Khan from meddling with his affairs. At the same time Sindhia was to be informed of the determination to exterminate the Pindaris as an organised body, and was to be invited to co-operate in an object equally interesting to all the friends of peace and good government.[1]

The alliance with Jaypur so unjustifiedly broken off in 1805, had ever since been a subject of consideration with the Home authorities, who had hitherto approved of its renewal, should its revival be sought for. Now, however, that it formed part of a plan which it was thought might lead to a war with Sindhia, a different view was adopted, and considered as an article in a comprehensive scheme for the pacification of India, it was strongly discouraged if not positively interdicted.[2] Imperfectly informed of the state of India, measuring the present by the past, and greatly overrating the opposition to be

[1] Minutes of the Governor General, 3rd March, 1814; 1st December, 1815; 20th April, 1816; 8th March, and 26th December, 1817; and letter to the council, from Cawnpore, 10th Oct. 1817. M.S. Records. These documents present extraordinary proofs of the extent of the Governor General's information, the comprehensiveness of his policy, and the justness and nobleness of his sentiments.

[2] A letter from the secret Committee of the 29th September, 1817, enjoined the Government of Bengal not to undertake any thing which might embroil us with Sindhia; prohibited any material change in the existing system of political relations, and ended with directing that "the system which was consolidated at the close of the last Mahratta war, should be maintained with as little change as could be avoided." Exhibiting strange ignorance of the alterations which ten years had wrought in the relative situations of the existing states, to which the system of 1805, always objectionable, was now wholly inapplicable.

overcome, apprehensive of financial embarrassments, and reluctant to encounter the vulgar clamour raised in Parliament against the extension of the British empire in India, the President of the Board of Control, Mr. Canning, however eminent as a statesman in the political world of the West, exhibited a singular want of knowledge and foresight in prescribing the line of conduct to be followed for the regulation of the interests of the East, and sought to enforce upon the Governor-General a feeble and temporising policy wholly unworthy of the British character, incompatible with the prosperity of the British Indian Empire, and fatal to the existence of the native powers.[1] It was asserted that

[1] Mr. Canning had in consequence of the death of the Earl of Buckinghamshire, in the year 1816, been placed at the head of the India Board, and it became the duty of this distinguished statesman to prescribe the course which should be pursued in this important and perplexing crisis of affairs. Letter from B. S. Jones, Esq. Commons Report, 1832. Appendix Polit. 232. It was fortunate that the course so prescribed was not followed: some of the instructions are the following, "We are unwilling to incur *the risk* of a general war, for the *uncertain purpose of extirpating the Pindaris.* Extended political and military combinations we cannot at the present moment sanction or approve." There was not the least risk of a general war, nor was there any uncertainty as to the extirpation of the Pindaris. "We do not think it improbable that even from Sindhia you may derive assistance in enterprises against separate bodies of the Pindaris, who may have committed depredations on our territories." A most improbable supposition,—and a most unworthy policy to require Sindhia's aid for the protection of the British territories. The suggestion was also thrown out in the face of "information recently received as to the suspicious behaviour of certain of the Mahratta chieftains, and the daring movements of the Pindaris." The result is the announcement of expectations signally falsified by events. "We entertain a strong hope that the dangers which arise from both these causes, and which *must perhaps always exist*, in a greater or less degree, may, by a judicious management of our existing relations, be prevented from coming upon us in any very formidable force, while, on the other hand, any attempt at this moment, to establish a new system of policy, tending to a wider diffusion of our power, must necessarily interfere with those economical regulations, which it is more than ever incumbent upon us to recommend, as indispensable to the maintenance of our present ascendency, and by exciting the jealousy and suspicion of other states, may too probably produce or mature those very projects of hostile confederacy which constitute the chief object of your apprehension."—Commons Report, App. Vol. p. 232.

1816. no danger was to be apprehended from the actual condition of Central India, but much from any attempt to effect its amelioration. That such interference would provoke a combination which had yet no existence except in the fears of the Governor-General, and that although the individual members of the combination might be little formidable, yet united they must prove dangerous enemies, and a war with them collectively be attended with imminent hazard and ruinous expense. Even the extirpation of the Pindaris, if found likely to produce such a combination would be inexpedient, and it might be the more prudent course to adopt some other project for the diminution of their power and the suppression of their ravages. It might be possible to expel them from their seats, and induce Sindhia to prevent their settling again in the same locality, or it might be practicable to take advantage of the dissensions among them and neutralise their mischievous activity by setting one leader against another.[1] This latter suggestion aroused the indignation of the Governor-General, who justly repudiated all friendly intercourse with any of the members of an association the principles of whose constitution were rapine and murder. At length the audacity of the

[1] This proposition was also Mr. Canning's.—Commons Report. App. Pol. 232. Lord Moira replied, "When the Honourable Committee suggest the expedient of engaging one portion of the Pindaris to destroy some other branch of the association, I am roused to the fear that we have been culpably deficient in pointing out to the authorities at home, the brutal and atrocious qualities of those wretches. Had we not failed to describe sufficiently the horror and execration in which the Pindaris are justly held, I am satisfied that nothing could have been more repugnant to the feelings of the Honourable Committee, than the notion that this Government should be soiled by a procedure which was to bear the colour of confidential intercourse, of a common cause, with any of those gangs."—Letter from Bengal, 8th March, 1817.

Pindaris—their violation of the British territories convinced the English minister that offensive measures could no longer be delayed with a due regard to the character or interests of the Indian empire, and his previous instructions were qualified by the admission, that "they were not intended to restrain the Governor-General in the exercise of his judgment and discretion upon any occasion when actual war upon the British territories might be commenced by any body of marauders, and where the lives and property of British subjects might call for efficient protection." He admitted also, that any connection between Sindhia and Holkar, with the Pindaris, open or secret, acknowledged or unavowed, would place the Government in a state of direct hostility with the offending chiefs :[1] and anticipatory approbation was expressed of any measures which the Governor-General might have adopted, not only for repelling invasion, but for pursuing and chastising the invaders. 1816.

Nor was the irresolution of the Board of Control the only difficulty by which the decided policy of the Governor-General was embarrassed. In his own council there prevailed an exaggerated dread of the power of Sindhia, founded on the recollection of the last Mahratta war, and a fear that the multiplication of political connections might be regarded as an infringement of the instructions from home, so often

[1] Even here, however, a timid and dishonest course of dissimulation was enjoined. "In acting or forbearing to act on this ground, (the open or secret connexion of a Mahratta Prince with the Pindaris) you will be guided by considerations of prudence. It might be politic to attempt to divide such confederacy by dissembling your knowledge of its existence.—Secret letter to Bengal, 20th September, 1816. Papers Pindari war, p. 41, also Commons Report, Pol. App. p. 233.

1816.

repeated, against the extension of the authority and influence of the British Government over the native states. These sentiments were, however, confined to the minority, and when news was received of the outrages committed by the Pindaris in the northern Circars, the Council were unanimous in agreeing that no terms should be kept with the invaders, whatever consequences their extirpation might entail. Supported by this concurrence, and fortified by the spirit of the orders from home, however cautious and qualified their terms, Lord Moira, taking upon himself the responsibility of carrying out his own views to the extent he had originally contemplated, determined to let loose the powerful machinery he had never ceased to accumulate for the destruction of the robber bands and the eventual annihilation of the predatory system. Various circumstances occurred propitious to his designs before they could be carried into execution.

As soon as it became generally known that the British Government was disposed to abandon the system of non-interference which it had hitherto followed, applications came from all quarters for its alliance and protection. The Raja of Jaypur was the first to depute agents to Delhi to solicit the renewal of his former engagements, and, in the month of April, 1816, the Resident at Delhi was authorised to enter upon negotiations, for, although the orders from home implied a virtual prohibition of the alliance, yet, as in a previous dispatch it had been remarked, that "while the justice of dissolving the alliance with Jaypur was questionable, its impolicy had been clearly demonstrated by the injury

done to the country by Amir Khan and the Pindaris; and the Government," it was added, "would have seen the necessity of providing against the depredations of both;" it was argued by the Governor-General that it had not been the intention of the Secret Committee, in their late injunctions, to have positively interdicted an arrangement, the policy and justice of which were still undeniable.[1] The negotiation, however, although the first commenced, was one of the last concluded, the Raja being deterred from an earlier termination by the alternate tone of menace and conciliation adopted by Sindhia and Amir Khan, who led him to fear, that if he persisted in the negotiation, they would attack him immediately with all their forces, and to hope that they would cease to harass his country, if he abstained from an English connexion. There was, also, a strong party in his court opposed to the alliance, as they apprehended it would give the Raja the means of resisting their encroachments upon his authority and resources, and recovering from them the lands they had taken advantage of his distress to usurp. There were, also, difficulties as to the amount of the subsidy to be paid, and the degree of interference to be exercised; and after repeated interruptions, the negotiation was not brought to a close until active hostilities had ceased, and the supremacy of the British was placed beyond dispute.

The example set by Jaypur was followed by the

[1] The injunction against making any new treaty without previous sanction, "was not issued by the Court of Directors, but by the Board of Control through the Secret Committee."—Mr. Jones. Commons Report, Pol. App. 234. note.

1816. Rajas of Udaypur and Jodhpur: envoys were sent by them to Delhi, and negotiations set on foot towards the end of 1817, which, with little delay, terminated in treaties of alliance. The Raj Rana of Kota also pledged his unreserved assent to whatever terms the British Government should impose, and the Raja of Bundi pleaded his former services as giving him a claim to British protection. A variety of petty chiefs also on the borders of Bundelkhand, or the further limits of Malwa — the Rajas of Krishnagar, Kerauli, Banswara, Pertab-gerh, and Dungarpur, applied earnestly for the protection of the British Government. Even Amir Khan offered his services against the Pindaris, and promised to disband his troops, and abstain from predatory practices, if guaranteed, in his actual possessions. The particular engagements entered into with these several chiefs we shall have subsequent occasion to notice, but the universality of the application, and the earnestness with which it was made, unequivocally evinced the feeling which pervaded the native states, their anxiety to be rescued by the British Government from the miserable slavery to which they had been reduced, and their readiness to contribute to the measures about to be adopted for their liberation.

An ally whose services were of immediate value, was also secured in Nazar Mohammed, the young Nawab of Bhopal, who had scarcely succeeded to his father's throne when he applied to the Political Agent in Bundelkhand to be admitted to the British alliance. Obvious as was the utility of his concurrence in the movements contemplated, and strong as

were his claims upon the friendship of the British Government, the positive prohibition of the Home authorities, precluded the Governor-General from acceding at once to his solicitations. They were not, however, absolutely rejected or discountenanced; and when in the beginning of the following year, his application was renewed through the Resident at Nagpur, that officer was directed, when military operations were on the eve of taking place, to enter into a preliminary engagement with the Nawab, which should stipulate at present for nothing more than military service. A more formal treaty was to be concluded after the war. 1816.

Notwithstanding the dread entertained by the opponents of the Governor-General's policy that Sindhia would take up arms in defence of the Pindaris, nothing occurred to justify the apprehension. It was known that their chiefs had agents in his camp, and friends among his ministers, who endeavoured to persuade him that his resources would be impaired, and his security imperilled, if he suffered the Pindaris to be extirpated. "What," wrote Namdar Khan to Sindhia, "what, if we are destroyed, will become of you?" — and it was with much uneasiness that the Maharaja looked forward to the approaching storm, and with extreme mortification and annoyance that he found himself compelled to abandon adherents who, notwithstanding their occasional disobedience, were looked upon by him as an essential part of his military strength. Many of his most distinguished officers were avowed friends of the Pindari leaders, and were impressed with a belief that, if supported with vigour, they might

1816.

defy the English. There were some weak enough to put faith in the vaunts of the Pindaris themselves, that they would easily baffle and exhaust the English troops,—that they would far outdo what Jeswant Rao Holkar had been able to achieve; and that at the head of fifty thousand horse, they would carry fire and sword to the environs of Calcutta. Sindhia was not misled by such rhodomontade; he knew his own weakness and the strength of the British too well to hazard a rupture; and when called upon to explain the countenance that he had shown in his camp to the Pindaris, he denied all connexion with them, and declared it to be his intention to inflict upon them condign punishment.—When apprised that this would be undertaken by the British Government, he professed himself entirely satisfied with the determination, and willing to co-operate in any manner which should be required. The sincerity of Sindhia's professions might be questionable, but his public disavowal of all connexion with the Pindaris was calculated to diminish their confidence and weaken their power, and to remove one of the obstacles which had been supposed to impede the execution of the Governor-General's projects. It was equally improbable, whatever might be their real sentiments, that the Raja of Nagpur, or the Peshwa, would take part with the Pindaris.

For some time after his elevation to the Regency of Nagpur, Apa Saheb, apprehensive of the intrigues of the party opposed to his nomination, found it necessary to throw himself unreservedly upon the support of his new allies. The troops stipulated for by

the subsidiary treaty were cantoned in the vicinity of the capital, in July, and Apa Saheb immediately removed his residence close to their lines, leaving the palace and the person of the Raja in the keeping of his opponents. As the latter was the chief source of their ability to thwart Apa Saheb's administration, the titular authority of the Raja being employed to contravene the acts of the Regent, Apa Saheb was instigated to rid himself of the impediment, and agents were speedily found to effect its removal. On the morning of the 1st of February, 1817, the Raja Parswaji Bhonsla was found dead in his bed. No marks of violence were perceptible; and as his health was always precarious and constitution infirm, it was not impossible that his sudden demise was to be attributed to natural causes. Some vague reports of foul practice reached the ears of the Resident, but they were not traceable to any authentic source, and resting apparently on no solid foundation, were to be classed with the popular calumnies which are the ordinary concomitants in India of the decease of a person of rank. Apa Saheb was at the time absent from Nagpur, and as nothing transpired to implicate him in the transaction, he was acknowledged, in virtue of his hereditary rights, Raja of Nagpur. The interests of the Raja were somewhat different from those of the Regent, but the ascendency which had been established at Nagpur, the professions, and, for a season, the conduct of Apa Saheb afforded no grounds for apprehending that he would fall off from the alliance to which he probably was indebted for his life, and certainly for his succession to the throne.

1816.

BOOK II. CHAP. V.

1816.

Less confidence was to be placed in the disposition of the Peshwa, but the occurrences which had embittered his animosity had also diminished his power to do mischief. A course of restless and unavailing dissension had led to the commission of acts which were regarded as those of an enemy, and had ended in the still further reduction of his political consequence. Scarcely had he relinquished Trimbak to the British officers when he repented of his acquiescence, and earnestly solicited that the culprit should be restored to him. He declared that he had given him up only in the belief that he was to undergo a public trial, and that if convicted of the murder of the Sastri, he was to be replaced in the Peshwa's hands for punishment. As it was, great injustice was done to Trimbak, who was cast into confinement, without any proof of his criminality, and great disgrace was inflicted upon the Peshwa in the privation of that right which he possessed in virtue of his sovereign authority of awarding the punishment due to the offences of his own subjects. His representations to this effect were unceasing; the incarceration of Trimbak in a foreign prison was, he urged, a perpetual indignity, and his sense of the dishonour was the more keen as it was inflicted by his friends. He was also subjected to serious pecuniary injury, for his principal treasures were entrusted to Trimbak's care, and no other person knew where they were concealed. He professed himself willing to adopt any arrangements for Trimbak's security, that the Resident should dictate, but declared that unless he were confided to his charge, his life would be passed in misery and mortification.

For a time, his suit was preferred in friendly and conciliatory language; but he at length changed his tone and accompanied his application with the representation of various grievances, some of which he ascribed to the injustice of the Government, some to the personal unfriendliness of the Resident. His claims on the Gaekwar and Nizam were unadjusted. He had been obliged to subsidise a larger force than was originally proposed; and he had ceded territory even beyond what was demanded, yet Kattiwar, which, according to treaty, was to have been restored, was still retained, and its restoration was saddled with unwarranted conditions. The subsidiary force stationed near Poona, was about to be removed to a post where it would block up the only bridge by which he could cross the river, and would do mischief to his Mango groves. Vexatious propositions were continually submitted to him affecting the customs forming part of his revenues. The Resident was also constantly annoying him about the Southern Jagirdars, and had prevented him on one occasion from going to Poona from Pundrapur. These complaints were partly frivolous, partly unfounded, but they expressed the feelings which had grown up in Baji Rao's heart against his allies. More important intimations of the same purport were afforded by the activity of the secret communications carried on with Nagpur and Gwalior, and by the orders issued to Bapu Gokla, and others of his Sirdars, to levy additional troops.

While these discussions were pending, they received augmented interest from the escape of Trimbak from his imprisonment on the evening of the 2nd

BOOK II. CHAP. V. 1816.

of September, 1816. He had been detained in the Fort of Thanna, near Bombay, which was garrisoned by Europeans. He had been allowed to take exercise on the ramparts for an hour or two in the afternoon, and it was remembered, after his flight, that latterly a groom in the service of one of the officers was accustomed to bring his master's horse near the same place, and as he walked the animal backwards and forwards, to sing Mahratta songs, the language of which was unintelligible to the sentries. By this channel Trimbak was apprised of the device he was to adopt, and the facilities provided for his escape. The privy of his residence adjoined a stable, and a hole had been cut through the wall of the latter. On a dark and rainy night which concealed his person from the view of the sentinel who attended him, Trimbak contrived to pass unobserved into the stable, and having thrown off his dress, and placed a basket on his head, as if he were a common labourer, he walked unquestioned through the gateway out of the fort. When the alarm was given he was nowhere to be found. To mislead his pursuers a rope was fastened to a gun as if he had thus lowered himself from the rampart. The tide was low, and the narrow channel which separates Salsette from the main land being fordable, Trimbak waded through the water, and found upon the bank a party of horsemen waiting to receive him. He fled up the Pipri Ghat to the south of Nasik.

As soon as the Resident was informed of the flight of Trimbak he communicated the circumstance to the Peshwa, and called upon him to evince his fidelity to the British alliance, and his

immunity from all suspicion of connivance by promulgating the most positive and stringent orders for the apprehension of the fugitive. Baji Rao protested his ignorance of any project for Trimbak's liberation, or any concern whatever in its accomplishment, and professed his readiness to take the requisite steps for his arrest, expressing his hope, that in the event of his being recovered, he would not be treated with severity, and would be eventually placed in his charge. No hopes were held out that the latter expectation would be fulfilled, but the Peshwa was assured that, as Trimbak's flight was no aggravation of his crime, it would of itself subject him to no new punishment. Baji Rao's promise to assist in his discovery was accepted as a mark of his desire to maintain the subsisting good understanding uninterrupted.

Notwithstanding Baji Rao's professions, the Resident soon had reason to suspect the sincerity of his intentions. Any information that was supplied of Trimbak's concealment turned out to be illusory; and no exertions were made by the Peshwa's officers for his apprehension, although he was known to be collecting armed followers at no great distance from Poona, with little attempt at concealment. In consequence of the earnest remonstrances of the Resident, a party of horse was sent against Trimbak, then in the Mahaleo hills, but the officer commanding the party halted on the road, and reported that neither leader nor followers could be found. The same evasive course was now deliberately pursued, and, although it was notorious throughout the country, that Trimbak was at the head of considerable bodies

BOOK II. CHAP. V. 1816.

of both horse and foot, the Peshwa affirmed that he could hear of no such insurgents, and that he must depend upon the Resident for their discovery. He pretended, indeed, to doubt if Trimbak were alive, and his ministers were instructed to repeat their belief of his death in their communications with the Resident. It was obviously the purpose of Baji Rao to allow Trimbak to assume so imposing an attitude as should compel the British Government to assent to the conditions on which he had already insisted, and in the case of their non-compliance, to excite a spirit of resistance, not only in his own dominions, but in those of the other Mahratta princes, whom he had been long engaged in urging to a confederacy against the British ascendency.[1]

Baji Rao's encouragement of the extensive risings throughout the country, instigated by Trimbak and his partisans, was not restricted to silent connivance and pretended disbelief of their occurrence; more active participation was detected. It was ascertained, that several secret interviews had taken place between the Peshwa and his favourite, that considerable supplies of money had been clandestinely conveyed to him, and that the military and fiscal authorities in general identified the partisans of Trimbak with the troops of the Peshwa. Thus fostered, the insurrection was rapidly gaining head, and from fifteen to twenty thousand men were assembled under Trimbak and his associates, in dif-

[1] Dispatches from the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, to Lord Moira, 11th March, 1817.—Secret Letter from Bengal, 9th June, 1817. Papers Mahratta war, pp. 79, 91.

ferent parts of the country, and on the borders of the territory of the Nizam. The levy of forces on behalf of the Peshwa also continued with augmented activity; his strongest fortresses were placed in a condition to resist an attack, and his principal treasure was removed from Poona to places of greater security. It had become a question of peace or war, but Baji Rao still protested his fidelity and attachment to the British alliance, offered to acquit himself by oath of any intercourse with Trimbak, and declared his readiness, if an insurrection did exist, to act vigorously in concert with the Resident for its suppression. Referring to Calcutta for the course of proceeding to be adopted towards the Peshwa, Mr. Elphinstone set seriously to work to put down the rising before it had attained a more menacing aspect, and before the mischief had spread to the adjacent countries. The principal part of the Poona troops which had marched to the frontier to defend it against the inroads of the Pindaris, was recalled, and the subsidiary force of Hyderabad was instructed to move to the confines of the Peshwa's territories, and advance into Kandesh. The insurgents were collected chiefly in two large masses—one at Maswar, a few miles west of Pundrapur, commanded by Trimbak's brother-in-law Jado Rao,—the latter by Godaji Danglia, a nephew of Trimbak,—in Kandesh. Each was estimated at from four to five thousand strong: there were also a number of smaller parties preparing to join one or other of these divisions; and the party in the south were endeavouring to march northwards to effect a junction with the insurgents in

1817.

BOOK II. CHAP. V.

1817.

Kandesh, as soon as they should have concentrated their force. In this latter project the insurgents were frustrated by the movements of Colonel Smith, who advanced to Maswar early in February, and dislodged them. They fled to the eastward, were pursued for a considerable distance, and partly dispersed. Colonel Smith then marched to Poona, leaving Colonel Wilson with six companies of his Majesty's 65th regiment and three battalions of Native Infantry, at Ranjangaon, near Seroor, while a division under Colonel Milnes was stationed at Pipalgaon on the Godaveri. On the Hyderabad side, Major Macdowall advanced to Tuljapur, while a detachment from Jalna moved to the west into Kandesh. The remainder of the southern party, having rallied to the number of three thousand five hundred, of whom above two thousand were well mounted, resumed their northern route in the beginning of April. On their march a troop of Pindaris attached to the body fell in with Lieutenant Dacre, of the Madras Artillery, with a small escort, and robbed and murdered him and his attendants. The barbarity was not unrequited. Information of their movements being received by Colonel Wilson, he detached Major Smith, with six hundred infantry, to intercept their flight. Although too late to accomplish this object, Major Smith came upon the track of the party moving from the Bhima by Toka towards the Godaveri, and pursued them with unremitting activity. After a march of one hundred and fifty miles in five days, he came upon the insurgents at Patri, above the ghats of Kandesh, at daybreak of the 17th

April, just as they were mounting to resume their route. After firing a volley, the troops charged and put the enemy to the rout, leaving seventy dead on the field, with a quantity of arms and a number of their horses. After several attempts to rally, which were defeated, the insurgents fled, and such of their horse as kept together, crossed the Godaveri towards Nasik, where they joined Godaji Danglia. Another division going northwards, more to the west, fell in with Colonel Milnes, and although they also escaped into Kandesh, it was not without a material diminution of their numbers. In the mean time, however, the force to which they were conveying an accession of strength was so completely disabled, that the junction of their friends was insufficient to retrieve the disaster. Captain Davies, with eight hundred of the Nizam's reformed horse, and a party of foot, had been dispatched to Kammin, twenty miles west of Aurangabad, on the evening of the 19th April. Having ascertained on the 22nd, that Godaji Danglia, with his main body, was marching towards the Godaveri, at no very great distance, he moved early in the morning of the 23rd, and, avoiding the main road, came, after a march of about thirty miles, upon the insurgents, drawn up with their left upon a strong mud fort, and their front protected by a water-course with steep banks. Captain Davies having ordered his men to charge across the water-course, the enemy, although above two thousand strong, wavered and broke: they were pursued for six miles, and entirely dispersed, with the loss of four hundred killed and some prisoners taken. Captain

BOOK II. CHAP. V. 1817.

Davies and Captain Pedlar were wounded, but not dangerously; twenty-five men were killed and forty wounded. The affair was the more remarkable as a proof of the efficiency of the Nizam's horse, as now organised and led by British officers. This first success was followed up by the advance of the main body of the Hyderabad force, under Colonels Walker and Doveton, and by them the province of Kandesh was cleared of the insurgents before the setting in of the Monsoon. Trimbak took refuge at Chuli Maheswar, on the Nerbudda.

The troubled state of Cuttack, and the neighbouring districts having cut off the communication with Calcutta, the instructions of the Government of Bengal failed to reach the Resident within the customary interval. He was, therefore, under the necessity of acting upon his own responsibility, and as the Peshwa's menacing preparations still continued, and no steps had been taken to comply with his requisitions, he determined to bring the discussion to a close. Having assembled the subsidiary force in the vicinity of Poona, Mr. Elphinstone demanded of the Peshwa a written engagement that he would deliver up Trimbak without delay, and that as a security for the fulfilment of his promise, he would surrender to the British troops his forts of Sing-gerh, Purandar and Rai-gerh: the engagement to be signed and delivered within twenty-four hours or war would be declared. At first, the Peshwa seemed resolved to withhold his assent, and endeavoured to prevail upon the Resident to grant a longer interval; but when this was refused, and the troops were stationed so as to command all

the outlets of the city, Baji Rao became alarmed and accepted the ultimatum. He pledged himself to apprehend and deliver Trimbak within a month, and in the meantime gave orders that the forts demanded should be opened to British garrisons. The troops were then withdrawn from the environs of the city, and actual hostilities were avoided, but the Peshwa was apprised that so serious an interruption of the amicable relations established by the treaty of Bassein, must be considered as an infraction of that treaty and involved the necessity of a revised engagement, the conditions of which he could not expect, after the proofs he had given of his unfriendly disposition, to be equally favourable to his interests. The proceedings of the Resident were entirely in unison with the sentiments of the Governor-General, the communication of which arrived at Poona on the 10th of May. 1817.

Even after the engagement entered into upon the 7th of May, the Peshwa had exhibited his usual vacillating conduct, and had forborne from prosecuting any active measures for the seizure of Trimbak. The arrival of the instructions from Bengal roused him to decision, and on the 21st, he issued a proclamation, promising a reward of two lakhs of rupees and a village yielding one thousand rupees a year,[1] to any person who should effect the delinquent's apprehension. Minor rewards were offered for information of the place of his concealment, and the members of his family and adherents who were in

[1] Dispatches from the Resident, 9th May, 1817.—Papers Mahratta war, p. 96.

BOOK II. CHAP. V. 1817.

Poona, were placed under restraint. This display of sincerity came too late to save him from the consequences of his former duplicity; and a new treaty was offered for his acceptance, of which the following were the principal conditions. Baji Rao engaged to recognize for himself and his successors the dissolution, in form and substance, of the Mahratta confederacy, and to renounce all pretensions arising from his former situation of executive head of the Mahratta empire; to advance no claims to the lands of Sindhia, Holkar, the Raja of Berar, and the Gaekwar, and to relinquish those upon the Raja of Kolapur and the Government of Sawantwari; and with a view to the fulfilment of the article of the treaty of Bassein, which precluded the Peshwa from carrying on negotiations with foreign powers, he was now required to promise that he would neither maintain any agents at other courts nor admit their agents at Poona; and that he would hold no communication whatever with foreign princes, except through the British Resident, With respect to the Gaekwar, the Peshwa was required to renounce all future claims, and accept as a commutation for the past, an annual payment of four lakhs of rupees. For a further annual sum of four lakhs and a half he was to grant to the Gaekwar, the perpetual lease of Ahmedabad.

The treaty of Bassein had stipulated that the Peshwa should maintain at all times a contingent force of five thousand horse and three thousand foot, to act with the subsidiary force. This article was annulled, and in lieu of it, it was required that the Peshwa should place at the disposal of the Bri-

tish Government sufficient funds for the payment of a body of troops of the like amount, viz., five thousand cavalry and three thousand infantry; the funds to be provided by the cession of territories in the Dekhin, and of the tribute of Kattiwar, to the extent of a net revenue of thirty four lakhs of rupees a year. He was further expected to cede in perpetual sovereignty the Fort of Ahmednagar, all his rights, interests, or pretensions, feudal, territorial or pecuniary in Bundelkhand, including Sagar, Jhansi, and the possessions of Rana Govind Rao; all the rights and territories in Malwa, secured to him by the treaty of Sirji Anjengaum, and generally all rights and pretensions of every denomination which he might possess in the country to the north of the river Nerbudda; and he was to pledge himself never more to interfere in the affairs of Hindustan.[1]

These were undoubtedly hard terms, but the Peshwa, by his inveterate enmity to the British name and power, and the treachery with which, while professing a faithful adherence to the terms of the treaty of Bassein, he had violated its most essential conditions, labouring in secret to re-unite the separated members of the Mahratta confederacy and direct their combination against his allies; and by the gross manner in which he had disregarded the law of nations and the guarantee of the British Government, in sanctioning, if not perpetrating, the murder of the Gaekwar ambassador; sub-

[1] Treaty with the Peshwa, 13th June 1817.—Collection of Treaties, 27th May, 1818, p. 60; and the observations of the Governor General on the several articles.—Papers, Mahratta war, p. 109.

1817.

jected him justly to heavy penalties. In some respects, also, their severity was less than it appeared to be, and they were levelled against the Peshwa's political pretensions rather than against his real power or authority. His lands in Malwa, and his claims on the chiefs of Bundelkhand, for instance, had long ceased to be of any pecuniary value, or to bring him any accession of political importance, and the acknowledgment of his supremacy, occasionally professed by the individual occupants, was unaccompanied by any substantial tokens of obedience. The limitation of his claims on the Gaekwar, involving a guarantee of his realisation of as large a sum as he was likely ever to receive regularly without British intermediation, was likely to prove a beneficial arrangement to him, and if any loss attended it, he had little right to complain of being thus permitted to compound for his infraction of both moral and national law, by his participation in the guilt of Gangadhar's assassination. As far as these stipulations were concerned, therefore, he suffered little diminution of revenue or loss of real power. The additional amount of the subsidiary force, and the sequestration of lands for its payment, were more serious deductions from his revenue and from his authority, but they were regarded by him as less intolerable than those stipulations which annihilated his hopes of regaining his place as head of the Mahratta confederacy, and prohibited him from plunging into the dark and dangerous intercourse in which his genius delighted; and such was the tenacity with which he adhered to his design, such the inveteracy of his animosity against the British,

that rigorous as were the conditions of the new treaty, and essentially as they impaired both the Peshwa's credit and power, it would hardly have been compatible with the safety of the British interests in India, to have imposed milder terms. It would have been an encouragement to Baji Rao to persevere in his hostile projects, to have left him the undiminished capability, as well as the unretracted purpose of undermining and subverting British ascendency.

The terms to which the Peshwa's assent was demanded excited the indignant feelings of many of his advisers, and his most distinguished military adherent, Gokla, urged him strenuously to the only course by which his reputation might have been preserved — an appeal to arms; but Baji Rao was unequal to such a resolution: he ratified the treaty, protesting that he submitted to the conditions through consciousness of his inability to resist, and that they had not his acquiescence. The dispute was, however, brought for the present to a termination. Trimbak continued at large, but there was no reason to suspect that the Peshwa had not done all in his power to effect his seizure, and no demerit was imputed to him on this account. Baji Rao, soon after the signature of the treaty, quitted Poona for Mahauli, whither he invited Colonel Malcolm to an interview, as one of his early friends, and endeavoured to obtain his aid in procuring a mitigation of the terms of the engagement. He appeared, however, for a time, to have suspended his complaints on this head, and to have diverted his thoughts to the reduction of the dis-

BOOK II. CHAP. V. 1817.

trict of Sundur, for which object he had been formerly promised the co-operation of the British troops. The Government of Fort St. George was instructed to comply with his request, and Colonel Munro, who had been nominated to the charge of the newly-ceded districts of Darwar and Kusigal, was ordered to establish the Peshwa's authority over the Jagir of Sundur.

The great advantages accruing to the Gaekwar from the treaty of Poona, and the additional military obligations which it imposed upon his allies, were considered to require a revision of the engagements subsisting with that prince, so as to secure the whole of the Kattiwar collections to the British Government, in order to provide for an augmentation of the subsidiary force. Although, not questioning the general expediency of the arrangements, the government of Baroda objected to the proposed conditions, and the conclusion of the treaty did not take place till after the war.

CHAPTER VI.

Plan and purposes of the campaign of 1817–18.—*Disposition of British forces—in Hindustan.—Grand army.—Centre.—Right Division.—Left Division.—Subordinate Detachments.—Reserve.— Army of the Dekhin.—First Division.—Second, or Hyderabad.—Third.—Fourth, or Poona.—Fifth.—Reserve.—Events at Poona.—The Peshwa's discon-*

tent.—Poona division takes the field.—Force left in Cantonments withdrawn to Kirki. — Menacing appearances.—Explanation demanded.—Peshwa's ultimatum.—The Residency destroyed.—Battle of Kirki.—Peshwa defeated.—British Officers seized by marauding parties.—The Vaughans murdered. — Return of General Smith to Poona. — Flight of the Peshwa.—Poona occupied.—Advance of the third and fifth Divisions across the Nerbudda. — Pindaris driven from their haunts. — Union of the first and third Divisions under Sir T. Hislop, near Ujayin.—Conduct of Sindhia.—Advance of the centre and right Divisions of the Army of Hindustan towards Gwalior.—Treaty with Sindhia.—Ravages of Cholera in the centre Division.—Change of Position.—Disappearance of the Disease.—Pindaris cut off from Gwalior. — Fly towards Kota.—Overtaken by General Marshall.—Amir Khan intimidated.—Disbands his Troops.—Pindaris intercepted by General Donkin.—Return to the South.—Encountered by Colonel Adams.—Join Holkar's Army.—Cheetoo flies to Jawad.—Diminished strength of the Pindaris.

BOOK II. CHAP. VI.

1817.

THE determination of the Governor-General to form effective military arrangements for the eradication of the Pindaris, and for the suppression of the predatory system, was formed in the close of 1816, but it was impracticable to carry his designs into operation until after the rainy season of the following year. The interval was busily occupied in assembling and organising the troops, and establishing controlling military and political authority

BOOK II. CHAP. VI. 1817.

in those quarters in which Lord Hastings was not personally present. The preparations were conducted as unostentatiously as possible, in order that the armies might be able to take the field at the appointed period, before those against whom they were directed, or any other power disposed to obstruct the policy of the British Government, should be prepared to offer serious opposition.

The plan of the campaign was dictated by the geographical position of the chief objects of hostility, the Pindaris, and by the disposition of the British resources. The territories of the chiefs of the freebooters, Karim and Cheetoo, were centrically situated in the south of Malwa, being bounded on the east by the principality of Bhopal, on the south by the Nerbudda, on the west and north by the possessions of Sindhia and Holkar, which intervened between Guzerat and the Peshwa's province of Kandesh. They were thus exposed on every side except the north, to an attack from the contiguous frontiers of states through which a ready access was open to the British forces, and although the privilege of marching an army through the dominions of Sindhia, had not been conceded by existing treaties, yet his promise of co-operation had been plighted, and it was part of the purposes of the campaign to enforce the fulfilment of this promise, and compel him to throw open his country to the movements of the British divisions. Further to the north, the pending arrangements with Jaypur and Amir Khan, admitted of the advance of troops in that quarter, with the intention of overawing both Sindhia and the Patan, protecting the Rajputs against their

enmity, and preventing the escape of the Pindaris in a northerly direction, when they should have been expelled by the operations in the south from their haunts on the Nerbudda. 1817.

On the side of Hindustan, the Bengal forces were arrayed in four principal divisions. The centre division consisting of three regiments of cavalry, one of His Majesty's foot, and eight battalions of Native infantry, with detachments of artillery,[1] commanded by Major-General Brown, was assembled at Cawnpur. It was there joined on the 14th of September by the Marquis of Hastings, as Commander-in-chief. The right division, under Major-General Donkin, was formed at Agra, and comprised two regiments of cavalry, one regiment of European, and three battalions of native infantry, with artillery.[2] The left division, commanded by Major-General Marshall, was in advance at Kalinjar, in Bundelkhand, and consisted of one regiment of native cavalry, two corps of irregular horse, and five battalions of infantry, with guns.[3] On the left of this division, and constituting subordinate portions of it, were two small bodies, one at Mirzapur, under Brigadier-General Hardyman, and another, under Brigadier-General Toone, on the frontiers of

[1] The troops forming the centre were His Majesty's 24th Light Dragoons, 3rd and 7th regiments N. C. and the Governor-General's Body Guard. His Majesty's 87th regt., and of Native Infantry the 2nd batt. 13th, 1st batt. 24th, 2nd batt. 11th, 1st batt. 8th, 2nd batt. 1st, 2nd batt. 25th, 1st batt. 29th, and a Flank battalion. Detachment of horse and foot artillery, and 54 guns.

[2] His Majesty's 8th Dragoons, 1st N. C. Gardiner's horse and contingents of the Raja of Bhurtpur and Dholpur, His Majesty's 14th regt., N. I. 1st batt. 25th, 1st batt. 27th, 2nd batt. 12th, 18 guns.

[3] 4th N. C. 2nd and 3rd Rohilla horse, N. I. 2nd batt. 28th, 1st batt. 14th, 1st batt. 1st, 1st batt. 26th, 1st. batt. 7th, guns 24.

BOOK II. CHAP. VI. 1817.

South Behar;[1] the duty of these two corps being the defence of the British confines in the south-west, the prevention of any sudden inroad through Rewa or Chota Nagpur,—and the line of frontier further south, through Sambhalpur and Cuttack, was considered to be sufficiently protected by the troops already stationed in those provinces. The fourth, or reserve division, commanded by Sir D. Ochterlony, was formed of one regiment Native cavalry, and two corps of irregular horse, one regiment of European, and five battalions of Native infantry.[2] To each of the divisions were attached bodies of irregular horse and foot, the troops of several petty chiefs, who, by their tenure, or by treaty, were bound to furnish military contingents in time of war. In general they added little to the real strength of the army, but their presence was an indication of the extent of the British sway. The whole number of troops in this quarter amounted to above twenty-nine thousand foot, and fourteen thousand horse, with one hundred and forty guns, both horse and foot artillery. The centre division crossed the Jumna on the 26th of October, and took up a position on the Sindh river on the 6th of November, where it was equally ready to act against the Pindaris and the Mahratta states. On

[1] The first consisted of 8th N. C., His Majesty's 17th regiment 2nd battalion, 8th N. I., 6 guns; Raja of Rewa's contingent horse. The second of His Majesty's 24th regiment, 2nd battalion of 4th N. I., 4 guns; Raja Gumsham's horse.

[2] 2nd N. C. two corps of Skinner's horse; His Majesty's 67th regiment. N. I. 2nd battalion of the 19th, 1st of 28th, 2nd of 7th, 1st of 6th, 2nd of 5th, 22 guns; contingent horse and foot of Begum Sumroo, Faiz Mohammed Khan, Ahmed Bakhsh Khan, the Raja of Macheri, and the Raja of Patiala.

the right, General Donkin, by the 9th of November, advanced to Dholpur, on the Chambal, where he threatened equally Sindhia and Amir Khan; and shut in between this division and the centre, the former chief had no alternative left but to disarm the British Government by submission to its will. The left division was intended, in communication with the Nagpur subsidiary force, to act upon the western extremity of the Pindari line, and advanced, by the 12th of November, to Sagar, on the south-west angle of Bundelkhand. The reserve division, which was intended to cover Delhi, and support the negotiations with the Rajput states, was posted on the 27th of November at Rewari. The two smaller detachments, under Brigadier-Generals Hardyman and Toone, assumed their respective stations in the course of October and November.

The army of the Dekhin was under the command of Sir Thomas Hislop, the Commander-in-Chief at the Madras Presidency, who was also invested with full political powers within the sphere of his military operations. The force was distributed into five divisions: the first, with the head-quarters, was formed of a detachment of European, and two regiments of Native cavalry; of a detachment of European infantry, the Madras European regiment, and six battalions of Native infantry, besides artillery.[1] The second, or Hyderabad division, was commanded by Brigadier-General Doveton, and was composed of

[1] Detachment of His Majesty's 22nd Light Dragoons, 4th and 8th regiments N. C., Flank companies of H. M.'s Royal Scots, Madras European regiment N., I. 1st batt. 3rd, 1st battalion 16th, 2nd battalion 17th, 1st battalion 14th, 2nd battalion 6th, and 1st batt. of 7th: horse artillery, and Rocket troop.

BOOK II. CHAP. VI. 1817.

one regiment of Native cavalry, one of European infantry, and six battalions of Native infantry, with horse and foot artillery, together with the Berar and Hyderabad brigades.[1] The third division, consisting of one regiment of Native cavalry, and a detachment of Native infantry, with the Russell brigade, Elichpur brigade, and Mysore auxiliary horse, was commanded by Brigadier-General Sir John Malcolm.[2] The fourth or Poona division, was commanded by Brigadier-General Lionel Smith, and comprised one regiment of Native cavalry, a European regiment, six battalions of Native infantry, artillery, and a body of reformed Poona horse, under European officers.[3] The fifth division consisting of the Nagpur subsidiary force, under Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, was composed of three corps of horse, besides the contingent of the Nawab of Bhopal, and six battalions of Native infantry.[4] Brigades were left at Poona, Hyderabad, and Nagpur, and a reserve division was formed from the force which had been employed under Colonel Munro, at the desire of the Peshwa, to reduce to his subjection the Zemindar of Sundur.[5] The task was performed

[1] 6th regiment N. C., His Majesty's Royal Scots, 2nd battalion 13th, 2nd batt. 24th, 1st batt. 11th, 2nd batt. 14th, 1st. batt. 12th, 1st batt. 2nd, Berar brigade, four battalions N. I. reformed horse, Hyderabad brigade, five companies Madras European regiment, N. I. 1st batt. 21st, 1st batt. 22nd, 1st batt. 8th.

[2] 3rd regiment N. C., five companies 1st batt. 2nd N. I., Russell brigade, 1st and 2nd regiment, Elichpur contingent, 1200 horse, and five batt. foot, 4,000 Mysore horse.

[3] 2nd N. C. His Majesty's 65th regiment, Madras N. I. 2nd batt. 15th, Bombay N. I. 2nd batt. 1st, 1st batt. 2nd., 1st batt. 3rd, 2nd batt. 9th.

[4] 5th and 6th regiment N. C. 1st Rohilla horse, Bengal N. I., 1st and 2nd batt. 10th, 1st batt. 19th, 1st and 2nd batt. 23rd, L. I. battalion.

[5] His Majesty's 22nd Light Dragoons, 7th regt. Madras N. C., European flank batt. M. N. I., 2nd batt. 4th, 2nd batt. 12th. These details are taken

in the course of November, and the troops, having returned to the north of the Tumbhadra, were assembled at Chinur by the middle of the following month, under Brigadier-General Pritzler. The line of operations had been completed by the formation of a respectable force in Gŭzerat, commanded by Major-General Sir W. G. Keir, which was to advance from the west, and communicate with the army of the Dekhin.[1] The aggregate of these forces amounted to 52,000 foot, 18,000 horse, with 62 guns; forming with the Bengal army a body of 113,000 troops, with 300 pieces of ordnance.

It had been intended that the first and third divisions should cross the Nerbudda at Hindia early in the campaign, but the movements of the troops were delayed by the unusual duration of the monsoon, the impracticability of the roads, and the swollen state of the rivers. Sir Thomas Hislop, also, was detained at Hyderabad by illness, from the 12th of August to the 1st of October. He proceeded to assume the command by the 10th of November, when the first and third divisions were in position at Harda, not far from the southern bank of the Nerbudda. The fifth division had advanced to Hoseinabad, on the same river, not far from their right, by the 9th of the month. The second division had a position assigned to it in the neighbourhood of Akola, in order to protect the Berar frontier, and to support the troops in advance, as well as to observe Nagpur, where the disposition of the

from Colonel Blacker. Some modifications took place in the field, but none of material importance.

[1] His Majesty's 17th Dragoons, His Majesty's 47th regt., Bombay N. I., Flank and Grenadier batt., 1st batt. 8th, 2nd batt. 7th.

BOOK II. CHAP. VI. 1817.

Raja had become an object of suspicion.[1] The fourth division, under General Smith, was directed to move towards Kandesh to defend the Peshwa's territory, or be at hand to act against him should his latent hostility break out into open violence. Its manifestation took place sooner than was anticipated.

The treaty of Poona had scarcely been signed by Baji Rao when he repented of the deed, and resumed with redoubled eagerness the intrigues in which he had previously been engaged, and his earnest endeavours to excite the other Mahratta chiefs to give support to the Pindaris. At the same time, under pretence of acting in concert with the British in their movements against those marauders, he commenced an extraordinary levy of troops, and large bodies of horse and foot were assembled in the vicinity of Poona by the end of October, the insolence of whose conduct was sufficiently expressive of their master's intentions. Active intrigues were also set on foot for the seduction of the subsidiary force, and bribes and menaces were employed to tempt the men from their allegiance.[2] Although

[1] Lord Hastings' Narrative, Papers, Mahratta War, 385.—Colonel Blacker says Doveton was directed to move his head-quarters to a position immediately in the rear of Mulkapore, either above or below the Berar Ghats, with the view and possible necessity of besieging Asirgerh.—p. 49.

[2] The Peshwa's emissaries began to tamper with the troops early in August; their practices were immediately reported by the men to their officers, and they were suffered to carry on the negotiations, which they did with such success, that the Peshwa fell into the snare. Large sums of money were distributed among them; a Jemadar of the 6th, who was admitted to an interview with Baji Rao and Gokla, a few days before the action at Kirki, was promised land and titles if he could bring over his men, and received five thousand Rupees, which he transferred to his commanding officer. Very few were tempted to desert their colours by offers of this nature: some desertions took place, but they were of natives of the Konkan, whose homes were situated in places subject to the Peshwa or to Gokla, and who were intimidated by violence threatened, or, in some cases, offered to their families. There is no doubt that the Peshwa was

these proceedings were well known to the Resident, yet, in order to avoid embarrassing the meditated operations against the Pindaris, and feeling confident reliance on the fidelity of the Sipahis, Mr. Elphinstone refrained from any exposure of the Peshwa's treacherous conduct, or from taking any steps, except those of general remonstrance, to counteract his projects. He allowed the main body of the subsidiary force, forming the fourth division, to march from its cantonments, and retained in the vicinity of Poona no more than the portion usually stationed in the environs of the city. General Smith, however, upon his arrival on the confines of Kandesh, received advices of the threatening aspect of affairs at Poona, and the probable necessity of his return. He accordingly halted at Phultamba, on the Godaveri, with an understanding that should his communications with the Residency be interrupted, he should march immediately on Poona.

The force which had been left at Poona consisted of three battalions of Bombay infantry, under Colonel Burr, a battalion of the Poona brigade, the Peshwa's own troops officered by Europeans, under Major Ford, and two companies of Bengal Sipahis, forming the Resident's guard. The Poona brigade was quartered at Dapuri, a village a short distance on the west of Poona. The regular troops had formerly been cantoned on the east of the city, and were separated by it and by the Muta-Mula river

fully persuaded that the desertion would be very general as soon as the action commenced, and that this impression powerfully contributed to lead him into so desperate and fatal a procedure.

BOOK II. CHAP. VI. 1817.

from the Residency, which lay on the north-west of Poona, near the confluence of the Muta and the Mula rivers, the former coming from the north, the latter from the west, and both uniting off the north-west angle of the city. The position of the cantonments had long been regarded as objectionable, both in a military and political view. Situated on the opposite side of Poona, and inconveniently contiguous to the town, their communication with the Residency might easily be cut off; and they were exposed to any sudden hostile attack, as well as to the insidious influence of the population of the capital. It had been, therefore, for some time past, resolved to move the troops to Kirki, a village about two miles north of Poona, on the same side as the Residency, and although detached from the latter by the course of the Mula river, which ran between them, capable of ready communication with it by a bridge over the stream. Dapuri, the station of the Poona brigade, being situated also on the same side of the city, and not far in the rear of Kirki, communication with it was easy. Baji Rao, who was too sagacious not to understand the real motives of the change, had strenuously objected to it; but this was an additional argument in its favour, and due preparations having been made, the battalions under Colonel Burr marched from the old station and encamped at Kirki on the 1st of November. The force had been joined on the preceding evening by the Bombay European regiment, and by detachments of the 65th regiment, and of Bombay artillery, on their march to join the 4th division. On the 5th of November, a light battalion, which had

been ordered back to Seroor by General Smith, marched upon Poona with a thousand of the auxiliary horse. Before their arrival the affair had been decided. 1817.

The intentions of the Peshwa to fall upon the Residency, were very currently reported during the month of October, and an extensive feeling of alarm pervaded the Capital: many persons quitted Poona, and many more sent away their families and property: private intimations to the same effect from individuals whose authority was unquestionable, were received both by Mr. Elphinstone and some of his staff, but unwilling to precipitate a crisis, and doubting whether Baji Rao would have the courage to hazard so desperate an enterprise, the Resident deemed it advisable to take no public notice of the Peshwa's proceedings until they were too notorious, and too menacing to be longer disregarded. A large army had been drawn up on the south of the City, and parties were thrown out towards the new cantonments, as if to cut off the communication between them and the Residency. Upon requiring to know the object of these movements, and insisting that the advanced parties should be withdrawn, a confidential servant of the Peshwa, Witoji Naik was deputed to the Residency with his master's ultimatum. The Peshwa, he said, having heard of the arrival of the reinforcements from Seroor, was determined to bring things to an early settlement; he desired therefore, that the European regiment should resume its march, the native brigade be reduced to its usual strength, and the cantonments removed to a place which he should point

1817.

out. If these terms were not complied with, the Peshwa would leave Poona, and not return until they were assented to. The Resident replied that the march of the troops had been necessitated by the Peshwa's own preparations, but that there was no wish to act hostilely against him, and that if he would adhere to his engagements, and send off his forces to the frontier, to serve with the British troops, agreeably to the conditions of the alliance, he would still be regarded as a friend. If, on the contrary, his troops persisted in pressing upon the British position, they would be attacked. Within an hour after Witoji's return, large bodies of troops began to move towards the camp, and a battalion of Gokla's contingent had previously taken up ground within half a mile of the Residency, between it and the cantonments. The Resident, therefore, deemed it advisable to quit the former with his suite and escort, and fording the Mula, proceeded along its left bank to the bridge at Kirki, which he crossed, and joined the troops. Immediately upon his departure, the Mahrattas entered the Residency grounds, and plundered and set fire to the dwellings.

The Peshwa's army computed to amount to ten thousand horse, and as many foot, had been drawn up at the foot of the Ganes-khand hills, immediately on the north-west of the town, their left resting on the hills, their right on the Residency; an immense train of ordnance protected the centre. The Peshwa moved out to an elevation, the Parbati hill south of Poona, at some distance, but commanding a view of the field; the British force, consisting of infantry only, was less than three thousand strong: the ground

in front of them, although broken by ravines, was not wholly unfavourable to the evolutions of cavalry; and a forward movement was calculated to lead them into the midst of large bodies of horse, against which they would act at a disadvantage. On the other hand to await an attack was likely to produce a sense of discouragement among the troops, which, combined with the feelings that had possibly been engendered by the temptations to which their fidelity had been recently exposed, might be followed by dangerous desertion. To endeavour to avoid an engagement, and defend the position, would have the same, or worse effect, and would add to the confidence and numbers of the enemy. Some days must elapse before effective succour could be received, and the interval was pregnant with disaster. In India, in particular, the boldest counsels are usually the wisest: hesitation has been frequently followed by defeat, and audacity, almost equivalent to temerity, has, as frequently, achieved triumph: it did so in the present instance, and notwithstanding the immense disparity of numbers, Mr. Elphinstone and Colonel Burr concurred in ordering a prompt advance against the Mahratta host. 1817.

Having left a detachment with a few guns at the village of Kirki, to protect the baggage and the followers, the line moved onwards about a mile, and then halted until the Poona brigade from Dapuri should come up. The centre was occupied by the European regiment, the Resident's escort, and a detachment of the 2nd battalion of the 6th Bombay infantry. The 2nd battalion of the 1st regiment formed the right wing, and the 1st of

1817.

the 7th the left: each of the exterior flanks was strengthened by two guns. On the approach of Major Ford with his brigade, the line again advanced; when a heavy cannonade opened upon them from the enemy's artillery, and masses of horse crowded on the flanks, and passed round to the rear. A strong division headed by Moro Dikshit, one of the Peshwa's most distinguished officers, who, although always averse to the war, was faithful to his duty, resolutely charged the battalion from Dapuri, as it advanced on the right of the line: throwing back its right wing, the battalion received the charge with a steady fire, and the Mahratta horse, foiled in their attempt to break the line, passed round the brigade towards Kirki. There they were received with equal firmness, by the detachment posted for the defence of the village, and Moro Dikshit being killed by a cannon ball, his followers, disheartened, retired from the field.

On the left flank, a select body of about three thousand infantry, Arabs, and Gosains, advanced in solid column against the 7th native regiment: they were met with a destructive fire, and fell back in confusion. The Sipahis, in their turn, pressed upon the fugitives, and falling into some disorder, were charged and broken by the Mahratta horse: two companies of Europeans were presently brought up to their support, the cavalry was driven back, and the line was reformed. The troops from Dapuri having now completely come up, the united force moved forward. As they advanced the Mahrattas retreated, and finally abandoned the victory to the British. Darkness coming on, put a stop to pursuit, and the

troops retired to their posts at Kirki and Dapuri: their loss was inconsiderable, not more than nineteen killed, and 67 wounded; that of the enemy was more severe, besides Moro Dikshit, a Patan officer of rank was killed, and several chiefs were wounded. On the morning after the action, the troops from Seroor arrived, and as no danger could now accrue from delay, it was determined to wait for the arrival of General Smith before undertaking any further movements.[1]

The main body of the Mahrattas, after the action, withdrew to a spot about four miles to the east of Poona, the Peshwa having been with difficulty dissuaded by Gokla from flying to Purandhar. Parties spread through the country and sullied their cause by deeds of useless and barbarous ferocity. On the day after the engagement, two officers coming from Bombay, Cornets Hunter and Morrison, were attacked and plundered by some Mahratta horsemen, and were taken prisoners and sent into the Konkan. A few days afterwards, Captain Vaughan and his brother, who had recently entered the Company's service, having been similarly robbed and seized at Wargam, were taken to Fattehgaon about twenty-four miles from Poona, and there hanged by order of the principal fiscal officer. About the same time, Lieutenant Ennis of the Bombay Engineers, who was out on survey with a

[1] Papers Mahratta War.—Letters from Mr. Elphinstone. Report of Colonel Burr, pp. 119, 123.—The battle of Kirki was fought through the persuasion and precipitancy of Gokla. The Peshwa, after giving the order, wished to recal it, but Gokla anticipating his irresolution had begun the action. Gokla avowed that his confidence and impatience to engage, were founded on the certainty that the Sipahis would come over by companies or battalions, on the field.—Papers 128.

BOOK II. CHAP. VI. 1817.

small escort, was attacked and killed by a party of Bhils in Trimbak's service; his men fought their way to a neighbouring village, of which the Headman gave them protection and saved their lives.

The customary communications from Poona not having arrived, General Smith inferred that hostilities had broken out, and immediately prepared to retrace his steps. He marched from Phulthamba on the 6th of November, and arrived at Ahmednagar on the 8th. From thence his march was harassed by the Peshwa's horse, but no serious delay was occasioned, and he arrived at Poona on the 12th. On the 14th, the force was concentrated on a spot between the bridge of Kirki and the left bank of the united stream of the Muta-Mula, opposite to the Peshwa's army, which had taken up its position on the ground of the old cantonments. On the evening of the 16th, the army crossed the river in two principal divisions, the one on the right, under General Smith, at the confluence of the streams, the other on the left, commanded by Col. Milnes, at the Yellura ford. The passage of the first was effected without opposition, the whole attention of the Mahrattas being directed against the second, but their resistance was fruitless, and both divisions were in readiness for a combined attack at daylight, on the following morning. Their junction was effected, but on advancing towards the Peshwa's camp, it was found deserted. He had ridden off at two in the morning, and his troops had followed carrying off their guns, but leaving their tents standing, and the greater part of their stores and ammunition on the field. A few Arabs only had been

left to guard the capital, and as their expulsion would only have caused a needless waste of life they were prevailed upon to retire. It was with some difficulty that the troops, incensed by the burning of the Residency, by which much of their property had been destroyed, and by the ignominious murder of the Vaughans, could be restrained from the plunder of Poona, but the arrangements adopted for the purpose proved successful, and the capital of the Mahrattas was quietly taken possession of in the course of the day. Hostilities were, however, far from their termination.[1] Baji Rao fled to Purandhar, and stimulated and supported by the courage and conduct of Gokla, still cherished hopes of baffling and tiring out his enemies and recovering his power.

At the time at which these transactions at Poona took place, the several divisions were rapidly concentrating on the points to which they were directed.

The third and fifth divisions of the Madras army crossed the Nerbudda early in November. The former was to have been followed by the first division, but advices of the transactions at Poona having reached Sir Thomas Hislop on the 15th of November, he thought it advisable to return to the southward; desiring, however, the third division to advance, and taking possession of the fort of Hindia, which had been temporarily ceded by Sindhia. Before he had proceeded many days on his route, Sir T. Hislop was overtaken by dispatches from the Marquis of Hastings, urgently enforcing his adherence to the original plan of the campaign, and enjoining his im-

[1] Report from Brigadier General Lionel Smith.—Mahratta Papers, 125.

BOOK II. CHAP. VI. 1817.

mediate march in a northerly direction. Accordingly, after making such arrangements as he thought to be required by the state of affairs at Poona and Nagpur, the Commander-in-chief of the army of the Dekhin, with the first division, retraced his steps to the Nerbudda, and again crossed the river on the 30th of November. In the mean time, Sir John Malcolm had traversed the districts chiefly dependent upon Cheetoo, and recovered possession of the places which the Pindaris had wrested from Sindhia and the Nawab of Bhopal. Crossing the Kirveni Ghat into Malwa, he arrived at Ashta on the 21st of November, and was in communication with the fifth division under Colonel Adams, who, after crossing the Nerbudda, on the 14th of November, had advanced on the road to Seronj, in which direction the Durra of Wasil Mohammed had retreated. At Raisen, a communication was opened with the left division of the grand army, which was at Reili on the 28th of November. These three corps were now, therefore, on the proposed line of coöperation, and by their concurrent movements, had driven the Pindaris from their haunts, and compelled them to fly to the north and west. The country by these means was freed from those marauders, and the position of the British detachments served as a new base, upon which future operations were to rest. Accordingly, General Marshall, with the left division of the grand army, marched to Seronj, where he halted till the 7th of December. By the same date, Colonel Adams had reached Manohar Thana, in the principality of Kota. The third division of the Dekhin

army moved westerly in the track of Cheetoo's Dur- 1817.
ra, of which it never lost sight, although unable to come up with him. Upon arriving at Burgerh on the 3rd of December, Sir John Malcolm learned that the Pindaris had doubled to the south, and, having arrived at Mahidpur, were there encamped in the vicinity of Holkar's army, and under its protection. The combined forces of Holkar and Cheetoo being too formidable to be attacked by Sir John Malcolm, with the detachment under his command, he drew off towards the south, and halted on the 11th of December near Tajpur, to be at hand for the instructions of Sir Thomas Hislop, who was again marching rapidly towards him. The first division entered Malwa, on the road to Ujayin on the 4th of December; Sir Thomas Hislop was at Sonkeir, and on the 7th at Unchode, whither he had previously detached a light division. On the 11th he was at Dattana-mattana, within eight miles of Sir J. Malcolm's camp, and not far from Ujayin. On the following day the head-quarters of the army of the Dekhin, and the first and third divisions marched past Ujayin, and crossing the Sipra at a ford opposite the north-west angle of the city, encamped on the left bank of the river. Directions had been dispatched to Sir William G. Keir, commanding the force from Guzerat, to march in the same direction. The army was posted so as to command the approach to Ujayin from the north, and the road to Mahidpur, where lay Holkar's army, and Cheetoo's Pindaris. It is necessary, however, now to advert to the movements of the army of Hindustan.

BOOK II. CHAP. VI.

1817.

Notwithstanding the declarations of Sindhia, that he was as much the enemy of the Pindaris as the British Government, and was resolved to effect their extirpation himself, or unite with the British in so desirable an object, proofs of his insincerity were daily forthcoming, and evidences were multiplied of his being in friendly communication with all who were inimical to the British power. A compact had been entered into with Holkar's Government, having in view the acknowledgment of the Peshwa's supremacy, and a considerable sum of money, twenty-five lakhs of rupees had been received from Baji Rao to enable Sindhia to move to his assistance. Several envoys from Nepal with letters, and two of Sindhia's seals, were arrested on their return at Bithur, in the course of September;[1] and letters and messengers from the Pindari chiefs were constantly arriving at Gwalior, and men were enlisted with little attempt at secrecy for their service. It became necessary, therefore, to call upon Sindhia for unequivocal confirmation of his professed friendship or an avowal of his enmity. It had been the purpose of Lord Hastings to have delayed requiring a categorical answer to his demands, until it should have been so obviously unsafe for Sindhia to decline a compliance,

[1] The letters were concealed between the leaves of a Sanskrit MS. pasted together at the edges. Some were open, some closed; the former referred obscurely to the intended combinations between Sindhia and the other Mahratta princes. The closed letters were restored to Sindhia in open Durbar, without comment, in the course of October, while the treaty was under discussion. The detection evidently confounded the Court, although Atma Ram, the minister through whom communication with the Resident was usually carried on, affected to treat the letters as a weak invention of the enemy, declaring that they were fabricated by some one who was inimical to his master: Sindhia was silent. It was reported to the Resident at Khatmandu, that the government of Nepal was at this time busily augmenting the military force.—MS. Rec.

that his assent must be given or his destruction were certain; and this intention was not altogether disappointed, although the announcement of the requisitions of the Governor-General was made rather earlier than had been projected. This had been rendered necessary by the first movements of the army of the Dekhin, and the arrangements made in the end of September, for crossing the Tapti into Sindhia's territories. As the object and intent of the proposed operations could no longer be concealed, it was determined to come to a final understanding with Sindhia, and apprise him fully of what he was required to comply with. At the same time, the organization of the Grand army, and the advance of the centre division to a position suited both to menace Gwalior and to intercept all communication between it and the south, left the Mahratta prince little option between an implicit acquiescence in the demands of the British Government, and the certainty of its prompt infliction of the penalty incurred by his refusal.

The ultimatum of the British Government and the draft of a treaty to be signed by him, were communicated to Sindhia, towards the end of October. At this period the Marquis of Hastings with the centre division, crossed the Jumna, and advancing towards the Sindh, established his head-quarters on that river, at the Seonda Ghat, on the 7th of November. On the 8th of the same month, the right division, commanded by General Donkin, took up the position designed for it on the Chambal. Each of these divisions was within two marches of Gwalior, when Sindhia, isolated from all his best

BOOK II. CHAP. VI. 1817.

troops, which, under their refractory leaders were at a distance from their disregarded sovereign, and cut off from all communication with the Pindaris and the Peshwa, was wholly unable to oppose any resistance to so overwhelming a force. Conscious of his helplessness, he laid aside all attempts at subterfuge, and signed the treaty which had been presented for his acceptance.

By the engagement now entered into, Doulat Rao Sindhia bound himself to employ his forces conjointly with those of the British Government in prosecuting operations against, not only the Pindaris, but all other bodies of associated freebooters, with the view of destroying and preventing the renewal of the predatory system in every part of India: to give no shelter or support to the Pindaris, but to seize the persons of their leaders and deliver them up to the British Government, and never to re-admit the Pindaris, or any predatory bands, into his dominions, nor allow any of his officers to countenance or support them. In order to define the precise extent of his coöperation, in addition to the general aid to be given by all his civil and military functionaries, Sindhia agreed to maintain a contingent of five thousand horse, to serve with the British troops, and under British command, and to have an English officer attached to each division of such troops as the channel of communication with the British commanding officer. The same officer was also to be the medium of issuing the pay of the contingent, in order to secure its being punctually discharged: the funds to be derived from the application to this purpose of the amount of the pensions paid to Sind-

hia and the members of his family or administration, by the British Government, and by the assignment to the latter of the tributes of Jodhpur, Bundi and Kota for a term of two years. In furtherance of the military operations of the British against the Pindaris, Sindhia consented to yield to them the temporary occupation of his forts of Hindia and Asirgerh, to be restored after the war, It was also declared that the eighth article of the treaty of 1805 was annulled, and that the British Government was at liberty to form engagements with the states of Udaypur, Jodhpur, Kota, and other substantive states on the left bank of the Chambal. All claims and rights of Sindhia over states and chiefs, clearly and indisputably dependent on or tributary to him, were not to be interfered with, and his established tributes from other states were to be guaranteed to him, but made payable through the British Government. In consideration of the Maharaja's being bound to treat as enemies, also, any states against which it might become necessary to wage war, either on account of its attacking one of the contracting parties, or aiding or protecting the Pindaris, the British Government promised him a liberal share of the spoil that should be reaped by success. This treaty was concluded on the 6th of November. The fulfilment of the stipulation respecting the contingent was delayed as long as it could be with decency, but rather from the difficulties thrown in the way by subordinate agents, than by Sindhia himself. The Maharaja, although deeply humiliated by his compulsory abandonment of those whom he had long regarded as his servants and de-

1817.

1817.

pendants, and sincerely distressed by his complete isolation from the Peshwa, to whom he looked up with hereditary regard as the head of the Mahratta association, was too indolent, too good natured, and too intelligent, not to recognise the immunities which the treaty conferred upon him, the preservation of his tributes, the assistance of the British in reducing his disobedient feudatories and officers to subjection, and his exemption from the turbulence, danger, and ruin in which his connexions with his countrymen might else have involved him.

The engagement with Sindhia had scarcely been concluded when the news of the Peshwa's treachery arrived. The ratification of the treaty was a fortunate occurrence for Sindhia, as it precluded him from listening to the advice of those counsellors who would have urged him to take up arms in the Peshwa's cause, and to which his natural prepossessions inclined him, although he was withheld by his prudence and apprehension. It was fortunate, also, for the British Government; for although the result was not doubtful, yet it might have been inconveniently retarded, as the powerful force, which threatened Gwalior, was scarcely in a condition to have accomplished the objects for which it had approached that city: it was decimated by disease.

The malady known by the name of spasmodic cholera, evacuations of acrid biliary matter, accompanied by spasmodic contractions of the abdominal muscles, and a prostration of strength, terminating frequently in the total exhaustion of the vital functions, had been known in India from the remotest periods, and had, at times, committed fearful ravages.

Its effects, however, were in general, restricted to particular seasons and localities and were not so extensively diffused as to attract notice or excite alarm. In the middle of 1817, however, the disease assumed a new form, and became a widely-spread and fatal epidemic. It made its first appearance in the eastern districts of Bengal in May and June of that year, and after extending itself gradually along the north bank of the Ganges, through Tirhut to Ghazipur, it crossed the river, and passing through Rewa, fell with peculiar virulence upon the centre division of the grand army, in the first week of November. After creeping about insidiously for several days among the lower classes of the camp followers, and engaging little observation, it at once burst forth with irresistible violence, and by the 14th of the month had overspread every part of the camp. Although the casualties were most numerous amongst the followers of the camp and the native soldiery, the ravages of the disease were not confined to the natives, but extended to Europeans of every rank.[1] The appalling features of the malady were the suddenness of its accession, and the rapidity with which death ensued. No one felt himself safe for an hour, and yet, as there was no appearance of infection, the officers generally were active in assisting the medical establishment in administering medicines

1817.

[1] Five officers and 143 men of the European force died in November.—Official return. According to Mr. Surgeon Corbyn, who was serving with the centre division, and whose plan of treatment was circulated to the army by the Marquis of Hastings, his Lordship was himself apprehensive of dying of the disease, and had given secret instructions to be buried in his tent, that his death might not add to the discouragement of the troops, or tempt the enemy to attack the division in its crippled state.—Treatise on Epidemic Cholera, by F. Corbyn, surgeon on the Bengal establishment, Calcutta, 1832.

BOOK II. CHAP. VI.

1817.

and relief to the sick. The whole camp put on the character of an hospital;—a mournful silence succeeded to the animating notes of preparation which had hitherto resounded among the tents: in place of the brisk march of soldiers in the confidence of vigour, and in the pride of discipline, were to be seen continuous and slowly moving trains of downcast mourners, carrying their comrades to the funeral pyre, and expecting that their own turn would not be long delayed. Even this spectacle ceased;—the mortality became so great, that hands were insufficient to carry away the bodies, and they were tossed into the neighbouring ravines, or hastily committed to a superficial grave on the spots where the sick had expired. The survivors then took alarm and deserted the encampment in crowds; many bore with them the seeds of the malady, and the fields and roads for many miles round were strewed with the dead. Death and desertion were rapidly depopulating the camp, when, after a few days of unavailing struggle against the epidemic, it was determined to try the effects of a change of situation. The army accordingly retrograded in a south easterly direction, and after several intermediate halts, crossed the Betwa, and encamping upon its lofty and dry banks at Erich, was relieved from the pestilence. The disease disappeared.[1] During the week of its

[1] The disorder ceased to be Epidemic about the 23rd of November. A few cases of a similar nature occurred daily till the end of the month There was no instance of it after the 8th of December. Mr. Jamieson is inclined to ascribe its disappearance not so much to the change of locality, as to the inaptitude of the disease to remain long in one place, a peculiarity which invariably characterized its future progress. In none of the camps which it afterwards visited, did it continue virulent for more than 10 or 15 days.—Report on the Epidemic Cholera-morbus in the Bengal Provinces, in the years 1817, 1818, and 1819, by Assistant-Surgeon J. Jamieson, Secretary to the Medical Board. Published by authority of the Board, Calcutta, 1820.

greatest malignity it was ascertained that seven hundred and sixty four fighting men and eight thousand followers perished.

Whether it was in consequence of any secret intrigue at Sindhia's court, or their reluctance to believe that he was in earnest in abandoning their cause, the Pindari leaders Karim Khan and Wasil Mohammed, flying from the combined advance of the divisions under Colonel Adams and General Marshall, marched in the direction of Gwalior, trusting to find there a shelter and an ally. As soon as their project was known, measures were taken to defeat it, without giving umbrage to Sindhia by appearing to doubt his sincerity. A cavalry brigade, and a battalion of Native infantry were detached from the centre division towards the Sindh, and they were followed, as soon as the restored health of the troops permitted, by the main body to the same river, but lower down on the Sonari ford within twenty eight miles of Gwalior. The advanced guard was thrown across the river, and by an inclination to the left, intercepted all communication on that line between Sindhia and the Pindaris. This movement, and the position of the second division on the Chambal in his rear, with the tidings which came from the south compelled Doulat Rao to submit to his fate, and to exert himself for the formation of the contingent which he had engaged to furnish, and which was very tardily organized.

The forward movement of the advance of the centre division, under Colonel Philpot, had the effect of compelling Karim Khan and Wasil Mohammed to abandon the direct road to Gwalior, and turn off

BOOK II. CHAP. VI.

1817.

to the north west in the direction of Kota. They were in expectation of finding in the ruler of that country, or in Amir Khan, whose forces lay beyond it, protection if not aid. Zalim Sing, the ruler of Kota, had entered into a close alliance with the British Government, and he was little disposed to incur any risk in favour of a power which he had no longer cause to dread. He, therefore, posted troops so as to shut the passes into his country against the Pindaris, and they were thus obliged to gain admission by force. In their first attempt they were foiled, but they were successful in the second, and carried the Nim-Ghat near Ladana after a respectable resistance, which with their former discomfiture retarded their progress and enabled their pursuers to close upon them from various quarters. The Pindari chiefs had been followed closely by General Marshall with the left division of the grand army. Upon receiving information of the route which they had taken, General Marshall quitted Seronj on the 8th of December, and with a light portion of his force reached Bijrawan on the 13th, where he learned that the main body of the Pindaris was but twenty two miles distant at Bichi-tál in Kota, on the other side of the Nim-Ghat. He again moved in pursuit on the night of the 13th, but, owing to the badness of the roads, did not reach the foot of the Ghat until two p.m., on the 14th. As soon as the Pindaris heard of the approach of the force, they moved off with their families and baggage, leaving one thousand horse to cover their retreat. The British detachment crossed the Ghat and came in sight of this body, which was charged by the cavalry under Colonel Newberry, and dis-

persed with some loss. The pursuit was resumed on the two following days to the Parbati river.

In the meantime, General Donkin, with the right division, had quitted the Chambal, after leaving a guard at the fort of Dholpur, and, after a circuitous march, placed himself between the Pindaris and Amir Khan. At the same time, the reserve of the grand army advanced to the south of Jaypur; and General Ochterlony encamped in such a position as to separate the two principal divisions of the Khan's troops, who were thus intimidated into acquiescence in their being disbanded. A loan of money was made to Amir Khan to enable him to discharge their arrears, and an arrangement was authorised for reorganising a considerable portion of the force by taking it into British pay. By these means, Amir Khan and his chiefs were deprived of all excuse for longer delaying his ratification of the alliance with the British, and the annihilation of his battalions extinguished the hopes which the Pindaris had continued to cherish of the assistance of the Pathan.

The final settlement with Amir Khan being thus effected, General Donkin returned to the left bank of the Chambal, and crossed it at Gamak-Ghat eight miles north of Kota, on the 13th of December. The route followed by the Pindaris in their flight from Bichi-tál, lay across the direction of General Donkin's march, not many miles to the north east; and information of their proximity reached him on his arrival at the river. Taking with him a light division, General Donkin advanced by forced marches to Kalana on the western Sindh, where accounts of the affair at Bichi-tál were received, and it was

BOOK II. CHAP. VI. 1817.

ascertained that the Durra of Karim Khan was still in the neighbourhood, unconscious, apparently, of the approach of the detachment. Early on the 17th, the brigade came up with the Pindaris, but the main body had fled, abandoning their baggage and their families under a small party which immediately dispersed, leaving a quantity of property and Lal ki Begum, the wife of Karim Khan, in the hands of the victors. A large party was also attacked and put to flight by Gardner's horse, but Karim, with his main force, finding his advance to the north-west frustrated, and his hope of succour from Zalim Sing disappointed, turned back, and, passing between the divisions of Generals Donkin and Marshall, through the tract lying between the Sindh and Parbati rivers, trusted to make good his retreat to the south by Shirgerh and Gogal Chapra. He was again outmanœuvred, for although he avoided the division of General Marshall, which had advanced towards the direction of his retreat, he fell upon the line of Col. Adams's route, which had led by Gogal Chapra to Jhilwara on the Parbati, where he had arrived on the 16th of December. This compelled the Pindaris to change their course, and crossing the head of the column, they moved off to the south-west. They had purposely left behind every thing that could retard their flight: all those of the party, who were badly mounted and equipped, dispersed, and none but the most efficient cavalry remained with the leaders. The number of the Durra was reduced to little more than two thousand. As soon as Colonel Adams heard of their course, he dispatched his cavalry under Major Clarke, who overtook and routed a party

at Pipli. The main body, however, kept in advance, and reached Rajgerh Patan greatly dispirited and disunited, on the 21st. On the same day, Major Clarke rejoined Colonel Adams, on his march to Ekkair, where he arrived on the 22nd, and was obliged by heavy rains to halt during the following day. A party of Pindaris, four hundred strong, was here heard of, descending the Tara Ghat, and was pursued and cut up by Captain Roberts with the 1st Rohilla horse. The fugitive Durras continuing their flight, returned, after various divergent movements, to the upper course of the Chambal, which they crossed to join the remains of Holkar's army. Colonel Adams following hard upon their track, although greatly delayed by bad weather and insufficient supplies, reached Gangraur on the 6th of January, and halted there for some days to allow his troops to rest after the fatigue which they had undergone; the objects of his movements having been completely effected by the retreat of the remains of Karim and Wasil Mohammed's Durras to the south. 1817.

The Pindari Cheetoo, although he had fallen in with Holkar's army, and reinforced it with part of his followers, did not long remain in its vicinity. Interposing that force between him and his pursuers, he kept his principal party together in the country on the west bank of the Chambal in the upper part of its course, but the British detachments closing round him compelled him to shift his quarters. He returned towards the north, and during the latter days of December was encamped at Singoli, in a rugged country between Bundi and Kota, not more

BOOK II. CHAP. VI. 1817.

than twenty-five miles south-west from the town of Kota, the people of the country, whose sympathies were in general enlisted in favour of the Pindaris, providing him with supplies and information. He was not long unmolested. General Donkin, who still continued in the neighbourhood, secured the passes into Buńdi, and advanced to the Gynta Ghat. Cheetoo was no longer within his reach. Jeswant Rao Bhao of Jawad, one of Sindhia's officers, but, as usual, exercising independent authority within his own districts, invited the Pindari to take shelter in his country, having given him and his followers an asylum for their property and families in the thickets adjacent to the fort of Kamalmer, in Mewar. Although, however, the final extirpation of the freebooters was not yet accomplished, important advantages had been secured by the judiciousness and activity of the combined operations against them. By the advance of the first and third divisions of the army of the Dekhin, and the flank movement of the fifth, the Pindaris had been driven from their haunts on the Nerbudda. By a seasonable forward movement of a detachment of the centre of the grand army, they had been prevented from making their way to Gwalior, and had been compelled to turn off towards the north-west, in the hope of finding shelter in Kota, or with Amir Khan. Closely followed by the fifth division of the Dekhin army, and the left wing of the grand army from the west and south; they were cut off from the northern course by the right division of the army of Hindustan, and obliged to confine themselves to a narrow region on the western boundaries of Malwa. They

had been perpetually harassed, repeatedly surprised, and had suffered severe loss. Their numbers had been greatly diminished, and they were now reduced to a few scattered, feeble, and dispirited bands, hopeless of escape from utter destruction, except through the intervention of more powerful protectors than any who were likely to come forward in their defence. 1817.

CHAPTER VII.

Transactions at Nagpur.—Discontent of Apa Saheb.—Accepts publicly honorary distinctions from the Peshwa.—Hostile indications.—Preparations for defence.—British force.—Situation of the Residency.—Sitabaldi Hills.—Residency attacked.—Action of Sitabaldi.—Mahrattas defeated.—Negotiations.—Arrival of General Doveton with the second division of the Dekhin army at Nagpur.—Advance of General Hardyman's division.—Action of Jabalpur.—Town occupied.—Affairs at Nagpur.—Terms offered to the Raja.—Apa Saheb comes in to the British lines.—Action of Nagpur.—Mahratta army dispersed.—Contumacy of the Arab garrison.—City stormed.—Failure of the attack.—Terms granted, and Nagpur evacuated.—Provisional engagement with the Raja.—Policy of the Court of Holkar.—Intrigues with the Peshwa.—Professions of amity.

— Violence of the military leaders.—Murder of Tulasi Bai.—Hostilities with the British.—Battle of Mahidpur.—Advance of Sir Thomas Hislop.—Joined by the Guzerat division.—Sir John Malcolm detached in pursuit of Holkar. — Negotiations for Peace.—Treaty executed.—Prosecution of operations against the Pindaris.—Karim protected at Jawad.—Concentration of British divisions on Jawad.—Movements of General Keir.—Cheetoo returns to the Nerbudda Valley.—Surprised by Major Heath.—Takes refuge in Bhopal.—Proposes to submit.—Refuses the terms.—Again flies.—Karim's Durra surprised by Major Clarke. — Dispersed. — Many of the Leaders surrender.—Lands granted them in Bhopal and Gorakhpur. — General Brown marches against Jawad. — Jeswant Rao Bhaq surrenders.—Forts in Mewar recovered.—Troops under military Chiefs in Malwa dispersed. — Order restored in the territories of Holkar.— Operations against the Peshwa. —General Smith marches to Purandhar.—Peshwa retreats towards the sources of the Godaveri.—Joined by Trimbak.—General Smith cuts off his flight to Malwa.—He falls back towards Poona.—Captain Staunton detached to reinforce the troops at the Capital.—Falls in with the Peshwa's army. Brilliant action at Koragam.—General Smith returns to Seroor.—Peshwa turns off to the East.—Pursued by the Reserve.—Joined by the Fourth Division.—Possession taken of Satara.—The Raja proclaimed.—Peshwa formally deposed.— Mahratta forts reduced.—Smith resumes his pursuit.—Overtakes the Peshwa at Ashti.—Cavalry action at Ashti.

—Mahratta Horse defeated.—Gokla killed.—The Raja of Satara rescued.—Baji Rao's followers leave him.—The Southern Chiefs submit.—He flies to the North.—Hemmed in between the British divisions.—Passes to the East to join the Raja of Nagpur at Chanda.—Chanda covered.—Baji Rao pressed by General Doveton.—Falls upon Colonel Adams.—His whole force broken up.—He escapes.—Flies towards Burhanpur.—State of the Mahratta territories.—Ceded districts in charge of Colonel Munro.—His operations.—Organizes a Local Militia.—Reduces the neighbouring districts.—Reinforced.—Captures Badami and Belgam.—Assumes command of the Reserve.—Wasota taken.—Raja of Satara formally installed.—General Munro marches against Sholapur.—The Peshwa's Infantry defeated and dispersed.—The Fort surrendered.—Operations in the Konkan.—Reduction of Raigerh.—Country between the Bhima and Krishna Rivers occupied.

1817.

WHILE the right and left wings of the Grand army, and the fifth division of the army of the Dekhin were employed in chasing the Pindaris from the line of the Chambal, and from western Malwa; the other divisions of the Dekhin army had been engaged in hostilities with enemies of a different description. The return of the fourth division to Poona, has been described. The second was shortly afterwards recalled to Nagpur. The first and third divisions which we left at Ujayin, were speedily involved in a conflict with the army of the Holkar state, which was encamped in their vicinity. It

BOOK II. CHAP. VII.

1817.

will, therefore, be necessary to offer an account of the transactions at those two places.

For some time after the accession of Apa Saheb to the throne of Nagpur, he was profuse in his expressions of gratitude to the allies, through whose support, chiefly, he had succeeded to an authority which, although undoubtedly his by right of affinity, would have been disputed by an adverse and powerful faction, if he had been left to his unassisted resources. Well aware that this was the case, he expressed, and probably felt for a time, sincere devotion to the British alliance. He soon changed his tone. The conditions of the treaty were somewhat severe, and the amount of the subsidy exceeded a due proportion of the revenues of the country. The charge of the contingent was an addition to a burthen already too weighty for the state, and the Raja had some grounds for complaining of the costliness of his new friends.[1] There was no disinclination to disregard his representations on this head; and it was in contemplation to dispense with part of the contingent, and reduce the amount of the subsidy, or provide for it by territorial cessions. The impatience and folly of Apa Saheb precluded an amicable adjustment.

The propensity to intrigue, so strikingly characteristic of the Mahrattas, existed in all its national activity in the Raja of Nagpur; and, although the stipulations of the treaty which he had so recently signed, restricted him from holding communications

[1] The whole charge of the subsidy and contingent, amounted to between twenty and thirty lakhs ayear, and were more than one-third of the whole revenue.

with other princes, except with the privity and sanction of the Resident, he was speedily involved in a web of secret negotiations with Sindhia, the Peshwa, and even with the Pindaris. The first rupture with Baji Rao, and the treaty of Poona which followed, struck him with alarm, and he endeavoured to retrieve the error he had committed by the most solemn assurances, the truth of which he invoked the manes of his father and his household gods, to attest, of his unshaken fidelity to his engagements, his affection for the person of the Resident, and his fervent attachment to the British Government. Some steps were taken to prove his veracity by the formation of the contingent, but they were transient and delusive, and Apa Saheb soon reverted to a course of treachery which could not fail to terminate in his own destruction. 1817.

In proportion as the state of affairs at Poona hastened towards a crisis, the connexion with the Raja of Nagpur assumed a more uneasy character. The Ministers who had negotiated the subsidiary treaty were disgraced: others known to be unfriendly to the British interests were appointed: troops were levied upon the pretext of completing the stipulated contingent, but in violation of the conditions of the treaty, no information respecting their numbers and composition was imparted to the Resident. The communications with Poona were more frequent than ever, and, as the hostile purposes of the Peshwa were now thoroughly ascertained, any intercourse with him was necessarily to be considered as evidence of equally inimical designs. At last, as if to proclaim his allegiance to the reputed head of the

BOOK II. CHAP. VII. 1817.

Mahratta confederacy, in defiance of his relations with the British, the Raja accepted from the Peshwa the title of Senapati, or commander-in-chief, and a dress of honour with which he was publicly invested on the 24th of November, after the attack upon the British Residency at Poona, on the 5th, was known to have taken place. The ceremony was performed with due honour, in the presence of the Raja's army, which was encamped on the west side of the city. On this occasion, the Raja hoisted the Zeri Patka, the golden banner of the Mahratta empire. As if intending to add mockery to defiance, the Raja invited the Resident to be present, or to depute some officer of his staff, and requested that a salute might be fired by the troops of the subsidiary force, declaring that he saw no reason why the ceremony should disturb the good understanding that subsisted between him and his allies, and affirming that he had no thought of giving them offence. To the last moment he protested that he was most anxious to preserve the friendship of the Resident, and was fully prepared to conform to the pleasure of the British Government in all things, hoping that some relaxation of the conditions of the treaty might be admitted in his favour. These proceedings had not passed without meeting with the earnest remonstrances of the Resident, and his announcement of their inevitable consequences. All personal intercourse ceased between him and the court: on the other hand, the communication between the Residency and the city was interdicted, and finally, on the morning of the 26th of November, armed men were stationed opposite to the British lines, and

guns pointed against them. Still, however, messages were sent to the Resident proposing terms on which a reconciliation might yet take place, but they were justly regarded as delusive, and the Raja was told that unless he returned into the city immediately, and discontinued his military preparations without delay, no negotiations could be entertained. These preliminary conditions being disregarded, the Resident, Mr. Jenkins, prepared to encounter an attack, which he had some days past been induced to believe was contemplated, and which was now evidently on the eve of perpetration.

The greater part of the Berar subsidiary force had already taken the field, and there remained within reach a detachment which had been posted at Ramtek, about three miles distant, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Scott, consisting of two battalions of Madras Sipahis, the first of the 20th, and first of the 24th regiments of Native infantry; a detachment of European foot and of Native horse artillery, and three troops of the 6th Bengal cavalry. These, upon the Resident's requisition, marched on the 25th, to the Residency grounds, and were there joined by the escort, consisting of about four hundred men, with two guns, two companies of Bengal infantry, and a few troopers of the Madras horse. On the morning of the 26th, they were placed in position on the Sitabaldi hills.

The houses and grounds occupied by the Resident and his suite were situated beyond the city of Nagpur, on the west. They were separated from the suburbs of Nagpur by the Sitabaldi hills, a low

BOOK II. CHAP. VII. 1817.

range of limited extent, running north and south, and consisting of two elevations at either extremity, about four hundred yards apart, connected by a lower ridge, across which lay the public road. The two highest points had an elevation of not more than a hundred feet, and were of different form and extent. The southernmost, which was the larger of the two, was level; its widest extent on the summit was about two hundred and eighty yards from east to west. It was covered with tombs. The smaller hill, at the northern extremity, was conical and narrow at the summit, being about one hundred feet long, by not more than seventeen broad. The slope of both hills was easy of ascent, except in a few places where they had been scarped for quarries. Close along the western base of the whole range extended the Residency; the huts of the escort being situated at the foot of the northern elevation. The several houses and offices occupied the remainder, looking west over a spacious plain. On the other three sides, along the base of the hills, were native huts and houses irregularly disposed. East of them extended the city, and beyond the city spread the Mahratta camp, stretching round from the east to the south, about three miles from Sitabaldi.

In the disposition made by Lieutenant-Colonel Scott of his small force, the lesser hill was occupied by the 1st battalion of the 24th, with two six-pounders drawn up on its northern declivity. The 1st of the 20th, with one company of the 24th, were posted on the larger eminence, facing east and south. One hundred men of the escort defended its western side, and the rest were stationed to guard

1817.

the Residency dwellings, which had been fitted for defence as well as time and means allowed. The three troops of cavalry, with the small party of the Madras body guard, were formed on the plain in front of the Residency. The whole force was about one thousand three hundred strong. The numbers of the Mahrattas were computed at twelve thousand horse, and eight thousand foot, the latter including three thousand Arabs.[1]

During the forenoon of the 26th, notwithstanding the receipt of pacific messages from the Raja, large masses of cavalry were seen spreading themselves along the plain to the west of the Residency, while on the side of the city, infantry and guns were taking up positions menacing the hills. Towards sunset, Mr. Jenkins was visited by two of the Raja's ministers, Narayan Pundit, and Narayanji Nagria; the latter was one of the principal of the war faction; the former was friendly to the British. To them the Resident repeated his demands that all hostile preparations should be countermanded as a preliminary to any negotiations; but, before he could ascertain the object of their coming, or the extent of their powers, the firing had commenced, and he repaired to the scene of action. Narayanji returned to the Raja: his colleague preferred sharing the fortunes of the Resident.

The abrupt termination of this unproductive mission originated with the Arab mercenaries in the service of Nagpur, who opened a smart fire of musketry upon the eastern face of the southern hill; it was presently followed by a similar

[1] Papers Mahratta war, 135.

BOOK II. CHAP. VII. 1817.

attack upon the northern extremity of the ridge, the enemy firing under cover of the huts and the quarries along the skirts of the hill. Their fire was replied to with spirit, and a conflict commenced which continued throughout the night. The principal efforts of the enemy were directed against the smaller hill on the right, and they made repeated attempts to carry the post. These were as resolutely repulsed, but not without loss. The officer commanding, Captain Sadler, was killed, and the 24th had suffered so severely, that about one o'clock it was considered advisable to withdraw the battalion to the right of the position, replacing it by part of the 20th, and the escort under Captain Lloyd, who endeavoured to strengthen his post by a slight breast-work of grain bags on the summit of the hill to which it became necessary to limit the defence: the Arabs increasing in numbers and in confidence along the acclivity, although repeatedly driven down by the charges of the detachment. The firing was maintained throughout the night upon both extremities of the line, but with less effect upon the right, as the men were there sheltered by the greater extent of the summit, and by the tomb-stones on its surface.

During the night, the whole of the Mahratta army which had hitherto taken no part in the engagement, moved out into the plain, and as they extended in a semicircle round the south and west, were distinctly discernible by the light of the moon, the illumination afforded by the firing on either side, and the conflagration of the Arab huts: at dawn of the 27th they occupied the plain in dark, dense

masses of horse, interspersed with considerable bodies of infantry, and a numerous artillery. They abstained, however, from any serious demonstration against the Residency, and were contented to remain spectators of the action, which still continued along the hills, where appearances began to assume an aspect most unfavourable to the British. By seven in the morning, nine pieces of artillery were brought to bear upon the northern eminence, to which the detachment could make no effective return from the two guns in their possession. Between nine and ten, one of them was disabled and withdrawn to the rear, which the Arabs observing, they rushed impetuously up the hill, and in spite of their resistance, drove the defenders from the summit. Guns were immediately brought up and directed against the right of the British line, which thus laid bare to a flank cannonade from a rather superior elevation, suffered severely, and officers and men fell fast before the enemy's fire. Some of the Arabs crossed the hill and set the huts of the escort at its western base on fire, while others, boldly advancing along the ridge, planted their standards within seventy or eighty yards of the southern elevation. The enemy in the plain were, also, in movement; the masses were closing round the rear of the position, and their guns had begun to take effect upon the cavalry stationed in the Residency grounds. The prospect was gloomy, when the day was redeemed by a well-timed and gallant exploit. Being galled by the enemy's fire, Captain Fitzgerald, in disregard of the

1817.

BOOK II. CHAP. VII. 1817.

orders which had commanded him to stand firm,[1] resolved to make a dash against the horse and guns most in advance, and with his three troops of Bengal cavalry, and twenty-five men of the Madras body-guard, he rushed upon the foremost mass of the enemy's horse. The charge was irresistible, the unwieldy column was repeatedly penetrated and broken, and entirely dispersed. Their guns were seized and directed against the fugitives, and before the enemy had recovered from their surprise, Captain Fitzgerald with his trophies was again at his post.[2] This sally turned the tide of affairs. It had been witnessed from the hill, and gave fresh courage to the Sipahis. Charging the Arabs, they compelled them to fall back to the left. At this instant, a tumbril on the northern hill exploded, and taking advantage of the confusion which it occasioned, the Sipahis pressed forward and recovered

[1] This circumstance is not noticed by Mr. Prinsep; nor in the account ascribed to Colonel Lloyd. It is particularly specified by Colonel Fitzclarence, 121, and by Colonel Blacker, 113.

[2] The movement is somewhat differently described by different writers. Mr. Prinsep says, "Captain Fitzgerald led his troops across a dry nulla bounding the Residency grounds, and as soon as thirty or forty troopers had passed it, led them against the enemy, who retired as he pushed forward, until having passed to some distance beyond the guns, and seeing that the Mahrattas were making a demonstration of surrounding his small party, he commanded a halt. In the mean time, the rest of the cavalry had crossed the nulla and followed the advance, but had judiciously stopped short on reaching the abandoned guns, which were immediately turned upon the Mahrattas, who were kept back by their fire. These guns the cavalry took with them, firing as they retreated." Sir William Lloyd's account is that "Captain Fitzgerald charged with the cavalry under his command, while Lieutenant Hearsay with half a troop, made a dash at two of the guns. Both attacks succeeded." The account given in the text, is derived from Colonels Blacker and Fitzclarence, and Colonel Scott's official report to the Commander-in-Chief. The critical opportuneness of the charge is acknowledged by Colonel Scott in the orders of the day, and in a letter from the Resident, it is stated that "the charge at the critical moment at which it happened, may be said to have decided the fate of the battle."

the position, dislodging the Arabs from the summit, and driving them not only down the slope, but from the suburbs at its foot. They attempted to rally, but were taken in flank by a troop of cavalry which had charged round the northern extremity of the line, and completed the expulsion of the assailants from its eastern front. By noon they were, likewise, driven from their advance upon the southern hill, with the loss of two guns; and no longer venturing to approach the British line, confined their efforts to a distant, and comparatively harmless cannonade. Even this ceased by three o'clock, and the struggle ended in the unexpected triumph of the British detachment.[1] They had not purchased it without loss. One-fourth of their number was killed or wounded, including seventeen officers.[2] Nor were the casualties confined to the military. The imminence of the peril had enlisted the Resident and his civil staff in the ranks, and while they had shewn themselves by their firm bearing, and steady courage, worthy companions of their military brethren in the hour of danger, they had been exposed to similar casualties. A medical officer was among the killed, and the civil service had to regret the death of Mr. George Sotheby, the first assistant to the Resident, a gentleman of eminent ability, and lofty promise, who had taken part in the action with dis-

[1] The above particulars are derived from the official report, Mahratta Papers, 133. Prinsep's narrative, 2, 66. Colonel Blacker's Mahratta war, 109. Colonel Fitzclarence's Journey Overland, 115; and a description from the notes of Sir Wm. Lloyd, published in the Oriental Herald, September and November, 1838.

[2] One hundred and seventeen were killed, and two hundred and forty-three wounded. The Officers killed, were Lieutenant Clarke, 1st battalion 20th; Captain Sadler and Lieutenant Grant, 1st battalion 24th.

BOOK II. CHAP. VII. 1817.

tinguished gallantry, and was killed by a cannon shot from the smaller hill, after it had fallen into the hands of the Arabs. Nothing less than the inflexible resolution, and calm valour displayed in this brilliant affair by all present, could have saved them from the sword of an infuriated and barbarous foe, and their families, who tremblingly awaited the event in the adjacent dwellings, from death or dishonour. The victory achieved against such desperate odds, held out to the princes of India an additional lesson on the futility of opposing numbers and physical daring, to disciplined valour, and moral intrepidity.[1]

As soon as the action was decided, Apa Saheb dispatched a messenger to Mr. Jenkins to express his concern for the occurrence, declaring that his troops had acted without his sanction or knowledge, and that he was desirous of renewing his amicable intercourse with his old friends. As little credit could be attached to these assertions, the Rajá was told that the final decision now rested with the Governor-General, and that no communication could be permitted as long as the troops of Nagpur were in the field.

[1] The highest commendations were deservedly bestowed upon the troops, by the authorities in India and in England, but it was not until her present Majesty's accession, that any national honours were bestowed upon the survivors. The order of the Bath was then conferred upon Sir Richard Jenkins and Sir William Lloyd. An appropriate and interesting requital of their valour, was granted to the 24th Madras infantry. This regiment had formerly held the place in the Madras army of the 1st regiment, of which the first battalion was concerned in the Vellore mutiny, and the corps was consequently erased from the muster-roll. On this occasion a petition was presented by the native Adjutant, on behalf of the native officers and privates, praying that in lieu of any other recompense for their conduct, the regiment might be restored to its former number, and might resume its former regimental facings. It is scarcely necessary to say that the request was complied with.

The condition was acceded to, and on the evening of the 27th the army of the Raja retired to the position beyond the city, which it had formerly occupied. The Resident consented, in consequence, to the Raja's request for a suspension of hostilities, an arrangement equally required by the exhausted state of the British detachment, and recommended by the opportunity which it afforded for the arrival of the reinforcements for which the Resident had applied as soon as it appeared likely that a conflict was inevitable. Accordingly, Lieutenant-Colonel Gahan, who had reached Baitul, on his way to Nagpur, on the 26th, accelerated his advance, and arrived on the afternoon of the 29th, with three more troops of the 6th Bengal cavalry, and six companies of the 1st battalion of the 22nd Bengal infantry; being followed by the rest of the battalion. On the 5th of December Major Pitman joined with a detachment of the Nizam's infantry and reformed horse, and on the 12th and 13th, the whole of the second division of the Dekhin army, commanded by Brigadier-General Doveton, encamped at Sitabaldi. The strength of the force now enabled the Resident to dictate to the Raja the only terms by which the past might be atoned for.

The example or the orders of the Raja of Nagpur, had extended the spirit of hostility into other parts of his dominions, and his officers were everywhere assembling troops and menacing warlike operations. In the eastern portion of the valley of the Nerbudda, and in Gondwana, their proceedings assumed so formidable a character, that the British officers in command of small detachments

BOOK II. CHAP. VII.

1817.

thought it prudent to concentrate their force. Major Richards, commanding at Jabalpur, accordingly fell back to Gerhwara, where Major Macmorine was posted, and both retired to Hosainabad, where, on the 20th of December, they united with Major Macpherson, resigning the valley to the east to the occupation of the enemy. As soon, however, as the state of affairs at Nagpur was known to the Governor-General, he directed Brigadier General Hardyman, who had hitherto held a defensive position in Rewa to march to the Nerbudda at once, and there regulate his movements by the advices which he should receive from the Resident. General Hardyman marched immediately, and leaving a battalion of the 2nd Native infantry at Belhari, pushed forward with the 8th regiment of Native cavalry, and the 17th regiment of Europeans, with four guns. He arrived at Jabalpur on the 19th of December, and found the Mahratta Subahdar prepared to receive him near that town, at the head of one thousand horse and two thousand foot. The force was strongly posted, having a rocky eminence on the right, and a large tank with the town of Jabalpur on the left. The horse formed the right, the foot with four guns, the left of the line; General Hardyman placed his guns in the centre of his infantry, and formed a reserve of his cavalry, with the exception of two squadrons which were detached into the enemy's rear to intercept his retreat. After a short cannonade, a squadron of the 8th Native cavalry charged the Mahratta left, broke it, and captured the guns. The horse fled, but the foot retired in good order up the hill. They were

charged by another squadron of the 8th, but stood their ground until the left wing of the 17th ascended the acclivity. They then dispersed and suffered severely in their flight. A threat of bombarding the town and fort, led to their surrender; and General Hardyman, pursuing his route crossed the Nerbudda on the 21st. Proceeding towards the south, he was met on the 25th by a message from Mr. Jenkins, dispensing with his further advance, and recommending to his care the upper part of the Nerbudda valley. He, therefore, returned to Jabalpur, and there established his head-quarters. 1817.

As soon as the troops of General Doveton's division had recovered from the fatigue of their long and expeditious march, preparations were made for an attack upon the Nagpur army, which continued encamped on the opposite side of the city. Apa Saheb had been previously apprised of the conditions, on his assent to which the permanence of his authority depended. He had been required to acknowledge that by his treacherous conduct he had forfeited his crown, and that the preservation of his sovereignty depended upon the forbearance of his allies; to disband his army, and deliver up his ordnance and military stores; to cede Nagpur to the temporary occupation of the British as a pledge of his sincerity, and to repair in person to the Residency, and there take up his abode until matters should be finally arranged. Upon his compliance with these requisitions, he was told that he would be restored to the exercise of his authority, with no further diminution of his territory than such as might be necessary for the maintenance of the con-

1817.

tingent force which he was bound by treaty to furnish. His assent to these propositions was to be sent in by four o'clock on the morning of the 16th of December, and by seven of the same day his troops were to be withdrawn, and the city given up to a British garrison. The Raja was to come in during the day, either before or after the execution of the terms. His refusal, or his neglect to fulfil these stipulations would expose him to be treated as an enemy. To enforce these demands, the troops were drawn up in order of battle on the evening of the 15th, and slept all night on their arms. Late on that day Apa Saheb announced his acquiescence, but solicited a longer delay, and, on the following morning, it was affirmed, that the Arabs in his army would not suffer him to quit the camp. These excuses were held to be equivalent to a determination to hazard an engagement, and arrangements were made accordingly.

The army was arrayed in the plain, to the south of Nagpur. The cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Gahan, formed on the right. The rest of the line consisted of three brigades of infantry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonels Macleod, M'Kellar, and Scott. A reserve brigade of infantry under Lieut.-Colonel Stewart, was stationed in the rear, as was the principal battery under Lieut.-Colonel Crosdill, ready to be brought forward if needed. The 20th and 24th Madras Native infantry, and the Berar auxiliaries, under Major Pitman, remained in charge of the baggage. Before the troops advanced, the Resident sent word to the Raja, that he was still willing to receive him, and granted him the inter-

val until nine o'clock to come over. Accordingly, Apa Saheb, attended by three of his ministers, Ramchandra Wagh, Nagu Punt, and Jeswant Rao Bhao rode into the lines. Protesting his readiness to accede to whatever conditions the Resident should impose, he endeavoured to protract the period for the surrender of his ordnance and the withdrawal of his troops. Finding that no relaxation could be permitted, he sent back Ramchandra Wagh to carry the terms into effect by noon. At the appointed hour the British force moved forward: an advanced battery of fourteen guns was taken possession of without resistance; but when the line approached the Raja's main body, it was saluted with a heavy fire of musketry and cannon. The infantry immediately pushed on, while the cavalry and horse artillery passing along the rear to the right, came in front of the enemy's left battery, supported by a strong body of both horse and foot. The battery was promptly carried. The troops were charged and dispersed. Continuing the pursuit, the cavalry came upon a second battery and carried it, but were threatened by a superior number of the enemy's horse. These were broken by the fire of the horse artillery, and the pursuit was continued for three miles, when the cavalry halted for the infantry to join, who had, in the mean time, charged and routed the right and centre of the Mahrattas, and captured their artillery. By half-past one the enemy had disappeared, leaving the camp standing, and forty one pieces of ordnance on the field, and twenty more in a neighbouring depot. The British encamped in the bed of the Naga rivulet fronting the city.

BOOK II. CHAP. VII. 1817.

The disregard apparently shown to the orders of the Raja, might have been preconcerted; but it not improbably arose from the headstrong wilfulness of individual leaders, and was characteristic of the relaxation of authority which prevailed generally in the Mahratta armies. The incidents that followed exhibited the same feature in a still more prominent light. The Arab mercenaries, heedless of all considerations of public welfare, and determined to secure advantageous stipulations for themselves, exposed the capital of their retainer to almost certain destruction. Being joined by a body of Hindustanis, so as to form a force of about five thousand men, they threw themselves into the palace which formed a kind of citadel within the walls of the town, and occupied the approaches to it that lay through narrow streets, between well-built houses, from the flat tops and loop holes of which, a murderous fire could be maintained with little risk of loss to the defenders. It was found necessary, therefore, to proceed deliberately against the refractory soldiery, and clear away the obstacles which barred access to their principal defence. To do this promptly was impracticable, as the battering train attached to the second division had been left behind at Akola, on the advance to Nagpur. It was now ordered forward, but, in the mean time, batteries were formed with the guns in camp, and between the 19th and 22nd of December, regular approaches were carried along the lateral embankments of a large piece of water, the Jama Talao, which was situated between Nagpur and the Sitabaldi hills, until they reached the transverse bank, parallel with the city wall.

Trenches were then dug, and the opposite gateway, with a part of the wall on either side, was soon laid in ruins. The walls of the palace were about two hundred and fifty yards distant, and it was considered practicable to form a lodgement at this point from whence they might be breached, with which view, a party, consisting of one company of the Royal Scots, and four of the 22nd Bombay native infantry, with sappers and miners, was ordered against the gateway, while two different assaults were made in other quarters to distract the attention of the garrison. The subordinate attacks succeeded, but that on the principal gateway failed, the column encountering a raking fire from the Arabs under cover of the houses on either hand, which inflicted heavy loss, and could not be effectively met. The troops, therefore, hesitated to follow their officers, one of whom, Lieutenant Bell[1] of the Royals, was killed in the breach. The assailants were recalled, and it was resolved to await the arrival of the heavy artillery. The necessity of this delay was obviated, however, by the repetition of proposals from the Arabs to capitulate; and as much loss had been already suffered, and little progress could be made until the arrival of the battering train, it was deemed prudent to get rid of them by granting the conditions which they had originally demanded; security for their persons, property, and families, a gratuity of fifty-thousand rupees in addition to their arrears of pay, and a safe conduct to Malkapur, where they were to be disbanded, and allowed to go whither

[1] The total loss was ninety killed and one hundred and seventy-four wounded.

BOOK II. CHAP. VII. 1817.

they pleased, upon an engagement not to enter the fort of Asirgerh.[1] After plundering the palace, and committing various excesses, the Arabs marched out of Nagpur, which was occupied by a detachment under Colonel Scott; some of them went off to Hyderabad, but the larger number found their way to Kandesh, where they enlisted with the enemies of the British in that quarter. During the operations against the city, the principal body of the Nagpur horse which had fled to Warigam was surprised by a detachment under Major Munt, and put to the rout.

As soon as information of the attack upon the Residency reached the Governor-General, he had resolved not to leave Apa Saheb even nominally at the head of the government of Nagpur, nor did he change his decision upon learning that the Raja had given himself up, but reiterated his orders for Apa Saheb's deposal, unless the Resident should have entered into engagements with him implying that condition. His Lordship's instructions having been delayed by the difficulty of communication, Mr. Jenkins had, in the mean time, guaranteed to the Raja the continuance of his rank, influenced by the hope that the danger he had incurred, and the lenity he had experienced, might deter him from future practices adverse to the interests of his allies, and hazardous to himself; and by the conviction that the stipulations to which he had assented were sufficient

[1] Colonel Blacker considers the engineer blamable for the failure of the storm. He is the authority also for the Arabs having their own terms. Lord Hastings and Mr. Prinsep do not specify the fact, nor is it mentioned in the Resident's or General Doveton's dispatches.—Papers, Mahratta war, 133, 176.

to deprive him of the power of doing mischief, and to place upon a sound and durable basis the objects of the alliance. When made aware of the Governor-General's reluctance to the restoration of the Raja, it was too late to follow his policy, and it was not the purpose of the Marquis of Hastings to annul any part of the arrangements to which the faith of the Resident had been plighted; but as the treaty with the Raja had not been definitively agreed upon, Mr. Jenkins offered to him, as the condition of his preserving his power, a provisional engagement, subject to the approbation of the Governor-General, to the following effect. The Raja was required to cede his territories to the northward of the Nerbudda, as well as certain districts on the southern bank, and all his rights in Berar, Sirguja, Gawil-gerh, and Jaspur, in lieu of the former subsidy and contingent; to consent that the affairs of his government should be conducted by Ministers in the confidence of the British Government, and comformably to the advice of the Resident; to reside in Nagpur under the protection of British troops; to pay up the arrears of subsidy; to give up any forts which the Resident might require to be occupied by British troops; to dismiss from his service, and to apprehend, if possible, the persons whom he represented as resisting his orders, and deliver them to British officers; and to transfer to the British authorities the Sitabaldi hills, with ground adjacent, sufficient for a Bazar, to be fortified at the pleasure of the British Government.[1] The Raja gave his consent to these demands, and resumed his

1817.

[1] Letter from the Marquis of Hastings.—Secret Committee, 21st Aug. 1826.—Papers, Mahratta war, 423.

BOOK II. CHAP. VII. 1817.

throne on the 9th of January. Such, however, was his infatuation, that his conduct very soon justified the extreme measures which the Governor-General had originally enjoined, and he ceased to hold a place among the princes of India. Before, however, pursuing his fortunes, it will be advisable to revert to those of his confederates, Holkar and the Peshwa.

The conduct of the persons by whom the affairs of Holkar were administered, had long been characterised by a vacillating and insincere policy, arising from conflicting interests and feelings. In the first instance, the leading individuals had readily entered into the projects of the Peshwa, and the Government, in a fresh engagement concerted with Sindhia, had, as we have noticed, recognised in the first article the obligation to serve and obey that prince, as the bond of the mutual faith of the contracting parties. Envoys from the Peshwa were received with honour in the course of 1815 and 1816, and a persuasion was entertained that it would be practicable to form a general confederacy against the English, which should curb their ambition and curtail their power. Yet, although the national prepossessions of the Bai and her confidential ministers, Tantia Jog, and Ganpat Rao, inclined them to make common cause with the Peshwa, they were far from confident of the result, and a Vakil was sent to the British Resident at Delhi to assure him of the friendly dispositions of the court. Up to the latest moment these assurances were repeated to Captain Tod, the political agent at Kota, and to Sir J. Malcolm, and even after the arrival of Sir T. Hislop

at Ujayin, accredited agents were sent into his camp, vested, as they affirmed, with full powers to negotiate a treaty.[1] Terms similar to those which had been concluded with Sindhia were proposed, and the Vakils returned with them to the Bai, who, with her favourite, Ganpat Rao, would now have gladly accepted any conditions that should extricate them from the violence with which they were surrounded, and solicited an asylum with the British force. This was readily promised, but, although the parties were no doubt sincere, it was not easy for them to avail themselves of the desired protection. The military commanders, particularly Roshan Beg, who was at the head of the disciplined brigades, and Ram Din, who commanded the Mahratta horse, knowing that the immediate consequences of a pacification with the British would be the disbanding of their licentious soldiery, and the annihilation of their power, and encouraged by the receipt of considerable sums from the Peshwa, and by promises of more, had perseveringly urged recourse to hostilities, and had compelled the Bai to sanction the movement of the Holkar troops towards the south, which had brought them into the proximity of the British divisions. Aware of the negotiations that had been commenced, and of the disposition which prevailed in the court to conclude an accommodation, these men determined, not only to interrupt, but effectually to counteract the pacific projects of the Bai and her ministers. Motives of personal dislike

1817.

[1] In a letter of the 17th Dec. he mentions, "Since the united division moved to this place, within fourteen miles of the camp, a more definite negotiation has been opened; Vakils have been sent to the camp, and the substance of a treaty has been proposed."

BOOK II. CHAP. VII.

1817.

instigated other influential members of the administration to favour the execution of the plot, and on the 19th of December, Ganpat Rao and Tulasi Bai were seized, and separated from the person of the young prince: the former was imprisoned: a strict guard was placed over the tent of the Bai, and at dawn of the following morning she was carried to the banks of the Sipra, where her head was severed from her body, and the body was thrown into the river. Tulasi Bai was a woman of low extraction, the supposed daughter of a mendicant priest; her beauty had introduced her to the notice of Mulhar Rao, over whom she acquired an entire command, and established an authority in his court, which secured her during his insanity, and after his death, the charge of the regency. She was not thirty when she was murdered. She was a woman of engaging manners, persuasive eloquence, and quick intelligence; but she was profligate, vindictive, and cruel, and excited the fears and contempt of those with whom she was connected in the administration of the government. Her death was little heeded, and still less lamented. The military commanders, the principal of whom were Ghafur Khan, the confederate and representative of Amir Khan, Roshan Beg, commanding the infantry, Sudder-ud-din, and Ram Din, commanding the cavalry, bound themselves by an oath of fidelity to each other, and professing to act under the orders of the young Mulhar Rao Holkar, prepared with great gallantry and some skill to encounter the British army.

Sir Thomas Hislop marched before daybreak of

the 21st of December, from his encampment at Hernia, and following the right hand of the Sipra river came in sight of the enemy about nine; a large body of their horse on the same side of the river, had attempted to retard the advance, and harass the flanks of the army, but their main force was on the opposite side, the right resting on a rugged and difficult ravine, the left on a bend of the river, opposite to the town of Mahidpur. They were drawn up in two lines with a range of batteries, mounting seventy guns in their front. The horse, which had crossed the Sipra were soon driven back, and retreated to the main body forming in its rear. The troops then moved to the river, where a single ford was found available. The banks of the river were lofty, but under the farther one was a spit of sand, on which the troops might form under shelter from the enemy's fire; and near at hand opened the mouth of a ravine, by which they could ascend under cover to the top of the bank. Batteries were erected on the right bank to protect their passage. In this manner, the river was crossed without much loss, but as soon as the heads of the columns emerged from the ravine, a heavy cannonade was opened upon them, from which they suffered severely. With unflinching steadiness, however, they took up their position, and, as soon as they were formed, the first and light brigades, commanded by Sir J. Malcolm, pushed forward against the enemy's left, whilst the cavalry, supported by the second brigade, attacked the right. Both attacks were successful. The troops advanced

1817.

[1] Malcolm.—Central India, i. 316.

BOOK II. CHAP. VII. 1817.

in face of a well sustained fire, and carried the guns, on which the enemy's infantry on either flank broke and fled. The centre stood firm, until the second brigade wheeled upon them, when finding themselves assailed on both flanks, they also dispersed. The fugitives were briskly pursued. In the pursuit, the cavalry came upon the camp, which was deserted, but found themselves exposed to the fire of a battery lower down the river, where the enemy seemed disposed to rally in a position difficult of approach from the ravines into which the ground was broken. The object of the renewed resistance was, however, merely to give time for the passage of their troops across the river, and as soon as the infantry came up, the enemy hastily resumed their retreat. The pursuit was continued until dark, when the troops were re-assembled and encamped on the field of battle.

The victory was not achieved without loss. Of the British, nearly eight hundred were killed and wounded, including three European and twenty-seven Native officers.[1] Three thousand of the enemy were reported to be killed and wounded. Young Holkar, after the action, was carried off to Allote; he had been present in the action, seated on an elephant, and is said to have exhibited no marks of apprehension, but to have shed tears when he saw his troops retreat from the field. Ganpat Rao and Tantia Jog, who, during the action, had escaped from their guards, joined the Raja, and the latter received the

[1] The European Officers killed, were Lieutenant Macleod, Royal Scots; Lieutenant Coleman, Madras European regiment; and Lieutenant Glen, 1st battalion, 3rd regiment N. I.

office of minister from Kesaria Bai, the mother of the young prince, who was acknowledged as Regent.

1817.

Although prostrated by the action of Mahidpur, the court of Holkar retained for a short period its hostile attitude, and it was necessary to detach a division of the army, under Sir J. Malcolm, to disperse the enemy's troops which still kept the field. The division moved on the 26th of December, and, after several marches, overtook the baggage and the cattle of the enemy at Mandiswar on the 31st. The main body of the army, under Sir Thomas Hislop, followed on the 27th, and amidst very heavy rain, reached Taul on the Chambal on the 30th, where it was joined by the division from Guznat, under Sir W. G. Keir. This force had marched from Baroda, on the 4th of December, on the high road to Ujayin, and had reached Dawad on the 13th, when it was recalled to the vicinity of Baroda, by the positive orders of the Bombay Government, who, on hearing of the attack on the British Residency at Poona, became alarmed lest the Gaekwar should imitate the Peshwa's example. It would have been rather extraordinary if the ruler of Guzerat had coalesced with a prince who had always been his inveterate foe, and whose participation in the murder of his minister, was in part the occasion of the existing hostilities; but the Gaekwar was a Mahratta, who shared in the national veneration for the office of the Peshwa, and in the sympathy felt for his humiliation, and these apprehensions of the Bombay Government were not altogether without foundation. The amount of the danger likely to arise from the Gaekwar's possible treachery, seems, how-

BOOK II. CHAP. VII. 1817.

ever, to have been exaggerated; and the abrupt recall of General Keir's division was condemned by the Governor-General as unnecessary and ill-advised. The orders had been subsequently so far qualified, that their execution was made conditional upon the decision of the Resident, and as he did not consider the danger to be imminent, he authorised the division to march to its original destination, and it had proceeded accordingly to Malwa, where it fell in with the army of the Dekhin. The whole force then marched to Mandiswar, where it again united with the detachment under Sir John Malcolm.

Previous to the concentration of the British army, overtures of peace had been made by Holkar's ministers to Sir J. Malcolm, and preliminaries had been adjusted. Tantia Jog himself, had repaired, in consequence, to the British camp, and on the 6th of January a definitive treaty was concluded. The principal terms of this engagement were the confirmation of the stipulations entered into with Amir Khan, and the relinquishment of all claims to the territories which had been guaranteed to him and to his heirs; the cession to the Raj Rana of Kota, of various districts rented by him of the Holkar state; the renunciation of all right to territories within and north of the Bundi hills; and the cession to the British Government of all claims and territories within and south of the Sathpura hills, and in Kandesh, with all claims of tribute and revenue from the Rajput princes. It was also provided that Ghafur Khan, who had advocated pacific negotiations, and had kept his troops aloof from the battle of Mahidpur, should retain the lands held on the

tenure of military service as a hereditary fief, on condition of his furnishing a stipulated force for the Raja's service. In return, Holkar was released from all dependency on the Peshwa, and was guaranteed in his dominions by the British Government, on whose part a Resident was appointed at the Raja's court, and by whom a field force was to be maintained, and stationed at pleasure in the Raja's territories.[1] He was thus, virtually, in the position of a prince bound by a subsidiary alliance, and deprived of all independent sovereignty. Such was the fate of a martial dynasty which had once been dreaded throughout Hindustan; which had at one time threatened the supremacy of the Peshwa, and had intimidated even the British Government in the moment of victory into a discreditable course of conciliatory policy, the abandonment of its advantages, and the desertion of its allies. 1817.

The defeat of Holkar's army completed the series of events, in the course of which all the Mahratta princes, with the exception of Sindhia, had blindly rushed into toils of their own weaving, and had, in a singular manner, converted anticipated contingencies into realities; their possible combination with the Pindaris into actual war against the British, and thus had fully justified the precautionary policy of the Governor-General. Little more was to be feared from any efforts they might make. Holkar was an ally dependent for existence upon his late enemies, and the Raja of Nagpur was in an equally helpless predicament. The Peshwa was still at large, but no longer formidable, and the British Government was

[1] Papers, Mahratta war.—Collection of Treatises, p. 86.

1817.

left free to prosecute to a conclusion the main objects of its arming,—the suppression of the predatory system, and the complete annihilation of the scattered remnants of the Pindari associations.

The first operations of the British divisions had succeeded, as we have seen, in driving the Pindaris from their haunts along the Nerbudda, and had forced them to fly to the north and west, in the hope of penetrating either to Gwalior or to Mewar. They were frustrated in both designs by the intervention of the British forces, and had been severely handled. They still, however, continued in some force on the line of the upper course of the Chambal, and, by the rapidity of their movements, for a while continued to elude pursuit. Their activity served only to delay, for a brief interval, the hour of their extinction, which it was now determined to prosecute with renewed vigour. Hitherto the different divisions had been retarded in their movements by the heavy artillery which had been necessarily attached to them, while the enemies whom they might have to encounter were uncertain, but the diminished probability of requiring heavy ordnance in the field, enabled the brigades to dispense, in a great measure, with their guns, and to move with greater lightness and dispatch.

The durras of Karim Khan and Wasil Mohammed, reduced in number, exhausted by fatigue, and dispirited by defeat, had been arrayed with the battalions of Roshan Beg, at the battle of Mahidpur. The arrangements which were subsequently made with the government of the young prince, compelled their separation, and the Pindaris moved to the west-

ward, towards Jawad, where Jeswant Rao Bhao, who had previously afforded Cheetoo and his followers an asylum, extended his protection to the other chiefs. At the same time, General Donkin was at the Ghynta Ghat, on the Chambal, just above the afflux of the Sindh, and General Adams at Gangraur, on the Kali Sindh. General Marshall had been recalled to Bairsia, detaching part of his division to rejoin the centre of the grand army, from which the Marquis of Hastings had detached General Brown in advance, to act against the Pindaris. The detachment consisted of two regiments of native cavalry, four regiments of irregular horse, a dromedary corps, one troop of gallopers, a battalion of native infantry, and a company of pioneers.[1] General Brown followed a line passing between the divisions of Generals Donkin and Adams, and on the 5th of January, was at Soneir, where he was in communication on his left with General Adams, and on his right with the Resident at Kota.

1818.

The retreat of the Pindaris towards Jawad being ascertained, the several detachments moved upon that place as the centre of their operations. On the north, General Donkin moved westward, so as to shut up all the passes which led from the narrow tract within which the Pindaris were now confined, and arrived at Sanganer on the 8th of January, where he halted for three days, in order to receive intelligence of the movements of the other divisions.

As soon as the submission of Holkar was tendered to Sir Thomas Hislop, and the direction taken by the Pindari Chief, Cheetoo, was ascertained, Sir

[1] Blacker, 195.

BOOK II. CHAP. VII. 1818.

W. G. Keir, with the Guzerat division, was detached in pursuit. He was preceded by Captain Grant, who, with three troops of Native cavalry, fifteen hundred Mysore horse, and a weak battalion of infantry, had been sent to follow Karim Khan. As he advanced to the north-west, the Pindaris fled before him, and upon his arrival at Jawad, the chief, Jeswant Rao, was so far intimidated as to compel the parties of both Karim and Cheetoo to leave the immediate neighbourhood of his fort. No positive information of their movements could be obtained as the inhabitants were friendly to them; and Capt. Grant was therefore obliged to halt in the position which he had taken up. Sir W. Keir had turned off to the left, from the direct road to Jawad, in hope of surprising a body of Pindaris at Dhera; but they fled at his approach, leaving five guns and some baggage on the ground.

The advance of Captain Grant's detachment had driven the united durras of Cheetoo and Karim to the northward, and they were heard of by General Donkin at Dhaneta, in the neighbourhood of Chitore. Thither Colonel Gardner, with his irregular horse, was directed to proceed, but on his arrival learned that the Pindaris had again turned back to the south, and that the principal body, under Cheetoo, had moved towards the frontiers of Guzerat, while the durras of Karim and Wasil Mohammed had gone towards Malwa. Major-General Donkin, therefore, recalled his parties, and resumed his defence of the northern line, shifting his headquarters from Sanganer to Shahpura.

Sir W. Keir, having ascertained the intended

direction of Cheetoo, pursued his course also to the westward, and was at Bhinder on the 12th of January, where the nature of the country precluding a forward movement, he retraced his march to Pertabgerh. On his route he learnt that a number of Pindaris were collected at the village of Mandapi, under the protection of Fazil Khan, a dependant of Jeswant Rao Bhao, who, like his superior, gave covert encouragement to the freebooters, and allowed his village to become a rallying point for fugitives from all the durras; disclaiming, nevertheless, all connexion with Karim, and having, through his chief, obtained from Captain Caulfield, the British agent, letters of protection. Sir W. Keir, having formed a detachment of four squadrons of the 17th dragoons, and eight hundred infantry, moved against Fazil Khan, and pushed on with the dragoons to surround the villages, until the infantry could come up. As soon as the cavalry appeared, the Pindaris rushed out in various directions, and endeavoured to escape, but they were pursued by the horse, and nearly a hundred were cut up. The infantry arrived; the village was occupied, and the fort was about to be attacked, when a nephew of Fazil Khan appeared and produced his letters of protection. They saved the place from pillage, and such articles as had been taken were restored to the inhabitants, although they were, in part at least, the spoils of the fugitives.

1818.

The main body of Cheetoo's force, after experiencing much distress from the unproductiveness of the country, and the hostility of the Bhil inhabitants of the mountains and thickets with which it

BOOK II. CHAP. VII.

1818.

was covered, and foiled in their attempts to reach the Guzerat frontier, by the measures adopted for its security, and by the activity with which they were driven from one post to another, endeavoured to reseek once more their original haunts on the upper part of the Nerbudda. By taking a circuitous route, they evaded the pursuit of the British detachments. Crossing the territories of Holkar to the eastward, Cheetoo reached Unchode, and on the 24th of January ascended the Ghat to Kanode, but twenty-two miles north-west from Hindia on the Nerbudda, where Major Heath was stationed. Intelligence of the arrival of the Pindaris having reached him at 1 P. M., he formed a detachment of European and Native infantry, and a party of irregular horse, about eight hundred strong in all, and marched without delay against the marauders. He came upon their camp at eight in the evening; the darkness prevented his inflicting much mischief, but his movements had the effect of completely dispersing them, with the loss of their elephants and camels, and many of their horses. Cheetoo fled up the Ghats, and again assembled some of his scattered followers, but he was heard of by General Adams, and was once more obliged to take to flight by the approach of a detachment under Captain Roberts. After this, he wandered about Malwa for some time, until finding his situation desperate, he suddenly made his appearance in the camp of the Nawab of Bhopal, and, through his intercession, attempted to make terms with the British Government, demanding to be taken into its service with a body

of his followers, and a Jagir for their maintenance. Finding that he had nothing to expect beyond personal immunity, and a provision for his support in some part of Hindustan, he again became a wanderer, and, eluding all pursuit, made his way into Kandesh and the Dekhin, where he united himself with some of the disorganised bands of the Peshwa's routed army, and shared in their ultimate dispersion. Although his principal leaders had surrendered, and most of his followers had quitted him, he still disdained the conditions on which he might have purchased repose and safety; and in the rainy season of 1818, joined Apa Saheb, the Raja of Berar, with whom we shall, at present, leave him. 1818.

The durras of Karim Khan and Wasil Mohammed, after leaving Jawad, retraced their course to Malwa, which they entered in three bodies, more effectually to distract the attention of the British divisions, and avoid their collision. The most considerable of the three, led by Namdar Khan, the nephew of Karim, passed round by Nimach, and crossing the Chambal marched past Gangraur, where Colonel Adams was encamped, to Kotri, on the Kali Sindh, where they seem to have considered themselves in safety. Accurate information of their progress was brought to Colonel Adams, and he dispatched Major Clarke, with the fifth cavalry, to surprise them. The detachment came in sight of the bivouac of the Pindaris about an hour before dawn, and as there appeared to be no stir indicating any dread of his approach, Major Clarke halted, until daylight should enable him to make his onset with more precision. As soon as the day broke he divided his

BOOK II. CHAP. VII. 1818.

detachment, and ordering Lieutenant Kennedy to make a direct attack with three troops, he led the rest to a point where he might better intercept the fugitives. The manœuvre was attended with complete success. The Pindaris taken by surprise attempted to escape from their assailants, and fell upon the party stationed to stop their flight. The pursuit was maintained for twenty miles, and of the whole body, estimated at one thousand five hundred men, not more than five hundred escaped.

Although the principal party was thus destroyed, there still remained the other two bodies which had passed to the southward of Gangraur, and to which the wreck of the defeated portion united themselves. They were not allowed to gather strength. Colonel Adams satisfied that the district of Mewar was now cleared of them, confined his attention to those in Malwa, and following them up without intermission for nine days consecutively, drove them to the confines of Bhopal. Finding themselves thus hard pressed, the body finally disbanded, and Namdar Khan delivered himself up, with eighty-seven followers, to Colonel Adams, at Deorajpur, on the 3rd of February. Karim Khan, who had been concealed at Jawad until the 30th of January, and had subsequently wandered from village to village, surrendered himself to Sir John Malcolm on the 15th of February. His eldest son, and other Sirdars of his durra, gave themselves up soon afterwards through Zalim Sing of Kota. Kadir Buksh, of the Holkar Shahi Pindaris, delivered himself to Sir John Malcolm. Wasil Mohammed contrived to find his

way to Gwalior, and threw himself on the protection of Sindhia, but was given up at the demand of the British Government. Many others put themselves into the hands of the Nawab of Bhopal. The terms that had been offered to the chiefs were, the removal of themselves and families to Hindustan,[1] where they were promised grants of land for their support, and in the interval a pecuniary provision. Karim Khan, Kadir Buksh, Rajan, and Wasil Mohammed were accordingly, with their families and followers, sent to Gorakhpur, where the two former were gradually transmuted into peaceable and industrious farmers.[2] Wasil Mohammed, restless and discontented, attempted to escape from the surveillance to which he was subjected, and being prevented from effecting his purpose by the vigilance of the police, took poison and perished. Namdar Khan, who had never led a predatory gang into the Company's possessions, and for whose good conduct the Nawab of Bhopal became responsible, was allowed to settle in Bhopal. The fate of Cheetoo will be subsequently noticed. Of their respective followers, great numbers had been destroyed by the troops,—still more by the villagers in some parts of the country, and by the Bhils and Gonds; still greater havock was made among them by fatigue, exposure,

[1] Their great fear was being sent to Europe, by which, however, it was found they meant Calcutta.

[2] Karim's land was calculated to produce sixteen thousand Rupees a year, his family and followers amounted to six hundred persons. Kadir Buksh's followers were about one hundred and twenty; his lands were of the value of four thousand Rupees per annum: a few years after his establishment, he experienced some of the miseries he had been wont to inflict: in 1822 his house was attacked by a gang of Dekoits, from Oude; four of his people were killed, and many wounded, and much of his property was carried off.

1818.

and famine. That so many should still have adhered to their leaders, amidst all the hardships and dangers which they underwent, is a singular proof of that fidelity to their leaders, which characterises the natives of India; as nothing could have been more easy than for a Pindari to have deserted his captain, and become identified with the peasantry. The tenacity with which some of their principal leaders clung to the life of a wanderer and a plunderer, preferring privation, peril, and death, to the ease and security of tranquil social existence, exhibited also that impatience of control, that love of independence, which is the general attribute of half civilised and martial people. It has been remarked as extraordinary, that in many parts of the country, and particularly in Harawati, the villagers were disinclined to give any information that might lead to the discovery and destruction of a Pindari band; but the inhabitants of those countries had never suffered any greater injury from the Pindaris than from the other component members of the Mahratta army,—they considered rapine inherent in the system,—had often taken part in it themselves, and looked with sympathy and admiration upon the hardships and hazards which their countrymen and fellow-plunderers underwent. The state of society in Central India was similar to that of Europe in the early part of the middle ages, when robbers, and outlaws, free companies, and banditti, were objects of less terror than the more powerful and equally rapacious baron,—the more necessitous and equally unscrupulous monarch.

Simultaneously, and in connection with the pur-

suit of the Pindaris, the forces on the north of the Nerbudda, were engaged in various military operations which require to be noticed. The conduct of Jeswant Rao Bhao, in the protection which he had given to the Pindari leaders,[1] was justly regarded by Lord Hastings to be incompatible with the alliance which subsisted with his liege lord Sindhia, and as it was satisfactorily established, that, although the main body of the freebooters had withdrawn from Jawad on the approach of Captain Grant's detachment, yet a number of them, with some of the chiefs, had been secretly sheltered by him, he was denounced as a public enemy, and General Brown, whose advance to Suneir has been mentioned, was ordered to proceed against him. Before the receipt of these instructions, General Brown had marched towards Jawad, when Captain Caulfield, who had been dispatched to act with Jeswant Rao's contingent, under the treaty of Gwalior, having found all expostulation unavailing withdrew to the British camp. At his suggestion a squadron of cavalry was sent round the town to occupy the road by which the Pindaris might escape. On their march they were fired at, both from the town and from an encampment of Jeswant Rao's forces on the south of the town, on which General Brown immediately ordered

1818.

[1] Besides the Pindaris who were driven out of the village of Fazil Khan, and those of inferior rank who were sheltered in his forts and villages, Jeswant Rao gave open countenance to Bhikhu Sayed, a Sirdar who led the incursion into Gantur in 1815, and permitted him to pitch his tents within a short distance of that of Capt. Caulfield, the British political agent. It was afterwards discovered also that Karim Khan, who had been unable through indisposition to accompany his Durra, was secreted in the town of Jawad at the time of its occupation. Jeswant Rao's protection was not altogether gratuitous, he received, it was stated, a hundred Rupees for every Pindari to whom he gave an asylum.—MS. Rec.

BOOK II. CHAP. VII.

1818.

out his whole line for an assault upon the Mahratta posts. The third cavalry and horse artillery having joined the advanced squadron, the whole, under Captain Newbery, attacked and carried the camp, whence the detachment had been fired upon. Captain Ridge with the fourth cavalry, and a party of Rohilla horse, was sent against a second and still stronger encampment, formed of two regular battalions, besides horse and six guns, on the north of the town. The detachment, disregarding the fire, galloped into the camp, charged and cut up the battalions and captured the guns; while General Brown caused the gates of the town to be blown open, and carried the place by storm. Jeswant Rao escaped with a few followers, and took shelter in Komalner. He shortly afterwards surrendered that fortress to General Donkin, and gave himself up to Sir J. Malcolm in the middle of February. Jawad and Nimach, two of Sindhia's perganas held by him in Jagir, were occupied for a season, but were finally restored to Sindhia. The forts in the Mewar territory, Ramnagar, Raipur, and Kamalner, the latter, one of the strongest hill forts in India, which Jeswant had unwarrantably wrested from Udaypur, were taken in the course of a few weeks by General Donkin's division, and were given back to the Rana. The whole of the country along the confines of Harawati and Mewar was thus cleared of enemies of any note.

The restoration of order in the territories subject to Holkar was an object to which the attention of General Brown was next directed. Shortly after the battle of Mahidpur, Roshan Beg, and other leaders

of the mercenary brigades, retired with the remnants of their battalions to Rampura. Intelligence of their position reached General Brown on his arrival at Piplia, about twenty miles from Rampura, and he moved against them with the third cavalry, the dromedary corps, and two companies of infantry. No serious opposition was encountered; most of the refractory troops had already dispersed, leaving about four hundred foot and two hundred horse, who fled to a neighbouring hill, where they were overtaken, and lost about two hundred of their number; one of their leaders was captured, the others fled and found safety in obscurity. The only body of troops that remained in force consisted of the Paga, or household horse, under the command of Ram Din who, finding all attempts to raise an insurrection in the vicinity of Indore, where he had held authority, frustrated by the activity of Sir J. Malcolm, moved off to the Dekhin and joined the Peshwa. Bhima Bai, the daughter of Jeswant Rao Holkar, who had collected a body of troops in the neighbourhood of Dhar, surrendered herself to Sir Wm. Keir on the 10th of February, and was conducted to Rampura.

Whilst the great objects of the policy of Lord Hastings were thus attained, through the conduct of the commanders, and gallantry of the troops engaged in their prosecution, in central Hindustan, no less judgment and activity were displayed on the occasions which called for the exertion of those qualities in the Dekhin, for the final eradication of the authority of the Peshwa. The once formidable prince who bore that appellation, continued throughout the same period to remain in arms, although a

BOOK II. CHAP. VII.

fugitive, and to keep alive the spirit of resistance in a portion of the Mahratta country.

1818. Upon the retreat of Baji Rao from Poona to Purandhar, he was followed thither by General Smith, as soon as the arrangements for the security of the capital were completed. The march of the division was incessantly harassed by the Mahratta horse, which hung upon its flank and rear, threatening to cut off its baggage and intercept its supplies. On its approach the Peshwa moved to Satara, whence he carried off the person of the descendant of Sivaji and his family, and continued his route to Poosa-saoli, where he arrived on the 29th of November, 1817. Here his flight to the southward was arrested by the fear of falling upon the reserve under General Pritzler, which was moving in a northerly direction to meet him, and he turned aside to the east to Pundarpur, whence he retraced his steps, and again moved northward towards the sources of the Godaveri river; on the road he was joined by Trimbak, with reinforcements from Kandesh. The fourth division followed him closely, arriving at Pundarpur on the second day after Baji Rao had quitted it; and thence continuing its march so as to deter him from making any attempt upon Poona, as he passed it on his northern route. General Smith keeping the same track arrived at Seroor, the cantonments of the subsidiary force, on the 17th of December, and there, dropping the heavy guns which had somewhat delayed his progress, resumed his pursuit on the 22nd; and having ascertained that during the halt at Seroor, the Peshwa had loitered on his route, he made a circuit to the eastward with such expedition and

secrecy, as to place his force on the line of the Peshwa's retreat, cutting him off in that direction from Malwa. Thus prevented by the superior activity of his pursuers from penetrating into Malwa, where he hoped that his presence would encourage Sindhia and Holkar to exert themselves in his favour, Baji Rao attempted to profit by the opening which the distance of General Smith afforded, and recover possession of Poona. He arrived at Watúr on the 28th, and on the 30th was at Chakan, within eighteen miles of the capital, a movement which led to one of the most brilliant actions which distinguished the campaign. 1818.

The approach of the Peshwa towards Poona, induced Captain Burr, who had been left for the defence of the city, with three native battalions and a body of irregular horse, to call for a reinforcement from Seroor, in consequence of which Captain Staunton was dispatched with the 2nd battalion of the 1st regiment of Bombay N. I. six hundred strong, two guns, and twenty-six European artillerymen, under Lieutenant Chisholm of the Madras artillery, and a detachment of about three hundred and fifty reformed horse, under Lieutenant Swanston.

The detachment left Seroor on the 31st of December, at six in the evening, and by ten on the following morning, had ascended some high ground about half way to Poona, overlooking the village of Korigaon, and the adjacent plain watered by the Bhima river. Beyond the river appeared the whole of the Peshwa's forces, estimated at twenty thousand horse, and nearly eight thousand foot. Captain Staunton immediately determined to throw himself

1818.

into Korigaon, which being surrounded by a wall, and protected on the south by the bed of the river, offered shelter against the Mahratta cavalry, and might enable him to resist any force of infantry that could be brought against him. As soon as his movement was descried, his intention was anticipated by the enemy, and a numerous body of their infantry, chiefly Arabs, pushed for the same point; both parties reached the place nearly at the same time, and each occupied a part of the village, the British the northern and western, the Arabs the southern and eastern portions. The Arabs obtained possession of a small fort which gave them the advantage, but good positions were secured for the guns, one commanding the principal street, the other the banks of the river. By noon the preparations of both parties were complete, and a desperate and seemingly hopeless struggle ensued. The first efforts of the British were directed to dislodge the enemy from that portion of the village which they had seized, but their superior numbers enabled them to repel the several vigorous assaults made for that purpose, and Captain Staunton was obliged to confine his objects to the defence of his own position. The Arab infantry became in their turn the assailants, and while some maintained a galling fire from the fort and the terraced roofs of the houses, others rushed along the passages between the walls surrounding them, leading to the British posts, with desperate resolution. They were torn to pieces by the discharge from the guns, which were served with equal rapidity and precision, or they were encountered and driven back at the point of the bayo-

net by the equal resolution of the defenders. In these actions, the few officers commanding the troops were necessarily exposed to more than ordinary hazard. They were eight in number, including two assistant surgeons, who were more usefully employed in encouraging the soldiers, than in attendance on the wounded, and who shared with their brother officers the peril and honours of the day. In addition to the dangers and toils of the engagement, the men were much distressed by want of food and water, and by the fatigues of their previous march. Towards evening the situation of the party became critical; Lieutenant Chisholm, of the artillery, was killed; many of the artillerymen were killed or disabled. Lieutenants Pattinson, Conellan, and Swanston, and Assistant Surgeon Wingate had been wounded, and Captain Staunton, with Lieutenant Innes, and Assistant Surgeon Wylie, were the only officers remaining effective. At this time one of the guns was captured, and the enemy penetrated to a Choultry, a building for travellers, in which many of the wounded had been deposited. The ferocity of the assailants vented itself upon the helpless men who were thus within their reach, and many of them were barbarously slain. Amongst them, Mr. Wingate was cut to pieces, and Lieutenants Swanston and Conellan were about to share the same fate, when the surviving officers, at the head of a party of their men, charged into the Choultry, bayoneted every one of the enemy who was found within it, and put those without to flight. The gun was recovered by a sally, headed by Lieutenant Pattinson, although at the time mor-

BOOK II. CHAP. VII.

1818.

tally wounded. A second wound disabled him, but his example had been nobly followed, and the Arabs were driven back with great slaughter.[1] Notwithstanding their success, the loss had been so great, and the exhaustion of the troops was so excessive, that some of the men, both Europeans and natives, began to consider resistance hopeless, and expressed a desire to apply for terms of surrender. Their commanding officer, however, convinced them that their only hope of safety lay in a protracted defence, and that to surrender would doom them to certain destruction from barbarous foes, exasperated by the loss which they had suffered. This exhortation animated the troops to persevere, and the Arabs disheartened by the ill-success of their repeated assaults, intermitted their exertions, and about nine, drew off, leaving the entire village in possession of the detachment. During the night water was procured, and arrangements were made for a renewal of the defence; but the Peshwa learning that General Smith was approaching, considered further delay unsafe, and at day-light of the 2nd of January, his whole force was in motion along the Poona road. Not being aware of the advance of the fourth division, Captain Staunton thought it advisable to march back to Seroor. The

[1] This incident is narrated by Captain Grant. Lieutenant Pattinson who was a very powerful man, being six feet seven inches in height, lying mortally wounded, having been shot through the body, no sooner heard that the gun was taken, than getting up, he called to the Grenadiers once more to follow him, and seizing a musket by the muzzle, he rushed into the middle of the Arabs, striking them down right and left, until a second ball completely disabled him; Lieutenant Pattinson had been nobly seconded; the Sepoys thus led were irresistible, the gun was re-taken, and the dead Arabs literally lying above each other, proved how desperately it had been defended. —Mahratta Hist. 3, 435.

enemy attempted to entice him to cross the river into the more open country, by sending fictitious messages from Poona, urging him to hasten his march in that direction, and he pretended to entertain the purpose of complying with the request. Towards nightfall, however, having procured conveyance for his wounded, he set off for Seroor, which he entered on the following morning, with both his guns, and all his wounded, with drums beating, and colours flying: thus having set a memorable example of what is possible to a resolute spirit, and of the wisdom of resistance in the most desperate circumstances. Surrender to Asiatic troops, ignorant of the laws of civilized warfare, is as likely to be fatal as ultimate defeat. It may not preserve life, although it must incur dishonour. Of Captain Staunton's small force, two officers were killed, and three wounded, as above named, and of the latter, Lieutenant Pattinson subsequently died of his wounds. Of the twenty-six artillery-men, twelve were killed, and eight wounded; of the native battalion, fifty men were killed, and one hundred and three wounded; and of the auxiliary horse, ninety-six were killed, wounded, and missing. Captain Staunton received the thanks of the Governor-General for his gallant conduct, and a public monument was erected on the spot in honour of those who fell.[1]

On the day after the action of Korigaon, General Smith who had learned at Chakan the situation of Captain Staunton's detachment, hastened to his res-

[1] For the particulars of the battle of Korigaon, see Papers, Mahratta war, 180, 221. Grant Duff, 3, 434. Blacker's Memoir, 179. Bishop Heber describes the monument.

1818.

cue. Finding that he had fallen back to Seroor, he proceeded thither himself, and after one day's halt, resumed the pursuit of the Peshwa. In the mean time, Baji Rao had found his southward flight again obstructed by the advance of the reserve division, under Brigadier-General Pritzler, which had crossed the Krishna early in December, and after being delayed some days at Bijapur, in order to secure the safe junction of supplies, had reached the Salpi Ghat by the 8th of January, and ascending the pass, came upon the Peshwa's rear, who had crossed the head of the column, and keeping to the left bank of the Krishna, continued his flight to the vicinity of Merich. He was followed closely by the reserve, and on the 17th a smart action took place between the cavalry of the division, and a large body of the enemy's horse, under Gokla, who interfered, as was his practice, to give the Peshwa time to escape. The Mahrattas showed themselves in two divisions, which were successively charged and dispersed by Major Doveton, with a squadron of dragoons, and two of native cavalry: a third body intercepted his return to the camp, but this, also, was resolutely charged and broken, and the whole then drew off. The pursuit was again continued until it was ascertained that the Peshwa had been forced upon the track of the fourth division. The reserve then halted for two days, after having marched twenty-five days without cessation. The proximity of General Smith once more threw the Peshwa on a southern route; his presence brought the fourth division into communication with the reserve, and both corps were united near Satara on the 8th of

February. The fort was summoned, and surrendered without resistance on the following day, when the flag of the Raja was hoisted on the fort, and a proclamation was issued, announcing to the Mahratta nation the deposal of Baji Rao, and that the Company intended to take possession of his territories, establishing the Raja of Satara in a principality for the maintenance of his rank and dignity, and of that of his court.[1]

After the occupation of the Fortress of Satara, it was determined to continue the pursuit of the Peshwa with the cavalry and a light division[2] only, leaving the guns and the rest of the infantry to reduce at leisure the various strongholds in the southern Mahratta districts. Divisions for the same purpose were directed upon Ahmednagar and to the Konkan. Their objects were effected with little opposition. In the course of March, ten forts, including two of great strength, Singgerh and Purandhar were reduced. Ahmednagar, and the country between the Pheira and Bhima rivers, were occupied by Colonel Deacon, with a detachment which was at first stationed in Kandesh, to guard the province against an inroad of the Pindaris and subsequently to intercept the Peshwa's flight to the north. The forts in the Konkan, were carried by a small force fitted out from Bombay, under Colonel Prother. Brigadier-General Munro, overran the country as far south as the Malparba. Little remained to the

[1] Substance of a Mahratta Proclamation issued on the 11th February, 1818, by the Honourable Mr. Elphinston.—Papers, Mahratta war, 245.

[2] Consisting of the horse artillery, 2 squadrons of his Majesty's 22nd Dragoons, 2nd and 7th regiments Madras Cavalry, one thousand two hundred Poona auxiliary horse, and two thousand five-hundred Infantry.

BOOK II. CHAP. VII.

Peshwa except the ground on which he was encamped.

1818. Immediately after the occupation of Satara, General Smith had marched with the detachment he had organised for the pursuit towards Pundrapur and Sholapur, where the Peshwa had delayed and had levied contributions. From thence, Baji Rao resumed his flight, at first towards the west, but turned suddenly to the north and reached Ashti on the 18th of February. Accurate information was gained of his movements, and early on the 20th, General Smith came in sight of the Mahratta army as they were preparing to march. The tents were struck, the baggage was loaded, and the men had just taken their morning meal when the alarm was given. Baji Rao, who had throughout displayed great want of personal courage, mounted his horse and fled with the greatest celerity. Gokla, with between eight and ten thousand horse, stood firm, in the hope of covering his flight and the retreat of the baggage. The Mahratta cavalry were divided into several masses, which made a demonstration of supporting each other, and they were separated from their pursuers by a deep Nulla or water course. The British cavalry advanced in three columns. The two squadrons of His Majesty's dragoons in the centre; the 7th Madras cavalry on the right, and the 2nd on the left. The Bombay horse artillery were on the right flank, and the galloper guns on the left, both a little retired. The ground over which they had to march was much broken, and intersected by small water courses running from the hills to the main stream. The formation of the line was

consequently retarded, and the centre and right columns were separated from the left. Taking advantage of their disjunction, Gokla anticipated the attack. A strong division of Mahratta horse, led by himself, darted across the nulla, and charging obliquely across the ground from the left to the right, his men firing their matchlocks as they passed, turned the right of the 7th Native cavalry, and rode round to the rear of the line. There with their long lances in rest they threatened the flank of the dragoons, but Major Dawes,[1] their commanding officer, immediately threw back the right troop, and wheeling the left into line met charge with charge. A confused fight ensued, in which General Smith received a sabre cut, and the gallant commander of the Mahrattas, Gokla, fell covered with wounds. His fall, and that of some other Sirdars of note, disheartened the enemy. The 7th cavalry having recovered from their disorder, and coming again into action, supported by a squadron of the 2nd, completed the enemy's defeat. They fled in utter confusion to the left, in which direction the main body had retreated, pursued by the second cavalry: after following the fugitives for about five miles the pursuit was discontinued. The whole of the camp equipage and a number of camels, elephants and palankeens, laden with valuable property, among which were the images of the Peshwa's household gods, were captured. A more important prize was the person of the Raja of Satara, whom the Peshwa had hitherto detained, and who, with his mother and brothers, gladly placed himself under British protection. But

[1] Prinsep has Davies.

BOOK II. CHAP. VII. 1818.

the consequence most fatal to the Peshwa, was the loss of the chieftain, who, with exemplary loyalty and intrepid valour, had hitherto directed and defended his flight.[1] This officer had been long known to the English: he had succeeded chiefly through their influence to the rank and command held by his uncle, who was Governor of the Carnatic, and was killed in the course of the hostilities with Dhundia Wagh. At the time of the treaty of Bassein, Bapu Gokla commanded on the Peshwa's frontier, and joined the British forces under Colonel Wellesley, on his march to Poona;[2] he afterwards served in the campaign, and was recommended for his military services by the British commander to the favour of the Peshwa's Government. He had been frequently indebted to the interposition of the Resident, for the preservation both of his possessions and his life, when he had incurred the displeasure of the Peshwa. Upon his reconciliation with Baji Rao and his restoration to favour, he became the implacable enemy of the English, and the chief instigator of Baji Rao in the warlike policy which he finally adopted. He does not seem to have been actuated by any sinister motives, nor by any personal aversion to his former friends and patrons, and may be entitled to credit for a patriotic feeling. He had vehemently opposed the treaty of Poona, and advocated the more honourable alternative of an appeal to arms, and he may have hoped that a vigorous resistance would eventually secure for the Peshwa

[1] See Duff, Mahratta History, iii. 443.

[2] Wellington Despatches, vol. i., January to April, 1803. Grant Duff's Mahrattas, vol. iii. 47, 193.

terms less inglorious than a tame and prompt submission. The counsel he had given he vindicated by his own exertions, and was spared the pain of witnessing, and possibly of sharing his master's degradation. 1818.

The defeat at Ashti was quickly succeeded by the total ruin of the affairs of the Peshwa in the southern portion of the Mahratta states, the chiefs of which, with few exceptions, hastened to proffer their allegiance to the British authorities, or to the Raja of Satara. Many of his followers also despairing of success, and worn out by the fatigues and terrors of incessant flight, detached themselves from his person, and returned quietly to their homes. With the remainder, much reduced in number and lowered in spirit, Baji Rao fled northwards, hoping to be able to pass through Kandesh into Malwa; but when he had forded the Godaveri, he found in his front the main body and detachments of the first division of the army of the Dekhin, which had crossed the Tapti on its return southwards in the beginning of March. After making some forward movements to facilitate a junction with Ram Din, and the horse of Holkar's routed army, and to call in the garrisons of such forts as could not be maintained, he again fell back to the south-east, but was stopped by the second division, under General Doveton. General Smith also advanced on the west from Seroor. There was still an opening to the eastward, and thither also the Peshwa was invited by secret communications from the Raja of Nagpur, who promised to meet him at Chanda with all the force that he could muster. The timely discovery of this plot

BOOK II. CHAP. VII.

1818.

prevented its execution. A detachment from Nagpur, under Lieutenant-Colonel Scott covered Chanda, while the main body of the Nagpur subsidiary force, under Colonel Adams, marched to Hingan Ghat;— at the same time Baji Rao was closely pressed by the Poonah and Hyderabad divisions, which had been concentrated at Jalna, and proceeded thence in two parallel lines so as to intercept the Peshwa's entrance into Berar. After a few marches the Hyderabad force diverged to the north-east, towards the rough country that lies between the upper part of the courses of the Warda and Payin Ganga rivers, where they are separated by the ramifications of the Berar hills, which are covered with jungle, and difficult of access. After various long and fatiguing marches, Brigadier-General Doveton arrived at Pandukora on the 18th of April, and his approach compelled the Peshwa to make a precipitate retreat from Seoni, where he had been encamped. A simultaneous movement from Hingan Ghat towards Seoni had been made by Colonel Adams, and his division arrived at Pipal Kote shortly before daylight on the 10th. After a short halt to refresh the horses and men, the march was resumed. The troops had scarcely moved five miles on the road to Seoni, when the advance came in sight of the van of the Peshwa's army flying from General Doveton. Baji Rao, as usual, made off upon the first alarm; some of his cavalry attempted to cover his flight, but they were driven back by the fire of the horse artillery, supported by the fifth cavalry, and the whole of the Peshwa's force was wholly broken and scattered. The nature of the ground prevented

their sustaining very severe loss, but the rout was complete. Baji Rao was attended by his personal guards, and Ram-Din carried off some of his horse towards Berhampur, but the greater part were dispersed in every direction, and never afterwards rejoined their leaders.[1] 1818.

The Peshwa fled on the first day to Mainli thirty miles in a south-westerly direction, and continuing the same course reached Amarkeir on the fourth. He was hotly pursued by General Doveton, with part of his force lightly equipped. On the 23rd of April the division was within eight miles of Amarkeir, but the exhausted state both of men and horses, and the necessity of waiting for supplies, compelled a halt. The Peshwa's adherents had suffered still more severely from fatigue and privation, and had been able to leave Amarkeir only on the same morning on which General Doveton reached the neighbourhood. Their route was tracked by cattle dead or dying on the road, and their numbers were daily thinned by desertion. From Amarkeir, Baji Rao fled northwards towards Burhanpur, and his pursuers suspended their movements, General Doveton retiring towards the cantonments at Jalna, and General Smith towards Seroor: the former arrived at Jalna on the 10th of May, the latter at Seroor on the 16th. On the march, a light detachment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham, dispersed a body of infantry stationed at Dharúr, and the Poona aux-

[1] Among the Sirdars who returned to their own country, were Madhu Rao Rastia, Apa Dhundheri, Baji Rao's father in law, and a cousin of Bapu Gokla; so many applications were made for leave to return, that the Resident issued a proclamation, declaring that those who returned quietly to their homes, should suffer no molestation.

1818.

iliary horse, under Captain Davies, came up with a party of Mahratta cavalry near Yellum, the leaders of which, Chimnaji Apa, the Peshwa's younger brother, and Apa Desay Nipankar, one of his best officers, gave themselves up without resistance. This terminated the operations against the Peshwa in the Dekhin. It will now be expedient to advert to other transactions in the same quarter, which took place during the movements that ended in his final expulsion.

As long as the Peshwa, at the head of a considerable force, continued to elude the pursuit of the British divisions, a strong feeling in his favour pervaded the Mahrattas, and many of the Jagirdars remaining faithful to their allegiance, retained in his name, the forts and districts entrusted to their keeping, and propagated a belief of his eventual restoration to power. It became necessary, therefore, to convince his adherents that the British Government was determined to admit of no adjustment with him, and to compel, by forcible means, where force was requisite, submission to the authority which was to be substituted, absolutely and for ever, for that of the Peshwa.

The southern extremity of the Poona territory, the districts of Darwar and Kusigal, bordering on Mysore, had been ceded to the British Government by the treaty of Poona, and had been placed under the civil administration of Colonel Munro. When the army of the Dekhin was organized, he was nominated to the command of the reserve, but by a change of arrangements, the command had been transferred to Colonel Pritzler. It was again as-

signed to Colonel Munro, but as the division was in active service in communication with the fourth division, Colonel Munro refrained from interfering with its movements, until a more convenient opportunity of taking charge of it should arrive, occupying himself in the mean while with the establishment of the British authority in the districts under his charge, and its extension to the neighbouring territory, which was still subject to the Peshwa, and was held for him by Kasi Rao Gokla, with a force of fifteen hundred horse, and eight hundred foot, besides about five thousand infantry in different garrisons.[1] Colonel Munro had but limited means at his disposal: his character compensated for the deficiency. He knew that the agricultural population were well affected towards him, and he had no hesitation in confiding to them the defence of the districts, or even in employing them to subjugate those of the Peshwa. Retaining in the pay of the Company the native Peons, or irregular militia, of the country, armed with spears and swords, or occasionally with matchlocks, and reinforcing them by similar Peons from Mysore and the Carnatic, he placed in their hands the forts hitherto occupied by the regular troops, and thus rendered the latter available for more active service. Being joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Newall, the Commandant of Dawar, Colonel Munro took the field with five companies of native infantry, belonging to the second battalions of the fourth and twelfth regiments; three troops of the fifth cavalry, subsequently joined by a party of Mysore horse, and a

[1] Life of Sir Thomas Munro, i. 473.

1818.

small battering train. With this force he proceeded to reduce the forts in the enemy's territory, and in the course of the month most of them had surrendered. Parties of Peons alone, under native military Amildars, established the British authority in the open country. Little vigour was shown in the opposition encountered. Kasi Rao, although he occasionally made his appearance at the head of his horse, ventured upon no serious conflict. His most vigorous attempt was upon an open village, which five hundred Peons had taken from his troops, and he was repulsed with the loss of many of his men. Colonel Munro about the same time dispersed a body of Pindaris, who, in the beginning of January, eluding the pursuit of the British divisions, directed their course to the south, and committed some depredations; one of their parties entered the district of Harpanhali, but they were surprised and routed by the left wing of the fifth cavalry, and returned expeditiously to the north. The irruption, in some degree, deranged Colonel Munro's plans, as it induced the Madras Government to withhold the reinforcements with which it had been designed to furnish him, in order to guard the frontiers of Mysore, but the retreat of the Pindaris having removed all ground of apprehension, the troops were again ordered to the west, and Colonel Munro was reinforced by the 2nd battalion of the 9th N. I., and two squadrons of His Majesty's 22nd dragoons.

In the beginning of February Colonel Munro marched against Badami, beyond the Malparba river, a post consisting of fortified hills, with a

walled town at their foot, having an inner fort, the whole being esteemed one of the strongest hill forts in India, and almost impregnable if defended by a determined garrison. The division arrived before the place on the 12th of February, batteries were erected against the town walls without delay, and by the evening of the 17th, a practicable breach was effected. At dawn, on the following day, the town was stormed and carried, and the assailants following the fugitives to the upper forts, the garrison apprehending an escalade, called out for terms of capitulation. They were allowed to march out with their arms, and by ten o'clock, on the 18th, Badami was in the possession of the besiegers. Turning hence to the westward, Colonel Munro marched up the Ghatparba to Padshahpur, receiving the ready submission of different strongholds on his way, and establishing British functionaries for the management of the conquered country. The only place of any strength remaining to be subdued in this quarter was Belgam south of Padshahpur, near the western Ghats. Colonel Munro commenced the siege on the 20th of March; the fort was strong and of great extent, the walls were massive and in perfect repair; a broad and deep ditch surrounded it, and the interior was garrisoned by sixteen hundred men. They made a more obstinate defence than had yet been encountered, and the spirit of the besieged, with the imperfect means available to the besiegers, delayed the surrender of the fort until the 8th of April, when a sufficient breach in the curtain having been effected, the commandant capitulated. The reduction of Belgam completed the subjugation of the country about

1818.

1818. the sources of the Krishna, subject to the Peshwa; and the rulers of the adjacent districts, the southern Jagirdars readily gave in their adherence to the British Government, stipulating only not to be required to serve against the Peshwa. Matters being thus settled, Colonel Munro was at liberty to proceed to the northward, and to assume the command of the reserve which, under Brigadier-General Pritzler, had again separated from the fourth division, and had been employed since the latter part of March in reducing to obedience the country in the vicinity of Satara. The principal operation undertaken was the siege of Wasota, a fort situated on the summit of a lofty mountain in the western Ghats, part of a range accessible only by a few narrow and difficult passes. It was considered one of the strongest forts in the Mahratta territory, and had been selected, therefore, by the Peshwa as a depository of his treasures, and as the prison of the family of the Raja of Satara. Cornets Morrison and Hunter, who had been taken in the beginning of the war, were also prisoners in Wasota. The force arrived before the place on the 11th of March, and as the Killadar declared his purpose to hold out, it was at once invested. With great labour and difficulty batteries were erected on mountain points commanding the fort. A brisk bombardment was opened by the 5th of April, and on the following day the garrison surrendered unconditionally. The Raja of Satara was in the camp, and witnessed the operations. Having placed a garrison of Bombay N. I. in the fort, the division returned to Satara, where the Raja was formally installed in his principality by the

British Commissioner. On the 12th, the reserve marched southwards to meet Colonel Munro, and joined his force on the 22nd at Nagar-Manawali; receiving on its route the submission of a great number of hill forts, the governors of which beheld in the elevation of the Raja of Satara the hopelessness of aid or reward from Baji Rao. 1818.

Having concentrated and organized the force now under his orders, Brigadier-General Munro moved on the 26th of April towards the Bhima river, near which the Peshwa had left his infantry and his guns, on his flight towards the west in the middle of February. The Bhima was crossed on the 7th of May, and the Sena on the 8th, and on the 9th a position was taken up within two miles of the enemy's camp,[1] and the fortress reconnoitered; a summons to surrender on terms, having been answered by the unjustifiable murder of the native officer who had been sent to make the communication.

Sholapur was a town of considerable extent, enclosed by a strong mud wall with towers of masonry; on the south-west it was further protected by the fort, a parallelogram of ample area, built of substantial masonry, and defended on the south by a large tank, supplying a broad deep ditch, which circled entirely round the fort, separating it on the north and north-west from the town: the Peshwa's infantry, amounting to about six thousand foot, including one thousand two hundred Arabs, and eight

[1] After this junction, Brigadier Munro's force consisted of the European flank battalion, four companies of Rifles, the 4th regiment, the 2nd, 7th, 9th, and 2nd of 13th of the Madras N. I., the 1st of the 7th Bombay, two squadrons of His Majesty's 22nd Dragoons, two companies of artillery, and four of Pioneers,—in all about four thousand strong.

hundred horse, and having fourteen guns, were posted on the west of the tank. The garrison of the fort was about one thousand strong.

At day-break of the 10th of May, two columns of attack, under the orders of Colonel Hewitt, advanced to the walls of the town, and carried them by escalade. The attack was supported by a reserve, under General Pritzler; little resistance was made to the assault upon the town, and, except the part adjacent to the fort and exposed to its fire, the whole remained in the possession of the assailants, in spite of several attempts made for its recovery. During the assault, the Mahratta commander, Ganpat Rao, had moved round to the east side of the town, to take the attacking party in flank; but he was checked by the reserve, and upon one of his tumbrils exploding, the division led by General Munro in person, charged with the bayonet and drove him back to his original position, with the loss of three of his guns. Ganpat Rao was wounded, and the next in command was killed by a cannon shot. Disheartened by this repulse, and the loss they had suffered, the Mahrattas began to retreat, leaving behind their artillery, and whatever might encumber their flight. As soon as their retreat was known, they were pursued by the dragoons, and a body of auxiliary horse, but such had been their expedition, that they had marched seven miles before they were overtaken. They made an irresolute stand, and were speedily and completely dispersed before night put an end to the pursuit on the banks of the Sena river. Nearly a thousand were left dead on the field, and the rest were so entirely disorganized, that

for all military objects, the force had ceased to exist. The fort held out but a short time after the discomfiture of the troops. Batteries were immediately erected against its southern face, in which a practicable breach was made in two days, when the garrison surrendered, upon the promise of security for themselves, and for private property. The reduction of Sholapur completed the subjugation of the southern districts, and the operations of the campaign were concluded by the cession of Manawali, by Apa Desai Nipankar, a Mahratta chieftain, who had followed the fortunes of Baji Rao, until his flight towards the Nerbudda. This chief had strongly fortified his residence, Nipani, but as he had submitted in time, he was allowed to retain a portion of his territory, subject to the usual feudal conditions under which he had held it of the Peshwa. After visiting him at Nipani, General Munro returned to Dewar and Hubli, and the troops went into cantonments.

It has been already mentioned that in the beginning of the war a small detachment was formed at Bombay, for the purpose of occupying the Mahratta territory below the Ghats, in the Konkan, and keeping open the communication with Poona. This object being effected, the detachment, commanded by Colonel Prother, was reinforced,[1] and directed to extend its operations above the Ghats. Colonel Prother ascended the Bore Ghat, and on the 4th of

[1] The force consisted at first of about six hundred men, detachments of the 5th and 9th regiment of N. I., and a few European foot and horse. It was afterwards reinforced by two companies of the 2nd of the 4th N. I., and about three hundred and seventy of his Majesty's 89th regiment sent round from Madras.

BOOK II. CHAP. VII. 1818.

March arrived before Logerh, a strong hill fort, near the road from Bombay to Poona: no resistance was met with; the garrison of the fort, as well as that of Isagerh, in its vicinity, capitulated as soon as preparations were made for an assault. Several other fortresses were given up with the same promptitude. At Koari, a hill fort twenty miles south of the Bore Ghat, and situated at the summit of the Ghats, it was necessary to erect batteries, the fire from which, causing an explosion of the enemy's magazine, compelled them in the course of two days to surrender. Intimidated by this event, the garrisons of other forts surrendered them at once, and the division returned to the low country belonging to the Peshwa, between the Ghats and the sea coast.

Before Colonel Prother's ascent of the mountains, operations were successfully commenced with the reduction of a number of petty forts below the Ghats and along the sea-coast by smaller detachments, under Colonels Kennedy and Imlach, with the occasional assistance of parties from the cruizers off Port Victoria, and a detachment of H.M.'s 89th, which, on its way to Bankut, had been, by stress of weather, obliged to put into Malwan. Little remained to be accomplished, for the entire subjugation of this part of the Konkan, when Colonel Prother, returning from above the Ghats, laid siege to Raigerh, a stronghold to which the Peshwa, in the belief that it was impregnable, had sent his wife, Varanasi Bai, and a valuable treasure. It was garrisoned by one thousand men, of whom many were Arabs. All impediments to the approach having been surmounted, the Petta or town of Raigerh was occupied on the 24th

of April, by a party of European and native troops, under Major Hall. Much difficulty was experienced from the ruggedness of the ground, in bringing up the mortars and howitzers, with which to bombard the place, but the object was attained, and shells were thrown into the fortress with great effect. A safe conduct was offered to the Bai, to enable her to leave the fort, but the communication was suppressed by the officers of the garrison, who appeared determined to make a resolute resistance. On the 7th of May, however, a shell set fire to the residence of the Bai, and she is said to have prevailed upon the troops to surrender. Terms were accordingly demanded, and the garrison marched out, preserving their private property and arms. Varanasi Bai was permitted to retire with her attendants to Poona, from whence she was afterwards escorted to join her husband in captivity. Raigerh is celebrated in Mahratta history, as the early seat of Sivaji's successful insurrection against Mohammedan oppression, and at the time of its capture boasted possession of his palace and his tomb. Previous neglect, and the recent bombardment, had left scanty vestiges of either. The near approach of the monsoon, compelled the return of the troops to cantonments, although several forts of minor importance, were still held by the Mahrattas. They were ultimately given up, and the Konkan became a British province.

1818.

Quitting the sea coast, and returning to the eastward of the Ghats, we find that a supplemental division had been originally dispatched under Colonel Deacon, from Hurda, to occupy Kandesh upon

BOOK II. CHAP. VII.

1818.

the recall of General Smith to Poona.[1] The detachment took up its station at Akola, on the 28th of December, but in the course of two days was ordered to move to the south, to counteract the Peshwa's advance in that direction, and disperse his adherents. The whole of January was occupied in the discharge of this duty, and in the beginning of February the detachment was at Ahmednagar. Colonel Deacon was here in communication with Mr. Elphinstone, and was directed by him to clear the country between the Phaira and Bhima rivers, of any parties of the enemy that might show themselves. This was effected by the capture of the forts of Kurra and Chakan, in the course of February, after which the detachments marched to Poona, where the different corps composing the Poona division underwent a new distribution, in consequence of the arrangements which had been rendered necessary by the dissolution of the army of the Dekhin.

[1] Consisting of two squadrons from the 4th and 8th regiments N. C. the 2nd battalion 17th N. I., and the contingent of Nawab Salabat Khan, being detached from the Second or Hyderabad division of the army of the Dekhin.

CHAPTER VIII.

Dissolution of the armies of Hindustan and the Dekhin. —Divisions left in the field.—March of Sir T. Hislop with the 1st division to the South.—Contumacy of the Kiladar of Talner.—Fort stormed.— —Murder of British officers.—The Kiladar hanged. —Return of Sir T. Hislop to Madras.—Military operations in Kandesh.—Hill Forts surrendered or captured.—Arab mercenaries.—Siege of Maligam. —Storm of the Fort.—Repulsed.—Petta carried. —Garrison capitulate.—Operations in the Nerbudda Valley. — Movements of the left division of the grand army in Bundelkhand.—Rights of the Peshwa transferred.—Ságar annexed to the British Territory.—General Marshall advances to the Nagpur ceded districts.—Dhamani and Mandala taken.— Kiladar of the latter tried.—Acquitted.—Operations in Gondwana.—Proofs of Apa Saheb's hostile designs.—His arrest, and deposal.—Baji Rao, a minor, made Raja.—Administration by the Resident. —Fatal error of the Peshwa.—Chanda taken.—Colonel Adams cantoned at Hosainabad.—Apa Saheb sent to Hindustan.—Makes his escape.—Peshwa overtaken by Colonel Doveton.—Prevented from crossing the Nerbudda by Sir J. Malcolm.—Negotiates with the latter.—Joins his camp.—His troops mutiny.—Are reduced to terms and dismissed.—

Baji Rao marches towards Hindustan.—Governor-General disapproves of the terms granted to the Ex-Peshwa.—Confirms them.—Their defence by Sir J. Malcolm.—Baji Rao settled at Bithur.—Trimbak taken.—Confined at Chunar.—Mahratta power annihilated.

BOOK II. CHAP. VIII.

1818.

As soon as the principal objects of the campaign had been accomplished, the Marquis of Hastings deemed it unnecessary to maintain his military arrangements on the extensive scale on which they had been hitherto constructed, and accordingly at the end of January, he determined to break up both the grand army and the army of the Dekhin, entrusting the duties which remained to be executed to such of the subordinate divisions as were most conveniently situated. They were reorganized for the purpose, and orders were issued for the return of the centre and right divisions of the grand army to the British territories. From the centre a brigade of three strong battalions, and a regiment of Native cavalry, under Brigadier-General Watson, was despatched to Samthar, to take up the heavy ordnance which had been left there upon the march of the centre from Seonda, and the whole were then directed to join the left wing, under General Marshall, which remained embodied in order to complete the subjugation of the territories on the Nerbudda taken from the Raja of Nagpur. The remaining corps of the centre fell back to the Jumna by the end of the month, and retired to their appointed stations. Lord Hastings on quitting the army, proceeded on a visit to the Nawab of Oude, and arrived at Lucknow on the 6th of March.

The right wing of the grand army speedily received the same orders, and commenced its homeward march by the end of February. One brigade of Native infantry was placed at the disposal of Sir John Malcolm, to assist in restoring subordination in the territories of Holkar, after which it joined the reserve under Sir David Ochterlony, who remained some time longer in force in Rajputana. Most of the remaining battalions had crossed the Jumna by the end of March. The divisions of Colonels Toone and Hardyman had previously been broken up, but troops were detached from the former to enable Major Roughsedge to take possession of the Berar dependencies of Sirguja, Jaspur, and Sambhalpur, and a force under Colonel Hardyman, remained some time longer in the country upon the upper course of the Nerbudda.

The dissolution of the army of the Dekhin commenced somewhat earlier, and in the middle of January, the head quarters, with the first division, from which reinforcements had been furnished to the third, left in Malwa with Sir John Malcolm, began their march southwards; consigning to the Guzerat troops the task of freeing the country round Indore from the scattered parties of Pindaris and disbanded mercenaries, by which it was still partially infested. Sir Thomas Hislop moved to the Nerbudda, and crossed the river on the 10th. The other three divisions, the Berar and Hyderabad subsidiary troops, with Generals Adams and Doveton, and the Poona division, remained embodied, but were placed under the orders of the Marquis of Hastings, as Commander-in-Chief, in communication with the

BOOK II. CHAP. VIII. 1818.

Residents and the Commissioner of the Mahratta territory. Sir Thomas Hislop, with the first division, arrived before the fortress of Talner on the 27th of February, intending to cross the Tapti river at that place.

The country between the Nerbudda and the Tapti, subject to Holkar, had been ceded to the British, by the treaty of Mandiswar, and no obstacle had been hitherto experienced from the officers of the Holkar state in taking possession. The stronghold of Sindwa had been given up as soon as summoned, and no expectation was entertained that the fortress of Talner would be closed against British authority. No precaution had been adopted anticipatory of such an event, and the column of baggage preceding the division, advanced into the plain on which Talner is situated, without a suspicion of danger, when its progress was arrested by the salute of a gun charged with round shot from the fort. The division was halted, and a summons was sent to the Kiladar, or governor, requiring him to surrender the fort, warning him of the serious consequences to which he exposed himself, by acting in contempt of his sovereign's orders, and setting the right of the British at defiance; and "apprising him distinctly, that if he attempted resistance, he, and his garrison, would be treated as rebels." A verbal message of the same tenor accompanied the letter, and, although the Kiladar declined to receive the latter, the former was delivered. The messenger was robbed and beaten, and his return was followed by a sharp fire of matchlocks from the walls, by which several of the Sipahis were wounded, and some were killed.

1818.

The summons was despatched between seven and eight in the morning, but the fire of the garrison was not returned until noon, when, finding that no answer had arrived, and that indications of resistance continued, batteries provisionally erected were opened against the defences of the fort. The wall of the outer gateway was soon in a condition to admit of a storm, and preparations were made for the assault. The Kiladar now applied for terms, and was told that none but personal immunity would be granted. No answer was received, and the storming party, consisting of the flank companies of the Royal Scots and Madras European regiment, under Major Gordon, supported by the rifle battalion, and the third Native light infantry, was ordered to advance. They carried the outer and one of the inner gates: a number of persons unarmed, and apparently intending to escape, came out from the wicket of a third gate as the troops approached it, and were placed under a guard; among them, as was afterwards discovered, was the Kiladar, but he did not make himself known.[1] This and a fourth gate were passed through by the assailants, but they found the fifth closed, with the wicket open, and the passage within occupied by the garrison. Some parley with the Arabs regarding the terms of their surrender was attempted, but it was, no doubt, mutually unintelligible.[2] Concluding that surrender was acquiesced

[1] Mr. Prinsep says the Kiladar came out and proffered his surrender to Colonel Conway, the Adjutant-General, but, according to the evidence on his trial, he did not disclose himself when arrested, nor had he any distinguishing marks of his rank in his dress or appearance, and the inference therefore was warrantable, that he intended to get off without being recognized.

[2] Colonel Blacker says from the circumstance of noise and apprehen-

BOOK II. CHAP. VIII. 1818.

in, Major Gordon passed through the wicket, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Macgregor Murray, and a few grenadiers. The instant they entered, Major Gordon was dragged forward and killed, the grenadiers were shot or cut down, and Colonel Murray was stabbed. Fortunately the wicket was kept open by the foremost assailants, and Colonel Murray was extricated from his peril. A fire was poured in which cleared the gateway, and the leading files, headed by Captain Macgregor, forced their way in with the loss of their leader. The whole party then penetrated into the fort, and the garrison, about three hundred strong, were put to the sword. Their conduct justified this retaliation, although the motives by which they were instigated, if there were any, except the impulse of the moment and ungoverned fury, remain unexplained.[1] The Kiladar was brought to immediate trial, and hanged upon one of the bastions the same evening, for waging hostilities without the authority of any recognized

sion which attended it, more probably, from mutual ignorance of each other's language. It is not likely that the officers knew more of Arabic than the Arabs did of English.

[1] Sir Thomas Hislop imputed the attack to the treachery of the Arabs. Dispatch. — Papers, Mahratta war. Colonel Blacker (232) to apprehension of consequences. Mr. Prinsep ascribes it to a paroxysm of distrust and desperation, in consequence of the inability of the officers to make themselves intelligible. Lieutenant Lake assigns a cause which will sufficiently explain the business, if the statement be correct. He says, some of the Grenadiers who had entered by the wicket, attempted to disarm the Arabs by force, and as the retention of their arms is a point of honour of which they have always shown themselves tenacious, they resisted the attempt, and the affray ensued.—Sieges, Madras Army, 55. Colonel Macgregor Murray, at a subsequent period, affirmed that the attack was instantaneous; they had no time for parley. Lieutenant Lake's account is partly confirmed by Sir T. Hislop's dispatch, in which he says, "the garrison were to the last moment offered the assurance of their lives being preserved, on their unconditional surrender. This unfortunately they did not, or could not understand, as they persisted in asking for terms: none other could be given.

power, and therefore within the predicament of a robber or a pirate.

1818.

The circumstances which attended the capture of Talner attracted public notice and drew upon General Hislop much severe animadversion. An explanation was required by the Governor-General, and at home, both Houses of Parliament, in passing a vote of thanks to Sir Thomas Hislop and the army of the Dekhin, specifically excepted his execution of the Kiladar from the purport of the vote, considering it necessary to await further information on the subject. With that which had been received, Mr. Canning declared neither the Government nor the East India Company were satisfied. When the first feelings had subsided, the business was forgotten, and it was not deemed necessary to communicate such information as was received to the public.[1] The severity was vindicated by Sir Thomas Hislop, and his reasoning was supported by the Marquis of Hastings upon two grounds: the lawless character of the proceedings of the Kiladar, and the absolute necessity of deterring others from a similar conduct, involving needless peril and loss of life, by the example of his punishment. The fort that had been placed in his care by his sovereign, had been voluntarily aban-

[1] Some of the dispatches on the subject, were printed by order of Parliament, 16th February, 1819; but the documents are very meagre, and comprise but a small and unimportant part of those on record. Much more ample materials are on record, particularly the minutes of the Governor-General, in March, 1819, and Sir Thomas Hislop's vindication in September of the same year, confirmed by the answers to queries which he had addressed to Lieutenant-Colonels Conway, Blacker, Murray, and Captain Briggs. Colonel Conway states his opinion, that the sentence was a humane one, and Captain Briggs declares his belief, that it was demanded by the political exigencies of the times.—MS. Records.

BOOK II. CHAP. VIII. 1818.

doned by that sovereign. He had no warrant for its defence; he was no longer the representative of any acknowledged prince, and could not urge obedience to orders in palliation of his resistance. That he was in possession of the orders for the delivery of the fort was proved by evidence; and it was also testified that he had declared his resolution not to give up the fort but with his life. He had incurred a foreseen peril voluntarily, and had made himself responsible for all the consequences springing from his determination. Even the attack upon the officers who had passed through the gate, was a catastrophe every way imputable to him, as he had stimulated his soldiers to resistance, and then abandoned them to the guidance of their own passions. He had been distinctly apprised, also, that if he stood an assault no mercy would be shown to him. He had despised the warning and was liable to the forfeiture.

Reasoning from the usage of civilized nations, and adopting the principles which they have agreed to appeal to, as calculated to alleviate the evils of war, there could be no doubt of the justice of the sentence; but it might have been pleaded in mitigation, that the Mahrattas were ignorant of those principles, and that the Kiladar was punished for the violation of a law of which he was wholly ignorant. The loose practice of his government palliated his conduct, disobedience of the prince's instructions was far from uncommon, and the officers of Sindhia and Holkar were accustomed to interpret the orders they received, not according to the expression, but to what they conjectured to be the

real intention of the chief by whom they were sent. In this case, also, the Kiladar might have urged, that, although holding immediately of Holkar, he owed a higher duty to the Peshwa, who was still in arms, and whose cause it was incumbent upon him to defend to the utmost extremity. As to the garrison, it is most probable that he had little or no control over them, and that they would not have listened to any commands which he might have issued.

The necessity of an example, is a more tenable apology for the rigour of the sentence than the violation of the laws of European warfare. Baji Rao was yet at the head of a considerable force, and was moving towards Kandesh, in which he had numerous adherents. The country was studded with fortresses; the commandants of which were in the interest of the Peshwa, and were known to be preparing for resistance. The reduction of Chandore might have been the work of a campaign; Galna and Rasaigerh were also strong places. The occupation of a large portion of the British force in these seiges, would have protracted military operations, until the season admitted no longer of their continuance, and the interval would have given the Peshwa an opportunity of reorganizing his forces, and of forming dangerous combinations in his favour. The extensive mischief, and the great loss of life which another campaign would have occasioned, were considerations of undoubted weight, and extenuated, if they did not justify, the condemnation of the Kiladar. At any rate, these were the reasons which mainly actuated Sir Thomas Hislop, and in which

1818.

he was supported by the concurrent opinion of Lieutenant-Colonel Conway, the Adjutant-General of the army, and Captain Briggs, the political agent, who assisted at the trial. The Kiladar made no defence. The effect of his fate was undeniable. Tulasi Ram, the Kiladar, was a man of rank, the uncle of Balaram Set, the late minister of the Bai, and his execution made the greatest impression. Chandore, held by his brother, was immediately surrendered, and the other fortresses were given up with equal promptitude. On the other hand, an opinion prevailed among the people and the soldiery, that the Kiladar had been unfairly dealt with; and, in some places, a more obstinate resistance was in consequence encountered. An equally advantageous result would probably have been attained by a sentence of perpetual imprisonment, and the imputation of needless severity would have been avoided. But it must be admitted that hostilities in this campaign were generally prosecuted in a stern and inflexible spirit, vindicable, perhaps, by the cruelty and treachery of the Mahratta princes; but making little account of the feelings which the humiliation they underwent, could not fail to engender both in them and in their adherents.

After the reduction of Talner, Sir T. Hislop continued his march towards the Godaveri, and his route had the effect of arresting the flight of the Peshwa in that direction, and turning him back upon the pursuit of the second division. On the 15th of March, the head-quarters were at Phulthamba, and here the corps composing the first division were divided between the Poona and Hyder-

abad forces, with the exception of a small personal escort, attended by which, Sir T. Hislop proceeded to Aurangabad, where he arrived on the 26th, and promulgated his final orders as Commander-in-Chief of the army of the Dekhin. He also relinquished his civil authority; and the management of the political interests of the British Government in the south reverted to the functionaries in whom they had been vested at the beginning of the war. Sir Thomas then resumed his route by way of Poona to Bombay, where he embarked on the 12th of May, on his return to Madras. 1818.

While the several divisions of the army of the Dekhin had been almost exclusively engaged in circumscribing the Peshwa's movements, the province of Kandesh, the first seat of military operations for the suppression of Trimbak's partisans, had been comparatively neglected; and the adherents of the Peshwa in that quarter had been suffered to collect round them numerous bands of mercenaries, and to strengthen the fortresses of which they were in possession. Opportunity now offered for their reduction, and Mr. Elphinstone, the Commissioner of the Mahratta territories, resolved to adopt active measures for that purpose: a detachment from the Hyderabad division,[1] under Lieutenant-Colonel Macdowall, was employed upon the duty, and ordered to proceed against the strong-holds, situated in the line of hills north of the Godaveri, which form the southern boundary of

[1] It consisted of one company of foot Artillery, two companies of the Royal Scots, three of the Madras European regiment, 1st battalion 2nd N. I., four companies of the 2nd battalion 13th N. I., five companies of Pioneers, and a few hundred irregular horse: a small battering train and a corps of Sappers and Miners were also attached to the force.

1818.

Kandesh. The range is formed of a series of detached elevations, rising abruptly from the plain to the height of from six hundred to eleven hundred feet, connected by low narrow necks of land. From the summit of many of the hills start up bluff and perpendicular rocks, of eighty or one hundred feet high, and so regularly scarped, that they have every appearance of having been artificially wrought. Such of the hills as contained water had been fortified, and the rocky scarp constituted a minor fort, or citadel. There was seldom any work of defence raised upon them, as they were accessible only by flights of steps cut out of the solid rock, and leading through a succession of gate-ways or barriers commanding each turn of the steep and winding staircase. The ascent was utterly impossible, if the garrison were resolute, as those who attempted it were not only exposed to a raking fire, but might be crushed by the rocky fragments which the defenders had the easy means of precipitating on their heads. Of this description was the fort of Ankitanki, before which Colonel Macdowall presented himself on the 3rd of April. Either the courage or the fidelity of the Kiladar failed, or he was intimidated by the recent catastrophe at Talner, and he surrendered the post as soon as summoned.

The next place to which the detachment advanced, Chandore, was, in like manner, at once given up by Ramdas, the brother of the Commandant of Talner; but beyond the Chandore pass were two forts, Rajdher and Inderai, the Kiladars of which disregarded the summons to surrender; Colonel Macdowall, therefore, marched to attack

the former, one of the strongest of those natural fortresses with which the hills were crowned. The troops encamped in the valley which separated the heights of Rajdher from those of the adjacent Inderai, on the 11th of April, and a battery was constructed on the low ground, chiefly intended to cover the attempts which were made to form a lodgment on an elevation more nearly level with the fortress, access to which, although difficult, was practicable at the south-eastern end of the hill, on which Rajdher was situated. This was effected easily on the 12th, and an outwork occupied by the garrison, was carried. Arrangements for constructing a battery on its site, within two hundred and fifty yards of the fort, were immediately made. The guns were taken from their carriages and brought up by hand, and the battery would have opened on the morning of the 13th, but after it was dark, the buildings within the fort were observed to be on fire, and the garrison endeavouring to quit it. Parties sent to make them prisoners were deterred from approaching by the heat of the passage, and in the confusion, and the darkness of the night, most of the enemy escaped. Forty were brought in captives on the following morning by the irregular horse.[1] Inderai, and several similar strong-holds, in the vicinity of Rajdher, abandoned all purpose of re-

1818.

[1] Colonel Blacker states that the cause of the conflagration was never ascertained, but supposes it might have been the effect of the shells, p. 320. —According to Lieutenant Lake, it was a quarrel which took place in the garrison, originating in the Brahman Kiladar's refusal to pay to the families of those men who had been killed, the arrears of pay due to them. In revenge, the garrison set fire to his house, and the manner in which the flames spread alarmed them so much, that they were induced to capitulate, 97.

sistance after the prompt fall of a place so celebrated for the strength of its position.

1818. After halting at Rajdher till the 15th of April, the detachment moved to the south-west, and on the 22nd sat down before Trimbak,[1] a fortified rock, the summit of which was five miles in extent; the sides presented a perpendicular scarp, varying from two to four hundred feet in height, and everywhere unassailable, except at two gateways, one on the northern, the other on the southern face. The ascent was by narrow passages with flights of steps, and was protected by other gateways at the top, flanked by towers: there were few works on the summit, and the magazine and dwellings of the garrison were excavations in the rock. The petta of Trimbak lay in a valley on the north side of the fort, and the Godaveri river, issuing from the western face of the rock, flowed round the fort, and through the centre of the town.

Notwithstanding the difficulties of the approach, enhanced by the rocky nature of the soil, which rendered it necessary to carry up earth for the formation of an elevated, instead of a sunken, battery, a lodgment was effected on the north side on the 23rd, and a battery was opened at day-light on the following day, against the curtain and tower of the gateway. A battery was also erected against the southern gateway, to distract the attention of the garrison, and intercept their communication. A nearer approach to the north gate was accom-

[1] Trimbak, or more correctly Tryambak, is a name of the Hindu deity, Siva, to whom a celebrated shrine was here dedicated, whence the name of the place. The appellations of their divinities are commonly adopted by the Hindus, whence the designation of the Peshwa's favourite.

plished on the 24th, and the enemy were driven from a ruined village at the foot of the scarp which afforded cover for the besiegers. Following up this advantage with some precipitancy, and under a misconception of orders, the covering party attempted to ascend to the gateway; but they were quickly driven down by a heavy fire of gingals, rockets, and muskets, and by heavy stones. Retiring behind the walls of the village, a battery of four six-pounders was completed there during the night, but before it could open on the 25th, the Kiladar expressed a desire to treat, and the garrison being allowed to march out with their arms and private property, the fort was surrendered. The example of Trimbak, as celebrated for its strength, as for its sanctity as the source of the Godaveri, a river second only to the Ganges in the veneration of the Hindus, was quickly followed. Seventeen hill forts were immediately afterwards relinquished, and the whole of the country, one of the strongest in the world, submitted in the course of a very short campaign. 1818.

That the defence of places of such extraordinary natural strength, should have been conducted with so little vigour, was to be expected from the constitution of the garrisons, and the depressed fortunes of the prince whom they served. Enlisted on the spur of the moment, and composed of hirelings from every country in India, they were held together by no feeling of nationality, by no attachment to the Peshwa, and from his evident inability to make head against his pursuers, anticipated his speedy downfall. The sentiments thus inspired contributed more effectively to the easy reduction of Rajdher and

1818.

Trimbak than the science and courage of the assailants; but these qualities were soon to be called into exercise, independently of any facility from the disaffection or indifference of the native garrison.

The employment of Arab soldiers by the princes of the Peninsula and of Central India has been frequently noticed, as has the character of those mercenaries for determined and desperate valour. Of the Arab troops set at liberty by the capitulation of Nagpur, a considerable portion had taken service with the Mahratta officers in Kandesh, and others had similarly enlisted, who had been cast loose by the dispersion of the infantry of the Peshwa. Although caring little for the cause of the fugitive prince, they were not disposed to forego their military habits, and retire to inactive tranquillity in their native deserts, and it became necessary to impose this alternative by their forcible expulsion. They had taken their chief stand at the fortress of Maligam, and notwithstanding the advanced period of the year, Lieutenant-Colonel Macdowall was instructed to lead his detachment against the place. He accordingly retraced his steps to the north, and returned to Chandore on the 10th of May. After a halt of three days, the force marched northward, and arrived on the 15th before Maligam, a fort of formidable strength garrisoned by seven hundred Arabs. The detachment was much weakened by the fatigues it had undergone, and the losses it had suffered, as well as by the guards left in most of the captured forts, so that it scarcely mustered nine hundred and fifty firelocks, besides two hundred and seventy pioneers, and a small detail of European artillery.

1818.

The fortress of Maligam stood on the left bank of the river Musan, shortly above its junction with the Girni, a feeder of the Tapti; it was situated in a circular bend of the river, which protected its western and part of its northern and southern faces. The body of the work was a square, enclosed by a high wall of masonry, with towers at the angles: a second quadrangular wall of considerable elevation, at some distance from the first, surrounded the latter, and in the space between the walls ran a deep and wide dry ditch: an exterior enclosure at a still greater interval, of an irregular quadrangular form, surrounded the whole. The gates were nine in number, very intricate, and all containing excellent bomb-proofs. Part of the defences were of clay, but the greater portion was of substantial masonry: the Petta was opposite to the eastern face, and was capable of being defended, as it contained many strong and lofty buildings, and was surrounded by a rampart, which, however, was somewhat decayed.

After reconnoitering the place from the right bank of the river, it was determined to attack it from the south-west, and operations were accordingly commenced on the 18th, after dark, in rear of a mango grove, which stood at this point near the bank of the river. The besiegers were not allowed to proceed without interruption, a sortie being made by the garrison, supported by a sharp fire from the fort. The river being fordable, the Arabs crossed and attacked the covering party in the grove, consisting of a detachment of the Madras European regiment, with great intrepidity: they were repulsed after a short but sanguinary conflict, in which Lieu-

1818.

tenant Davies, the commanding engineer, was unfortunately killed. The spirit thus evinced by the garrison was displayed in several similar attempts, but the works proceeded, batteries were erected, and by the 28th of May, what was thought to be a practicable breach had been made in the body of the work. Considerable reinforcements,[1] had been received, and it was resolved to attempt a storm.

Accordingly, on the morning of the 29th, three columns advanced against the place. The column directed against the breach, consisting of one hundred Europeans and eight hundred Sipahis, was commanded by Major Greenhill, and conducted by the engineer in command, Lieutenant Nattes; of the other two columns, one under Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart was directed to carry the Petta, and the other, under Major Macbean, to attempt the escalade of the outer wall of the fort near the river gate. The Petta was taken, but the escalade was abandoned in consequence of the failure of the attack upon the breach. Lieutenant Nattes led the way, but was shot when he had gained the summit; the commanding officer was wounded, and the second in command killed, the troops arrived at the head of the breach, and remained there with great steadiness exposed to a destructive fire. Finding that no progress was likely to be made, and having reason to suppose that there were obstacles to be overcome, for which preparations had not been de-

[1] They were two companies of the 2nd battalion 14th, the same of the 2nd battalion 13th, and the 2nd battalion of the 17th N. I., a battalion of the Russell brigade, and a body of irregular horse.

vised, Colonel Macdowall recalled the storming party to the lines.[1]

1818.

The failure of the attack on the west face of the fort, and the cover afforded by the Petta, induced a change of plan, and it was determined to assail the fort from the north and east. The main body of the force accordingly crossed the river, and batteries were constructed on the side of the town nearest the fort, and efforts were made to carry mines under the towers of the eastern wall. These arrangements occupied the troops till the 10th of June, when they were reinforced by a battalion of N.I., and a battering train from Seroor. The mortars were placed in position on the same night, and on the following morning occasioned an explosion of two of the enemy's magazines, by which a considerable extent of the inner wall was thrown down, and the interior of the fort laid open. Advantage was taken immediately of the accident, and batteries were erected to take off the defences of the inner breach, and open one in the outer line; the result of these preparations was anticipated, by the proposal of the garrison to capitulate, and on the 13th of June they marched out and grounded arms in front of the line; the side arms were restored to them, and their arrears of pay discharged, after which they were marched to the sea-coast, and sent back to Arabia, with the exception of those who had been

[1] Colonel Blacker states, that when the column was under partial cover the scaling ladders were dropped from the top of the wall, and disappeared, which unfavourable circumstance being reported to Colonel MacDowall, he directed the attempt to be abandoned, 327. Lieutenant Lake doubts the insufficiency of the ladders, and attributes the failure to the hesitation of the troops, occasioned by the casualties which deprived them of their leaders, 141.

1818.

long settled with their families in the south of India. Those that surrendered were three hundred and fifty in number, part having effected their escape. The loss sustained by the besiegers, amounted to two hundred and nine killed and wounded, including twelve officers.[1] After the surrender of Maligam the division was broken up, and the troops composing it returned to their several quarters for the monsoon.

When the annihilation of the Pindaris, the desperate condition of the Peshwa, and the seeming contrition of Apa Saheb, gave reason to hope that military operations were on the eve of discontinuance they were renewed in the upper part of the valley of the Nerbudda with increased activity, and for a protracted period. Their renewal originated in the perfidy and ultimate hostility of the Raja of Nagpur.

The restoration of Apa Saheb to a portion of his dominions, after having justly forfeited the whole by his unprovoked attack upon the Residency, might be supposed to have taught him, if not a lesson of gratitude, the danger of involving himself in hostilities with an enemy against whose overpowering strength he had found himself so wholly unable to contend. Yet, whether he fancied that as long as Baji Rao was at large there were hopes of success, or, whether he was impelled, as he affirmed, by an irresistible sentiment of duty towards the head of the Mahratta confederacy, he had

[1] The officers killed were Lieutenant Davis and Ensign Natter, sappers and miners; Lieutenant Kennedy, 17th N. I., and Lieutenants Eagan and Wilkinson, 13th N. I.

scarcely been replaced upon the throne of Nagpur, when he began to plot against the power to whose forbearance he was indebted for the recovery of any part of his territories, and for the rank and title of a prince. The intercourse with Baji Rao was renewed, and urgent messages were dispatched to induce him to march towards Nagpur. The orders, which upon the recent occasion had been issued to the Commandants of his forts, to shut their gates against the English, were either left unrecalled, or secret orders to the same effect were now circulated, notwithstanding the places were those which the Raja had bound himself to surrender. The British troops were, therefore, compelled to possess themselves by force of the fortresses which had been ostensibly ceded to them by treaty. 1818.

The left wing of the grand army had been left in the field for the purpose of occupying the districts in the upper valley of the Nerbudda, relinquished by the Raja of Nagpur, and, with this view, was strengthened by the division from the centre, under General Watson. The force was concentrated on the 5th of March in Bundelkhand, and its first operations were called for in that province.[1] Although not immediately connected with the affairs of Berar, it will be convenient here to notice the transactions in this quarter.

The treaty of Poona had transferred the rights which the Peshwa still claimed in Bundelkhand, to

[1] It then consisted of the 7th N. C., the 2nd battalions 1st, 2nd 13th, 1st 14th, 1st 26th, and 2nd 28th regiment of N. I., three thousand horse of Sindhia's contingent, four hundred of Baddeley's irregular horse, with a train of heavy artillery.

BOOK II. CHAP. VIII. 1818.

the British Government. These were chiefly feudatory services, and tribute from the petty principalities of Jalaun, Jhansi and Ságar. Treaties were accordingly concluded with Nana Govind Rao, of Jalaun, and with the manager of Jhansi, on the part of Ram Chand, the Subahdar, a minor, by which they were both recognized as hereditary chiefs of these states. The succession was guaranteed to their heirs for ever, and they were taken under British protection. They were bound to serve in time of war with all their forces with the British armies; and to render all such assistance compatible with their means as might be required. No tribute was demanded from Jhansi, the former ruler having always been a friend of the British. The tribute of Jalaun, was remitted in consideration of some districts ceded by the Nana.[1] The arrangement with Ságar was less easily adjusted. The Government was nominally exercised by the widow of the last Raja, but was managed on her behalf by Vinayak Rao. The right of the Bai was disputed by Nana Govind Rao, of Jalaun, who was the nephew of the former Raja, and the successor to the principality. According to the terms of the grant made by the Peshwa, the Nana was bound to pay an annual tribute of three lakhs of rupees, and to maintain a body of three thousand horse. In the new engagement to be proposed to Vinayak Rao, it was determined to remit all arrears of tribute, and to reduce it to one lakh, or less, upon

[1] Treaty with the Subahdar of Jhansi, 17th November, 1817.—Collection of Treaties, Papers, Lord Hastings' administration. A treaty of a similar purport was at the same time entered into with Govind Rao, of Jalaun.

1818.

the cession being made of a fort or tract of land. The contingent was also limited to six hundred horse. As soon as preparations for the campaign were in a state of forwardness, Vinayak Rao was required to accede to these conditions, and to supply his quota of troops; but no answer was returned to the demand, and it was discovered that he had opened secret communications with the Pindaris, and had suffered troops to be levied within his districts for the service of the Peshwa and Raja of Nagpur. His contumacy and disloyalty were deemed sufficient grounds for dispossessing him of the power he held, and annexing Ságar to the British possessions; making an adequate provision from its surplus revenue for the maintenance of Vinayak Rao and the Bai, and transferring the balance to Govind Rao for his life in commutation of his claims.[1] General Marshall was instructed to carry these measures into effect. No resistance was attempted. Vinayak Rao was sensible of the futility of opposition, and submitted without further hesitation to the terms imposed.

The political management of Ságar, having been assumed by Mr. Wauchope, the commissioner in Bundelkhand, General Marshall, sent detachments to receive the submission of the dependant fortresses. The whole were surrendered peaceably, and the division marched to Dhamauni, a fortress belonging to Nagpur, included in the cessions which the Raja had agreed to make. The orders given to the Kiladar were of a different tenor, and it was not until batteries were opened that the fort was given

[1] Papers, Mahratta War, p. 413.

1818.

up. General Marshall thence crossed the Nerbudda into Gondwana, where the same spirit of resistance had been excited by the instructions of the Raja; and the Commandants of the principal fortresses, and the rude tribes of the forests and mountains, the Gonds, who professed allegiance to Nagpur, had been encouraged to violate the conditions to which Apa Saheb had acceded. It was, therefore, necessary to enforce submission, and the force marched against Mandala, the capital of the district, situated on one of the branches of the Nerbudda, not far from its source, where it is joined by a small feeder, the Banjira. The mountainous irregularity of the country rendered the march of the division, and the transport of the ordnance for the siege, extremely laborious; but the difficulty was overcome, and on the 18th of April the town was invested. As the Kiladar refused to comply with the summons to surrender, batteries were constructed against the wall of the Petta, and on the 25th they opened with such effect as to lay it sufficiently in ruins for an assault. Accordingly, on the 26th, a storming party, under Captain Dewar, supported by a column under Colonel Price, both commanded by General Watson, ascended the breach, and advancing into the town, drove out the troops which had been stationed for its defence. They retired upon the fort, which was separated from the town by a deep ditch, filled from the river; the gates were closed upon them, and the greater number fell under the fire of the assailants; a portion endeavouring to escape, were cut up by the cavalry. This success intimi-

dated the garrison, and on the following morning they voluntarily evacuated the fort without arms.[1] The Kiladar had attempted, during the night, to cross the river in a boat, but was taken prisoner as soon as he landed. He pretended that he had come to offer an unconditional surrender of the fortress, but his contumacy in defending it, contrary to the terms of the public treaty by which it had been relinquished, and a treacherous attempt made by him in the beginning of March, to cut off, by a vastly superior force, a small party under Major O'Brien, who had proceeded to Mundala to settle the arrears of pay due to the garrison, and recover possession of the fort, agreeably to the instructions of the Resident of Nagpur, were thought to deserve the punishment of treason. The Kiladar was, therefore, tried by a drum-head court-martial of native officers, for rebellion against the Raja of Nagpur, and treachery against Major O'Brien.[2] He was, however, acquitted of both charges, Major O'Brien declaring his belief that the Kiladar was not concerned in the attack upon him, and the court expressing their conviction that he had acted agreeably to the secret commands of the Nagpur Government, and under the restraint and coercion of chiefs sent by the Raja to control the Kiladar, and enforce obedience to his secret instructions.[3]

1818.

After the capture of Mandala, General Marshall was called to the command of the cantonment of Cawnpur, and left that of the division in Gondwana, to Brigadier-General Watson, whose duty it

[1] General Marshall's Dispatch, Papers, Mahratta War, p. 207.
[2] Prinsep, ii. 208. [3] Papers, 329.

1818.

became to reduce to subjection the Gond chiefs inhabiting the mountains that form the southern barrier of the eastern valley of the Nerbudda. A small force under Lieutenant-Colonel Mac Morine, the head-quarters of which had been at Jabalpur, had hitherto performed this office, as far as its strength permitted, and had latterly been engaged in checking the predatory excursions of the garrison of Chouragerh, the Commandant of which had hitherto refused to give it up to the British authorities. The feebleness of the detachment prevented it from undertaking more comprehensive operations, and the reduction of the country awaited the approach of a more powerful force. The division under General Watson marched, accordingly, on the 1st of May, from Mandala, and, after passing by Jabalpur, arrived on the 13th within one day's march of Chouragerh. The necessity of a further forward movement had ceased, the garrison of Chouragerh had abandoned it on hearing of his approach, and it was immediately taken possession of by Colonel Mac Morine. The successful surprise of a remnant of the Pindaris on the confines of Bhopal, and the reduction of some small fortresses in the neighbourhood of Bairsia, completed the service of Brigadier-General Watson in this quarter.

The plea upon which the Kiladars of Mandala and Chouragerh justified their refusal to surrender their forts, necessarily suggested doubts of the Raja's sincerity, and the truth of the plea was established by the discovery of letters from his minister, authorising the proceedings of the subordinate functionaries. The discontent of Apa Saheb had been

manifested soon after his restoration, and he professed a wish to resign the whole of his revenues into the hands of the Resident, contenting himself with a pension for his personal support. His complaints were not limited to this representation, but were repeated in an intercepted letter to Baji Rao, in which he pressed the Peshwa to come speedily to his succour. Other proofs of hostile purposes rapidly accumulated. The agents of the Mahratta princes were still in Nagpur, and admitted to private conferences with such of the ministers as enjoyed the confidence of the Raja; particularly Nago Punth and Ramchandra Wagh, who were notoriously opposed to the British connexion. Those who were friendly to it were sedulously excluded from the prince's councils. The family of the Raja, and the principal part of his treasures, were deposited at Chanda, a fortified town, one hundred miles south-west from Nagpur, and thither it was that Apa Saheb purposed to retire. He was there to be joined by Ganpat Rao, who after the battle of Nagpur had gone over to the Peshwa with a body of Arab foot, and the Berar horse, and it was known that he was marching towards Nagpur, followed by the Peshwa in the beginning of March. The time called for decision, and to prevent the dangers arising from his intrigues, it became necessary to put the Raja under restraint and deprive him of the power of doing mischief. After placing guards round the city so as to prevent Apa Saheb from quitting it, he was required to repair to the Residency, and remain under the Resident's supervision. As he delayed compliance with the requisition, a party of Sipahis under Lieut. Gordon,

1818.

1818. assistant to the Resident, was sent to compel his attendance. This was done without any occasion for violence, and Apa Saheb was a prisoner. Nago Punth, and Ramchandra Wagh were apprehended at the same time. The arrest of Apa Saheb and his advisers was followed by multiplied testimony of their hostile intentions, and by irrefragable proofs of their communication with the enemies of the British Government. It was now also ascertained beyond contradiction, that the death of the late imbecile Raja Parswaji, was the act of Apa Saheb's partisans, and was committed with his privity and approbation. An attempt to poison the unhappy prince having failed, he was strangled in his bed. For this, however, Apa Saheb was not brought to account. His treacherous attack upon the Resident, of which he confessed himself to have been the author, in opposition to the advice of his ministers, and the revival of his inimical designs, were considered sufficient grounds for his being visited with condign punishment. The Governor-General, therefore, determined that Apa Saheb should be deposed, and that the next of kin also named Baji Rao, the son of Raghuji Bhosla's daughter, a boy between eight and nine years of age, should be raised to the Raj. The regency was to be vested in the mother of the young prince, but the administration of affairs was to be exercised by the British Resident, until the Raja should be old enough to assume the Government of the country.

The secret negotiations carried on by the Peshwa with the Raja of Nagpur, proved eventually as fatal to him as to the Raja, as they diverted him from

his purpose of making directly for Hindustan, which he might possibly then have reached, and led him to the easterly route which ended in his being hemmed in between the divisions of Generals Adams and Doveton, and the dispersion of his troops by the former at Seoni. The van of the Mahratta army, in pursuance of the plan of forming a junction with the troops of Apa Saheb, had advanced to within fifteen miles of Chanda, where they were anticipated by a detachment under Lieut.-Colonel Scott, consisting of the 6th Bengal Native cavalry, and one squadron of the 8th; a reserve of auxiliary horse, 1st battalion of 1st Madras Native cavalry, and the 6th company of the 2nd, which had been sent to intercept their march. At the same time, the division of Colonel Adams had marched to the south, and its approach caused the Peshwa's retreat. He lost time and opportunity by this demonstration on Chanda, and the attempt to combine with the Raja of Nagpur involved him in the same ruin. 1818.

After the retreat of Baji Rao to the westward, Colonel Adams advanced against Chanda, and arrived before it on the 9th of May, with an effective and well equipped force. The town of Chanda, about six miles in circumference, was surrounded by a stone wall, from fifteen to twenty feet high, flanked by towers, and defended by two watercourses, running along its eastern and western faces, and meeting nearly half a mile from its southern extremity. In the centre of the town was the citadel; the garrison of which was between two and three thousand men, of whom part were Arabs. They

BOOK II. CHAP. VIII. 1818.

had fired upon Colonel Scott's detachment, when recently before the walls. The division took up its ground on the south of the town, and batteries were erected opposite to the south-east angle, which, by the 19th, had brought down a sufficient portion of the defences to admit of an assault being attempted. On the 20th, accordingly, a storming party under the command of Lieut. Col. Scott, marched to the breach in two columns, and, although received with a warm fire from the garrison, forced their entrance into the town. An occasional stand was made by parties of the garrison on the ramparts and in the streets, but all opposition was overborne, and the town being in the possession of the British, and the Commandant being killed,[1] the citadel was abandoned. Most of the garrison escaped into the thickets which approached on the north side close to the walls, and gave cover to the fugitives. The loss attending the capture of Chanda was inconsiderable, and booty of some value rewarded the resolution of the assailants. This operation terminated the campaign. Part of the force was stationed at Nagpur, but the head-quarters returned to Hoseínabad, where the force was attacked by cholera, and lost more men by that fatal malady than by the whole of the previous operations. Notwithstanding the state of the troops and the unfavourableness of the rainy season, detachments were obliged to be kept occasionally in the field in consequence of the escape of Apa Saheb and the

[1] According to Prinsep, he was wounded at the breach, and apprehensive of being put to death, if taken, poisoned himself; he had no claim to mercy, as he had ordered the bearer of the summons to surrender sent by Colonel Adams, to be blown from a gun.—2, 258.

effects of his presence in the mountains and thickets of Gondwara.

1818.

As soon as all apprehension of the Peshwa's advance upon Nagpur had been dissipated by the movements of the subsidiary force, the Resident, in obedience to the orders of the Governor-General, sent off Apa Saheb, whom it was thought expedient to place in security in the fort of Allahabad towards Hindustan. The Raja marched from Nagpur on the 3rd of May, under the guard of one wing of the 22nd Bengal N. I. and three troops of the 8th N. C., commanded by Captain Browne. On the 12th the party halted at Raichur, a small town, one march on this side of Jabalpur. On the following morning the Raja had disappeared. During the night he had been secretly furnished with the dress and accoutrements of a Sipahi, and when the sentinels were changed, had marched off with the relieving party. A pillow took his place on his couch, and when the native officer, whose duty it was to inspect the tent, looked into it, he saw what he supposed to be the Raja quietly reposing, and two servants kneeling by the bedside, engaged in the office of rubbing his limbs. Some of the Sipahis had been induced to contrive the Raja's escape, and became the partners of his flight. Sufficient time had elapsed between his evasion and its discovery, to enable him to reach the thickets of the adjacent hills; and although, as soon as his flight was known, an active pursuit in all directions was set on foot, the prisoner was not retaken—he had fled to Haray, a place about forty miles to the south-west, on the skirts of the

BOOK II. CHAP. VIII. 1818.

Mahadeo hills, and in these recesses, and under the protection of Chain Sah, a Gond chieftain, was, for the present at least, safe from recapture. The fidelity of his protectors was proof against all temptation, and the large rewards offered for the recapture of the Raja failed to seduce from their allegiance the half-savage mountaineers.[1]

While the Raja of Nagpur thus effected his escape from captivity, the chief in whose cause he had perilled his freedom and lost his dominions, was hastening to throw himself into more durable toils.

After his surprise and rout at Seoni, the Peshwa fled to the north-west with the design, it was suspected, of seeking a refuge in the strong fortress of Asir, which was held by Jeswant Rao Lar. He was closely followed. The Hyderabad division, after resting but a few days at Jalna, again took the field on the 14th of May, and on the 25th halted a short distance beyond Burhanpur, within fourteen miles of the Peshwa's camp. An immediate attack was arrested by intelligence that negotiations were in progress with Sir John Malcolm for Baji Rao's surrender. Prevented from crossing the Nerbudda by the military arrangements in his front, and alarmed by the rapid advance of Colonel Doveton; wearied of a life of flight and terror, and deprived of his chief adherents by death or desertion, Baji Rao became sensible of the fruitlessness of prolonging the contest, and resigned himself to the humiliation from which he could not hope to escape.

[1] The reward was a Lakh of Rupees (£10,000), and a Jagir of 10,000 Rupees (£1,000) a year for life. The pecuniary reward was afterwards doubled.

He addressed himself accordingly to Sir John Malcolm, as to an old friend, and besought his intercession with the Governor-General for favourable terms, inviting him to his camp that they might discuss the conditions in person. Nor was he actuated solely by his own convictions. The few chiefs of rank who still adhered to him, conveyed to Sir John Malcolm their assurances that they would follow Baji Rao no longer if he refused to negotiate. Sir John Malcolm declined the invitation, but consented to send some of his officers to communicate his sentiments to the Peshwa himself, at the same time apprising the Peshwa's Vakils that the sentence of deposal was irrevocable, and that no negotiation would be admitted which had for its basis any proposal of Baji Rao's restoration; that the Peshwa must give up the persons of Trimbak, and of the murderers of Captain Vaughan and his brother, if he had the power so to do, and that he must evince his sincerity by coming forward without any force, and meeting Sir John Malcolm on the Nerbudda. The Vakils were sent back to Baji Rao with this message. Sir J. Malcolm moved from Mow to Mandaleswar, where he arrived on the 22nd of May, and thence dispatched Lieutenant Low to the Peshwa at his earnest solicitation. Notwithstanding the fears under which Baji Rao laboured, Lieutenant Low found him very reluctant to relinquish his title or his capital although consenting to a reduction of his territories, and very apprehensive of the consequences of the proposed interview with Sir John Malcolm. The terms of the meeting were after much discussion agreed upon, and it took

BOOK II. CHAP. VIII.

1818.

place on the 1st of June, at Khori, a village at the foot of the mountain pass, above which stood the Peshwa's camp. Baji Rao, clinging to the shadow of power, attempted to give the interview the character of a public audience, and received Sir John Malcolm, and his staff with the customary formalities, after which, withdrawing to a private tent, he exerted all his eloquence to procure from Sir John Malcolm some assurance of a reversal of the decree which had been issued against him. He declared that he had never intended to engage in warfare with the British Government, and that he had been the victim of the intemperance and rashness of those about him, most of whom had deserted him in his extremity, and his only reliance was in Sir John's friendship, and the generosity of the Governor-General. The hopelessness of a compliance with his desires was distinctly stated, and the interview terminated without his coming to any decision. As no delay could be allowed, an engagement was submitted in the evening to Baji Rao for his signature, with an intimation, that if not acceded to within twenty-four hours, hostilities would re-commence. The conditions stipulated that Baji Rao should resign for himself and his successors, all claim to sovereignty; that he should repair with his family, and a limited number of his adherents and attendants, to the camp of Brigadier-General Malcolm, whence he should be escorted to Benares, or any sacred place in Hindustan which the Governor-General, at his request, might appoint for his future residence. In the event of his prompt submission, he was promised a liberal pension, not less than eight lakhs

of rupees per annum: that his requests in favour of such of his followers as had been ruined by their devotion to his cause, should meet with liberal attention, and that the same should be paid to his representations in favour of Brahmans and religious establishments supported by his family. These terms were received with varying sentiments by the Peshwa's advisers, and the whole of the following day was passed in communications from the Peshwa and his principal adherents, some of whom became more anxious for their own interests, than those of their chief.[1] There were honourable exceptions to this selfishness, and the Vinchoor Jagirdar, the Purandhar chief, and the manager of the interests of the family of Gokla, deserve honourable mention for their regard for the fallen fortunes of the Peshwa, and their resolution to abstain from all disrespectful importunity, although convinced of the hopelessness of the contest, and willing to employ every means of persuasion and remonstrance in order to prevail upon him to submit.[2] The counsels of those who advocated submission at last prevailed, and after some further vacillation, and attempts to procrastinate his surrender, Baji Rao, with a force more numerous than that of Sir J. Malcolm, removed to

1818.

[1] Amongst the applicants were Trimbak, Ram Din, and the Pindari, Cheetoo. Unconditional surrender was insisted upon for the first and last. Ram Din was desired to dismiss his followers, and return quietly to Hindustan.—Papers, Mahratta war, 356. To the Mahratta chiefs was extended the indulgence granted to those who had left the Peshwa, after the defeat at Ashti, Jagirs for their personal support, not for the maintenance of a military contingent.

[2] The Vakil of the Vinchoor chief said that his master's family had served that of the Peshwa for five generations, and had always spoken boldly to him and his ancestors; "but now that fate is upon him, we must be silent, unmerited reproaches ever have remained, and must remain unanswered."—Malcolm's Political History of India, 2, ccix.

BOOK II. CHAP. VIII. 1818.

the vicinity of the British encampment, and on the 4th of June accompanied the division on its first march towards the Nerbudda. Trimbak, who had been in the Peshwa's camp, with a strong body of horse and Arab infantry, had previously moved off towards Asir; and Cheetoo, with his followers, took the same route. Ram Din, and other leaders, dispersed in different directions. On the 9th, Sir John Malcolm having crossed the Nerbudda, was obliged to halt to suppress a mutiny of the Arab infantry of the Peshwa, in which his person was in danger. The mutineers, intimidated by the arrangements made for an attack upon them by the British force, consented to an equitable adjustment of their demands, and marched off, as enjoined, for Kandesh. Henceforth, Baji Rao, attended by about twelve hundred horse and foot, accompanied the British camp, declaring that now only he felt his life secure.[1]

When the conditions which had been tendered to Baji Rao were submitted to the Governor-General, they were not such as met with his unqualified approbation. Lord Hastings entertained a conviction that Baji Rao was at this time conscious of the helpless state to which he was reduced, and that he had resolved to come in under any terms, although he sought to obtain favourable conditions by keeping up the show of negotiation. His being suffered to negotiate at all was an indulgence to which he was not entitled; and the dispatch of British officers to his camp evinced an anxiety for peace and a deference to the Peshwa, which were incompatible with the

[1] Narrative of Baji Rao's surrender.—Malcolm's Political History of India.—Appendix.

relative position of the parties, and might be liable to be misconstrued by the natives and princes of India, as well as tend to foster erroneous notions in the mind of Baji Rao himself. The Governor-General also objected to the amount of the stipend, and the stipulation in favour of the Peshwa's adherents; both of which should have been left entirely open for the determination of the Government. On the other hand, Sir John Malcolm urged the probability of a still longer protracted contest and the importance of its prevention. The Peshwa might have found means of retreating into the thickets of Kandesh, or of crossing the Nerbudda into Malwa, or he could with ease have thrown himself into Asirgerh, the Commandant of which had given shelter to his family and his treasures, and had offered an asylum to Baji Rao.[1] Had either event occurred, hostilities must have been delayed for several months, as the approaching monsoon would have rendered it impossible for the troops to move, and, during this interval, the hopes of Baji Rao and his partisans would have been kept alive; and agitation would have been at work in every part of the Mahratta States, from the frontiers of Mysore to the northern extremity of Malwa. The expense of another campaign and of the prepara-

1818.

[1] Political History, 522. In his previous correspondence, Sir J. Malcolm expresses an opinion that the Kiladar would not commit himself and his prince, by openly sheltering an enemy of the British Government.—Papers, 349. Doveton asserts, that Sindhia had given orders to receive the Peshwa into the fort.—Political History, 524. See Papers, 46. A letter was subsequently found in Asirgerh, in Sindhia's own handwriting, commanding Jeswant Rao Lar to obey whatever orders the Peshwa should give him. It was of a somewhat earlier date, or December 1817; but the instructions had never been countermanded, and Jeswant Rao was fully disposed to obey them.—MS. Rec.

1818.

tions which it would be necessary to set on foot, were saved by a prompt arrangement, and the stipend granted to the Peshwa was not more than was consistent with the honour and dignity of the British nation, whose proceedings had, on all similar occasions, been marked by the utmost liberality. With reference also to the personal character of Baji Rao, it was to be expected that the more easy his condition was rendered, as long as his income was not calculated to furnish him with the means of carrying on dangerous intrigues, the more contented he would be, and the less inclined to incur any hazard for the sake of change. This last consideration seems to have been justified by the result, as the ex-Peshwa appears to have been reconciled to his altered position by the pleasures he has been able to purchase, and has never instigated any serious attempts to recover his power. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the annihilation of the Peshwa, as the head of the Mahratta federation, was rendered less impressive upon the native mind by the liberality of the British Government: however munificent the allowance, the representative of a chief who had once given laws to Hindustan, had descended to the level of a dependent upon the bounty of his victorious enemies. Although not approving of the stipulations, Lord Hastings immediately ratified them, and did full justice to the motives of Sir John Malcolm. He also admitted, four years afterwards, when addressing the Secret Committee, that none of the evil consequences which he had anticipated, had resulted from the arrangement.[1] The Court of Directors also formally

[1] October 1822.—Papers 457.

pronounced their opinion, that the important advantages which resulted from Baji Rao's surrender, justified the terms by which it had been secured.[1] 1818.

Baji Rao, after accompanying General Malcolm to Mahidpur, was transferred to the charge of Lieutenant Low, by whom he was escorted to Hindustan. A residence was assigned him at Bithur, about ten miles from Cawnpore, on the Ganges, recommended to the Government of Bengal by its proximity to that military cantonment, and to the Mahrattas[2] by its reputed sanctity; a European officer, was stationed at Bithur as Commissioner, having the general charge of Baji Rao and those who remained with him, and being the medium of his communications with the Government.[3] Trimbak, after the failure of his attempt to obtain any conditions, retreated to Nasik, and remained concealed there for some time; but information of his lurking-place having been received, a party of horse, under Captain Swanston, succeeded in discovering and apprehending him; he was conveyed to the fort of Thanna, whence he had formerly escaped, but was afterwards sent round to Bengal, and kept in confinement in the fort of Chunar, where he died. The commander of the party by whom the Vaughans were murdered, was long harboured by Chintaman Rao, one of the southern Jagirdars, but upon a force being sent against that chief, he was given up. As he plead-

[1] Political History, I, 533.

[2] It is fabled to have been the scene of a performance of an Aswannedha by Brahmá.

[3] In 1832, the land adjacent to the town of Bithur was converted into a Jagir, and granted to Baji Rao exempt from the operation of the Regulations of the Government; the civil and criminal jurisdiction being intrusted to the ex-Peshwa, subject to such restrictions as might at any time appear advisable. Bengal Regulations, i. 1832.

1818.

ed, however, the orders of his superiors, his life was spared, but he was imprisoned for the rest of his days in one of the hill forts. Sure retribution thus overtook the perpetrators of acts of treachery and cruelty, as contrary to the dictates of humanity, as to the laws of international intercourse, and bringing deserved disgrace and defeat even upon the justifiable vindication of national independence.

The extinction of the name and power of the Peshwa, and the dissolution of the bonds by which the Mahratta chiefs were held together, was one of the greatest political revolutions that modern India had witnessed. Little more than half a century had elapsed since Sadasheo Bhao led two hundred thousand combatants to the battle of Panipat, and although the result of the combat was disastrous, the speedy retreat of the Afghans and the decline of their power allowed the vanquished to recruit their strength, and renew their ambitious designs with improved resources and enhanced success. A Mahratta prince ruled Hindustan as the nominal representative and real master of the Mogul. Again yielding to the ascendency of the stranger, the supremacy of the Mahrattas was destroyed, but they retained strength sufficient to be formidable, and needed only consolidation and guidance to dispute with the victors the mastery over Hindustan. The blow now inflicted was irretrievable. The diminished and scattered fragments of the Mahratta confederacy were reduced to a state of weakness which could acquire no vigour from re-union; and as the main link which had held it together was struck out of the chain, it was disunited for ever.

Although the escape of Apa Saheb occasioned the prolongation of military operations after the surrender of the Peshwa, yet, as all the principal objects of the campaign had been accomplished, and the armies of the British Government had, for the most part, been finally withdrawn, the war might be now considered at an end. In taking a brief retrospect of the transactions by which it had been signalised, it is impossible to withhold from them the merits of comprehensiveness of plan, skill of combination, and vigour and precision of execution, although it is equally impossible to deny that the tortuous policy and insane temerity of the Mahratta princes surpassed all reasonable anticipation. The web was woven with masterly art, but that the victims should rush so precipitately into its meshes, appeared to be the work of an overruling destiny, rather than the result of human infatuation, against which it could have been necessary to provide.

The equipment of a force so much more than adequate to its avowed object,—the extinction of the predatory system, upheld, publicly at least, by a scanty horde of undisciplined and ill-organized banditti, was fully justified by the knowledge which the Governor-General possessed of the disposition of the Mahratta princes to countenance that system, and to perpetuate a state of things which, in their belief, contributed to their strength and ministered to their necessities; replenishing their coffers with a portion of the spoil, and recruiting their armies in time of war, with willing and hardy partisans. That they would lend secret aid to the Pindaris was therefore certain; that they would make common

1818.

cause with them was not impossible, and it was wisely done, therefore, to show them the danger of such policy by a display of the vast and irresistible might of the British Government. The armies that took the field, and the commanding positions which they assumed, were well calculated to intimidate the most daring of the native chiefs, and to impress upon their minds the hazard of secret support, the hopelessness of open resistance.

But beside the bias in favour of the Pindaris, arising from an imagined identity of interests, the Mahrątta princes, as the British Government was correctly apprised, were animated by a spirit of intense hostility, engendered by their past discomfiture and recent humiliations, against the effects of which it was equally necessary to guard. Although it may be reasonably doubted if any definite combination against the British power had been concerted, yet it is certain that Baji Rao, who had been the greatest sufferer by the British connexion, had been labouring for some years to infuse into the minds of other chiefs, the indignant feelings which rankled in his own, and to engage them in a scheme for the regeneration of the Mahratta power, and the restoration of the Peshwa to the rank and consideration enjoyed by his predecessors. That his intrigues had not altogether failed of effect was ascertained, and although no perceptible indications announced the general adoption of his projects, yet it was prudent to leave no temptation to their adoption by a mutilated display of the strength with which they would be encountered. By the extent and disposition of the grand army, Sindhia, the most formidable of the

chiefs, was at once paralysed, and the army of the Dekhin was well suited to curb the discontent of the Peshwa and the Raja of Nagpur, had they not with inconceivable desperation, defied consequences and rushed upon their fate. 1818.

It is not easy to comprehend the motives which urged the Peshwa into a deadly rupture with his allies, at a moment when his dominions were occupied, and his communications intercepted by armies to which he had nothing to oppose. He no doubt over-rated both the disposition and the ability of Sindhia to assist him, and he probably exaggerated the embarrassments and difficulties of the attack upon the Pindaris. He was not ignorant, however, of the resources of the British, or of the comparative insignificance of his own, nor was he destitute of judgment or sagacity. It is not, however, inconsistent with the native character, to throw away in a fit of extreme irritation the fruits of a long course of caution and craftiness, and to dare inevitable destruction. Without question, however, he relied upon a larger measure of forbearance than he experienced, and looking back to the excessive lenity which had been displayed to Sindhia and Holkar at the close of the last war, expected no heavier retribution than an augmented subsidy and territorial sequestration.

The conduct of Apa Saheb was, if possible, still more insane than that of Baji Rao. Inconvenient as he might feel the engagements which he had contracted, yet it was to them that he owed even what he possessed. His power was the work of his allies, and if the price he paid for it was heavy, he

BOOK II. CHAP. VIII. 1818.

had yet no reason to believe that it was incapable of alleviation. His only plea in vindication of his conduct, was his allegiance to the Peshwa, a plea scarcely compatible with his position, as the Bhonsla Rajas had never regarded themselves as vassals of the Peshwa, and had not unfrequently been their opponents. The plea was a mere excuse for the indulgence of a rash and restless nature. His treachery could not have been an element in the estimate of probable foes, but the arrangements that had been made were adequate to the unexpected contingency. The hostility of Holkar was an occurrence upon which anticipation was less at fault. The inefficiency of the Government of the State was matter of universal notoriety, and the predominating influence of the military leaders was likely to compel it to warfare. Their interests were involved; they were a part of the predatory system.

Whatever, therefore, might have been thought of the disproportion between the magnitude of the original preparations, and the objects for which they were originally designed, events vindicated in a remarkable manner the wisdom and foresight with which the Marquess of Hastings had adopted so extensive a scale. Contingencies which were unforeseen, as well as those which had been anticipated, were fully provided for, and not only had the predatory hordes been extirpated, but the princes who came forward in their support had shared their downfall. Every object that could have been proposed had been triumphantly achieved, and a single campaign had totally changed the political aspect of

Hindustan. The extent of the transformation will be best understood when we shall have completed the narrative of military operations.

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CHAPTER IX.

Barbarian races of the ranges of hills along the Nerbudda.—Gonds, Bhils, &c.—Measures against the depredations of the latter in Kandesh and Malwa. —Operations against the Gonds, and other adherents of Apa Saheb.—His refuge in the Mahadeo Hills.—Irregular bands in his service.—Desultory hostilities.—Defeat of a British detachment.—Death of Captain Sparkes.—Extension of the insurrection.—Checked.—Many parties cut up.—Troops penetrate into the hills.—Gond villages destroyed.—Concerted plan of operations.—The Mahadeo Hills ascended.—Apa Saheb leaves the hills, accompanied by Cheetoo.—Flies to Asir.—Not allowed to remain.—Assumes the disguise of an Ascetic.—Makes his way to Mundi.—Cheetoo not admitted into Asir.—Flies to the thickets.—Killed by a tiger. —Asirgerh demanded from Sindhia.—Jeswant Rao Lár ordered to deliver up the fort.—Procrastination. —The fort besieged.—Lower fort taken.—Upper surrendered.—Documents proving Sindhia's insincerity.—Asirgerh retained.—Close of the war.—Its results.—Territorial acquisitions from the Peshwa.—System of Management.—From Holkar—

From Sindhia—From Nagpur.—Territorial arrangements with the Nizam—With the Gaekwar. —Political Results.

BOOK II. CHAP. IX. 1818.

THE Vindhya and Sathpura ranges of hills, which accompany the Nerbudda, from its source to its termination in the Gulph of Cambay, following nearly parallel lines on the north and south of the course of the river; expanding at its eastern extremity into a mountain rampart, which separates Bengal and Orissa from Berar, and at the western into a similar, but less extensive barrier, dividing Malwa from Kandesh and Guzerat; appear to have afforded an asylum to the aboriginal inhabitants of central India when they retreated before the southern progress of the Brahmanical Hindus. In the middle portion of this line, the hills sink down to their lowest elevations, and they accordingly afford the most practicable routes from the Dekhin to Hindustan, and are the seat of several populous and flourishing towns; but the country on the east and west presents a succession of hills, of greater, although not very lofty height, which are rendered difficult and dangerous of access, by dense and insalubrious thickets, amidst which existence is secure only to the beasts of the forest, or the scarcely tamer human beings whom habit has fortified against the pestiferous vapours by which their haunts are best protected against the encroachments of more civilised tribes. The most eastern of these hills, from the confines of the British possessions to the borders of Berar, are the loftiest and most inaccessible, and much of the country is even yet unexplored.

They are tenanted by various barbarous races, of whom the principal are the Koles, the Khands, and the Gonds, living in villages among the forests, under their own chiefs; practising, in some places, a limited agriculture, but more usually subsisting on the produce of their cattle, the gleanings of the chase, or the wild fruits, herbs, and grain, which are the spontaneous growth of the thickets. The want of wholesome nutriment is in some measure compensated by the use of fiery spirits, to which the people are immoderately addicted. They are as scantily clothed as fed, and are armed chiefly with bows and arrows, large knives, and occasionally with matchlocks. Although sometimes professing to respect the few ignorant Brahmans who may have settled among them, this is not universally the case, and they cannot be said to follow the Brahmanical religion. The objects of their rude worship, which is commonly sanguinary, and sometimes comprises human victims, are local divinities, as the Deity of the Earth, or the presiding Genii over certain mountain peaks; or shapeless blocks of wood or stone, occasionally dignified with denominations borrowed from the Hindu Pantheon—particularly with the name of Siva, and his wife Parvati: in some few places, also, Mahadeo, in his ordinary type, seems to have been adopted as one of their gods. The Koles, called in some places also Lurka Koles,[1] are found

[1] Of the Koles, or Lurka Koles, little authentic information has been published, and that little has appeared in ephemeral publications. According to Lieutenant Blunt, he met with Koles near the river Sôn, on the eastern confines of Rewa, while all the mountain tribes, from the northern limits of Ruttenpur, towards the confines of Berar and Hyderabad, between them and the Mahanadi, he calls Gonds.—Journey from Chunar

1818.

principally in Sirguja and Sambhalpur; the Khands on the borders of Cuttack and Ganjam. The Gonds are still more widely extended, and spread from the western and southern limits of Bahar to those of Bundelkhand and Berar, and for some distance along the valley of the Nerbudda. Towards the western extremity of the ranges, the hills and forests are occupied by the Bhils,[1] a race similar in their general habits and character to those which have been mentioned, but associating more freely with their civilised neighbours, and therefore somewhat less barbarous. The same familiarity with civilisation had, however, fostered other pro-

to Yertnakudam, Asiatic Researches, vol. vii. Mr. Colebrooke, in his journey from Mirzapur to Nagpur, describes Koles, Gonds, and other tribes, on much the same line of route.—As. Ann. Reg. for 1806, vol. viii. "The Alpine region of Orissa, comprising the central ridges, the lofty plateau, and the inner valleys of the chain of Ghats, with the great tracts of forest by which they are surrounded, has been occupied from the earliest historical periods by three races, the Koles, the Khands, and the Souras,—according to tradition, the original occupants, not only of this portion, but of the greater part of the Orissa."—Macpherson's Report on the Khands. How far these races are allied or distinct has not been determined by the only test now available, that of their language. Some tolerably copious vocabularies of the Khand language are given in the sixth and seventh volumes of the Journal of the Madras Literary Society, but I am not aware if any of the languages of the Koles or Gonds have been published. Of these races the Gonds seem to be most widely spread; occupying the interior mountains from the confines of Bahar and Orissa to the south-western limits of Bundelkhand and the valley of the Nerbudda.—Bengal and Agra Gazetteer, 1842, vol. ii. p. 1, 341. In three districts of the Nerbudda territories the Gond population is considered to be much under-rated at 180,000.—Ibid. 351. Sir J. Malcolm also mentions the existence of Gonds between Bagli and Mandaleswar. See also Jenkins's Report on Nagpur for the Gond tribes of the eastern portions of the province. Koles and Gonds are named in early Sanscrit works, the latter are found in the Amara Kosha.

[1] Sir J. Malcolm has given an account of the Bhils in his Central India, vol. i. 517. According to him they are a distinct race from any other Indian tribe, but this requires to be established by a comparison of their dialects with those of the other mountaineers. Their own traditions bring them from the north, the borders of Jodhpur. In Sanscrit works of the tenth and eleventh centuries we find Bhils inhabiting the country between Bahar and Bundelkhand, the present site of the Koles and Gonds—an additional reason for considering them to be allied.

pensities, and the Bhils had learned to lay waste the cultivated lands in their vicinity, or levy a tax upon the villagers as the price of their forbearance. These barbarians occupied chiefly the rugged country between the Tapti and the Nerbudda, spreading both to the south of the former, and north of the latter river, into Kandesh, and the territories of the Peshwa and Nizam on the one hand, and Nimaur and Malwa on the other. At an early date, some of the Bhils migrated into the plains in search of subsistence, and earned it by acting in subservience to the village authorities, as a rural police; serving as watchmen in the villages, and patrolling the roads. They received an equivalent in money or in grain, and this they came to consider as their indisputable right. In the latter days of disorder, their connexion with the Government officers had been dissolved, and many acts of mutual offence had transformed them from guardians of life and property, into their most dangerous assailants. The Bhils of the plains had been joined by recruits from the hills, and cultivation and commerce were almost annihilated by their depredations. 1818.

Upon Trimbak's escape from captivity, he sought security, as we have seen, in the vicinity of the Bhil settlements, and found among them ready partisans. The licence to plunder with which he requited their services was too agreeable to their habits to be relinquished when their leader was obliged to fly to the east, and their predatory incursions were continued for some time after his expulsion. The movements of the Peshwa left the British functionaries no opportunity to attend to minor evils, but

BOOK II. CHAP. IX. 1818.

as soon as any peril from that cause ceased to be apprehended, active measures were adopted by Captain Briggs, the political agent in Kandesh, and by Sir John Malcolm, in Malwa, for the protection of the districts under their control, against the irruptions of the Bhils.

The unhealthiness, as well as the ruggedness of the tracts in which the villages of the mountain Bhils were situated, rendered it impossible to undertake any operations against them on an extensive scale, or for a continuous period. Small detachments were, however, sent occasionally into the hills, which were in general successful, burning the Hattas, or villages of the mountaineers, killing many of the men, and capturing their families and their chiefs. Troops were also posted along the skirts of the hills to check their inroads, and cut off the supplies which they were accustomed to procure from the plains. At the same time, the chiefs were invited to come in and resume the police duties which they had formerly discharged, upon the assurance that their claims should be equitably investigated, and those for which precedent could be established should be allowed.[1] Many of them accepted the conditions, and although, in some instances, the engagements into which they entered were not held sacred, and travellers and merchants were still robbed and murdered; yet the greater number adhered to their pledge, and as prompt punishment followed the perpetration of violence, a salutary terror confirmed their peaceable

[1] Elphinstone's Report on Poona.—Extracts from the Records, iv. p. 141.

disposition, and rendered them even willing instruments in the apprehension of the refractory.[1] This object was further promoted by the introduction of the policy which had long proved effective in Bengal, in respect to the wild tribes of the Rajmahal hills. A Bhil militia, disciplined and commanded by British officers, was substituted for the disorderly gangs, headed by their own Nayaks; and the same men who were the scourge and dread of the districts contiguous to their forests were trained to guard the labours of the farmer, and to guide the traveller and the merchant in safety along the roads.[2]

The military operations which it became necessary to undertake against the Gonds, partook more of the character of systematic warfare, as they grew out of political occurrences, and were required for the accomplishment of a political object,—the suppression of the adherents of the fugitive Raja of Nagpur, and his seizure or expulsion.

When Apa Saheb effected his escape from his

[1] Nadir Sing, a Bhil chief of great notoriety, had been induced, partly by threats and partly by rewards, to promise conformity to the British system. After some time he violated his engagements, and plundered and put to death some inoffensive travellers; an atrocity that required exemplary punishment. At the time when his guilt was established he was on a visit to some of his kindred for the purpose of celebrating the marriage of his son; an order was immediately sent to the chiefs with whom he was, to apprehend and send him to the British functionary. Troops were ready to enforce the order, but their presence was unnecessary. He was seized by his own associates and sent to Sir J. Malcolm, by whom he was sentenced to imprisonment for life at Allahabad. His son was allowed to succeed to his authority. "No event," says Sir J. Malcolm, "was ever more conducive to the tranquillity of a country than this act of justice."—Central India, i. 524. As an instance of Bhil habits, as well as of the liberality of his captors, Nadir Sing was allowed during his captivity a bottle of brandy every four days.—MSS.

[2] There are several Bhil corps in the service of the Company. Under the Bengal Presidency are three, the Mewar, Nimaur, and Malwa corps; collectively about one thousand one hundred foot, and one hundred and twenty horse. There is also a Bhil corps in Kandesh.

1818.

escort, in the middle of May, he fled to Harai, a petty state in the Nerbudda valley, governed by Chain Sah, a powerful and ambitious Gond chieftain, who had usurped the chiefship from his nephew while a minor, and had established his authority not only over Harai, but several of the adjacent districts. His power extended throughout the Mahadeo hills, a detached cluster, lying on the south of the river, and to the right of the main road from Nagpur to Hosainabad, at about an equal distance, or eighty miles from either. Within this circuit was a temple of celebrity, dedicated to Mahadeo, whence the name of the hills, which at certain seasons was a place of great resort as an object of pilgrimage, and the sanctity of which was, no doubt, considered by Apa Saheb as a sanctuary from pursuit. A much more effective protection was afforded by the thickets which spread over the hills, and which could not be penetrated with impunity during the rainy season, now about to commence. Here the Raja was at leisure to devise measures for the annoyance of his enemies, if not for the recovery of his power, and found a ready auxiliary in the restless and turbulent Gond. Many other chiefs, professing themselves to be vassals of Berar, also joined the Raja; and the Mahratta soldiers, Pindaris, and Arab mercenaries, who had been cast adrift by the dispersion of the regular troops of Poona and Nagpur, either repaired to the Mahadeo hills, or concentrated in different parts of the surrounding country, and carried on a war of posts against the British detachments. Their numbers were exaggerated, but they occasionally acted in

bodies of three or four thousand, and the aggregate in arms could not have been much less than twenty thousand, so easy was it at this period to collect armed bands around every standard which led the way to confusion and plunder.

Although it was indispensably necessary to postpone an attack in force upon Apa Saheb's headquarters, until a more favourable period, yet the equally imperious necessity of protecting the country from desolation, and of checking the extent of the rising in the Raja's favour, rendered it impossible to avoid exposing the troops to the harassing services of desultory hostilities at an inclement season; and detachments were accordingly stationed in various parts of the valley contiguous to the hills, from the several divisions of Colonel Adams at Hosainabad, Lieutenant-Colonel Scott at Nagpur, and Brigadier-General Watson at Ságar. Their distribution and movements counteracted, in a great measure, the objects of the enemy; but the organisation of the latter, their knowledge of the country, and the countenance and assistance which they received from the natives and from the civil functionaries of the Mahratta Government, enabled them at first to elude the attacks of the British, and even to gain some advantages over them. As the contest was prolonged the troops became more manageable, the country better known, and the insurgents suffered severe retaliation.

The first affair that took place was calculated to give confidence to the Raja's partisans. A body of Arabs, after assembling at Mail Ghat, on the Tapti river, advanced to the town of Maisdi, and took posses-

1818.

sion of it. In order to dislodge and disperse them, Captain Sparkes was detached, on the 18th of July, from Hosainabad to Baitul, with two companies of the 10th Bengal Native infantry. He was followed on the two following days by stronger detachments, but without waiting for their junction, Captain Sparkes pushed forward, and on the 20th encountered a party of horse, the van of the enemy's force. They retreated, but only to fall back upon the main body, consisting of two thousand Mahratta horse, and fifteen hundred Arab and Hindustani foot. Taking post upon the edge of a ravine, Captain Sparkes checked, for some time, the enemy's advance, but when they had crossed the ravine in considerable masses, retreated to a hill, where his men again maintained their ground until their ammunition was expended, and many, with Captain Sparkes, had been killed. The enemy then rushed upon them in overwhelming numbers, and put nearly the whole to death. A few wounded Sipahis contrived to escape, and eight others, who had been left to guard the baggage, effected a timely retreat.

To remedy the ill effects of this disaster, Major Macpherson was sent to take the command at Baitul, and reinforcements under Captain Newton and Major Cumming were immediately dispatched from Hosainabad. Captain Hamilton was sent from Nagpur to superintend the country about Deogerh, and was followed by Captain Pedlar with reinforcements. On the north and north-east a division was thrown forward from Jabalpur. A corps of Rohilla horse was distributed along the northern skirts of the Mahadeo hills, and Salábat Khan of Elichpur, on

1819.

the south-east, was called upon for his contingent. Brigadier-General Doveton also moved from Jalna; but his march was delayed by the inclemency of the weather, and the impassable state of the roads and rivers. The troops were exposed to incessant rain and frequent storms, and soon began to suffer in their health. At the Gawilgerh pass the whole of the tents were blown down by a violent gale. Their advance was, therefore, painful and tedious, and after frequent halts, and leaving behind the artillery and heavy luggage, it was not until the middle of September that the force was concentrated at Elichpur.

Until the troops could be assembled in sufficient strength, the partisans of the Raja continued their successful career. A small party of Sipahis, posted at Shahpur, was surprised and destroyed by a Gond Raja, and in the beginning of August, the enemy gained possession of the town of Multai, chiefly through the connivance of the civil authorities. To the eastward, the Gonds and Arabs occupied Lanji, Compta, Ambagerh, and other places, and advanced to within forty miles of the capital, where much agitation prevailed, and a conspiracy against the young Raja was detected. The leaders were punished; and to repel the advancing insurgents, Captain Gordon, with a further portion of the subsidiary force, was sent from Nagpur. Major Cumming was directed to recover Multai—a service which he executed at the end of the month—the garrison evacuating the town and fort. Light detachments, under Captain Newton and Lieutenant Ker, overtook parties of the fugitives, and put

BOOK II. CHAP. IX. 1818.

numbers to the sword. In like manner, the places to the eastward were soon retaken. Compta, which was defended by a stockade with a ditch and a small fort, was carried by assault, in which six hundred of the garrison perished. Amba-gerh was taken by escalade, and Pouri by storm, by another detachment from Nagpur, commanded by Major Wilson. Other places were recovered, and the enemy were driven from all their posts upon the plain in this direction. Important successes were also gained in other quarters. A party at Burday, about five hundred strong, was attacked by Major Bowen, with a squadron of cavalry and one hundred light infantry, and three hundred of the number were slain. A like party was destroyed at Jiva-gerhi by Lieutenant Cruikshanks, with a detachment of one hundred and eighty infantry, fifty of the 7th Bengal cavalry, and eighty Rohilla horse. A vigorous effort by Chain Sah, at the head of two thousand Gonds and Mahrattas, to gain possession of Chauragerh, was checked by the gallantry of a native officer and thirty men, its slender garrison, until the arrival of a detachment under Lieutenants Brandon and Bacon; when the Gonds were defeated and driven off with heavy loss. By the end of September, operations began to spread into the hills. Captain Newton, with the 2nd battallion of the 10th Bengal infantry, a company of the 1st battallion of the 23rd, and a squadron of the 7th Native cavalry, marching from Baitul, followed the flying Gonds to their villages, burnt many of them, and captured or killed their defenders. Several of the chiefs fell; among whom was one who

had headed the party which put to death the Sipahis at Shahpur. The villagers at several places had also been engaged in the action with Captain Sparkes, as appeared from the dresses, arms, and accoutrements of the 10th infantry, which were found in their huts, and their comrades exulted in the vengeance which they had inflicted, and the trophies which they had recovered. 1819.

With the commencement of 1819, the system of detached and desultory war was discontinued, and was succeeded by a concerted plan for an attack upon the head-quarters of Apa Saheb. With this view the detachments were, for the most part, called in. A concentrated portion of the Nagpur subsidiary force marched from Nagpur to Multai. Colonel Adams, with his main body, moved from Hosainabad upon Pachmari, and Major O'Brien, from Jabalpur, upon Haray. Brigadier-General Doveton advanced from the south-west, to cover the road by Jilpi-amner, a fortified town, of which the siege detained him several days. Major O'Brien, on his march, fell in with Chain Sah, defeated, and took him prisoner. Parties, from the Nagpur and Hosainabad divisions, penetrated into every recess of the hills, and Colonel Adams arrived at Pachmari in the middle of February. Apa Saheb was no longer there.

Reduced to great distress for supplies, by the vigilance of the British detachments, skirting the bases of the hills, and cutting off all communication with the adjacent country, and foreseeing the adoption of decisive movements as soon as they should become practicable, Apa Saheb determined to look to some

BOOK II. CHAP. IX.

1819.

other quarter for an asylum. In this design he was encouraged by the Pindari Cheetoo, who, after loitering along the southern limits of Bhopal, made his way, in the beginning of August, into the Mahadeo hills. Their knowledge of the friendly disposition of Jeswant Rao Lar, the Kiladar of Asir-gerh, induced them to expect a refuge in his fortress, and thither, therefore, they resolved to direct their flight. On the 1st of February, Apa Saheb, accompanied by Cheetoo and a few well-mounted horsemen, quitted the hills, and passed through Burday, the officer commanding there having been misled by false reports of the Raja's intended route, and having marched to Shahpur in the hope of intercepting him. On his arrival at Shahpur, he discovered the trick, and immediately countermarched and reached Burday in time to encounter and destroy a large body of Arabs and Hindustanis, who attempted to follow the route which the Raja had succeeded in taking. The first party pursued their course to the west towards Asir, but not with the same good fortune. News of Apa Saheb's flight having been conveyed to Lieutenant-Colonel Pollock, commanding at Jilpi-amner, he marched immediately to the north, and arrived on the morning of the 4th of February, at Piplode, where he covered the two main roads to Asir-gerh. About two miles in his rear lay a third road, by the village of Yuva, and this was guarded by a strong picquet of cavalry and infantry. Late in the evening, the Raja and his companions came unexpectedly upon the British post at Yuva. As soon as they perceived their error, they turned their horses' heads and

dashed into a deep ravine, where, aided by the darkness of the night, they escaped from the pursuit of the cavalry. A few were taken; amongst the prisoners were several of the Sipahis, who had assisted Apa Saheb in his flight from Captain Brown, and who suffered the penalty of their disloyalty: the rest effected their retreat to the neighbourhood of Asirgerh, where a temporary shelter was given to the Raja. Jeswant Rao refused, however, to admit Cheetoo and his followers, and while they hovered about Asir they were attacked by Major Smith, who had been detached by Sir John Malcolm to secure the passes north of Asirgerh. They fled under the walls of Asir, from which a fire of matchlocks checked their pursuers, and afforded them an opportunity to disperse. Whether his own fears or those of Jeswant Rao abridged the period of the Raja's stay may be doubted, but after a few days, Apa Saheb repaired in the disguise of a religious mendicant to Burhanpur, where he was secreted for a short interval. Thence he made his way in the same disguise into Malwa, and approached Gwalior; but Sindhia was not inclined to risk the displeasure of the British Government in behalf of a Raja of Nagpur. He was obliged, therefore, to resume his travels, and found no rest until he reached the Punjab, where Ranjit Sing gave him shelter and subsistence for a season. Upon the withdrawal of his countenance, Apa Saheb had recourse to a petty Raja, the Raja of Mundi, beyond the first range of the Himalaya, and was suffered to remain there unmolested for several succeeding years. At a subsequent date he returned to Hindustan, and was pro-

1818.

1818.

tected by the Raja of Jodhpur, who was allowed to grant him an asylum on condition of becoming responsible for his safe custody and peaceable conduct.

The companion of the ex-Raja of Nagpur, the Pindari Cheetoo, was still more unfortunate; and, after surviving the destruction or surrender of his former associates, was fated to suffer a death not undeserving of commiseration, although not an unapt close to his wild and sanguinary life. After the dispersion of his followers under the walls of Asirgerh, he fled, with his son, to the north, with the intention of escaping into Malwa. Having crossed the Nerbudda at Pún-ghat, he sought to traverse the Vindhya mountains by the pass of Bágli, but finding it vigilantly guarded, he parted from his son, and turned off into a thicket near Kantapur, notoriously infested by tigers, to one of whom he fell a prey. His horse, wandering alone, was caught by a party of Holkar's cavalry marching from Bágli to Kantapur, and being recognised, search was made for the rider. On penetrating into the thicket, his sword, and parts of his dress torn and stained with blood, were found, and, finally, his head was discovered. These remains were readily identified by several of his followers who had been captured, and by his son, who, at the same time, gave himself up to Sir John Malcolm. Such was the end which the Pindari had hazarded rather than submit to a tranquil life, shackled by the restraints of dependance.

The attempt of Apa Saheb to take shelter in Asirgerh, had been anticipated by the British Government, and in order to prevent its success, Sind-

hia had been required to place the fort in the temporary occupation of a British force. This arrangement had been proposed at the beginning of the war, and had been ostensibly acceded to; but as no emergency arose which rendered its fulfilment peculiarly expedient, and as it was probable that Sindhia's orders for the delivery of the fort, even if issued in a spirit of sincerity, would be disregarded, and that it would be necessary to lay siege to Asirgerh, to ensure its occupation, it was judged advisable to refrain from insisting upon the transfer of the fortress. Now, however, a contingency had arisen which admitted of no longer hesitation. It was of the highest importance to exclude Apa Saheb from a strong-hold, in the strength of which he might find the means of renewing a protracted resistance, and reanimating the hopes of his partisans; and it was accordingly resolved to call upon Sindhia to execute the original stipulation. Dowlat Rao affected cheerful compliance, and dispatched orders to Jeswant Rao Lar to give up his fort to Sir John Malcolm, and repair to Gwalior. He followed up his orders by sending officers to enforce obedience, and declared himself prepared to unite his troops with those of the British in the siege, if the place were not promptly surrendered. Jeswant Rao pretended a like readiness to obey, but frivolous pleas were devised from day to day to defer his departure to Gwalior, until the contingency against which it was intended to provide, actually occurred, and Apa Saheb was admitted into Asirgerh. It was obvious that Jeswant Rao had no intention of resigning his fort, and that Sindhia either connived

BOOK II. CHAP. IX. 1818.

at his recusancy, or was unable to enforce compliance with his orders. The reduction of the place was necessary to vindicate the British power, and to deprive an unavowed enemy of the means of causing mischief. By firing also upon the British troops when in pursuit of Cheetoo and the followers of the Nagpur Raja, as well as by the reception of the Raja himself, Jeswant Rao had committed overt acts of hostility, which it was impossible to leave without rebuke. Sir John Malcolm, therefore, and General Doveton were instructed to employ the resources at their disposal in the siege of Asirgerh.

The fortress of Asirgerh stood upon a detached rock, about two miles from the end of one of the chief ranges of the Sathpura hills, commanding one of the great passes from the Dekhin. It consisted of two forts, a lower and an upper; the former occupying the western extremity of the rock, opposite to the Petta, or walled town, beneath it, from which alone an ascent into the fortress was practicable: on every other side the perpendicular scarp of the rock defied assault, and the ascent from the town was strongly fortified. The approach from the lower to the upper fort, which crowned the summit of the rock, at an elevation of seven hundred and fifty feet above the plain, was by steep flights of stone steps, which led in succession through five gateways of solid masonry. There were some breaches in the face of the rock, especially on the north and east, but the chasms had been built up with substantial walls. The top of the rock was surmounted by thick and lofty ramparts, and by large cavaliers car-

rying guns of immense calibre.[1] The country on the north and south sides was generally level, but on the east and west was intersected by deep ravines, and crossed by ranges of hills, connected with the Sathpura range.

Brigadier-general Doveton, having been reinforced with troops and ordnance from Kandesh and Hosainabad,[2] advanced to the vicinity of Asir late in February, while Sir John Malcolm moved close to the fortress with the forces which he had collected at Mhow,[3] and with which he had been employed in settling some disturbed districts on the Guzerat frontier, in the beginning of the year. As soon as it was obvious that compulsory means alone would obtain possession of Asir-gerh, General Doveton's division took up its ground on the south of the fort, while that of Sir John Malcolm was posted on the north. On the 18th of March, operations were commenced by the advance of a column from either division upon the Petta, which was carried with little loss, the enemy retreating into the lower fort. Posts were established and batteries constructed in the Petta, and a spirited sally of the enemy on the 20th having been repulsed, although

[1] One of these, an iron gun carrying a ball of three hundred and eighty-four pounds, was believed by the natives capable of lodging a shot at Burhanpur, fourteen miles distant.—Lake.

[2] His force consisted of one troop of European Horse Artillery, three regiments, the 6th Bengal, and 2nd and 7th Madras N. C., the Madras European regiment, the 15th regiment Bengal N. I., 1st batt. 7th, 1st batt. 12th, 2nd batt. 13th, 2nd batt. 14th, 2nd batt. 17th Madras N. I., and details of Bengal and Madras Pioneers, with an extensive battering train.

[3] These were details of European Horse Artillery, camel howitzer battery, 2nd regiment Madras N. C., 2nd batt. 6th, and 1st batt. 14th Madras N. C., 1st Grenadier regiment Bombay N. I., and 1st of the 8th ditto, with Pioneers. They were joined by two battalions Bengal N. I., 2nd batt. 1st, and 2nd batt. 13th, with artillery and heavy guns from Ságar.

BOOK II. CHAP. IX. 1818.

with the loss of Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer of the Royal Scots, a practicable breach was made by the 21st, and the garrison retreated to the upper fort; but the explosion of a powder magazine attached to one of the batteries, emboldened them to return and resume the fire from the lower fort. It was soon silenced by the fire of the batteries. The charge of the Petta, and the prosecution of the siege on that side were made over to Sir John Malcolm, while General Doveton, with the principal part of the heavy ordnance, moved to the east front, as most favourable for the attack of the upper fort. By the 29th, both divisions were in full operation, and on the 30th preparations were made for storming the lower fort, when it was finally abandoned by the garrison and occupied by the assailants. On the eastern front the progress was necessarily slower, but by the 7th of April the defences were in so ruinous a condition, that Jeswant Rao despaired of the result, and after a conference with the British Generals consented to unconditional surrender. The garrison, composed chiefly of Arabs and Baluchis, marched out accordingly on the 29th; they were allowed to retain their shields and daggers and all private property, and were promised a conveyance to their native country. The loss of the garrison was less severe than that of the besiegers; the former having been sheltered by the nature of the ground. The latter had one officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer, killed, and eleven wounded; the whole of the killed and wounded amounted to three hundred and thirteen. The reduction of a fortress of such high repute in native estimation as Asirgerh in so short a time, confirmed the impres-

sion which the success of the British arms had inspired throughout the campaign of the futility of opposition. 1818.

The capture of Asirgerh disclosed indisputable proofs of the insincerity of Dowlat Rao Sindhia; of his having sanctioned the contumacy of the Kiladar, and of his having contemplated affording shelter and succour to Baji Rao. A box of papers was seized containing letters, not only from the Peshwa and Apa Saheb, but others in Sindhia's own hand writing, as was acknowledged subsequently by his ministers and himself, in which he directed that the fort should not be given over to the English, and that whatever orders might be received from the Peshwa they should be obeyed. As a punishment for this double dealing, it was determined to retain possession of Asirgerh and the district dependent upon it, and to communicate to Dowlat Rao the grounds of its detention. No further notice was deemed necessary, as the objects of the war had been accomplished, and allowance was made for the pardonable prepossession of the Mahratta chief in favour of his paramount lord. Dowlat Rao admitted the authenticity of the documents, but declared that they were intended only to make it appear that he wished to do something for the Peshwa's service, and that the tenor of any orders he might have sent was immaterial, as he knew well that Jeswant Rao would obey none but such as should be consistent with his own designs. He even admitted that he had written to Baji Rao to invite him to Gwalior, because he believed that his coming there was impossible. As an apology for this double duplicity, he merely

1818.

pleaded in the figurative language which he frequently employed, that it was natural for a man seeing a friend struggling in the water and crying for help, to stretch out his hands towards him, and to speak words of comfort, although he knew that he could give him no assistance. He was, however, evidently apprehensive of the consequences of his conduct until time convinced him of the sincerity of the purposed forbearance of the British Government.

The capture of Asirgerh terminated the military movements of the British armies, and most of the troops returned to their stations in time of peace, having throughout this supplementary campaign, as well as in the earlier progress of the war, distinguished themselves, as much by their cheerful endurance of hardship and privation, and of the labours which they had undergone, as by their steadiness and intrepidity in action.

We are now prepared to consider the results of the past transactions, as they affected the British Government, and the Native powers of India.

The acquisition of additional territory formed no part of the original objects for which the Marquis of Hastings took the field. The districts from which the Pindaris were expelled were restored to the princes by whom they had been granted, or from whom they had been usurped; and not a rood of land would have been annexed to the British possessions, had not the violence and treachery of the Mahratta chiefs exposed them to the loss of their dominions. It was evident that Baji Rao considered himself too deeply wronged ever to forgive, and no leniency towards him could appease his resentment.

1818.

His deposal was necessary for the preservation of public tranquillity, and for the security of the British power; and it, therefore, became a question to whom his extensive authority should be intrusted. He had no children, and no hereditary claims were involved in his downfall. To have elevated the Raja of Satara in his place, would have been to invest a doubtful ally with the means of becoming a formidable enemy, and would have been a boon exceeding his reasonable expectations. It was doubted by the Governor-General whether the grant of a liberal Jagir would not have been an adequate provision for him, and the substitution of a principality, as recommended by the Resident on political considerations, was coupled with the condition of a subordinate rule over a circumscribed territory.[1] The country set apart for the Raja was bounded by the Nira on the north, the Krishna and Warna on the south, the Ghats on the west, and the district of Punderpur on the east; and was calculated to yield an annual revenue of above thirteen lakhs of rupees.[2] The remainder of the Peshwa's dominions, comprising an estimated area of fifty thousand square miles,

[1] "Your Excellency's instructions left me the choice of giving him a Jagir or small sovereignty, and I was inclined to adopt the latter plan, for various reasons. At the time when I had to decide, the Mahrattas showed no disposition whatever to quit the Peshwa's standard, and it appeared not improbable that the dread of the complete extinction of their national independence, and still more, that of the entire loss of their means of subsistence, from the want of a government likely to employ them, would induce them to adhere to Baji Rao, that could never have been produced by affection for his person or interest in his cause. It therefore seemed expedient to remove these grounds of alarm by the establishment of a separate government."—Letter from the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone to the Governor-General, Parl. Papers, Raja of Satara, Part I., p. 498.

[2] In the second year the net revenue amounted to nearly fifteen lakhs. —Treaty with the Raja of Satara, 25th Sept., 1819. Papers, Adm. of the Marquis of Hastings.

BOOK II. CHAP. IX. 1818.

and a population of four millions, was made an integral part of British India.

The territory acquired by the British Government in the Dekhin which had formerly acknowledged the authority of the Peshwa, comprised the province of Kandesh on the north; the country constituting that of the Mahrattas especially, comprising the districts of Ahmedadad and Poona, above the Ghats, and the Konkan on the west of the Ghats; and south of the Krishna, a portion of Canara, which had been formerly subjugated by the Mahrattas, and was, for the most part, divided among a number of feudatory chieftains, or Jagirdars, most of whom, although declining to act against the Peshwa, had either refrained from joining him, or had abandoned him at an early period, and were, consequently, permitted to retain their lands on the same tenures on which they held them under the Peshwa. The Konkan was added to the Bombay Presidency: the rest was placed under the authority of a Commissioner, assisted by five officers, including the political agent with the Raja of Satara, who, under the designation of collectors, discharged the supreme revenue and judicial duties. The arrangements adopted for the administration of the Mahratta territories were based upon the existing institutions, and which, when weeded from some glaring defects, were considered to be most acceptable to the people, and best suited to the prevailing condition of society. In the collection of the revenue, the chief principles laid down were to abolish the farming system, which had been carried to a ruinous extent under Baji Rao;[1] to

[1] The office of Mamlatdar, or Head Collector of a district, was put up

levy the revenue according to the actual cultivation; to make the assignments light; to impose no new taxes; and to abolish none, unless obviously obnoxious and unjust; and above all to make no innovations. In the administration of civil law, Panchayats were had recourse to, while criminal cases were investigated by the British functionaries in person: to them, also, was entrusted the principal personal superintendence of the police. In their mixed duties they were assisted by the native officers, combining similar powers. The system worked well; for although vast numbers of disorderly persons were thrown out of employment by the dispersion of the Peshwa's soldiery, the country speedily assumed a tranquil aspect, cultivation was extended, and trade revived; and no attempt of any importance was made to re-establish a native government. The immediate consequence of the mal-administration of the revenue, as well as of the mischief caused by political and military events, was a considerable diminution of the revenue. The amount of this, at one time, under the Peshwa, had exceeded two crores of rupees,

1817.

to auction among the Peshwa's attendants, who were encouraged to bid high, and sometimes disgraced if they showed a reluctance to enter on this sort of speculation. Next year this operation was renewed, and the district was generally transferred to a higher bidder. The Mamlatdar had no time for inquiry, and no motive for forbearance; he let the district out to under farmers who repeated the operation until it reached the Patel. If this officer farmed his own village, he became the absolute master of every one in it. If he refused to farm it at the rate proposed, the case was perhaps worse, as the Mamlatdar's own officers undertook to levy the sum with less knowledge and mercy. In either case the actual state of the cultivation was little regarded; a man's means of payment, not the land he occupied, was the scale by which he was assessed. No moderation was shown in levying the sum fixed, and every pretext for fine and forfeiture, every means of rigour and confiscation were employed to squeeze the utmost out of the people before the time when the Mamlatdar was to give up his charge.—Elphinstone, Report of the territories conquered from the Peshwa, Calcutta, 1824; also Selections from the Records, iv. 139.

1817. but the cessions demanded from him in June 1817, and other circumstances, had reduced it to one crore and ten lakhs, of which, not above fifty lakhs came into the treasury of the Peshwa. This sum it was expected to realize, and a surplus of thirty lakhs was calculated on, but after the first twelvemonth, the revenue was found to amount to but seventy-six lakhs, while the charges and assignments, exclusive of the pensions to the Peshwa and his brother, extended to seventy-two, leaving, therefore, the new possessions a financial loss. This, however, was but a temporary disappointment, and the improvement of the country, with the diminution of the expenses, rendered the acquisitions in the Dekhin as valuable in a financial as they were in a political point of view.

By the treaty with Holkar, the districts in Kandesh and the Sathpura hills, as well as those in the Dekhin, which were intermixed with the territories of the Peshwa and Nizam, were ceded to the British. They were not of great extent or value, but derived consideration from the manner in which they were scattered among territories subject to other princes, involving the inconvenient proximity of different independent jurisdictions. The conflict of claims arising out of such juxtaposition, was congenial to Mahratta policy, which hoped, from such collision, some contingent advantage. Such objects were of course foreign to the system now adopted; and, although some indulgence was shown in regard to places recommended by peculiar considerations, the districts of Holkar[1] in the

[1] The right of Holkar, as Des-mukh or head of a district, to villages, or

Dekhin were amalgamated with those in their vicinity.

1817.

In the engagements concluded with Sindhia, no territorial cession was originally contemplated; but those districts which had belonged to the Peshwa, and had devolved on the British, either by cession or conquest, and which had been usurped by Sindhia or his officers, in Malwa, were reclaimed: the restoration of all usurpations from princes under British protection was also insisted on. It was further found desirable to require various exchanges of territory between Sindhia and the British government and its allies, for the purpose of establishing a more compact and better defined boundary. In this manner several districts on the confines of Bhopal and Bundelkhand were annexed to them, and Ajmer was transferred to British authority. The possession of this province was recommended by political considerations, as its centrical position afforded ready communication with the Rajput states, and held in check the western confines of Sindhia's dominions, and the newly created principality of Amir Khan. Its financial value was inconsiderable,[1] and its sequestration was no loss to Dowlat Rao, as the whole revenue had been appropriated by his officer, Bapu Sindhia, by whom it had been held for some time past. Upon the whole, Sindhia was a gainer by these exchanges,[2]

parts of villages, or to certain payments or perquisites, presents a characteristic picture of the intricate and incompatible arrangements common under the Mahratta system. A statement of his claims is therefore given in the Appendix.

[1] In the first year of its occupation the revenue was less than a lakh and a half of rupees. Four years afterwards it exceeded four lakhs. The population was also quadrupled.—MS. Records.

[2] The revenue of the territory ceded by Sindhia was estimated at six lakhs, those made to him at nearly seven.—MS. Records.

BOOK II. CHAP. IX.

although his duplicity and treachery ill-deserved such favour.

1817. The acquisitions next in extent and importance to those made from the Peshwa were derived from the territories of the Raja of Nagpur. They comprised the eastern portion of the valley of the Nerbudda, on either bank of the river, extending north and east to the district of Ságar, which, as we have seen, had been also taken possession of by the British, and to the borders of Bundelkhand; and on the west and south to the confines of Berar. In the latter province were ceded Gawilgerh and Narnala, with Akote and the contiguous districts. The government of the Raja's reserved territories was, as has been noticed, exercised, with the entire concurrence of the young Prince's nearest relatives and of the Regent Bai, by the British Resident, assisted by British officers as superintendents of the main divisions of the Principality, to whom the collection of the revenue, and maintenance of public order were entrusted, and who were instructed to preserve the native system and establishments unchanged, except in the correction of gross and palpable abuses. Under this system the principality of Nagpur progressively improved in resources and prosperity until its final restoration to the Raja.[1] The territories separated from it were placed under the direct authority of the Government of Bengal. Sambhalpur, and the wild country spreading to Bengal and Orissa, hitherto dependant upon Nagpur, were likewise ceded, and a line of communication from Bengal to

[1] Report on the territories of the Raja of Nagpur, by Richard Jenkins, Esq., printed in Calcutta, 1827.

the Mahratta territories on the west, was thus completed.[1] The management of the district of Ságar was united to that of Bundelkhand. The Nerbudda valley was subjected to the authority of a civil Commissioner, whose administration was based upon the same principles that had been adopted in the Poona territory, and who combined in his own person the chief revenue and judicial, as well as political, functions; having under him several assistants, entrusted with similar powers, but subject to the superintendence of the Commissioner. The assessment of the revenue, the distribution of civil justice, and the regulations of the police, were founded upon the institutions and usages of the people, but modified by the spirit of the British regulations. Subsequently Ságar was united to the Nerbudda territories, but the character of the administration long remained unaltered. The mountain countries to the eastward were governed by an agent, especially deputed for the purpose: and with some other dependencies of Nagpur, which, although not alienated, were managed by British officers for some years after the Raja's exercise of authority, were generally under the control of the resident of Nagpur. The revenues of the cessions from Nagpur were intended to provide funds for the payment of

1817.

[1] These cessions were demanded in the conditional agreement entered into with Apa Saheb, 6th January, 1818, but the agreement was annulled by his flight, and was not finally renewed until December, 1826, when the Raja attained his majority. In the mean time, the administration of the whole being in the hands of the Resident, the terms of the agreement had been acted on and the territories occupied.—See Treaty with the Raja, 13th December, 1826, Com. House of Commons, 1832, App. Pol. 620. The whole area of the ceded territory was estimated at 70,000 square miles.—Jenkins's Report on Nagpur.

BOOK II. CHAP. IX. 1817.

the seven and a half lakhs, the cost of the subsidiary force, and to be a compensation for the contingent force which the Raja was bound to maintain, the expense of which was estimated at nine and a half. The produce of the ceded territory approached nearly to this amount, realising, after some years' occupation, inclusively of Gondwana, about sixteen and a half lakhs of rupees, levied from a population of one million, three hundred and forty thousand persons. Conjointly with Ságar, the increase of British subjects in this quarter might be called two millions, paying a revenue of two millions and a half of rupees.[1]

Although not immediate annexations to the British territories, yet as arising out of the war, we may notice the new arrangements made with the Nizam and the Gaekwar. As usual, districts subject to the Mahratta princes, especially to the Raja of Nagpur and the Peshwa, were intermixed inconveniently with the dominions of Hyderabad. Such of these as had fallen to the British, it was proposed to exchange for territories belonging to the Nizam situated beyond his general frontier, giving

[1] The following are the returns of 1827, when the Sagar and Nerbudda territories were united under one agency, and divided into three principal districts, viz. 1. Jabalpur, &c.; 2. Hosainabad, &c.; 3. Sagar:

NERBUDDA.

	JABALPUR.	HOSAINABAD.	SAGAR.	TOTAL.
Revenue	7,50,000	8,85,000	9,81,000	26,16,000
Population	7,20,000	6,25,000	5,60,000	19,05,000

The revenues of the Nerbudda districts are stated by Mr. Prinsep as having been in 1818-19, fourteen and a half lakhs; in 1819-20, twenty-one lakhs; and as having averaged twenty-three lakhs (say £230,000), during the three following years. The Sagar revenue rose in the same time from eight to nearly eleven lakhs, forming a total of thirty-four lakhs; but the first assessments on the land were too high, and the diminution made, with the gradual recovery from temporary depression, left them at the period here referred to, 1839-40, as stated, twenty-six lakhs.

him the advantage, as a recompense for the services of his subsidiary force, and his other contingents during the war. The adjustment was delayed, through the difficulty of obtaining an accurate valuation of the districts to be exchanged, and by the reluctance of the Nizam's ministers to admit the validity of any of the Peshwa's claims, to which the British government had succeeded. A treaty was at last concluded in 1822, by which the Nizam was released from all claims and demands on account of the late Peshwa, and received territories belonging to that prince and the Raja of Nagpur and Holkar, yielding a revenue of ten lakhs of rupees a year; in return for which he relinquished his lands between the Sena and Tumbhadra rivers, and his rights and possessions within the district of Ahmednagar, the whole being estimated at little more than four lakhs. He also engaged to give up a small tract to the Raja of Nagpur, and to continue the payments made by the Peshwa to certain of his dependents leviable from the revenues of the territory transferred to the Nizam.[1] 1819.

As great advantages were secured to the Gaekwar by the treaty with the Peshwa, in June 1816, in which the claims of the latter for tribute, and for his share of the farm of Ahmedabad, were abandoned;[2]

[1] Treaty with the Nizam, 12th December, 1822.—Treaties with Native Princes, printed by order of Parliament, 1825.

[2] The annual gain to the Gaekwar was estimated at something more than twenty-two and a half lakhs of rupees (£222,500), viz:

Tribute relinquished	11,50,000
Ahmedabad farm	9,75,000
Interest of a loan raised to pay off part of the debt to the Peshwa	1,00,000
Rupees	22,25,000

BOOK II. CHAP. IX. 1819.

and as the opportunity was considered favourable for imposing an additional burden upon the finances of Guzerat, in the shape of an augmented subsidy, that Prince was, therefore, required to increase the subsidiary force, by a battalion of infantry, and two regiments of cavalry, and to provide the requisite funds. It was at first proposed that they should be supplied by the transfer of Kattiwar, but as this was objected to by the court of Baroda, it was finally arranged that the Gaekwar should cede all the benefit which he had obtained from the perpetual farm of the Peshwa's territories subject to the city of Ahmedabad, in perpetuity to his allies. Some exchanges of territory were at the same time effected.[1]

These were the principal territorial additions which were the results of the war, and which brought with them a valuable accession of revenue and population. They were still more important in a political respect. Besides the actual extension of territory, they opened the whole of India to British access. Malwa, Rajputana, and a great part of the Dekhin had been almost closed against the British before the war, and the armies by which they were traversed beheld countries previously unknown. The dominions of the Mahratta chiefs interposed

The average revenue of Guzerat for the three years, 1813-16, had amounted to 71,90,000 rupees, and the expenses to 62,70,000 rupees, leaving a surplus of above eight lakhs per year. The debt to the company had been liquidated, and it was expected that all other encumbrances would be discharged in two years more.—Letter from Bombay, August, 1817. These expectations were disappointed, as we shall hereafter have occasion to observe.

[1] Supplement to the Defensive Treaty with the Gaekwar, 6th November, 1817, ratified by the Governor-General, 12th March, 1818, also additional article modifying exchanges and fixing the value of Ahmedabad at 12,61,969 rupees, 6th November, 1818.

an extensive but compact barrier, separating the three Presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, from each other, and from the principalities of Rajputana. This barrier was now broken down, and the intervening country pierced in every direction by British districts and dependencies, which enabled the government at once to exert its influence, or employ its power, wherever either might be required for its own benefit, or the general welfare. The termination of hostilities was coincident with the establishment of the political supremacy of the British government over every native state; and although some short time elapsed before this supremacy was fully recognised, or its good effects were universally experienced, the delay was ascribable more to the reluctance of the Government to take advantage of its position, than to the disinclination of the native Princes to submit to, or their ability to resist, its dictation. The progress made in the establishment of the paramount influence of the Government of India during the first few years subsequent to the war, we shall now proceed to trace.

1819.

CHAPTER X.

Settlement of Central India.—Territories of Holkar.—Improvement in population and revenue.—Claims of the State—Of its dependants.—Adjusted by British interference.—Rival Pretenders to the Throne.—Suppressed.—Settlement of Dhar and Dewas.—Relations with Sindhia.—Services of the Contin-

gent.—His financial difficulties.—Engagements with Bhopal.—Islamnagar restored to the Nawab.—Death of Nazar Mohammed.—Killed by accident.—His widow Regent. — Principality prospers. — Rajput Princes—Secondary and principal.—Topographical situation of the former.—Engagements with Banswára. — Dungerpur. — Pertabgerh. — Sirohi and Krishnagar—With Bundi and with Kota.—Peculiarity of the treaty with the latter.—Its inconveniences.—Death of the Raja.—Aversion of Kesari Sing, his successor, to the hereditary minister. —Quarrels with Zalim Sing.—Raises troops.—Action of Mangrole.—Kesari Sing restored under restrictions.—Death of Zalim Sing.—His son succeeds as Minister.—Continued aversion of the Raja. —Treaty with the Rana of Udaypur. — Alienated and usurped lands recovered and restored to him.—Country improved.—Treaty with Jaypur.—Delay—finally concluded.—Interference necessary.—Death of the Raja.—Disputed succession.—Birth of a posthumous son.—Bhyri Sal made minister.—Resident appointed.—Supports the minister.—Treaty with Jodhpur.—State of parties.—Man Sing resumes the government.—Puts his adversaries to death.—Country prospers.—Treaty with Bhikaner.—Suppression of insurrection among the Bhattis.—Treaty with Jesalmer.—International tranquillity assured. —Internal tranquillity imperfectly maintained.

BOOK II. CHAP. X.

1819.

After all the alterations and exchanges which remodelled the political subdivisions of Malwa, a considerable portion of this extensive and valuable province continued to be subject to the Mahrattas,

The share of Mulhar Rao Holkar had been much diminished by the separation of the districts assigned to the independent rule of the military adventurers, Amir Khan and Ghafur Khan, and by the cessions made, under the treaty of Mandaleswar, to Kota, Bundi, and the British Government. There still remained, however, territory of some extent in the south-west of Malwa, surrounding the capital, Indore; some relaxation was admitted in regard to the tributes due from various subordinate Rajput chiefs; and several of Holkar's villages, in the Dekhin, were also restored to him. The Raja, Mulhar Rao Holkar, was a boy, but the administration was in able hands; and Tantia Jôg, with the advice and support of Sir John Malcolm, soon raised the state to a degree of prosperity which it had not experienced when of less circumscribed extent. Hundreds of villages, which had been left desolate, were re-peopled, and the peasantry, in following the plough, laid aside the spear and shield which they had been formerly obliged to bear for their defence during their agricultural labours. The mercenary troops were greatly reduced, and the expenses of the court economically regulated. In the course of a year, the revenue was raised from a nominal amount of four lakhs of rupees—the whole of which had been formerly anticipated by assignments in favour of military marauders—to fourteen lakhs; and, continuing to improve during the life of the minister, amounted at his death, in 1826, to thirty-five lakhs of rupees.

The principal objects that required British interference, were the claims advanced by the state upon

BOOK II. CHAP. X. 1819.

its tributaries, and those made upon it by a particular class of its dependants. At the time of the conquest of Malwa by the Mahrattas they either expelled from their possessions the Rajput chiefs, among whom the country was divided, or, when those chiefs were too powerful, were satisfied to require from them an acknowledgment of allegiance, and payment of an annual tribute. The weaker Rajas, who were despoiled of their patrimonies, fled to the hills and forests, and, collecting armed followers, ravaged the districts of which they had been dispossessed. Unable to arrest their predatory incursions by force, the Mahratta rulers submitted to purchase their forbearance, and granted them fixed assignments on every village within their reach, on condition that they desisted from plunder. The assignments were, in general, of small amount, but they were irregularly paid, and still more irregularly levied, and afforded a constant excuse for rapine and disorder. The number of claimants of this order, termed Grasias, from the nature of their demands,[1] was considerable. The more powerful Rajas were much fewer, but there were several tributary to Holkar, or Sindhia, or to both. In the general anarchy which had prevailed, their lands had been laid waste, and their means of discharging their tributes had been greatly reduced. But the means of enforcing payment had been equally enfeebled, and long arrears had been suffered to accumulate, the liquidation of which was a fruitful subject of contention between them and their superior lords. By the

[1] They were so termed from *Grás*, a mouthful, or as much as may be put into the mouth at once.

intervention of the British functionaries, both descriptions of claims were adjusted. The assignments of the Grasias were commuted for fixed payments by the public treasury, and arrangements were entered into for the gradual discharge of the arrears, and the regular payment of the stipulated tribute of the dependent Rajas. In this manner the states of Jabua and Narsinggerh, dependencies of Holkar, and those of Amjira, Ratlam, Silana, Sitamow, and others tributary to Sindhia, were made to contribute to the resources of the paramount power, while protected against its extortion by the interposition of the British Residents. 1819.

Little else occurred seriously to disturb the peaceable settlement of the Holkar state, although attempts were made to dispute the title, and even the identity of the young Raja. The former had a claimant, with a preferable right, in the person of Hari Rao Holkar, the son of Etoji, the elder brother of Mulhar Rao, who was put to death by the Peshwa. The young man showed little inclination to dispute the pretensions of his cousin, but he was detained in easy confinement by the prudence of the minister. The attempt to contest the Raja's personal identity was attended with more trouble. It was asserted that the young Raja had fled alone from Mahidpur, and concealed himself in an unfrequented part of the country, so effectually that he could not be found. As, however, the British refused to treat with any authority except the Raja, Tantia Jôg had provided for the occasion the supposititious prince who now bore the title. The story was well supported, and the appearance and deportment of the

1819.

Pretender gave it so much the air of probability, that several old servants of the family believed its authenticity. There was no difficulty in collecting troops—many of the disbanded soldiers of Holkar's armies were wandering about the neighbourhood, and were ready to join any cause which held out the promise of free quarters and unrestricted pillage. Active measures were, however, promptly adopted, and the insurrection was suppressed before it had attained maturity. Krishna, the pretended Mulhar Rao, was captured, and proved to be the adopted son of a member of the family, of the age of the Raja, and not unlike him in person. After a short confinement, he was set at liberty, as not likely to be again formidable. With the exception of the occasional disturbances created by refractory dependants, the affairs of the Holkar state continued for several years to prosper, under the able administration of Tantia Jôg, and the support and advice of Mr. Wellesley, the Resident.

West of the territories of Holkar, extending towards Guzerat, are situated the two small states of Dhar and Dewas, the governments of kindred chiefs. Their ancestors were Rajputs of the Powar tribe, but they had migrated at an early period to the south, and had become naturalised as Mahrattas. Included among the Peshwa's officers, they obtained assignments of land and tributes in Malwa upon the Mahratta conquest; and, although their possessions had been reduced to extreme insignificance by dissensions among themselves, and the encroachments of Sindhia, Holkar, and the other more powerful Mahratta leaders, they still retained a portion of

their patrimony, and a place among the Mahratta princes of Malwa. Upon the advance of the British armies, they applied to be taken under protection, and, as part of the plan of effecting a settlement of Malwa, the application was, after some investigation, complied with. Allegiance, with military service on the one hand, and protection on the other, were the main conditions of the contracts.[1] Dhar ceded to the British government its claims of tribute on the Rajput principalities of Banswara and Dungerpur, and as security for a pecuniary loan, the province of Bairsia for five years. This district was eventually restored to Dhar. 1819.

The relations established with Sindhia have been already noticed. They continued unaltered, and Dowlat Rao seems to have learned to rely upon the friendly disposition of the British authorities, with some degree of confidence, although unable to divest himself wholly of suspicion of its ultimate designs against him. In his own language, although it might be possible for a man to become familiar with a tiger, and enter his cell without the fear of instant destruction, yet it would be difficult to remove all apprehension from his mind that he might at last become the prey of the animal. The anticipation has not been falsified, although its verification was deferred. The actual conduct of his allies was, however, calculated to confirm his reliance. The contingent, under British officers, performed services for Sindhia, which his other troops, perpetually in a state of mutiny and disorder, were

[1] Treaty with the Raja of Dewas, 12th December, 1818, and with the Raja of Dhar, 10th January, 1819.

BOOK II. CHAP. X. 1819.

unable to effect; recovered for him the province of Gurra Kota, from which his officers had been expelled; and reduced to submission the chiefs Ajit Sing and Dhaukal Sing, who had succeeded to the rights and resolution of Jaysing of Raghugerh. The latter of these chiefs repeatedly foiled all attempts to prevent his incursions into the settled territories, and defeated the detachments sent against him. He was at length taken by Captain Blacker, with part of the contingent, when a compromise was effected, by which the Khychwari chiefs recovered the town of Raghugerh, and were allowed pensions, in commutation of their other claims. The contingent was effective also in enforcing Sindhia's authority in a domestic quarrel. Patankar, the governor of his districts in Guzerat, having withdrawn from court, and carried with him his son, who had been betrothed to the Raja's daughter, the recovery of the bridegroom, as well as the preservation of his dependencies, were objects, for the realisation of which, the contingent was successfully employed. Sindhia had recourse also to the British government for assistance under the pecuniary difficulties by which he was constantly embarrassed. His own habits of life, and the expense of an armed rabble, useless in the altered condition of India, and at all times as formidable to those in whose service they were enlisted as to their enemies, occasioned a surplus expenditure, which left the Prince at the mercy of the bankers and money-lenders of his court, and perpetuated the mismanagement of his territory, by the practice of payment of loans through assignments on the reve-

nue. Still Sindhia preferred a struggle with his difficulties to a resignation of his independence; and, although he professed indifference as to what might become of his country after his death, he steadily persisted in declining to contract any subsidiary alliance.

A general agreement, stipulating for the co-operation of the Nawab of Bhopal with the British divisions in the part of Malwa contiguous to his principality, had been entered into at the commencement of the campaign. A formal compact was not executed until the principal events of the war had occurred. A treaty was then concluded, in which the Nawab acknowledged the supremacy of the British Government, and received the assurance of its protection. No tribute was imposed, but the Nawab agreed to furnish a contingent force of six hundred horse and one thousand foot, whenever required; and to assist, in case of necessity, with all his troops. In requital of his services against the Pindaris, a valuable accession of territory was granted to him from the possessions of the Vinchur Kar, which had devolved upon the British; and, at a subsequent date, the fort of Islamnagar, obtained by exchange from Sindhia, was restored to Bhopal. This was peculiarly grateful to the Nawab and his Mohammedan subjects, as it was the first strong place acquired by Dost-Mohammed, the founder of the family, and was made his capital. It had been taken by Sindhia's predecessor by treachery, and the strength of the fortress rendered its recovery by force hopeless. It was situated within a short distance of Bhopal, and its occupation by a Mahratta garrison was a perpe-

BOOK II. CHAP. X. 1819.

tual insult and annoyance. Its restoration was, therefore, a subject of national rejoicing to the Bhopal Pathans, and drew forth expressions of the warmest gratitude from Nazar Mohammed. There was no reason to question his sincerity; but he did not live long enough to attest it by his acts, and his early death was attended by circumstances ill-adapted to secure the consolidation and prosperity of his principality. A few months after the conclusion of the treaty, Nawab Nazar Mohammed was killed by a pistol shot. He had retired to the interior apartments of his palace, in company with his infant daughter and his brother-in-law, Faujdar Khan, a boy but eight years of age. There were no grounds to suspect treason, except the relationship of the Begum and her brother to Ghaus Mohammed, whom Vizir Mohammed had virtually deposed; and the affection of the Begum, and the tender years of the boy, as well as the circumstances under which the Nawab perished, satisfied the authorities, by whom a strict investigation was set on foot, that the pistol must have been accidentally fired by Faujdar Khan, in play with his brother-in-law.[1] Upon the death of the Nawab, the chief members of the family, and of the court, in the exercise of a privilege sanctified by the usages of the principality, elected, in concert with the British Resident, the son of Amir Mohammed, the elder brother of the Nawab, who had been debarred from the succession by the will of Vizir Mohammed, and the exigency of the times, to which his character was unfitted. The succession was restored to his son, but

[1] Major Henley, &c.—See Malcolm, Central India, i. 417.

on the condition of his betrothal to the infant daughter, the only child of Nazar Mohammed; and that, during the minority of the parties, the government should be administered by the Begum, as Regent, aided by two of the principal members of the family, and the counsels of the Resident. Although the advance of Bhopal proved less rapid than had been anticipated by the sanguine expectations of Sir John Malcolm, it continued to be well governed, and to prosper under the new administration. The Begum, notwithstanding her youth, being now about nineteen, had been highly educated according to the system of Mohammedan instruction, and proved herself a woman of ability, resolution, and judgment.

The greatest gainers by the change of affairs in central India should have been the princes of Rajputana, and they did not fail to reap important benefits from the revolution, although their own wretched management frustrated, in some degree, the natural tendency of events. They were comprehended under two classes, secondary and principal, including under the first head the petty chiefs of Banswara, Dungerpur, Pertabgerh, Sirohi, Krishnagerh, Kerauli, Bundi, and Kota; and under the second, the more powerful and distinguished Rajas of Udaypur, Jaypur, Jodhpur, Jesselmer and Bhikaner. With each of these, formal engagements were contracted, upon the general basis of subordinate coöperation, and acknowledged supremacy.

The Rajput princes of the inferior order, who, strong in the formation of their country and their native courage, compelled the Mahratta invaders

BOOK II. CHAP. X. 1819.

to substitute tribute for subjugation, are found chiefly in a rugged country, west of the sources of the Chambal, between Malwa and Guzerat, known by the denomination of Bagar and Kanthal. In the former were situated Banswara and Dungerpur, while the Raj of Pertabgerh was considered equivalent to the latter. The Raja of Banswara had negotiated at Baroda for an alliance in 1812, offering to pay three-eighths of his revenue in requital of the protection of his territory and principality. He was referred to Delhi, and an envoy was accredited to the Political Agent, who, when it was resolved to take the Rajputs under the ægis of the British power, was instructed to conclude a treaty on the terms proposed.[1] The Raja disavowed his agent, but declared himself to be still desirous of British protection, and a second treaty was framed and ratified, by which, in lieu of a proportion of the revenue, the Raja engaged to pay to the British Government the arrears of tribute due to Dhar, and to continue the payment annually, in a scale of progressive augmentation, until it should rise to the amount that might be required for the military defence of the country—the final tribute not to exceed three-eighths of the revenue.[2] In the event of delay, or failure of payment, a British agent should be appointed to receive the collection. The terms of the engage-

[1] Treaty, 16th September, 1818, and 25th December, 1818. Treaties, Marquis of Hastings' Administration, xcix. cvii. Agreement with Bhawani Sing, 11th February, 1823.

[2] The arrears were estimated at 35,000 rupees, which were to be paid in three years. The tribute for three years was fixed at 17,000, 20,000, and 25,000 respectively. In 1827-8 the Banswara tribute amounted to 30,000 rupees, it afterwards declined to 25,000.—Sutherland. In the Commons' Report, App. Pol. p. 182, the tribute of Banswara is called 130,000 rupees, and that of the two preceding years, severally 50,000 and 40,000.

ment formed with the Raja of the neighbouring state of Dungerpur,[1] a kinsman of the Rana of Udaypur, were precisely the same as those with the Nawab of Banswara. The Raja died in July, 1819, and was succeeded by his son, Bhawani Sing, who was placed upon his cushion of sovereignty by the assistant to the Political Agent in Malwa. 1819.

The Raja of Pertabgerh was also a scion of the ruling family of Udaypur. He had been tributary to Holkar, but had been released from his dependance on that chief, by a treaty concluded with him in 1804, by Colonel Murray, commanding the Guzerat division. This treaty, and others concluded on the same occasion, with the petty Rajas in this part of India, were never formally ratified by the British Government, and had no other result than that of exposing the chiefs to the vindictive resentment of the Mahrattas. Pertabgerh had experienced its full share of the evil consequences of a precipitate contract, and readily sought relief in a new and better guaranteed agreement. Protection was promised, as was assistance against the mountain tribes of the neighbourhood, and against the Raja's refractory subjects,[2] in return for which the Raja agreed to pay, by instalments, the arrears of tribute due to Holkar, and a gradually increasing annual tribute, until it should reach a stipulated sum.[3] Under these arrangements, this petty state

[1] Treaty with Sri Jeswant Sing, Raja of Dungerpur, 11th December, 1818. Treaties, Marquis of Hastings' Administration, ciii.

[2] Agreement with the Raja of Pertabgerh, 9th December, 1818. Treaties, Hastings Papers, c.

[3] 72,000 rupees. This again was paid to the Government of Holkar, the British Government, although claiming the allegiance and the tribute of Pertabgerh for itself, agreeing to pay to Holkar the same sum as the latter amounted to.

BOOK II. CHAP. X.

1819.

continued to prosper, notwithstanding the occasional occurrence of domestic dissension. One important benefit realised to these feeble principalities was their extrication from a swarm of military adventurers, chiefly Arabs, Sindhis, and Mekranis, who, called in to engage in their mutual quarrels, had become, to a great extent, masters of the country. The dismissal of these mercenaries formed an article in each of the several engagements, but as it would have been incapable of fulfilment by the princes themselves, the employment of British troops was essential to its accomplishment; and by their aid a burthen that pressed heavily upon the resources of the state was thrown off. Above four thousand mercenaries were expelled, in the course of two years, from the country west of the Chambal. The benefit afforded by the repression of the incursions of the Bhils and Mhers was also of great magnitude, not only to the several states, but to Malwa and Hindustan; the roads to which, from Guzerat and the sea-coast, lay through Dungerpur and Banswara, and being now rendered secure from robbery and murder, were again thrown open to foreign traffic.

The Rajput ruler of Sirohi, a small principality on the south-eastern borders of Jodhpur, early applied to the British Resident at Baroda to be taken under protection. The position of this state in the line of communication between Rajputana, and Guzerat recommended the formation of an alliance with the Raja, and the overture was favourably received. The conclusion of any agreement was delayed by the claims preferred by the Raja of Jodhpur, who maintained that Sirohi was included

among his tributary dependencies. The claim was denied, although it was admitted that military incursions had been occasionally inflicted on Sirohi by the Raja of Jodhpur, or some of his Thakurs, for the purpose of levying arbitrary contributions.[1] No engagements of allegiance or protection had ever been exchanged. It was therefore determined to extend to Sirohi the connection subsisting with the petty Rajput princes of Bagar and Kanthal, and thus form a continuous series of protected states from the frontiers of Malwa to those of Guzerat, where the chiefs of Pahlanpur, and Radhanpur, feudatories of the Gaekwar, under British supervision, completed the chain. The principality of Sirohi, although more extensive than either of the other petty states of this class,[2] was less populous and productive, being situated among the Aravali mountains, and inhabited chiefly by Bhils and Minas, more addicted to plunder than to cultivation. At the time when the connection was first established, the poverty of the country had been enhanced by the oppressive rule of the Raja. He had been deposed by his subjects, and

[1] The petty and harassing nature of these incursions may be best conceived from examples. The village and lands of Srivara on the frontiers of Sirohi, had been subjected to a contribution levied by a body of Jodhpur troops, about once in three years, of one hundred and eighty rupees (say £18). In 1818-19, a demand was made of 1400 rupees (£140), which the village being unable to pay, the invaders accepted a promissory note for 800 rupees (not likely ever to be honoured), and a mare, valued at 600 rupees, for the balance. The two villages of Raniwara had been made, in like manner, to pay 300 rupees; in the same year they were plundered to the extent of 1000 rupees, were obliged to grant a bill for 500 rupees more, and were robbed of four hundred goats and sheep, besides being exposed to the insolence and violence of a lawless soldiery.—MS. Rec. Treaty with Seo Sing, Regent of Sirohi, 31st October, 1823.

[2] The area of Sirohi is calculated at three thousand square miles. That of Dungerpur, the next in size, at two thousand. Banswara and Pertabgerh at about one thousand four hundred each.

BOOK II. CHAP. X. 1819.

the Government was in the hands of his brother, as Regent, with whom the alliance was contracted. The presence of a Political Agent for some years at Sirohi, enabled the Raja to resume his authority, while it checked his tyranny, and the country was gradually restored to order and comparative prosperity.

Krishnagerh is a small state on the western borders of Jaypur, and immediately north of the British province of Ajmir. The treaty with the Raja provided for his military service when required, to the extent of his means, and promised protection, without interference in the internal management of the country.[1] Accordingly, at a subsequent date, in a dispute between the Raja and his Thakurs or nobles, the parties were allowed to adjust their own quarrel; and the Raja, upon being besieged in his capital by his Thakurs, was obliged to purchase their return to obedience by a confirmation of those privileges of which he had attempted to deprive them. So disgusted was the Raja with the result, that he abdicated his power in favour of his son; and, on condition of an annual pension from the revenue, retired to a private life in the British territories. Karauli,[2] a still smaller principality, on the eastern limit of Jaypur, early applied for British protection. The tribute paid by the Raja to the Mahrattas was remitted; and no conditions but those of general allegiance, and military service when required, were stipulated. The advantages of the engagement were entirely on the side of the Raja; and no in-

[1] Treaty with the Raja of Krishnagerh, 28th March, 1818. Treaties, Hastings Papers, xciv.

[2] Treaty with the Raja of Karauli, 9th November, 1817. Ibid. lxxix.

terference has ever been exercised in his territory. He has, nevertheless, been unable to resist the bias of his natural propensity to embark in hazardous scenes of strife and peril, and was known to have furnished military aid to Bhurtpur, on an occasion which will be hereafter noticed.[1] It was not thought necessary to visit with severity, a breach of faith so insignificant in its consequences. 1819.

The engagements that were entered into with the states of Haravati, or Bundi, and Kota, were of more substantive importance, and were an essential part of the political system adopted by the Governor-General. The treaty with Bundi relieved it of all tribute formerly paid to Holkar, and transferred to the British Government, the collection of that which had been reserved to Sindhia, amounting to eighty thousand rupees. The lands which had been appropriated by Holkar within the limits of Bundi, were also restored to the Raja.[2] The grounds on which this state had deserved the bounty of the British Government,—the assistance afforded to Colonel Monson, on his retreat, have been already adverted to. The Raja died in the middle of 1821, and his son, Ram Sing, a boy of eleven years of age, was placed on the cushion, by the British agent in Rajputana, who conferred upon the youth the 'tika,' or mark of sovereignty, as the representative

[1] "When the British Government was involved in the Burmese war, and Bhurtpur prepared for defence, under the usurpation of Durjan Sál, there was no doubt that Keraoli sent troops to the aid of the usurper, and assembled troops for its own defence. On the fall of that fortress, Keraoli made strong protestations of attachment, and it was not deemed necessary to take any serious notice of its proceedings."—Sutherland, 113.

[2] Treaty with Bishen Sing Raja of Bundi, 10th February, 1818. Treaties, xci.

1819.

of the paramount Lord. A council of Regency was appointed of four principal ministers of the Raja; but it was soon after dissolved by the influence of the queen mother, who assumed the character of Regent, and appointed her own minister. On his death, in the beginning of 1823, the young Raja nominated a successor, without consulting the political agent; but, as it appeared that the choice was judicious, it was confirmed; and the state under able management, continued prosperous. In the same year, the young Raja, then in his twelfth year, married a princess of Jaypur, who was in her twenty-fifth, the disparity of years being more than compensated by the honour of the alliance. The connexion was productive, at a later date, of disastrous consequences.

The real ruler of Kota, the Raj Rana, Zalim Sing, had, from the first, associated himself with the policy of the British Government, and had at once entered into a treaty of alliance. It was concluded with the sovereign of whom Zalim Sing professed to be the minister, the Maha Rao, Umed Sing. The tributes heretofore paid to the Mahrattas, were made payable, according to a stipulated scale, to the British Government.

The exercise of the supreme authority of Kota, by Zalim Sing, was apparently conformable to the wishes of the Raja Umed Sing, who, being of an unambitious and indolent disposition, rejoiced to be exempted from the cares of government. He was not subjected to any personal restraint; maintained a show of state; and was treated by Zalim Sing with the utmost deference. Still he had been

so little heard of, or known in the transactions of central India, for many years past, that the British Government looked only to his representative; and was prepared, at the period of the negotiations with Kota, to have acknowledged Zalim Sing as the head of the principality. That prudent chief's regard for the opinion of Rajputana, which, however indifferent to the appropriation of the authority, would have severely condemned the usurpation of the title of Raja, deterred him from taking advantage of the friendly disposition or ignorance of his allies; and the treaty was designated as having been framed with the Raja, through the administrator of the affairs of Kota. This was considered, however, an insufficient recognition of Zalim Sing's actual power, and a supplementary article was therefore framed, by which, while the succession of the principality was acknowledged to be vested in the son of Umed Sing, it was also provided that the administration should be in like manner heritable, and after being exercised by the Raj Rana Zalim Sing, should descend to his eldest son and his heirs in regular succession in perpetuity:[1] thus sanctioning the co-existence of a double government, and virtually guaranteeing the perpetual independence of a hereditary minis-

[1] Supplementary Article. The contracting parties agree that, after Mâha Rao Omed Sing, the principality shall descend to his eldest son and heir-apparent, Maharaj Kowar Kishour Sing, and his heirs in regular succession and perpetuity; and that the entire administration of the affairs of the principality shall be vested in Raj Rana Zalim Sing, and after him in his eldest son, Kooar Madhu Sing, and his heirs in regular succession in perpetuity. Concluded at Delhi, February 20th, 1818. This article is not found in the Collection of the Hastings Papers, nor in any Parliamentary Collection. It is given in a collection of Treaties printed at Bombay, apparently under the sanction of the Government.

ter. The inconveniences of such a guarantee were soon manifested.

1820. The Raja of Kota, Umed Rao, died in December, 1819, and was succeeded by his eldest son Kesari Sing.[1] The young Prince submitted, although with impatience, to the control of the aged minister, but cherished an insuperable dislike to the eldest son of Zalim Sing, and insisted on his right to choose his own confidential adviser and eventual minister in the person of Govardhan Das, the younger son of the Raj Rana, and the new sovereign's early associate and friend. In the prosecution of his purpose, the Rao adopted measures which menaced the political authority of Zalim Sing, and the Governor-General, in conformity with the principle of the supplementary article of the treaty, directed the Political Agent in Rajputana, Captain Tod, to interfere and uphold the minister against the Raja, to the extent even, if necessary, of deposing the latter. His dismissal of Govardhan Das was demanded, but the demand was resisted until troops were employed to surround the fort and prohibit the entrance of supplies, by which the Raja was starved into a temporary acquiescence. Govardhan Das was obliged to withdraw from Kota, and a seeming reconciliation was affected between the veteran minister and the Raja. It was not of long duration: as soon as the Resident had left the city, the quarrel revived with enhanced violence, and broke out into actual hostilities. Kesari Sing became alarmed and fled to Delhi, where he was

[1] Sutherland calls him Krishna Sing, but the public documents have Kishore (for Kesarí?) Sing.

detained until he promised to relinquish all pretension to interfere in the administration of his government. This promise he also broke, and, returning to Rajputana, had recourse to Bundi and Jaypur for aid. The sense of the country was universally in his favour. Notwithstanding Zalim Sing's unquestionable merits, his encroachments on the hereditary rights of the Raja were regarded as a dereliction of his duties as a subject, and as an indefensible and traitorous usurpation. Encouragement was given by the ruling authorities of different states to Kesari Sing to assert his claims, and many of the Rajput chiefs brought their followers to his standard, so that in a short time he had assembled six thousand men. It is questionable if Zalim Sing, left to his own resources, could have maintained himself against his lawful Prince, but the British troops were at hand to uphold his disloyalty. An action was fought at Mangrole, in which Kesari Sing was defeated. Prithvi Sing, his younger brother, and many of the chiefs who had embraced his cause were killed, and the Raja made his escape with no more than three hundred horse: the rest were dispersed. Finding that his attempts to throw off the yoke of his minister, while so powerfully supported, were hopeless, Kesari Sing submitted to the pleasure of the British Government, and was replaced in his titular sovereignty; a fixed stipend was assigned to him for his subsistence, and he was allowed to maintain a small body guard of horse and foot, but his authority was restricted to his own immediate dependants, and the real rule of Kota was once more confirmed to the Raj Rana.

1820.

BOOK II. CHAP. X. 1820.

Zalim Sing died in little more than two years after the restoration of the Raja, and was succeeded as minister by his son Madhu Sing. The animosity between the servant and the master, and the want of ability and character in both, demanded the continued presence of a Resident at Kota, and imposed upon him the duty of preserving unimpaired the respective rights and privileges of the minister and the Raja.[1]

We have now to review the relations which were formed with the more eminent Rajput states, and first with the Rana of Udaypur, the anxiety of which prince to be sheltered by British protection from the outrages and insolence of the Mahrattas and Patans had been signified to the British Resident at Delhi, long before the altered policy of the Government allowed it to gratify his wishes. As soon as the abandonment of the principle of non-interference was known, the Vakils of the Rana presented themselves at Delhi, and a treaty was speedily concluded by which Udaypur became tributary to the British, on account of protection against every other claimant.[2] The tribute was fixed at one-fourth of the revenue for the first five

[1] It was a subject of regret to the British Government, on the death of Zalim Sing, that a division of territory could not, consistently with the terms of the treaty, be made between the Raja of Kota and Madhu Sing. After many years of hesitation this arrangement was carried into effect, and put an end to the contest between incompatible hereditary successions. In 1838 the parties agreed, at the instance of the British Government, to a partition of the country. The Raj Rana, the son and successor of Madhu Sing, received one third of the dominions of Kota, thenceforward termed Jhalawar. The remaining two-thirds continued in the occupancy of the Maha Rao Ram Sing, the nephew and adopted son of Kesari Sing.—Bengal and Agra Gazetteer, ii. part ii, p. 197.

[2] Treaty with the Raja of Udaypur, 13th January, 1818. Treaties, xc.

years, and after that, three-eighths in perpetuity.[1] But the more remarkable feature in the treaty was, the acknowledgment of the supremacy of the British Government by a state which, amidst all its disasters and distress, had never recognised a superior in either Mohammedan or Mahratta. Nor had Udaypur ever paid regular tribute to the Mahrattas, although heavy contributions had been levied from time to time, and alienations of territory had been enforced as the price of forbearance, or as the requital of subsidiary service. All lands which had been assigned unauthorisedly, or had been seized by the officers of Sindhia and Holkar for no adequate reason,[2] the British Government undertook to recover, confirming those grants which had been voluntarily made. The Resident was also empowered to redeem on behalf of the Rana the domains of the Crown which, in the recent relaxation of all law and authority, had been silently usurped by his most powerful vassals. The Resident was able to effect this object by remonstrance and persuasion, and the Thakurs consented to restore all lands usurped from the Rana or each other since A. D. 1766; to observe faithfully their allegiance, and to discharge the duties under which they held their possessions.[3] They

[1] Sindhia claimed three-fifths of the revenue, and the Chouth, or fourth, besides, but upon no equitable grounds, and his claims were set aside. For several years no tribute was realized. From 1824-5 to 1826-7, nearly three lakhs were annually exacted, but this was found to press too heavily on the revenues. The last returns are about one lakh and a half (£15,000).

[2] These amounted, according to Captain Tod, to an annual revenue of above thirty lakhs of rupees. Sixteen having been appropriated by Sindhia's captains, fourteen by Holkar's.—MS.

[3] Among them was the attendance for three months alternately at Court in command of a body of their own followers, "in order to give strength and respectability to the executive government." The articles of the agreement are given by Mr. Prinsep, ii. 362.

1820.

also engaged to abstain from mutual hostilities, to harbour no banditti, to commit no violence on travellers and traders, and to cherish their peasantry. These obligations were fulfilled with various degrees of fidelity, and the growth of the country in prosperity was progressive, although retarded by the improvidence and extravagance of the Rana, Bhim Sing, by which, after some years, he was plunged into embarrassments little inferior to those from which he had been extricated by the British alliance. His revenue, however, as well as the condition of the country improved. In 1817 the royal lands returned scarcely a yearly sum of three thousand rupees; in 1821 they yielded about eleven lakhs. In the course of four years the inhabited houses of the capital increased from three thousand to ten thousand.[1] Bhilara, a commercial town of importance, and once containing twelve thousand families, but which latterly had not a single inhabitant, recovered, in less than a year, seven hundred families, among whom were many merchants and bankers. Commerce again became active, and travelling comparatively secure; and cultivation transformed the wilderness which had spread over the country, in consequence of its depopulation, to fields of grain, reaped without fear of their being laid waste by bands of mercenary Patans or predatory Mahrattas.[2]

[1] According to the Rana's own statement to Captain Tod, "when Jamshid Khan (the officer left by Amir Khan in charge of the Rana) was here no respectable man could walk the streets without being seized, and, unless he paid a sum of money, he was stripped. Men's wives and daughters were forcibly torn from their dwellings. Had the British not been here at this moment, the rents of the surrounding fields would have been in requisition, and parties of mercenary troops encamped in the valley. We were obliged to pluck the sour fruit before it was ripe, or it was taken from us."

[2] Bishop Heber passed through Udaypur and the neighbouring Rajput

The renewal of the alliance with Jaypur had been most earnestly solicited by the Raja as early as 1815, but a compliance with his requisition was the subject of much doubt and discussion, as we have already had occasion to observe. The Governor-General, considering it to be an essential part of his plans for the suppression of predatory warfare, carried the question in the affirmative, and the Resident at Delhi was authorised to enter into a negotiation with the Jaypur envoys. They, however, then held back, in conformity with the policy of their court, which anticipated relief from the exactions of Amir Khan, by the mere rumour of a British alliance, from the formation of which it was deterred by the opposition of the nobles, the advice of Jodhpur, and the menace of Sindhia that he would join Amir Khan if the negotiation proceeded. The expectation was in part realised. Amir Khan suspended operations, and the court of Jaypur, hoping to conclude a treaty with him on advantageous terms, marked their indifference to the British alliance, by suddenly proposing conditions which were inadmissible. The negotiation was declared to be at an end, but fresh applications from the Raja to the Governor-General led to its renewal. It was again

1820.

States on the way to Guzerat, in the beginning of 1825, at a time when the country was suffering from the effects of a season of drought, but he frequently notices the abundant crops of wheat, barley, and poppies. He also passed through Bhilwara, and describes it as a large town with a greater appearance of trade, industry, and moderate but widely diffused wealth and comfort, than he had seen since he left Delhi. The streets were full of carts laden with corn and flour, the shops stored with all kinds of woollen, felt, cotton, and hardware goods, and the neatness of their workmanship in iron surpassed what he could have expected to see. The people unanimously ascribed the renovation of their town to Captain Todd. —Narrative of a Journey, &c., ii. 46.

BOOK II. CHAP. X. 1820.

broken off, the amount of the subsidy being objected to by the agents, and the Minister of Jaypur declaring in open court that they had never been authorised to accede to any pecuniary payment for a subsidiary force. The envoys, nevertheless, remained at Delhi, confident that the intercourse with Amir Khan would end in disappointment, and that the Raja must eventually throw himself on British protection. They judged rightly, and after three years' vacillation, a treaty was concluded with Jaypur. Protection was promised on the one part, and allegiance on the other; and to defray the expense of the military defence of the Raj, was henceforth the duty of the protected power. Jaypur agreed to pay as a tribute, a progressively augmenting subsidy until it amounted to eight lakhs annually—at which sum it should be fixed until the revenue amounted to forty lakhs a-year, when five-sixteenths of the excess were to be added to the sum of eight lakhs.[1] The state was released from all other claims. As usual in all the engagements contracted at this season a clause was inserted, acknowledging the Raja and his successors absolute rulers of their territory and dependants. The treaty was scarcely concluded when interference in the internal government of Jaypur became necessary to preserve it from the horrors of a civil war.

The constitution of the Rajput states assigns a voice in the management of public affairs, to cer-

[1] Treaty with Jaypur, 2nd April, 1818. Treaties, xcv. The resources of Jaypur were greatly over-rated. In the first six years the collection fell short by five lakhs of the whole sum stipulated; in the next five by ten lakhs; and, by the last accounts, amounted to no more than thirty-one lakhs. —App. Pol. Report, p. 188. Bengal and Agra Gazetteer, ii. 11, 191.

tain of the chief nobles, or Thakurs, of the principality, each of whom fills much the same position as that of a feudal baron in the middle ages; holding his lands by the tenure of military service, governing them with independent power, engaged frequently in hostilities with his neighbours, and singly, or in coalition with other chiefs, sometimes taking up arms against his liege lord. Under an active and prudent Raja the Thakurs might be subjected to control; but Jagat Sing, dissolute and indolent, had aggravated by his defects, the disorders induced by foreign invasion, and had suffered the power of the Raja to fall into insignificance and contempt by the impunity with which he permitted his great vassals to encroach upon the demesne of the crown; or the imprudence with which he alienated his revenues in favour of military or religious persons, on conditions which they wholly disregarded. It became necessary to interfere to protect his power from annihilation; and a minister having been appointed with the sanction and support of Sir David Ochterlony, who united the chief civil and military authority in this part of Rajputana, many of the grants to undeserving individuals were resumed; and it was proposed to the Thakurs to assent to an arrangement, similar to that effected at Udaypur, by which they should consent to relinquish their usurpations. Their assent was not obtained until an example had been made of the most refractory, and the strong-holds of Kusalgerh and Madhurajpur had been captured by British troops. Before, however, any comprehensive arrangement was accomplished, Jagat Sing died. He left no heir. The

BOOK II. CHAP. X. 1820.

succession was claimed by Man Sing, son of the late Raja's elder brother; but he was unacceptable to the Thakurs, being born of a woman of inferior rank; and he was set aside in favour of a boy, said to have been adopted by the Raja in his dying moments. The genuineness of the adoption was questioned, but the opportune birth of a posthumous son, by one of the Ranis, rendered its validity unimportant. A dispute, however, arose for the ministry. The infant Raja's mother was acknowledged regent; but the appointment of her minister was demanded by the majority of the chiefs, who combined to place Bhyri Sal, one of their body, at the head of the state. The Political Agent was again obliged to interpose in order to protect the life of the actual minister, Mohan Ram, whom he had all along supported; but as the party opposed to him was of sufficient influence to nullify all his acts, it was thought prudent to yield to his dismission, and acquiesce in the elevation of Bhyri Sal. This was sufficient to create a new opposition, and a contest for power arose between the new minister and the officers and servants of the interior of the palace, where the two principal widows of Jagat Sing intrigued for the promotion of their creatures, and, according to popular scandal, their paramours. To obviate the mischief thus engendered, and to arrest the misappropriation of the resources of the state, which were lavishly alienated by both parties to secure adherents, it was determined to establish a permanent Resident at Jaypur; and although the measure was equally distasteful to both factions, Major Stewart was sent to Jaypur, in that capacity, in 1821.

This interposition was vindicated, not only by a regard for the interests of the minor Raja, but for those of the British Government, as the prodigal dissipation of the revenue was likely to prevent the punctual payment of the tribute. The interposition of the Resident was, in the first instance, restricted to advice, but this was found ineffectual to remedy the evils of a divided administration—the influence of Jhota Ram, the favourite of the Regent Rani, neutralising the authority of Bhyri Sal, and encouraging resistance to his orders. More positive interference was, therefore, had recourse to, and the Rani mother was threatened with the transfer of the Regency to the other widow of the Raja, who was of superior rank, being the daughter of the Raja of Jodhpur, unless she consented to the removal of her favourite. Jhota Ram was accordingly sent from court, and the sole authority vested for a while in Bhyri Sal. The Rani had, however, a strong party among the Thakurs, and the arrangement continued undisturbed only as long as it received the decided and vigorous support of the British Government. These dissensions prevented the principality of Jaypur from deriving the full advantage to have been expected from the expulsion of the predatory hordes by which it had been so long and so mercilessly ravaged.

The Government of Jodhpur early signified its willingness to contract an alliance upon the conditions which had been declined in 1804. A treaty was accordingly concluded on the same terms as those formed with the other Rajput states. Jodhpur received military protection on condition of acknowledging the supremacy of the British power;

1820.

and affording, when required, a force of fifteen hundred horse, or, in time of need, the whole of its disposable troops. The tribute paid to Sindhia, amounting to one lakh and eight thousand rupees a-year, was thenceforth payable to the British Government. The absolute authority of the Raja and his successors over their own dominions was admitted.[1] The treaty was concluded with Man Sing, as represented by the Prince Regent, Chatur Sing, the Raja, as we have seen, being at this time, or affecting to be, incapable of exercising the administration, and having withdrawn from public affairs. Chatur Sing died before the treaty was ratified, but the time had not yet come for the Raja to throw off the mask, and the state was governed by Salim Sing, the chief of Pokurn, and son of the Sawai Sing, murdered by Amir Khan, and by Akhai Sing, the latter as Dewan, or chief civil and financial minister. These were the leaders of the faction hostile to the Raja, and by whose aid the regency of the Prince had been maintained.

As soon as the cessation of military operations permitted, Sir David Ochterlony visited Jodhpur to ascertain the real state of parties, and early received private intimation from the Raja that he purposed to resume the reins of government.[2] He was encouraged in his resolution; but, although he held out the British alliance as an object of terror

[1] Treaty with the Raja of Jodhpur, 6th January, 1818. Treaties, lxxxix.

[2] He wrote to the General privately, stating that he had been waiting for assurances of the friendship of the British Government for three years, during which he had never shaved nor changed his apparel. He had now done both.—MS. Records.

to his disobedient nobles, he suffered some time to elapse before he manifested the full extent of his designs. Become a master in the art of dissimulation, he exhibited no resentment towards the usurpers of his power, and permitted them, with such a semblance of confidence as to lull their suspicions, to retain their ministerial functions. They paid the penalty of their imprudence. As soon as the Raja's projects were mature, the city of Jodhpur was startled by the appearance of various dead bodies thrown over the battlements of the citadel. Akhai Chand had been seized and imprisoned, made to disgorge the sums he had appropriated from the royal treasury, and was then put to death. The governor of the fort, and other members of the administration, who were found in the citadel, were treated in the same manner, and their partisans throughout the country were simultaneously arrested, tortured until they yielded up their ill-gotten wealth, and then poisoned. Salim Sing was not in the citadel, but in the town with his friend Sartan Sing of Nimaj. The house of the latter was beset by a large body of armed men, but the Thakur defended himself until most of his followers were killed, when he sallied forth with the survivors and was slain. His defence gave the chief of Pokurn opportunity to escape, but it did not save his estates from the Raja's retaliation. Taking advantage of the consternation excited by the suddenness and ferocity of his vengeance, Man Sing dispatched the troops, which the treasures he had recovered enabled him to levy, against the divided and bewildered Thakurs, and compelled them to fly for safety to the

1820.

1820.

surrounding Rajput principalities. Notwithstanding these disorders, the vigour which Man Sing displayed in the conduct of the government and the exclusion of the Patan plunderers, restored the territories of Jodhpur to tranquillity; and considerable cities, such as those of Merta and Nagore, which had been left in ruins, were repeopled and prospered.

Although situated beyond the ordinary sphere of predatory aggression, and offering little temptation to the plunderer, the Rajput state of Bhikaner had not wholly escaped, and therefore gladly joined its neighbours in the general appeal to British guardianship. The terms were, as usual, protection on the one hand, acknowledgment of supremacy on the other; abstinence from political intercourse with other states, and submission of all disputes to the arbitration of the paramount power. The British Government undertook to assist the Raja in reducing the tribes which had revolted from his authority, and he engaged to become responsible for any injury which his subjects, many of whom were notorious robbers, might have inflicted upon the adjacent British territories. The Raja also promised to provide for the safe passage of merchandise in transit through his dominions, from Kabul and Khorasan to India.[1]

The fulfilment of the stipulation, which undertook to reduce to obedience the revolted subjects of Bhikaner, was connected with the necessity of suppressing an insurrection on the frontiers of Hariana, among the Bhattis, who were the subjects of the British

[1] Treaty with Surat Sing, Raja of Bhikaner, 9th March, 1818.—Treaties, Hastings Papers, xciii.

1820.

Government, and who were assisted in their outrages by the people of Bhikaner in rebellion against their Raja. Upon the occupation of Hariana, the Bhattis who, in the course of their nomadic wanderings, frequented its western boundaries, mostly retired into the desert. Of those who remained, part were made subject to British authority and the rest were placed under that of a chief named Zabita Khan; a district being granted to him in Jagir. Although the pastoral habits of the Bhattis and their migratory life, were not incompatible with predatory practices, and they were dreaded in all the surrounding country as plunderers and robbers, they had hitherto refrained from molesting the British districts; but in the course of 1818, taking advantage of the enfeebled state of the forces usually stationed in the province, the greater part of which were still absent in Malwa, the Bhattis rose in great numbers and captured the frontier town of Fattehabad, which was guarded only by the Sikh contingent of the Naba Raja who fled from the attack. A small detachment was sent from the garrison of Hansi and Hissar[1] to recover the town, but it was driven back and with difficulty effected its retreat to Hissar in the face of a body of the enemy estimated at seven thousand strong. Reinforcements were immediately dispatched to Hariana, and a force was assembled at Hansi, under Brigadier-General Arnold,[2] for the purpose of put-

[1] Two companies of the 17th N. I., a party of the Dromedary corps, a risala of Skinner's Horse, and a brigade of guns under Major Foot.

[2] One troop of Horse Artillery, 1st N. C., two risalas of Skinner's Horse, three battalions and a half of N. I., two battalions of Begum Samru's troops and other auxiliaries, and a small battering train, in all between seven and eight thousand men.

BOOK II. CHAP. X. 1820.

ting down the insurrection on the adjoining confines of Bhikaner and Bhatner, and the capture of the forts occupied by the insurgents. Brigadier Arnold marched in the middle of August against the rebels, who fled before him into the desert. He then proceeded against their strongholds, all of which were surrendered without opposition, and most of the chiefs promised submission to their respective liege lords. Zabita Khan was removed from his Jagir, as unable to control his people, and pensioned; and the country was taken under the direct management of the British officers. The places belonging to Bhikaner were restored to the Raja.

The still more remote and sterile principality of Jesalmer equally sought the British alliance. Few points required adjustment, but a special clause provided that if invaded or menaced by any danger of great magnitude, the British government would defend the principality, provided the cause of quarrel were not imputable to the Raja. This clause was dictated by the necessity of preserving Jesalmer from the daily encroachments of more powerful neighbours, particularly of the Amirs of Sindh and the Nawab of Bahawalpur, who, but for this alliance, would have extinguished the Rajput principality.[1] The only power against which it became requisite to act was that of Bhikaner. The Maldotes, a robber tribe of the Bhatti race, made a foray from Jesalmer into Bhikaner, and carried off a number of camels, which had been purchased for the service of

[1] Treaty with Maha Rawal Mul-raj, Raja of Jesalmer, 12th December, 1818.

the Peshwa, and were on their way to the south. In retaliation, the Raja of Bhikaner sent a force against the robbers which destroyed their villages, and threatened some of the chief towns of Jesalmer. Further mischief was stopped by the intervention of the British authorities. The Raja of Jesalmer died in 1820, and was succeeded by his son Gaj Sing. 1820.

Thus was completed the connection formed with the Princes of Rajputana, who all acknowledged the supremacy of the British government, promised their subordinate coöperation in time of need, and agreed to submit their mutual disputes to its arbitration. The international peace of Hindustan was secured, and neither Rajput nor Mahratta dared henceforth draw his sword against his neighbour. The maintenance of tranquillity within the several states was less effectually cared for. Non-interference in the internal administration of each state was an invariable condition of their allegiance, a forbearance which it was impossible always to observe, and which, when observed, was generally attended with mischievous results to both prince and people. The latter had been too long accustomed to a state of violence and disorder to become at once peaceable and obedient subjects; and the former were, at all times, inclined to abuse their power, and tyrannise over those under their sway. Sources of dissension were inherent in the conflicting pretensions of the sovereign and his Thakurs —his clansmen and barons—high-spirited but turbulent chiefs, too arrogant to acknowledge subjection—too rude and ignorant to make a profitable use of independence—constantly engaged in feuds

BOOK II. CHAP. X. 1820.

with each other, or with their Prince—disregarding all law except that of the strongest—placing all their notions of honour in personal impunity, and trusting to their swords alone, for the preservation of their rights, and the assertion of their claims—it required nothing less than the strong hand of the British power to restrain them from involving themselves and their countrymen in scenes of strife and bloodshed. That hand has been somewhat capriciously interposed; sometimes held out and sometimes withdrawn. The policy pursued at one period has been departed from at another, and Rajputana has been consequently agitated by storms which a more decided, although, at the same time, moderate, application of authority might have dissipated in their birth.

CHAPTER XI.

Miscellaneous Occurrences during and after the Mahratta War.—Affairs of Cutch.—Hostility of the Rao.—His intemperance and violence.—Force sent against him.—Bhuj taken.—The Rao surrenders.—Deposed.—His infant Son raised to the Throne.—A Council of Regency, under the superintendence of the Resident.—Subsidiary Treaty.—Amirs of Sindh unfriendly.—Causes.—The Khosa Robbers attacked.—Sindh Troops enter Cutch.—Withdrawn and disavowed.—Treaty with the Amirs.—Arrangements with Kolapur.—Outrages by Plunderers from

Troops left at Kishme.—Consequences.—Defeat of a British Detachment by the Beni-Bu-Ali Arabs.—Second Expedition.—Tribe almost exterminated.—Agency abolished.—Transactions at Mocha.—Town Sawantwari.—A Force sent into the Country.—Treaties with the Regency.—Treaty with the Chief of Kolaba.—Piracies in the Persian Gulph.—Force sent against them.—Ras-al-Khaima again taken.—Treaty with the Arab Tribes.—Political Agent.—Treaty with the Imam of Senna.—Occurrences in the Eastern Archipelago.—Exclusive policy of the Dutch.—Defeated by Sir T. Stamford Raffles.—Lieutenant-Governor of Bencoolen.—His views on Sumatra.—Objected to by the Governor-General.—Offence not to be given.—Treatment by the Dutch of the Sultan of Palembang.—Determination of the Government of Bengal to secure the Straits of Malacca.—Negotiations with Malay Chiefs anticipated.—Settlement effected at Singapore.—Protested against by the Dutch.—Admitted by Treaty with Holland.—Prosperity of the Settlement.—Affairs of Achin.—Treaty with the Sultan.—Mission to Siam and Cochin China.—Relations with the Subsidiary States on the Indian Continent.—With the Gaekwar.—Death of Fateh Sing.—Prince Syaji made Dewan.—Death of Anand Rao.—Syaji succeeds.—Difficulties of position.—Arrangements.—Tranquillisation of Pahlanpur.—Of Kattiwar.—Relations with Hyderabad.—Maladministration of Chandu Lal.—Interference of the Resident.—Dissatisfaction of the Governor-General.—Question of Interference considered.—Chandu Lal's Financial embarrassment.—Connection with

the Mercantile House of Palmer and Co. — Sanctioned by the Governor-General. — Disapproved of by the Court of Directors.—Dissolved.—Affairs of Oude.—Border Plunderers.—The Nawab Vizir allowed to take the title of King.

BOOK II. CHAP. XI. 1819.

After the settlement of Central Hindustan had completed the political system of the administration of the Marquis of Hastings, no events occurred of sufficient importance to call forth a display of the immense resources that were now at the command of the British Government. A variety of transactions, however, ensued, which, although of minor moment, involved objects of considerable magnitude, arising from the determination to preserve the tranquillity of India undisturbed; from the necessity still existing of shielding maritime commerce from piratical depredation; from the duty of providing for British as well as Indian interests in the Eastern Seas; and from the obligations devolving upon the Supreme Government in the course of its relations with the several powers allied to it by subsidiary engagements. These we shall now proceed to describe.

We have already had occasion to notice the new engagements formed with Rao Bharmalji the ruler of Cutch, by which that prince became an ally of the British Government. The good understanding then established was of brief duration. The Rao, surrounding himself with dissolute and low companions, and falling into habits of gross intemperance to an extent that affected his intellects, disgusted the Jhareja chiefs by his capricious and violent conduct, and gave umbrage to his protectors by intima-

tions of inimical designs. These feelings were strengthened by the murder of the young prince Ladhuba, which was perpetrated by command of the Rao, by a party of his Arab mercenaries; from no motives that could be discovered except his own groundless jealousy and frantic disposition. The widow of Ladhuba, who was pregnant at the time of her husband's assassination, was menaced with a similar fate, and as she resided in the palace, and was consequently in the Rao's power, it is possible that the threat would not have been in vain, had not the British authorities interposed. It was not deemed expedient to demand charge of the person of the widow, lest the Rao in his indignation should be urged to the commission of the atrocity which it was sought to prevent; but he was warned that any practices against her safety, or that of her infant, would incur the severest displeasure of the British Government. The warning was not fruitless, and although the Rao indulged in menaces of the most brutal description, he refrained from attempting the life of the mother or the child, and she gave birth to a son. 1819.

Dissatisfied at the proximity of the British force at Anjar, and irritated by an interference in his family affairs, which he with truth averred was unauthorised by the treaty, the Rao began to collect mercenary troops, and to call for the contingents of his chiefs with the unavowed intention of expelling the British from his country. Knowledge of his purposes defeated their execution, and the timely arrival of an additional battalion placed the station of Anjar in security. The Rao then directed the force he had

BOOK II. CHAP. XI.

1819.

assembled, about five thousand strong, against Arisir, a fortified town belonging to Kalian Sing, the father of Ladhuba's widow, and one of the Jhareja chieftains, who were under British protection. Of this the Rao was admonished, and he was informed, that unless he desisted from his purpose he would be considered guilty of an infraction of the treaty, and would be dealt with as an enemy. The whole of the Jharejas alarmed by this attack upon one of the brotherhood, and by an attempt of the Rao to exact from them pecuniary contributions in the place of military service; indignant also at the murder of Ladhuba and the treatment of the Bai, conveyed to the Resident their readiness to support him in any measures he should propose to adopt towards the head of their Government. It was inconvenient at the moment to spare troops for carrying into effect the resolution to remove Rao Bharmalji from his throne, and he was suffered to carry on the siege of Arisir without interruption. The courage of the besieged, and the assistance of some of the neighbouring chiefs baffled the efforts of the Rao, and after detaining his troops before the place for several months, during which the garrison was reduced to great distress, compelled him to be contented with the occupation of one of the gates of the fort as an acknowledgment of his supremacy. His retreat was accelerated by the approach of British detashments which were soon concentrated at Anjar, and placed under the command of Sir William Keir.[1]

[1] The force was composed of the 1st regiment of N. C., a company of European artillery, H. M. 65th regiment, and three battalions of N. I., with guns.

The British division marched upon Bhuj on the 24th of March, 1819. As they approached the town they were charged by large masses of horse and foot, but they repulsed the enemy and drove them under the walls. Demonstrations were then made for an assault upon the town, but at the same time it was determined to attempt the surprise of the fort, and a strong detachment was sent against it before day-break on the 26th. The party reached the foot of the walls as the day broke, and the ladders were planted and the walls escaladed almost before the garrison were aware of the presence of the assailants. They fled with precipitation, and gained the town not without loss; that of the British was inconsiderable. As the town was completely commanded by the fort, the Rao was sensible of the hopelessness of resistance, and throwing himself upon the mercy of the victors, came into the British camp. His sentence had been pronounced. It was determined, in concert with the Jharejas, to depose him in favour of Rao Desal his infant son; the affairs of the Government being administered by a council of regency, composed of some of the principal Jhareja chiefs under the superintendence of the British Resident, and the guarantee of his Government.[1] The mercenary troops were dismissed, and the

[1] Soon after these events, in the middle of June, a remarkably severe earthquake laid great part of Cutch in ruins. At Bhuj seven thousand houses were overturned, and one thousand one hundred and forty people buried in the rubbish. About fifteen hundred houses were thrown down, and a like number rendered uninhabitable at Anjar. The fort was a pile of ruins. One hundred and sixty-five people were killed, and many more died of their bruises. Many other towns were partially, some wholly, destroyed. Shocks were felt in many other parts of India, as far as Nepal, but they were unattended with injury.—Papers relating to the Earthquake in India, 1819. Tr. Bombay Lit. Soc. iii. 90.

BOOK II. CHAP. XI. 1819.

defence of the principality was to be committed to a British force, the expense of which was to be defrayed by the Government of Cutch.[1] Clauses were inserted requiring the Rao and the Jharejas to suppress the practice of infanticide, and the Jhareja chiefs were guaranteed in their possessions. By a subsequent engagement, Anjar was restored to the Government of Cutch, in commutation of an annual payment of eighty-eight thousand rupees. After the novelty of these arrangements had ceased, the Jharejas were generally dissatisfied with the control to which they were subjected, by the influence of British principles in the Regency, and by the efforts which were made, with comparatively little good to suppress infanticide. They were not sufficiently united, however, to organize any effectual opposition, and the peace of the province was undisturbed. The deposed Rao was permitted to reside at Bhuj under a guard, but he manifested no inclination to recover his sovereignty.[2]

The interference exercised in the affairs of Cutch, was regarded with alarm and jealousy by the Amirs of Sindh. They had long entertained designs against the principality, and were deeply mortified to find themselves anticipated, and the country placed beyond their ambition. Other circumstances contributed to aggravate their irritation and to urge them to a course of procedure which would have led to hostilities, but for the forbearance of the British Government.

[1] The subsidy was two lakhs of Ahmedabad rupees.

[2] Treaty with the Cutch Government, 13th October, 1819. Ditto, 21st May, 1822.—Hastings Papers, Treaties with Native Princes.

The confines of Guzerat and Cutch, and the petty states east of the *Ran*, which had been latterly taken under British protection, had been for some time past infested by marauding tribes frequenting Parkur and the borders of the desert of Sindh, the principal of whom were termed Khosas. The Amirs of Sindh had been invited to cooperate for the repression of their ravages, and had, in compliance with the invitation, dispatched a body of troops against the plunderers; while a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay, marched against them from Pahlanpur. Notwithstanding the professions of the Amirs, the commander of the Sindh force appeared to have come with a design of protecting, rather than of expelling the Khosas, a body of whom encamped unmolested near the Sindhian detachment. In this situation they were attacked at night by a part of Colonel Barclay's division, and, becoming confounded with the Sindhians, exposed the latter to a participation in their disgrace and loss. The troops of Sindh retired from the frontier and represented the attack as the result of design. The British troops left to themselves pursued the Khosas across the boundary, and this also was complained of as a violation of the Sindh territory. In resentment of these injuries and of the occupation of Cutch, an army from Hyderabad entered the latter country, took Loona, a town fifty miles from Bhuj, and laid waste the adjacent district. Lieutenant-Colonel Stanhope with a strong detachment, was sent to repel the aggression. The enemy retired before him. The Bombay Government immediately demanded reparation for the mis-

BOOK II. CHAP. XI.

1820.

chief committed, and threatened to order the advance of the division into Sindh, if its demands were not complied with. The outrage was disowned, and envoys from Hyderabad were dispatched to Bombay and to Bhuj to deprecate the displeasure of the British. The Supreme Government, also, was averse to any hostile[1] collision with the Amirs, and rested contented with the disavowal of the act, the liberation of the prisoners, and the promise to restrain the Khosas and other marauders from any inroads into the British dominions. A treaty was concluded to this effect.[2]

By the treaty of Poona the Peshwa renounced all claims on the petty Mahratta states, among which the sea-coast of the Konkan, between Bombay and Goa, was principally partitioned. Kolapur, Sawantwari, and Kolaba, became in consequence exclusively subject to British supremacy. These states owed their origin in a great degree to piratical practices, and the subjects of Kolapur continuing in 1812 to exercise their old trade, it was found necessary to enter into a treaty with the Raja, by which he engaged to suppress piracy as far as it was in his power so to do, and to make over to the Bombay Government the fortified harbour of Malwan. After the

[1] The sentiments of the Government of Bengal derive an interest from late events. "Few things," they remarked, "would be more impolitic than a war with Sindh, as its successful prosecution would not only be unprofitable, but an evil. The country was not worth possessing, and its occupation would involve us in all the intrigues and wars, and incalculable embarrassments of the countries beyond the Indus. Hostilities might become unavoidable hereafter, but it was wise to defer their occurrence as long as possible."—MS. Rec.

[2] Treaty with the Amirs of Sindh, 9th November, 1820. Hastings Papers, cxxii. The treaty was formed with two of the Amirs, Karím Ali and Murád Ali.

recent war new arrangements were made, by which districts[1] that the Raja had been compelled to relinquish to the Peshwa were restored to him. Although a young man, he did not long enjoy this accession to his resources, being shot as he sat in his court by a chief, whose Jagir he had sequestrated. His successor was a minor, and the government was vested in the mother of the late Rajá as regent. A similar engagement for the suppression of piracy had been also contracted in 1812 with Sawant-wari, and the port and fortifications of Vingorla had been ceded to the British. Pond Sawant, the Desai, or ruler, of Sawant-wari died soon afterwards, and leaving only an infant son as his successor, this state fell likewise under female administration. The Rani, Durgá Bai, held the reins of government with a feeble grasp, and was unable to restrain the license of her chiefs. Some of them gathered armed bands around them, whom they could alone support by plunder; and instigated their followers to commit depredations on the territories of the Bombay Presidency. Repeated remonstrances producing no effect, a force was detached into the principality under Sir William Grant Keir, part of which crossed the Ghats and occupied the fort of Niuti which was quietly surrendered, while another portion proceeded by sea, and being joined by the main division, carried the external defences of a stronger fortress, that of Rairi, by storm. The upper fort was abandoned by the garrison and surrendered. General Keir

1820.

[1] Chekori and Manouli yielding three lakhs of rupees per annum. They were granted by an engagement or sunnud by Colonel Munro, but the grant was subsequently confirmed by treaty.

1820.

thence marched to the capital, where Durga Bai having died, the regency had devolved on two other ladies, the aunts of the Raja. Wholly unable to offer any resistance, the regents were ready to assent to everything that was required, and a treaty was accordingly concluded by which in the name of Khem Sawant, the young Raja, they agreed to acknowledge the supremacy of the British Government, to deliver to it any of their subjects who should have committed acts of violence or depredations in its territories; and to cede the forts of Rairi and Niuti, with the lands around them, as well as the whole of the remaining sea-coast from the confines of Kolapur to the Portuguese boundary. Part of these cessions were afterwards restored to the Raja, but the forts and line of sea-coast, with some inland villages, were retained. A British officer was attached to the court as a political agent, but his powers were inadequate to protect the country from the disorder consequent upon an inefficient government, and which were eventually remedied only by the active exercise of supreme authority.[1]

Kolaba had been once a place of importance in the history of the Bombay Presidency, having been included among the possessions of the enterprising pirate, Kanhoji Angria, by whom the trade of the Company was subjected to repeated insult and plunder during the first thirty years of the eighteenth century. The territory which he transmitted to his descendants had been reduced to insignificance, by the extension of the Peshwa's authority; but, a

[1] Treaty with the Regency of Sawant Wari, 17th Feb. 1819; Ditto, 17th February, 1820.

portion still acknowledged the sway of a member of the dynasty of Angria, subject to the supremacy of the head of the Mahratta state. The conquest of the territories of Baji Rao transferred his rights to the British Government, and a treaty was concluded with the Chief of Kolaba, by which those rights were defined.[1] Protection and allegiance were mutually plighted; the fees levied on the accession of a Chieftain were remitted; but the Government reserved to itself the paramount authority, and the right of conferring investiture on the Chief, on each succession to the Chiefship. The British laws and regulations were not to be introduced; but fugitives from justice were to be given up upon demand. Some exchanges of territory were agreed upon, in order to correct the inconvenient intermixture of contiguous districts. 1820.

The dependant condition of the petty states of the Konkan, extinguished all vestiges of the piratical practices for which this part of the coast of India had been infamous, since the days of Roman commerce; but the more daring pirates of the Persian Gulph still remained unsubdued. We have seen them incur severe retribution; but the effects of the chastisement administered were transient, and the renewal of their depredations demanded a repetition of the only effectual means of arresting their perpetration.

For some time after the destruction of Ras-al-Khaima, the Arab tribes of Oman refrained from infesting the waters of the Gulph, or confined them-

[1] Treaty with Raghoji Angria of Kolaba, July, 1822.—Collection of Treaties presented to Parliament, 1825.

1820.

selves to the country boats, in whose fate no powerful state was interested. As time advanced, their audacity revived, and they quickly obtained greater power than before. Ras-al-Khaima was repaired and fortified, and vessels of a large size were constructed and equipped; the different tribes entered into engagements for their mutual support, and assumed an attitude so menacing, that the Imam of Muscat, already the ally of the Company, applied earnestly for timely succour. The activity of the pirates, and, in particular, of the Joasmis, was suspended by the approach of Ibrahim Pasha, the son of the Pasha of Egypt, who, in obedience to orders from Constantinople, had marched from Egypt to chastise the Wahabis, to which sect the pirate tribes of Oman belonged. In the hope of securing his coöperation, a British officer, Captain Sadler, was despatched to the Pasha. He found Ibrahim near Medina; but the objects of his campaign were accomplished.[1] Deriah, the capital of Abdulla-bin-Saûd, the Wahabi Chief, had been stormed, and the Chief himself had surrendered, and been despatched prisoner to Cairo, whence he was sent to Constantinople, and there put to death. Considering the Wahabis as annihilated, the Pasha had no intention of proceeding to the Persian Gulph, and the punishment of the pirates was left to the British Government alone. An expedition was accordingly fitted out from Bombay, the land forces under the command of Sir William Keir[2]—the

[1] Account of a Journey from Katif on the Persian Gulf to Yamboo on the Red Sea, by Captain C. F. Sadler.—Tr. Lit. S. Bombay, iii. 449.

[2] The troops were composed of one company of European artillery, H. M.'s 47th and 65th regiments, 1st battalion of the 2nd, 2nd battalion of

maritime under that of Captain Collier, of his Majesty's ship Liverpool. They left Bombay in September, 1819, and, after touching at Muscat, arrived off Ras-al-Khaima in the beginning of the following December. The troops were landed on the south of the town, drove in a body of Arabs stationed in front of them, and effected a lodgment within three hundred yards of the defences. Batteries were erected without delay; a spirited sally was made by the enemy on the sixth, in which the Arabs were for a time masters of the guns; but they were repulsed, and displayed no further energy. A storm was ordered on the eighth; but, on approaching the walls, it was found that the place was deserted. Little loss had attended the previous operations.[1] The fall of Ras-al-Khaima, and that of Zaya, a strong fort to the north of Ras-al-Khaima, against which a detachment, under Major Warren, had been sent, struck terror into the neighbouring tribes, and their Sheikhs, repairing to the British camp, assented to the articles of a treaty proposed by the British Commander, the terms of which they could not have thoroughly understood, and to which it was not to be expected that they would long adhere. The main stipulations were that they should abstain from plunder and piracy; from killing their prisoners; from quarrelling with one another; and from trafficking in slaves. Their ships were also to carry a flag, indicative of their being friendly to the

1820.

the 4th, and flank companies of the 1st battalion of the 3rd N. I., and the Bombay marine battalion: about one thousand seven hundred Europeans and two thousand five hundred natives.

[1] Major Molesworth of the 47th and four privates were killed; two officers and forty-nine men were wounded.

1820.

British, and to be furnished with the papers which are regarded, among European States, as the requisite testimonials of a purely commercial navigation. The flag and the papers must have perplexed the Sheikhs; but they thought it prudent to accede to them, as well as to the more intelligible and important conditions. After reducing and demolishing some minor pirate ports, the squadron returned to India, leaving a Political Agent at Ras-al-Khaima. After a short interval he was directed to demolish the place, and remove to the Isle of Kishmé, where a small military detachment had been stationed, to secure the adherence of the Arabs to their engagements. This arrangement necessitated a second expedition.

The capture of an Indian trading vessel having been ascribed to an Arab tribe, the Beni-Bu-Ali, of Askara, near Ras-al-Had, a Company's cruizer was sent to inquire into the circumstances. The boats not being able to approach the land, the pilot, an Arab, swam to the shore to communicate with a number of the tribe who were assembled on the beach. The man was killed, the boats were fired upon, and the cruizer returned to Kishmé, when Captain Thompson, the Political Agent, conceived himself authorised to adopt military proceedings against the tribe in concert with the Imam of Muscat, whose authority the Beni-Bu-Ali had thrown off. Six companies of Sipahis with six guns, were landed at Soor, and being joined by a thousand of the Imam's troops, advanced to a town belonging to the Imam, the Beled-Beni-Bu-Haran, within three miles of the enemy's principal station. The Beni-Bu-Ali were so far intimi-

dated, that they declared themselves willing to give up the murderers of the pilot, but they were required to lay down their arms, with which demand they refused to comply. On the following morning the troops marched against the Arabs, who, although not more than six hundred strong, came resolutely forward to meet them. The Sipahis advanced in column: they were ordered to form line and charge; but the order had been delayed too long, and before the change of formation could be effected, the Arabs were amid the disordered files, striking down the men with long sharp swords: a general confusion and rout ensued: six officers[1] and four hundred Sipahis were killed, and the whole must have perished but for the exertions of the Imam, who himself received a wound. The fugitives took shelter in the town and repelled their pursuers from its walls, on which they resumed their retreat, and, with the troops of the Imam, returned to Muscat. Although disapproving of the attack upon the Beni-Bu-Ali, whose share in any piratical depredations was never substantiated, the Government of Bombay judged it necessary to redeem the credit of the British arms, and to maintain unimpaired the influence established in the Persian Gulph: a force was therefore sent against the offending tribe, commanded by Major-General Sir Lionel Smith, which landed at Soor in the end of February. While encamped near Soor, the Arabs made a night attack, in which they occasioned considerable disorder,

1820.

[1] Lieutenants Lawrie, Perrin, and Walsh, 2nd battalion of the 1st regiment; Price, of the Engineers; Short, of the marine battalion; and Assistant-Surgeon Higham.

BOOK II. CHAP. XI. 1821.

and inflicted some loss, but the assailants were repulsed, and the troops marched against the town. The Beni-Bu-Ali did not wait for the assault, but met the British troops on a spacious plain; they displayed the same desperate courage which had characterized their former conflicts, and were defeated only after a sanguinary engagement, in which nearly the whole of the tribe were killed or wounded. The town was cannonaded and surrendered—the Sheikh and part of the male survivors were sent prisoners to Bombay; others were made over to the Imam; the women and children, about a thousand in number, were transferred to a hostile tribe, and the Beni-Bu-Ali, who professed to trace their origin to the days of Mohammed, ceased for a while to be numbered among the tribes of Oman.[1] Their extermination might have been a political necessity, but the first attack upon them was an act wholly uncalled for by the British interests, and was a concession to those of the Imam of Muscat unwarranted by the instructions of the Government of Bombay. To obviate the recurrence of such an error, the Imam was apprized that it was not the intention of the British authorities to take any future part in disputes between him and the Arab tribes. The office of Political Agent in the Gulph was shortly afterwards abolished, and the station of Kishmé abandoned. Its occupation had given serious umbrage to the

[1] After two years' detention at Bombay the prisoners were allowed to return with presents, and with money to rebuild their town. The tribe was thus restored, although in a state much inferior to that which it had enjoyed before the war. They seem, contrary to the wont of their countrymen, to have cherished no vindictive feeling; receiving Lieutenant Welsted, when he visited them at the end of 1835, with the most cordial hospitality.—Travels in Arabia, i. 59.

Court of Persia, which claimed the sovereignty of the island, and threatened the employment of a force against the detachment, if it was not voluntarily withdrawn. 1821.

The opposite side of the Arabian peninsula also witnessed a display of the power of British India. A commercial intercourse had long subsisted between Mocha and the Indian continent, and a British officer resided at the former to superintend the interests of the Company's subjects. In 1817, the Dola, or Governor, of Mocha on behalf of the Imam of Senna, taking offence at the proceedings of the Resident, had him seized, dragged from his dwelling, and cruelly beaten. The factory was pillaged by the townspeople. Redress having been vainly demanded, it was determined to obtain it by arms; but it was not found convenient to carry this resolution into effect earlier than the middle of 1820. His Majesty's ship Eden, Captain Lock, with three of the Company's cruizers and a flotilla of gun boats was then despatched to Mocha, to demand satisfaction for the treatment of the Resident, the punishment of the Dola, and compensation for the property plundered and destroyed. The terms were rejected, and the squadron fired on, which was followed by the bombardment of the town. A truce was then solicited, and granted, until a definitive arrangement should be accomplished, but no disposition being manifested to accede to the terms demanded, the firing was resumed, and the town nearly laid in ashes. Troops and seamen were sent on shore, who stormed the forts by which Mocha was defended and destroyed them. The Arabs were at

1821.

length intimidated, and envoys from the Imam brought the offending Dola a prisoner on board the squadron; a satisfactory apology was made, and pecuniary compensation promised. The Dola, after a short detention, was enlarged and pardoned. The opportunity was taken to place the British factory on a more secure and independent footing, and to relieve the trade of some of its burthens. The Resident was allowed to have a military guard, to ride on horseback, and to have access to the Imam whenever he deemed it expedient. A cemetery was allowed for the use of the Christian members of the factory, and all its dependants were to be under the protection of the British flag, anchorage fees were discontinued, and the duties payable on imports and exports were reduced; the engagement to this effect was signed by the Imam of Senna.[1]

The proceedings of the Bengal Government, to which we shall next advert, were directed to a different quarter; and regarded the interests of the British nation in a still greater degree than those of its Indian dependencies. We have already seen, that in ignorance or disregard of the commercial value of Java, or in the excess of their liberality, the British Ministers had restored it unconditionally to the Dutch. Some excuse might perhaps be urged in consideration of the claims of an unoffending people, and it might have been regarded as ungenerous to punish Holland for its compulsory connexion with the French Emperor; but the same plea was not available for the omission of any stipulation for an equivalent,

[1] Treaty with the Imam of Senna, 15th January, 1821.—Coll. of Treaties. Hastings Papers, cxxii.

and of any provision, either for the commercial objects of Great Britain in the Eastern Seas, or for the permanence of those engagements which had been contracted with the native Princes of the Malay Archipelago by the British functionaries, during the period of their political ascendency. The consequences were obvious. The Dutch were no sooner repossessed of Java, than they sought to exclude all commercial and political competition from among the neighbouring States, and to regain that supremacy which had enabled them to monopolize both the authority and the trade of the Malay principalities. They would probably have succeeded in shutting out British vessels from all commerce with the islands of the Archipelago, in closing all direct communication between the Indian and China seas, and in subjecting the valuable trade of India and of Great Britain with China to serious interruption and embarrassment, had not the foresight and energy of Sir Thomas Raffles anticipated and defeated their projects; and, in despite of their intrigues, and of the indifference or ignorance of the British Ministry, insured for his countrymen, a commanding position in the very heart of those regions from which they were menaced with exclusion.

1818.

After quitting the Government of Java when its restoration to the Dutch was determined, Sir T. S. Raffles was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Bencoolen, on the island of Sumatra: he assumed charge of his Government in March, 1818, and was immediately involved in discussions with the Government of Batavia.[1] His first object was to establish the

[1] He arrived at Bencoolen on the 22nd of March. On the 7th of April

BOOK II. CHAP. XI. 1818.

predominance of the British throughout Sumatra, and obtain a port on the southern coast which should command one of the two great entrances of the Archipelago, the Straits of Sunda. With this view he traversed the island, entered into treaties with native chiefs, between whom and Europeans no intercourse had ever before existed, and began to form a settlement at Simanka Bay. These arrangements were disapproved of and annulled by the Government of Bengal, which, although not unaware of the unfriendly and exclusive character of the policy of the Dutch,[1] was unwilling to disturb the amicable relations formed between the parent countries, and directed every measure of offence to be carefully avoided, pending the reference of all disputed questions to the authorities in England.

In the convention with Holland of August 1814, by which her settlements in the East were restored to her, no provision was made for the continued observance of those compacts which had been formed by the English while in the occupation of Java, with the independent native States. The Dutch immediately annulled them. Among others, the Sultan of Palembang, who had been raised to his regal dignity by the English, was deposed by them, and the chief restored whom the English had de-

following, he writes, "I am already at issue with the Dutch Government."—Mem. 293.

[1] Lord Hastings recorded it as his opinion, "that the proceedings of the Netherlands' authorities since the arrival of the Commissioners-general to receive charge of the Dutch colonies, had been actuated by a spirit of ambition, by views of boundless aggrandisement and rapacity, and by a desire to obtain the power of monopolising the commerce of the Eastern Archipelago, and excluding the English from those advantages which they had long enjoyed, and which they only wished to share in common with other nations of the earth."—Mem. of Sir T. S. Raffles, 304.

prived of his authority, chiefly on account of his barbarous treatment of the members of the Dutch factory. An officer whom the Governor of Bencoolen had deputed to protect the Sultan, was seized and carried to Batavia; and an appeal made by the reigning Sultan to those who had raised him to power was unavailing; and he was seized and carried a prisoner to Batavia along with an English officer who had been sent by Sir T. Raffles to protest against the aggression committed by the Government of Java against an independent Prince and an ally of the British. It was not considered,[1] and the Dutch were encouraged to extend their claims of supremacy over all the native princes, whom it was for their interest to control, an invariable article of the engagements into which they were compelled to enter being the exclusion of the ships of all other European nations from their ports.

Notwithstanding this acquiescence in the pretensions of the Dutch Government of Java, the Government of Bengal considered it necessary "to adopt precautions with a view to arrest the injury and degradation which could not fail to ensue from a listless submission, to its unbounded pretensions,"

[1] The Governor-General held that "the Dutch were bound by principles of the clearest equity, as well as by the implied conditions of the transfer, to leave the relations between Palembang and Java as they found them, unless the Sultan violated his engagement. As the case, although well known at home, had not been noticed either by the Court of Directors or his Majesty's Ministers, in the Convention of 1814, the Government of India had no choice but to obey, leaving to the Dutch the odium of disregarding a moral and political obligation."—Mem. of the Governor-General. The desertion of the Sultan was the more indefensible, as it was no longer possible to restore the price which he had paid the English for their services. The island of Banca was exchanged for the factory of Cochin by the treaty of 1814.

1818. and determined to strengthen and extend its own connexions in the Archipelago, so as to preserve the free passage of the Straits of Malacca, the other great thoroughfare to the China seas. The Governor of Bencoolen, the soundness of whose views was fully acknowledged, although his zeal was considered precipitate, was armed with additional powers for this purpose, and was appointed Agent to the Governor-General, in charge of the British interests to the eastward of the Straits. The northern entrance was already in some degree under British influence, by the possession of the stations of Bencoolen and Penang. Some port, however, being still wanted, more advanced on the line to China, and more centrically situated with respect to the numerous islands of the Archipelago, a negotiation was opened with the Sultan of Rhio for the construction of a factory within his territory; but before the engagement was formally executed, a Dutch ship of war intimidated the Sultan into a refusal to ratify it, and into the formation of a treaty with the Government of Java, by which Rhio was closed to European, or rather to English commerce. The same course was pursued at the other ports in the vicinity, and the chiefs of Lingin, Siak, Johore, and Pahang, were deterred from admitting British vessels into their harbours.

While exulting in having thus baffled the projects of their rivals, the Dutch authorities were confounded by the intelligence that a British settlement had sprung up in a more eligible situation than any yet attempted. Sir Thomas Raffles had early contemplated Singapore as possessing the qualifications

1819.

requisite for the prosperity of the trade with the Eastern nations, and had obtained the concurrence of the Supreme Government in its occupation. This was a small island about twenty-five miles in length, and eleven broad, lying off the south-eastern extremity of the Malacca peninsula, and divided from it by a narrow strait. It possessed an excellent harbour situated in the route of all ships passing through the straits; was within six days sail of China, and in the heart of the Malay states, of which it had once been the capital. It was now covered with wilderness, and inhabited by about a hundred and fifty fishermen. It was a dependency of Johore, a principality on the peninsula of Malacca, but claiming rule over the islands on either coast—including Lingin and Rhio; and it was by a grant from a Sultan of Johore that Singapore became a British settlement. The Dutch disputed the title of the Raja, who had been living in so much obscurity for many years, that it required the local knowledge, and the interested policy of Sir Thomas Raffles to discover him. His pretensions were, however, indisputable, as the eldest son of the last acknowledged Sultan; but who, in consequence of his absence from Lingin, where his father died, had been supplanted by his younger brother, a supercession not unauthorised by Malay usage, although incompatible with Mohammedan law.[1] It suited the British authorities to substantiate his claim, and that of the Dutch to contest it;

[1] Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements of the Straits of Malacca, by Lieutenant Newbold, ii. 51. Raffles mentions that neither of the sons was duly acknowledged or regularly installed, Memoirs, 327.

BOOK II. CHAP. XI. 1819.

but the activity of Sir T. Raffles, in occupying the island with a military detachment, and hoisting the British flag, imposed upon the Dutch Commissioners the necessity of expelling him by force, an extreme measure which they were unprepared to hazard. They were contented, therefore, to complain to the Bengal Government, and to enter a protest against the occupation of Singapore, as contrary to the treaty which they had contracted with the Sultan of Lingin, its lawful sovereign, in which he had engaged never to transfer any portion of his territories to a European power without their approbation. They were told in reply, that it was the deliberate intention of the British Government to resist their spirit of exclusiveness and aggrandisement, and protect British commerce from their jealousy and injustice; that they had no right to demand the restoration of territories which they had never possessed; to reduce to vassalage the native Princes, who had always been treated by the British, while holding Java, as independent, nor to compel them to enter into engagements, having for their object the exclusion of British vessels from their ports; that the actual occupation of Singapore had anticipated the sanction of the Bengal Government; but that, as it had been effected, the settlement would not be withdrawn upon a simple demand. It was notorious that the Dutch had no connection with Singapore in 1795, when their possessions generally fell into the hands of the English; and, consequently, the present claim was one of recent suggestion, and, finally, that it was useless to discuss the merits of the transaction, as the question had

been referred to the authorities in Europe, and must await their decision. Renewed negotiations were, accordingly, set on foot, and a second treaty with Holland established a modification of the existing relations by which these disputes were terminated. The British settlement on Sumatra was ceded to the Dutch, in exchange for Malacca, and the settlements on the continent of India. The British withdrew their objections to the occupation of Billeton by the Dutch, and the latter theirs to the possession of Singapore. Admission to the ports of either nation was regulated by fixed moderate duties, and an unrestricted commercial intercourse was permitted to both with any of the native powers in the Eastern Seas. The Moluccas, or Spice Islands, were alone exempted from free access. The officers of both governments were forbidden to form any new settlements without previous sanction from Europe. The British were precluded from forming settlements on any of the islands south of the Straits of Singapore, or entering into treaties with their princes; and the Dutch engaged to observe a similar forbearance with regard to the peninsula of Malacca.[1] The Dutch were much the best informed as to the respective value of the reciprocal stipulations, and were the greatest gainers by the treaty. Singapore, however, rapidly rose into importance,[2] and the zeal of Sir

1819.

[1] See Newbold's Remarks on the Treaty, i. 15; and the Treaty itself, Ibid. App. dated 17th March, 1824. The debate in the Commons, May, 1824, upon the conditions of the treaty, only shows how little the House knew of the subject.

[2] In 1822 the population had risen to ten thousand.—Mem. 525. In 1836-7 it was nearly thirty thousand. In 1822 the value of the exports and imports exceeded eight millions of dollars; in 1835-6, fourteen millions of dollars.—Newbold, i. 291. In 1844-5 their amount was stated in the public returns to be nearly five millions sterling. In addition to its

BOOK II. CHAP. XI. 1819.

Thomas Raffles, which was so unpalatable to the British Ministry as at one time to have threatened his removal, was rewarded by the growing prosperity, and the acknowledged value of the settlement which he had founded.[1]

Before leaving this part of the Eastern world, we may notice the attempts that were made, about the same period as the formation of the settlement of Singapore, to extend the influence and relations of the Indian Government in the same direction. The establishment of an intimate connection with Achin on the northern extremity of Sumatra had been long considered desirable for the protection of the commercial interests of the Company, and had been latterly recommended by the policy of anticipating the Dutch, who were expected to take advantage of the distractions of Achin, and by their means acquire a paramount authority in the kingdom. The Sultan of Achin was no longer the potentate who could cover the adjacent seas and islands with numerous fleets and armies, threatening the Portuguese colonies with destruction,[2] or with whom the

advantageous position, Singapore, which is merely an entrepot where imports are reexported, owes its prosperity to its having been from the first a free port; no duties being levied.

[1] Shortly before his return to Europe, in November 1823, Sir T. Raffles writes—"I have heard nothing more of the question with the Dutch, but doubt not it will be agitated on my arrival in England. I rely more upon the support of the mercantile community than upon any liberal views of the Ministry, by whom I have been opposed as much as by the Dutch."—Mem. 561. At an earlier period, Mr. Charles Grant, the distinguished director, wrote to Sir T. Raffles—"You are probably aware of the obstacles which have been opposed to the adoption of your measures, and even threatened your position in the service."—Mem. 445.

[2] Malacca was repeatedly besieged by the Achinese. In 1615 the King, Paduka Sri, sailed to the attack of that city with a fleet of five hundred sail, carrying a force computed at sixty thousand men. The

sovereign of England could carry on a correspondence on terms of equality.[1] The principality had declined from its extent over nearly half the large island of Sumatra, to a limited tract at its northern termination, over which its sovereign ruled with a feeble and uncertain sway. The reigning prince, Jawahir Alem, had been engaged almost from the beginning of his reign in 1802 in a struggle with some of his principal chiefs, who at length conspired to depose him, and invited Syf-ul-Alem, the son of an opulent merchant of Penang, to assume the regal authority. Syf-ul-Alem supported by his father's wealth,[2] succeeded for a time in holding a divided sway, but finally the hereditary prince recovered his ascendency and was acknowledged by the Supreme Government of India as the Sultan of Achin, and a treaty was entered into with him, by

1819.

attack having failed, it was renewed in 1628 with a force twenty thousand strong, which was defeated with great slaughter. From this reign the power of Achin declined.—Marsden, Hist. of Sumatra, 429.

[1] Sir James Lancaster, in the first voyage on account of the East India Company, in 1600, carried to the King a letter from Queen Elizabeth, "to the great and mightie King of Achem (Achin), our loving brother." Her Majesty alludes particularly to the successful hostilities carried on between Achin and the Portuguese. "It hath appeared unto us, that your Highness and your royall familie, fathers and grandfathers, have, by the grace of God and their valour, sworne not onely to defend your owne kingdomes, but also to give warres unto the Portugals, in the lands which they possesse, as namely in Malaca, in the yeere of the Humane Redemption 1575, under the conduct of your valiant Captaine Raya-macota, with their great loss, and the perpetuall honour of your Highnesse crowne and kingdome."—Purchas. i. 154. In 1613 Achin was visited by Capt. Best, who brought a letter from King James to Paduka Sri Sultan, by whom the treaty concluded with Lancaster was confirmed.—Ibid. 462.

[2] His interests were also warmly advocated by a party in the Penang Government; but open interference in favour of either of the competitors was prohibited by the Supreme Government of India. Sir T. Stamford Raffles and Captain Combe were sent to Achin as commissioners in 1818, to ascertain the true state of the case; and although at first violently disagreeing, they at last united in recommending the claims of the old Sultan. Syf-ul-Alem was accordingly desired to desist from the contest, and to be content with a pension, payable nominally by the Sultan of Achin, but virtually,

BOOK II. CHAP. XI. 1821.

which the British Government engaged to effect the removal of his rival, Syf-ul-Alem, on condition of the latter being granted a fixed pension by the Sultan; and in return for permission to carry on a free trade with all the ports of his dominions. He also promised to receive a British Resident, to exclude the subjects of any other European power from a permanent habitation in his country, and to enter into no treaty or negotiation with any power, prince, or potentate, unless with the knowledge and consent of the British Government. The subsequent relinquishment of Sumatra to the Dutch cancelled these engagements and put an end to a connexion with Achin, which with various interruptions had subsisted for more than two centuries.

About the same time the attention of the Government of India was directed to the advantages of a commercial intercourse with the countries of Siam and Cochin China, which from having constituted an important branch of the trade of Europe with the East had fallen into neglect, and had finally been discontinued. It appeared advisable to the Governor-General to attempt the revival of the commerce, and Mr. J. Crawfurd was accordingly dispatched in the character of agent to the Governor-General on a mission to the two states in question, in the hope that it might be found practicable to establish with them a permanent and mutually advantageous communication. The mission left Bengal in November 1821, and arrived at Ban-

by the Government of Penang.—Anderson's Achin and Ports of Sumatra. Memoirs of Sir T. S. Raffles, 396. Treaty with the King of Achin, 22nd of April, 1819. Treaties, Hasting's Papers, cxi.

kok, the capital of Siam, in the following March. The members were admitted to a solitary audience of the King, but were referred to the ministers for the transaction of business. Nothing was transacted: the court of Siam ignorant of its own interests, suspicious of the real views of foreign visitors who came unbidden and unwished for, and affecting a majesty little inferior to divine, manifested no disposition to encourage the advances made by the British Goverment; and after treating the mission with various marks of indifference and indignity, dismissed it with an unmeaning and evasive treaty of commerce, and an arrogant letter to the Government of Bengal.[1]

In addition to the ordinary motives influencing barbarous states, there was a political transaction which contributed to render the temper of the court of Siam unfavourable to an intimate intercourse—the asylum given to the Ex-Raja of Queda in the settlement of Penang. This was a petty potentate, governing an inconsiderable territory opposite to Penang, which itself had formed part of his possessions and had been ceded by him to the British in consideration of an annual quit-rent. The king of Siam claimed the allegiance of Queda, and in a recent dispute with the Burmans, had called upon him for his military quota. The Queda chief delayed compliance with the demand, and denied the

[1] It was promised that the duties on British commerce should not be increased, and that the Superintendent of the Customs should afford all assistance to the English merchants in buying and selling with the merchants of Siam. In the letter it is said that his Siamese Majesty was much gratified by the "offerings" (the presents) made by the Governor of Bengal.—Crawfurd's Mission to Siam, i. 266.

1822.

right of Siam to anything more than a complimentary annual acknowledgment of its superior dignity and power. The Siamese troops were in consequence directed against Queda, and the Raja, unable to resist them, fled and made his escape to Penang, where he was permitted to reside and was protected against molestation. The Siamese ministers were anxious to obtain possession of the person of the Raja; no formal demand was made, but it was intimated that his seizure and delivery would be considered as a friendly act; and they were evidently disappointed on being told that such a violation of hospitality was incompatible with British principles. The reception given by the British Government to the king of Queda and the refusal to give him up, wounded the vanity of the Siamese court, and exercised a prejudicial influence upon the objects of the mission.

In the middle of July the mission proceeded to Cochin China, and arrived at the capital in August. Much personal civility was exhibited by the officers of state, but the King declined to receive the letter and presents from the Governor-General, whom, as exercising a delegated authority only, he refused to recognise as the equal of a king; and on the same account would not condescend to admit the envoy to an audience. Permission was, however, readily granted to English vessels to trade with the principal ports of the kingdom, and it was promised that they should be treated on the same footing as the Chinese. The mission left in October, having gained little in the way of political or commercial advantage, but bringing back much novel and va-

luable information respecting countries little known in Europe.[1]

1818.

Returning to Continental India, we have now to notice the state of the relations between the British Government and its subsidiary allies, as they subsisted after the termination of the Mahratta war. In the west of India, as we have already seen, the Gaekwar had been obliged to accede to a new treaty, stipulating for the augmentation of the forces which he was to maintain by the cession of additional territory. The measure was based upon the necessity of undertaking the whole military defence of Guzerat, and upon the advantages accruing to the Gaekwar from the treaty of Poona. These advantages were considerable, and apparently the finances of the state were in a sufficiently flourishing condition to bear the cost of additional expenditure. The arrangement was not altogether palatable to the court of Baroda, but its execution was unattended by any interruption of the good understanding which had been so long maintained between the two powers.

The conduct of the affairs of Guzerat had been entrusted, as has been mentioned, to Fateh Sing, the brother of the Gaekwar, with the coöperation and assistance of the British Resident. Fateh Sing died in June, 1818. As the combined administration had been attended with beneficial results, the arrangement was continued, and Syaji Rao, the younger brother of the deceased Prince, a youth of nineteen, was raised to the office

[1] Journal of an Embassy to Siam and Cochin China, by J. Crawfurd. Account of a Mission to Siam and Cochin China, by D. Finlayson.

BOOK II. CHAP. XI.

1819.

of Dewan, or Prime Minister of Finance, the duties of which he was to discharge in concert with the Resident. The immature age of the Prince, and the state of parties at Baroda required indeed the continuance of British support, notwithstanding the causes in which intimate interference had originated,—the ruinous state of the revenues, and the embarrassments of the Gaekwar,—were supposed to exist no longer. The union of authority was not of long continuance. Towards the end of the following year died the imbecile Anand Rao, the Gaekwar, whose nominal rule had been prolonged for so many years entirely by the support of the British Government. His death altered the aspect of affairs materially. Syaji Rao succeeded to the throne, and naturally concluded that if he was fit to govern his country in the capacity of Dewan, he was equally capable of governing it as Raja, and it was no longer possible for the Resident to exercise the real administration through the machinery of an incompetent minister, and an inefficient monarch.

The pretensions of the Gaekwar to independent authority were generally recognised; but it was considered to be inconsistent with the security of British interests and the prosperity of the country, to withdraw altogether from the control over the public expenditure which the Resident had hitherto maintained. In order to place the connexion which was to be continued for the future on a firm and lasting basis, the Governor of Bombay, the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, deemed it expedient to repair in person to Baroda, and to discuss with Syaji Rao the principles which were hereafter

to regulate the intercourse between the two states. The necessity of prolonged interposition in the financial administration of Guzerat proved to be even more urgent than had been expected. Instead of a surplus revenue and an unembarrassed exchequer, it was discovered that the expenses of the two last years had exceeded the receipts, and that a debt, amounting to more than a crore of rupees,[1] still hung heavily upon the resources of the Government. The troops were also largely in arrear, and the tributaries of the Gaekwar in Kattiwar[2] and the Mahi-Kanta had been reduced to severe distress partly by the consequence of unfavourable seasons, but still more by the oppressive exactions of the agents of the native Government. It became necessary to remedy these evils. Loans were raised for the discharge of the existing debts at a reduced rate of interest, upon the security of assignments of the revenues, and, as before, under the guarantee of the British Government for their ultimate repayment. The collections made from the Gaekwar's tributaries were transferred entirely to British agency. Engagements were finally concluded with Syaji particularising the extent to which he was expected to acquiesce in the control of the Resident. All foreign affairs were to remain under the exclusive management of the British Government. The Gaekwar was to administer without restriction the internal government, provided he fulfilled the engagements for which the British Government was

[1] Of this sum 27 lakhs had been borrowed for the pay of the Gaekwar's contingent serving in Malwa, and 25 lakhs more were still owing to the troops.

[2] In 1813 a famine occurred in Kattiwar, which was said to have caused the death of one-third of the population. It was followed by an epidemic disease, of which also great numbers died.—MS. Rec.

BOOK II. CHAP. XI. 1820.

guarantee; but the Resident was to be apprised of all proposed financial measures at the commencement of each year, was to have free access to the public accounts whenever he required to inspect them, and was to be consulted before any expense of magnitude was incurred. Whatever guarantees to ministers or other individuals had been granted by the British Government were to be scrupulously observed. The Gaekwar was to choose his own minister in communication with the British Government. In all cases of emergency, that Government was to offer its advice, but it was not to interpose in ordinary details, nor was its native agent to take a share as formerly in the Gaekwar's executive administration. With these arrangements Syaji was compelled to be content; and however they might encroach upon his independence, they provided more fully than an uncontrolled freedom of action was likely to provide, for his own comfort and the security and welfare of his dominions.[1]

During the progress of these transactions, the British troops had been employed on various occasions, in suppressing tumults in different parts of the dependencies of Guzerat. The petty state of Pahlanpur, the most remote of the divisions of the Mahi-Kanta, or country west of the Mahi river tributary to the Gaekwar, had long been in a state of anarchy. The ruling chief was a Mohammedan, the descendant of an Afghan adventurer, who established himself as Nawab, or Dewan, in that part of

[1] Extract from a minute of the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, 3rd May, 1820.—Report Commons Comm. 1832. Political App. 392.

the frontier. About the year 1800, the mercenary soldiers in the service of Firoz Khan, the Dewan, expelled him, and placed his kinsman Shamshir Khan, the chief of Disa, on the Musnud. They afterwards recalled Firoz Khan, but again mutinying put him to death. It was then thought expedient by the Resident to interfere, and a British force was sent to Pahlanpur in 1809, by which the mercenaries were reduced to order, and Fateh Khan, the son of Firoz Khan, a minor, was made Dewan, under the guardianship and regency of Shamshir Khan. When the young prince was old enough to manage his own affairs, the regent, as usual, was reluctant to relinquish his power; and continuing to act as regent, retained the prince in a state of captivity. Fateh Khan appealed to Baroda, and a division of the subsidiary force, under Colonel Elrington, marched to his succour, supported by a division of the Gaekwar's troops, under Major Miles, who was appointed Political Agent on the frontier. The strongholds in the mountains in the interests of Shamshir Khan were taken, and Disa and Pahlanpur recovered. The Nawab was rescued and reseated on the Musnud. A Gaekwar detachment was placed in charge of one of the gateways of the capital, and a Political Agent was appointed to superintend the affairs of the principality, and hold in check the turbulent border chiefs of the vicinity, as well as the robber tribes of the adjacent desert.

A second expedition against the piratical and plundering tribes of the northern coast of the peninsula of Guzerat became necessary in the beginning of 1820. The Wagars of Okamandal, encou-

BOOK II. CHAP. XI. 1820.

raged by the withdrawal of the British troops for the Mahratta war, rose in insurrection, defeated the Gaekwar's troops, surprised Dwaraka and Bate, and possessed themselves of the whole district. The fort of Virawali, defended by an Englishman in the Gaekwar's service, held out for some time, but was at length abandoned, and the province remained during the following months in the hands of the insurgents. As soon as the season admitted, an expedition, commanded by the Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel Stanhope, was sent by sea against the sacred city of Dwaraka,[1] the chief seat of the rebels: the troops were landed on the 24th of November, and, after a short bombardment, the town was carried by escalade, when the garrison, composed of Arabs and Sindhis, retreated to the great temple, within whose lofty and solid walls they considered themselves secure from all ordinary attacks. An entrance was, however, effected from the roof of an adjacent house; and after a severe struggle the defenders were driven out. In endeavouring to escape, they were encountered by different detachments, posted to intercept their flight to the thickets surrounding the town, and were nearly all destroyed; of five hundred not more than one hundred escaped. This success was followed by the surrender of the chiefs who had taken up strong positions in the adjacent thickets, and by the unconditional surrender of the Rana of Bate, who was at the head of the insurrection. The garrison of Bate

[1] The force was composed of H.M.'s 65th regiment, two battalions of Bombay infantry, 2nd battalion 3rd, and 1st batt. 5th, details of artillery, and the 1st regiment Native cavalry. The Nautilus cruiser convoyed the transports.

also surrendered on condition of being transported to the opposite coast of Cutch, and the district of Okamandal was restored once more to tranquillity and obedience. 1820.

In the centre of the peninsula of Guzerat, a similar cause, the absence of regular troops, was followed by like disturbances. A family feud arrayed one branch of a Katti tribe, the Koman Kattis, in arms against another; and as both parties assembled mercenary troops which they had not adequate means of maintaining, they added to their resources by plundering the neighbouring districts of Junagerh and Bhaonagar. The suppression of disorder in Okamandal permitted the employment of a portion of the division in a different quarter; and Colonel Stanhope marched with a detachment of European and a battalion of Native Infantry, against the Kattis. They were easily reduced to submission, their principal fort of Mitiala was taken with little difficulty, the mercenaries were compelled to quit the country, and the chiefs obliged to submit their quarrel to the decision of the court of Baroda. Although the subordination which had been now established for some years in the centre and south of Kattiwar had somewhat impaired the martial spirit of its population, yet these occurrences sufficiently proved that tranquillity could be preserved solely by the continued presence of a British military force.

A similar state of disorder prevailed in the territories of the Nizam, and obedience to the Government was alone maintained by frequent recourse to military coercion. It was inflicted, however, chiefly

BOOK II. CHAP. XI. 1820.

by the reformed brigades of the Nizam, who under the command of British officers, and receiving their pay with a greater degree of punctuality than the other troops of the state, were little less effective than the subsidiary force. They had been fully organized during the late war, and amounted at this time to five regiments of cavalry, eight of infantry, three small corps of artillery, and a corps of engineers. With the termination of hostilities their field services had ceased, but they were not suffered to remain idle in a country where extortionate exaction on one side and refractory turbulence on the other furnished repeated occasion for their employment. Among the duties of this nature which devolved upon them was the reduction of the strong fort of Nowa, held by a garrison of Arabs in the pay of some Hindu Zemindars, who had risen in insurrection and plundered the neighbouring districts. A detachment of the Nizam's reformed troops, under Major Pitman, marched against this place, situated above 24 miles north of Nandain, on the Godaveri. On the 7th January 1719, approaches were regularly effected, and the garrison having refused to surrender unconditionally, the fort was carried by storm after the destruction of part of its defences by the successful explosion of a mine on the 31st of the month. Many of the garrison fell in the storm; the rest endeavouring to escape were intercepted by the horse, and were almost all put to death.

Notwithstanding the severity of the examples thus made from time to time, it was found impossible to preserve tranquillity as long as the vicious system of the administration was unreformed. The Nizam

continued sullenly estranged from public affairs, and when importuned for an opinion, upon any subject of Government, replied that he had no interest in the matter, and that it would be settled by Chandu Lal and the Resident. Chandu Lal, although a minister of unquestioned ability and diligence, and the only individual about the court capable of discharging the functions of his office, was profusely prodigal in his expenditure of the public revenue, and as rapaciously insatiable in his exactions. The prodigality by which he was characterised, originated in a great degree in his apprehensions. Strong as he might have felt himself in the support of the British Government, he knew that he was disliked by the Nizam and odious to the courtiers, and that projects were constantly agitated for his removal and disgrace. To appease this enmity, and to neutralize its inveteracy, he distributed money without limit to the extravagant and profligate nobles, bribes to all their retainers and connexions,[1] and large sums to the private hoards of the Nizam himself. He maintained also an expensive and useless body of mercenary troops, and had, in addition to these wasteful and mischievous sources of outlay, to provide for the charge of the reformed troops, which, however serviceable to him and to his allies, constituted a heavy burthen upon the resources of the state. To raise the sums required for these disbursements, the minister contracted debts to the bankers and capi-

[1] In a conversation with the Resident, Munir-ul-Mulk, the nominal minister, and uncle of one of the Begums, he affirmed that the whole of the Nizam's family was bribed, that every one of his own servants was in Chandu Lal's pay, and that even his own mother-in-law sent to the Minister a daily report of the occurrences of the inmost recesses of his house.—Hyderabad Papers, p. 184.

1820.

talists of Hyderabad, bearing an interest proportionate to his necessities and to his want of credit, and let out the revenues of the country to the highest bidder. The contractor, regarding nothing but the realization of a profit, and armed with powers to enforce payment of his demands, however excessive, levied whatever he could extort from the cultivators by every method of violence and oppression. The consequences were obvious; cultivation fell off, the necessaries of life rose almost to famine prices, the people became robbers for the sake of subsistence, or emigrated to other states, and the country was rapidly becoming depopulated. Justice was no longer administered, and the Government was threatened with annihilation. The earnest remonstrances of the Resident had little effect upon the improvident recklessness of the minister, but his representations to the Government of Bengal procured for him authority to exercise a more decided interposition. He was instructed to employ his advice and influence for the establishment of the prosperity of the Nizam's dominions and the happiness of his subjects, and with this view to direct his attention to the following topics:—A salutary control over the internal administration of the country; accurate accounts of all establishments, receipts, and expenditure; the correction of abuses; a proper distribution of justice; the reduction of expense; the amelioration of the revenue system, including the customs and duties levied on commerce; the improvement of resources; the extinction of debt; the efficiency of the troops retained and the discharge of such as were useless. In order to reconcile the Nizam to this interposition,

his sons, who had been hitherto detained in Golconda were allowed to return to Hyderabad, and he was informed that he was at liberty, if he pleased, to assume the title of royalty.[1] 1821.

The authority thus granted to the Resident, Mr. Russell, was but sparingly applied, and few changes of any importance were effected in the administration before his departure for Europe. His successor, Sir Charles Metcalfe, finding the principality still in a condition of utter disorganization, and considering it to be upon the brink of dissolution,[2] engaged more strenuously in the task of reform, and compelled the assent of the Minister to various unpalatable measures. The chief of these was the abolition of the farming system and the settlement of the revenue for a definite term of years with the village communities, without any intermediate agency. The collections were left in the hands of the fiscal functionaries of the state, but the assessments were made by British officers attached to the Residency, or to the reformed troops;—they were further directed to receive all complaints against any irregu-

[1] Letter from the Secretary to the Government of Bengal to H. Russell, Esq., Resident at Hyderabad, 22d Jan. 1820.—Hyderabad Papers, p. 98.

[2] "The system of administering the revenue was that of farming. Large tracts of country were made over to whomsoever could best afford to pay for them. Portions of these tracts were again sublet to other farmers. Large advances were taken from all in anticipation of the collections, and the tenure was so insecure that it was a common saying in the country that these farmers proceeded from the capital to their districts, looking over their shoulders to see if other farmers were not following on their heels. These farmers were supreme in the districts which they farmed: they had even the power of life and death in their own hands, and there was no appeal from them or their tax-gatherers to the government or the laws."—Sutherland's Sketches of Relations with Native Powers, p. 55. Captain Sutherland was seven years in Hyderabad, and was "a witness of the afflictions in which the reign of Chandu Lal in the Hyderabad provinces, and of his brother, Govind Baksh, in those of Berar, involved this unhappy country."

1822.

larity or extortion on the part of the collectors, and where redress was not procurable from the local authorities to report the proceedings to the Resident. They were also empowered to seize upon all robbers and plunderers, and violators of the public peace. The sphere of this arrangement was limited to the northern division of Hyderabad. Chandu Lal, professing a desire to coöperate in the work, undertook to conduct the settlement of the southern districts. In the latter the reform was accordingly defeated, the collectors becoming contractors for the amount to be levied; in the former, the beneficial results of the measure were soon apparent in the return of the peasantry to their villages, the revival of cultivation, the suppression of tumult and plunder, and the progressive increase and prosperity of the population.

Although consenting with seeming cheerfulness to these measures of reform, they were by no means acceptable to the Minister, whose power they curtailed and whose rapacity they disappointed. After the settlements were concluded, therefore, he urged the withdrawal of the British officers, as their presence was no longer necessary to secure the Ryots from oppression, and as it was contrary to established practice and the conditions of the treaty; and when he found that no attention was paid to his representations, he addressed the Governor-General privately, complaining of the unfriendly disposition of the Resident, and of the interference which he had set on foot.[1] The Minister's

[1] Letter from Raja Chandu Lal to his Excellency the Governor-General, Aug. 1822, with Enclosures.—Hyderabad Papers, 173.

objections to the principle of interference were not unfounded, and the Governor-General expressed his opinion that it had been disregarded to an extent unwarranted by the character of the alliance which subsisted with the Nizam, and by the tenor of the original treaty. Unwilling, however, to occasion embarrassment, by the abrupt cessation of European superintendence, he directed it to be discontinued gradually, when in the estimation of the Resident it could be done without inconvenience. The Court of Directors took the same view of the case, while, on the other hand, the Resident and the Members of the Supreme Council vindicated the necessity of a continued supervision. The arguments on both sides exhibit the contradictions inherent in the relation of a subsidiary alliance.

The objections to interference with the internal administration of the affairs of a native state are of a twofold description, as affecting the party interfered with and the party interfering. It is an undeniable encroachment upon the independence of the Indian Potentate to wrest from his hands the power of appointing his own ministers, and to insist upon his modelling the practice of his government according to the principles of a policy to which he is a stranger, and the soundness of which, as it regards his own interests at least, he is disposed to dispute. On the other hand, the interference imposes upon the party interfering the irksome task of reforming evils, the origin and nature of which are liable to be misapprehended, and of which the correction must be attempted with imperfect and

1820.

restricted means, when it has to encounter the open or secret opposition of the Prince, and depends upon the instrumentality of agents ill-affected to reforms of any description, and more inclined to thwart than to promote them. The remedies must consequently be of partial and temporary efficacy, and their effects will cease as soon as their application is suspended. To interpose for a season is nugatory;—to interpose for perpetuity is, in reality, to assume the internal administration of the country. The real question then is—Is the Prince independent? Has he the right to govern or misgovern his own subjects at his own pleasure?

The degree of independence enjoyed by a prince connected with the British Indian Government by a subsidiary alliance depends, theoretically at least, upon the manner in which it is recognised by the terms of the compact into which he has entered. In the case of the Nizam, the language of the treaty is explicit: it declares that the Honourable Company's Government have no manner of concern with any of the Nizam's children, relations, subjects, or servants, with respect to whom his Highness is absolute;[1]—a declaration utterly incompatible with the reforms introduced into his administration without his sanction, and with the avowed purpose of protecting his subjects against his servants—of withdrawing his peasantry from the authority of the agents of his chief minister and acknowledged representative.

In opposition to the general arguments against in-

[1] Treaty with the Nizam, 1800, ch. xv.—Collection of Treaties, 193.

terference with the internal administration of a native prince, whose political existence is maintained by a subsidiary force, it is argued that the connection involves the duty of protecting the people against his tyranny. We have taken from them, it is urged, the ability to protect themselves. The great check upon despotism in the East is assumed to be popular insurrection. If left to his own resources, the prince would be unable to put down extensive discontent by force, and would, therefore, either be cautious how he provoked dissatisfaction, or would readily retract the measures which had created it; but, with a large body of disciplined troops at his command, whose strength renders resistance hopeless, he has nothing to fear from the resentment of his people, and may exercise with impunity any degree of oppression of which his nature is suggestive. It is, therefore, the right of the power which gives him all his strength to require that he shall use it wisely and mercifully, and if he be regardless of the obligation, to throw its shield over those who would otherwise be the victims of a confederacy formed to protect the Prince against foreign enemies and domestic treason, to secure his personal safety, and the integrity of his dominions, but not to screen him from the just indignation of his subjects. But a right to support the people against the will of the sovereign is obviously incompatible with the recognition of his independence, and is further objectionable, inasmuch as it provides a convenient pretext for depriving him of his sovereign character—of virtually accomplishing his deposal. Such an usurpation, however it may be palliated by an un-

1820.

deniable necessity, can scarcely be vindicated as a right, and the necessity must be undeniable before the interposition to this extent can admit of extenuation. It may be doubted also if the grounds upon which such interference is supposed to be justifiable can be substantiated. There is no record in Indian history of the despotism of its princes having been curbed by popular insurrection. Deposal and death have not unfrequently been the fate of Indian monarchs, but they have been the work of treacherous ministers or of competitors for the throne, in whose selfish policy the people felt little concern. The dread of such an event based upon experience of the past, is not likely to operate as a check upon misgovernment, and its non-occurrence is in nowise attributable to awe of a subsidiary force. Local tumults may not be uncommon, but they arise out of resistance to the exactions of the Collector or farmer of the revenue, not to the authority of the sovereign, and are as often ascribable to the refractory spirit of the military landholder, the Rajput Zemindar, who mounts guns upon the bastions of his fort, as to the extortion of the public functionary. No obligation exists to interfere in such a quarrel; the services of the subsidiary troops are not intended for such purposes, and, if withheld, it cannot then be maintained that the Prince is able to tyrannise over his subjects only through British assistance. Revenue disputes between the farmer of the revenue and the Zemindar cannot be regarded as justifying the appropriation of the sovereign authority, and it is only when universal disorder is to be apprehended, or when the conditions and objects of the alliance

are imperilled, that the authoritative interposition of the more powerful of the contracting parties can admit of justification.

Such indeed, it might be said, was the origin of the interference in the case of Hyderabad. The political interests of British India were considered to be endangered by the conduct of the Nizam, and it became necessary for their security to establish a commanding influence in his councils, by disallowing the right of the Prince to nominate his own minister, and compelling him to intrust the office to a person selected by his allies. Chandu Lal had been placed and was retained in his position by the power of the British Government. That power was consequently responsible for the manner in which he discharged his functions, and was bound to correct or cancel whatever arrangements he should make which might be pernicious to the welfare of the state, and to the interests of both prince and people. The interposition of the Resident at Hyderabad was, therefore, authorised by the conduct of preceding governments, in establishing the form of administration which now prevailed, and which, however anomalous, could scarcely be altered with advantage, as, notwithstanding his defects, Chandu Lal was the only person about the Court who was fitted by his talents, industry, and character, to hold the reins of government. The arrangements were, therefore, undisturbed until deference to the sentiments expressed by the Court of Directors, and the adoption of other views by succeeding Governors and Residents, imposed a check upon the employment of British func-

BOOK II. CHAP. XI. 1820.

tionaries in the civil administration of the Nizam's territories, and suffered them to relapse into a worse condition even than that from which their extrication had been attempted.

Among the sources of difficulty and embarrassment in which the Administration of Chandu Lal was entangled, and in which the credit of the Government of India became implicated, was his financial connection with a house of business established at Hyderabad, with the sanction and countenance of the British Government. Mr. William Palmer, who had been engaged for several years in the military service of the Nizam, quitted it for the business of a banker and merchant in Hyderabad. He was joined at an early period by some of the officers of the Residency, and received the general countenance of the Resident, at whose suggestion an application made to him in 1814, by the house of W. Palmer and Co., for permission to set up a commercial establishment at the capital of the Nizam, was favourably received by the Government of Bengal: he was consequently instructed to show the firm every proper degree of encouragement consistent with the provisions of the treaty, and to recommend them to the Nizam's Government. The permission had been obviously anticipated, and the house had already been constituted, but its being formally sanctioned gave additional activity to the business of the firm, and the members became intimately associated with Chandu Lal in raising pecuniary supplies for his financial necessities.

In the year 1816, the house of W. Palmer and Co. professed to entertain doubts whether their pecuniary

dealings with the Nizam's Government might not subject them to the penalties of the Act of Parliament,[1] which interdicted loans to native princes by British subjects, and prayed to be exempted from the operation of the law. Impressed with the belief that the interests of the Nizam and of the Company were promoted by the success and security of the commercial and pecuniary transactions of the firm, the exemption was granted by the Governor-General in Council, under the dispensing power which he inferred that he possessed according to the terms of the Act,[2] with this reservation alone, that it should be at the discretion of the Resident to satisfy himself at any time of the nature and objects of the transactions in which Messrs. Palmer and Co. might engage in consequence of the permission then granted. With this sanction the house was allowed to carry on extensive negotiations with the Minister, and, among other pecuniary transactions, was employed, with the cognizance and consent of the Government of Bengal, to provide the pay of the reformed troops in Berar and Aurungabad; none of the native bankers, it being asserted, being willing to advance the funds at the same rate of interest, or on the security of assignments of revenue, and the regular payment of the troops being indispensable to their efficiency at a season when their services were most import-

[1] Act 37th George III., cap. 142, sec. 28. See extract.—Hyderabad Papers, 8.

[2] The act prohibits the pecuniary transactions, &c., "unless consented to, and approved of by, the Governor-General in Council in writing."—Hyd. Papers, p. 8. The legality of the sanction was confirmed by the opinion of the Advocate-General, by whom the instrument conveying the license solicited was drawn up. Ibid p. 5.

1820.

ant:[1] the sanction involving, according to the expressed admission of the firm, no further pledge of support than the general countenance afforded to their establishment, which was indispensable for their existence in a country where there were no regular courts of judicature.

This arrangement had scarcely been completed (May 1820) when one of a still more comprehensive character was proposed by Chandu Lal for the Resident's sanction—the negotiation of a loan of sixty lakhs of rupees (600,000*l.*) from the house of Palmer and Co.; the amount being absolutely necessary, according to the Minister's statement, to enable him to discharge the arrears due to the public establishments, which he was anxious to reduce to the extent of twenty-five lakhs a year—to pay off heavy incumbrances due by the Nizam's Government to native bankers and others, and to make advances to the Ryots, in order to restore to them the means of cultivating the lands which had fallen into neglect. As the objects contemplated by the Minister were of undeniable benefit to the Nizam's country, and as, according to the Resident's showing, they were not attainable through any other agency on equally advantageous terms, this loan also was sanctioned—the sanction being understood to be of a general nature, involving no pecuniary responsibility.[2]

Shortly after authority was granted to this last

[1] Political Letter from Bengal, 20th Oct. 1820.—Hyd. Papers, p. 8.

[2] Letter from W. Palmer and Co., 19th May, 1820, to the Resident:—"We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday's date. By the security which we require from the Resident, we do not mean to imply any security by which the British Government should

loan, respecting which much difference of opinion prevailed in the Council of Bengal, communications were received from the Court of Directors, expressing in strong terms their disapproval of the whole of the transactions. Reasoning from experience of the past abuses which had disgraced the pecuniary dealings of British subjects with native princes, they anticipated a like result from the present, and positively enjoined the annulment of the exemption which had been granted to Messrs. W. Palmer and Co. from the penalties imposed by the Legislature. They also directed that the countenance shown by the Government to the house should be strictly confined to those objects of a commercial nature which the partners originally professed to have in view; and that if any discussion should arise between the Nizam's Government and the firm, in respect to their pecuniary transactions, the British Government should abstain from interposing in favour of their claims. These orders were communicated to the mercantile house, and their future pecuniary dealings with the Minister were interdicted.[1]

Soon after the appointment of Sir Charles Metcalfe, it was discovered that no progress had been made in the reduction of the expenditure of the state, and that the financial difficulties of the Minister were such as to threaten public insolvency, while

be responsible for the money we should lend to the Minister; all we require is the certainty that the Resident will use his influence to prevent our being defrauded, or any misappropriation made of the revenues of the Talooks on which we are to have assignments. We shall never require that influence to be exerted beyond the point to which the Resident can go without making it a discussion between our Government and the Nizam's. We are, &c."—Hyd. Papers, p. 42.

[1] Letter to Bengal, 24th May, 1820.—Hyd. Papers, p. 6. Letter to the Resident, 16th December, 1820, p. 70.

BOOK II. CHAP. XI. 1821.

the system of exaction was as unrelentingly practised as before. The measures adopted to check the latter have been adverted to, the former pressed equally upon the Resident's attention. Among the chief of the Minister's embarrassments were the engagements he had contracted with the house of Palmer and Co., and the debts due to the firm, amounting now to nearly a million sterling, bearing an interest of twenty-four per cent. Little improvement could be expected until an adjustment of these claims should be accomplished; and the accounts of the house were subjected to a scrutiny, by which it appeared that their dealings formed no exception to the character which applied to such former pecuniary transactions as the Legislature had intended to prohibit. Besides the high amount of interest—which, although less than the rate usually charged by native bankers lending money to the Minister, without the collateral security of the influence of the Resident, and in addition to large pensions and gratuities settled upon the members of the firm and their connections and dependants—it appeared that the loan of sixty lakhs was an arrangement, which had mainly in view the consolidation of the debts due to the house, and left all other demands, all arrears of the establishment, unprovided for, notwithstanding the Minister's assertion, that it had enabled him to pay off and discharge a considerable portion of the superfluous servants of the government. Such being the conclusion drawn by the supreme authority from an examination of the accounts, the countenance of the Government was finally withdrawn from the house, and Chandu Lal was required to

close his account with the firm, to enable him to do which, the Government of India undertook to supply the funds.[1] A peshkash, or tribute, of seven lakhs of rupees a year had hitherto been paid to the Nizam by the Company, for the northern Circars, and the consent of the Minister was obtained to the redemption of this tribute for ever by the immediate payment of little more than a crore of rupees, by which he was enabled to extricate himself from the embarrassments in which his improvidence and the cupidity of others had involved his administration.

The favour which had been shown to the house of Palmer and Co. by the Governor-General was contemplated with distrust by the Authorities in England; and it was attributed rather to personal motives, than those which had been assigned—the advantages accruing to the Government of the Nizam from the pecuniary assistance derived from such a source.[2] The question gave rise to long and

[1] It appears that when application was made for the sanction of the British Government to a loan of sixty lakhs, that sum was about the amount of the balances existing against the Nizam's Government in the books of Messrs. Wm. Palmer and Co.

On Hyderabad account . . .	Rps. 26,82,402
Ahmedabad ditto	13,18,669
Berar Suwar ditto	20,57,219
	Rps. 60,58,290

Letter from the Resident, 14th June, 1825. Hyd. Papers, 554.—This loan of sixty lakhs was contracted for on a reduced interest of 18 per cent. per annum, but of the total, eight lakhs were a bonus. The sum transferred was fifty-two lakhs, whilst interest on sixty was charged.—Ibid. According, however, to a statement made at a subsequent date by Mr. Russell, considerable pecuniary advances were made by the house on the Hyderabad account.—Debates E. I. House, 18th February, 1825.

[2] The Marquis of Hastings avowed an interest in the prosperity of the house, in consequence of a gentleman of his family, Sir Wm. Rumbold, (Papers, 44) being one of the partners, but his support was based upon

BOOK II. CHAP. XI. 1823.

acrimonious discussions in the Court of Proprietors, which ended in the complete vindication of the integrity of the Marquis of Hastings, but exercised an unpropitious influence upon his fortunes. These proceedings took place at a date subsequent to the period under review, but it will be convenient to notice them in this place, in order to dispose of the subject at once.

On the 3rd of March, 1824, a motion was introduced into the Court of Proprietors, by the Honourable Douglas Kinnaird, recommending to the Court of Directors to consider and report the means and measure of such a pecuniary grant to the Marquis of Hastings as should be worthy of the gratitude of the Company, and of the eminent services of the Governor-General. The motion was met by an amendment, calling for the papers and documents necessary to illustrate the transactions at Hyderabad; and this was altered to a motion for the printing of all the correspondence and other documents upon the public records which regarded the administration of the Marquis of Hastings as Governor-General of India, and which might enable the Court to judge of the propriety of entertaining the question of a further pecuniary reward to the late Governor-General. The motion in this shape received the concurrence of the Court.

The printing of the voluminous documents thus

a belief that the house rendered important public services both to the British Government and that of the Nizam, and he was not aware of the unavowed advantages enjoyed by the partners, or the real character of their dealings with the Nizam. As soon as he learned, or had reason to suspect the truth, he expressed his strong sense of their impropriety.—Letter to Sir Charles Metcalfe from the Secretary to the Government, 13th September, 1822. Hyd. Papers, 186.

called for, which had the collateral effect of placing within the reach of the public a mass of most valuable and interesting information, necessarily occupied a long interval, and nearly twelve months elapsed before any proceedings founded upon them could be held. On the 11th of February, 1825, the papers relating to the loans made to the Nizam were taken into consideration, upon a motion made by Mr. Kinnaird, that there was nothing contained in those documents which tended to affect in the slightest degree the personal character or integrity of the late Governor-General. The proposition was subjected to an amendment by Mr. Astell, the chairman, but acting in his capacity of proprietor only, by which the Court was called upon, while admitting that the papers furnished no ground for imputing corrupt motives to the Marquis of Hastings, to approve of certain dispatches sent by the Court to the Bengal Government—dispatches which censured in strong terms the encouragement given to the pecuniary transactions between the house of Palmer and Co. and the Government of the Nizam. A debate arose upon these propositions, which extended through seven days, and was conducted with great heat and virulence on either side, and diverged into much irrelevant and personal matter. The amendment was finally carried by ballot.[1]

[1] 18th March, 1825.

For the Amendment . .	575
Against . . .	363
Majority	212

Full reports of the previous debates will be found in the Monthly Asiatic Journals, for 1824 and 1825.

1823.

In the first of these dispatches, approbation of which was thus voted, the Court denied the necessity and questioned the legality of the dispensation which had released Messrs. Palmer and Co. from the operation of the Act of Parliament, prohibiting loans by Europeans to Native Princes, and peremptorily ordered that, upon the receipt of the letter, the license should be immediately cancelled and revoked, and positively forbidding, should any discussions arise between the house and the Nizam's Government respecting any pecuniary transactions between them, the interposition, in any way whatever, of the name, authority, influence, or good offices of the British Government, for the furtherance of their demands. The tone of the letter was evidently inspired by a suspicion of the motives of the Governor-General, and undervalued the considerations by which the indulgence was capable of extenuation,—a belief in its legality, founded upon the opinion of the first legal authority in India, the Company's Advocate-General, by whom the license itself was drawn up,—reliance on the judgment of the Resident, who had acquired, by long experience, a thorough knowledge of the condition of the Nizam's affairs, and who recommended the measure,—and a conviction that much benefit had already accrued from the commercial operations of the House. The sanction granted was, therefore, no intended violation of the law, nor was any sacrifice of public to private interests imagined to be involved in the permission.[1]

[1] Mr. Edmonstone, who at the date of the license, was a member of the Government, and was present in the debate of 1825 as a Director, while he

The second of the inculpatory letters, 28th November, 1821, first referred to a special transaction, in which the Government had sanctioned, prior to the receipt of the preceding dispatch, the undertaking of the house to issue pay to the Nizam's reformed troops at Aurungabad, at the rate of two lakhs of rupees per month, on the receipt of assignments for thirty lakhs a-year, being equivalent to an interest of twenty-five per cent. Confirmation of this arrangement had been strongly urged upon the Government by the Resident, but it was not granted without hesitation and inquiry; the Resident was required to furnish further explanations, and the house was desired to submit its accounts to the Council. This was at first objected to, but the condition was eventually complied with; when the Governor-General declined the examination, and, upon the explanations submitted by the Resident, sanctioned the arrangement. The Court complained that the explanations were not satisfactory,—that the advances had, in fact, been commenced without waiting for the sanction applied for,—that the maintenance of regularly organised troops by Native Princes was a measure of doubtful expedience,—and that, allowing the necessity of providing for their pay, it did not appear to have been necessary to have recourse to the agency of European capitalists, as the money might have been raised from the

subscribed to the opinion of the legal authorities in England of the illegality of the license, and admitted that the grant of it was indiscreet, as made with imperfect information as to the extent of the dealings which it authorised, maintained that with the legal opinions furnished, and acting under the information possessed, the Government was not to blame in acceding to the application of Palmer and Company. Report, Debate of 3rd March, 1825, A. J. vol. 19, p. 575.

1822.

bankers of Hyderabad, at a much lower rate of interest, or the Nizam might have been induced to advance it. This last supposition was hazarded upon a total forgetfulness of the passion of all Native Princes for hoarding treasure, and that such a propensity was peculiarly characteristic of the head of the Government of Hyderabad. The possibility of raising loans on easier terms from the native bankers was contingent upon the grant to them of the like support which the European house had been led to expect. Assured of the promised interposition of the Resident, the native bankers might have been induced to provide the funds at a similar rate on the same securities; but without it the Resident was fully warranted in asserting that they would not have given any pecuniary aid to the Minister upon assignments, the realisation of which was notoriously uncertain. The policy of maintaining the reformed troops was a different question; but while they were maintained, it was necessary to keep them orderly and effective, and this was only to be done by securing them their regular pay. It appeared also from the answers of the Resident, that the collection of the revenue was effected without any undue interference with the native functionaries. Whatever required to be cleared up, was placed in the hands of the Government by the house by the final submission of their accounts; and the only point in which the Government exposed itself to the charge of insufficient investigation and precaution, was the determination not to examine the documents. The reason assigned for such forbearance was ill-calculated to recommend

it to the Authorities at home, as it implied their incapacity to form an accurate judgment of statements which, if recorded on the proceedings of the Council, must come under their examination. The excuse was untenable, and the omission to inspect the accounts was unseasonable and injudicious, although it scarcely warranted the inference drawn from it by the Court, — that it evinced a determination in the Bengal Government to disavow all responsibility; to throw off the check of the authorities in England; to do whatever it chose to do; and to communicate to the Court no more than it thought fit. Neither did it justify the accusation contained in the same letter, that the Government of Bengal had in substance, if not in form, lent the Company's credit in the late pecuniary transactions at Hyderabad, not for the benefit of the Nizam's government, but for the sole benefit of Messrs. William Palmer and Company. Although not indifferent to the advantages of the house, the permission to embark in pecuniary dealings with the Nizam's minister, had been throughout based upon the representations of the Resident, that they were indispensably necessary for the solvency of the Hyderabad State, and that they had produced, and were producing, the most beneficial consequences. The information might have been erroneous, the decision might have been, as it was, ill-judged; but there was no room to impute any intention to benefit individuals solely by injury to an ally.

The same letter adverted to the negotiations for the sixty lakhs, to which also sanction had been granted before the arrival of the inhibitory dispatch.

BOOK II. CHAP. XI. 1823.

At this date, the Court was not apprised of the character given to this transaction by subsequent inquiry; nor was it suspected by the Government, when its sanction was conceded. The only grounds of disapprobation here taken, therefore, were the imperfect information possessed by the Government, and the possibility that the money might have been borrowed on better terms from the native bankers: the latter was a gratuitous supposition; the former a substantial objection, to an extent of which the Court was not itself aware. The same dispatch inferred, that from the time the licence was cancelled, the authorised engagement for the payment of the Berar troops, must have ceased; and directed that if such was not the case, the house should be commanded to bring it forthwith to a termination.

The third of the documents approved of by the Court, was a letter of the 9th of April, 1823, inclosing the opinions of his Majesty's Attorney and Solicitor General, and of the Company's standing counsel, that loans by British subjects to native Princes were illegal, whether made in their territories or those of the Company; and that in either territory it was also unlawful for British subjects to lend money at a rate exceeding twelve per cent. This view of the law was, however, declared to be erroneous by Chief Justice Best in expressing the unanimous sense of the Judges to the House of Lords, in favour of a declaratory Bill to that effect, brought in by the Marquis of Hastings.[1] According to this high authority, Acts of the British Parliament could not regulate the practice of foreign States; and penal

[1] Proceedings in the House of Lords, June, 1825. Asiatic Journal.

statutes could not be applicable to dominions in which British Courts had no jurisdiction.

The last letter for which the Directors claimed the approval of the Proprietors, was of a later date, 21st January, 1824, and reviewed the whole of the proceedings of the Government of Bengal in regard to the transactions at Hyderabad. In this they complained that their instructions had been imperfectly and tardily obeyed, in regard to the Aurungabad contract, which, although ordered to be put a stop to in 1820, had been suffered to proceed until the middle of 1822, and that in consequence, the house claimed arrears from the Nizam's government. This was partly, however, the consequence of their own injunctions in a former letter, in which they expressed their desire to avoid any precipitate measures which might tend to impair the credit of the firm.

The letter also analyses the pecuniary transactions of the house with the Nizam, and justly condemns the total absence of that scrutiny which it was the duty of the Resident to have exercised as a condition of the licence. A variety of transactions are pointed out, regarding which it does not seem that any information whatever was ever furnished to the Government, and which were engaged in without such reference, under what was considered to be a general licence, a construction warranted, perhaps, by the literal tenor of the authority granted to the house, but evidently incompatible with the provision that the Resident should be aware of all the proceedings of the house of such a description. The Sixty-lakh Loan is also designated as, in great part, a mere transfer of old debts to a new account, by

1823.

which the sanction of the Government was obtained to a debt, the existence of which was not known when the sanction was given. The whole amount of debt claimed by the house is stated to be ninety-six lakhs, in December 1822. Undoubtedly the Court had good reason to question the character of this Loan, the accounts of which are clouded by great obscurity, and the real nature of which was not distinctly appreciated by the Government of Bengal as it ought to have been before their sanction to it was granted.

A considerable portion of the dispatch is dedicated to the reprobation of the undue influence of the house in the councils of the Nizam, and their instigation of the minister to prefer complaints privately against the new Resident, and the Governor-General. It cannot be denied that the Court was justified in condemning the readiness of the Governor-General to entertain, in opposition to all the members of his council, a belief that Sir Charles Metcalfe was induced by personal pique and jealousy, rather than by a dispassionate regard for the credit of his own Government, and the interests of the Nizam, to picture the dealings of the house in exaggerated and undeserved colours; and they were not unwarranted in inferring that the measure of indulgence shown towards Messrs. Palmer and Co., could be ascribed only to a strong personal bias in behalf of some, at least, of the individuals concerned.

The relief of the Minister's financial embarrassments by the reformation of his revenue system, through the agency of European officers, is objected to by the Court as strongly as by the Governor-Ge-

neral; but blame is imputed to the Government that its reprehension was not earlier pronounced, a consideration of secondary importance, as, after all, the arrangement was not disturbed. So in regard to the advance of money from the Company's treasury to the Minister, to pay off his debts, inasmuch as the measure was finally approved of, the Court's censure of the delay which occurred between the first rejection of the plan in 1820, and its ultimate adoption in 1822, seems to have been uncalled for, especially as they admit that they participated in the doubts entertained by the Governor-General of the legality of such interference, upon which ground he had originally opposed the proposition. His final acquiescence was based upon the implied approbation of such an arrangement deduced from general expressions in the Court's letter of November 1821, of the preferableness of a loan by the Company, to one by a mercantile house. They deny the justice of the inference, and, perhaps, with reason; but the best defence of the inconsistency will be found in the altered feelings with which the Governor-General now regarded the proceedings of Palmer and Co. In 1820 he had not received the Court's orders to cancel the license, and conscientiously believed that the proceedings were legal and that they were to benefit the Nizam. In 1822 he was not only in possession of the sentiments of the Court, but had discovered that the operations of the house were calculated to embarrass, not to relieve, the difficulties of the Nizam's Government, and that it had become necessary to adopt some other mode of supplying the requisite funds.

BOOK II. CHAP. XI. 1823.

Upon a review of these transactions it must be admitted, that the objections which were taken by the Court, and, in fact, confirmed by the Board of Control, with whose concurrence the despatches in question were forwarded, were substantially just. Some of the arguments may be regarded as captious, and inapplicable to local circumstances, and they show an unfair disposition to identify the Governor-General with Messrs. Palmer and Co. Although it is not expressed, and, perhaps, not intended, there runs, also, throughout the correspondence an indication of a suspicion of unworthy motives, and the language is frequently unsuited to the high station and character, both of those from whom it proceeds, and the noble individual to whom it is addressed. Yet it is not to be denied that the personal interest taken in the successful operations of the house, the ready acquiescence with which their applications and representations were received, and the reluctance to admit anything in their disfavour until it could no longer be disputed that they had taken undue advantage of the confidence which had been shown them, were incompatible with the duties of the Governor-General, were an injudicious departure from the caution which experience of the past had suggested in regard to pecuniary transactions between Europeans and Natives of rank, were detrimental to the ally whom it was intended to serve, and subjected the Company to serious embarrassment and loss. The justice of these conclusions enabled the Court to triumph over an opposition which was conducted with remarkable ability and energy, and which derived a powerful support from

the unimpeached integrity of the Marquis of Hastings, and the unquestionable merits of his general administration. 1820.

We have now to direct our attention to the principality of Oude, where, in the estimation of the Governor-General, abstinence from interposition had been attended by the happiest consequences. It had not, however, wholly obviated the necessity of calling out regular troops against refractory Zemindars, and in the beginning of 1822 above seventy of their forts, in the vicinity of Sultanpur, were occupied and dismantled by a British detachment. Nor were the unassisted means of the Oude Government able to suppress the bands of armed robbers who haunted the jungles on the frontier, and made frequent and desperate inroads into the British territories. Their lurking places were occasionally penetrated, and their villages destroyed; but the connivance of the Oude police and the secret encouragement of the neighbouring Zemindars sheltered them from any very severe retaliation.[1]

[1] Between 1815 and 1820 there had been forty gang robberies on the frontier adjacent to Oude, in which forty persons were killed; one hundred and seventy wounded, and property carried off to the extent of 1.14.000 rupees. The Oude bands did not confine themselves to the frontier. In 1820 a party of four hundred, the pretended suite of a Hindu Raja, proceeding as asserted on a pilgrimage, and travelling deliberately with the usual accompaniments of a person of rank, elephants, horses, palankins, &c., traversed the British territory for more than 300 miles from the Oude frontier, and near Mongir plundered the boats of a merchant of Calcutta carrying bullion, to the extent of a lakh and a half of rupees, of the dispatch of which the leader had been apprised by his agents in Calcutta. The party retreated with their booty in safety. In the following year they were less fortunate. The same leader, with one hundred and thirty-three men and forty women, was apprehended by the exertions of the magistrates in South Béhar. The men were practised gang robbers. The chief was hanged; the most notorious were transported for life; the rest sentenced to hard labour for various periods. These people were chiefly of the tribe termed Shigal-khors, Jackall-eaters, from their lax habits in regard to food, and principally tenanted the thickets near Secrora, in

BOOK II. CHAP. XI. 1818.

Little advantage to the principality was to be expected from a change which took place at this season in the designation of its sovereign, who, with the consent of the Governor-General, assumed the title and the style of King. He was designated Abu Muzaffar, Moiz-ud-din, Shah-i-Zaman, Ghazi-ud-din Hyder Shah, Padshah-i-Awadh: the Victorious—the Upholder of the Faith—the King of the Age—Ghazi-ud-din Hyder Shah—King of Oude. The assumption of Shah Zaman was at first objected to, as implying an equality with the King of Delhi; but it was allowed to remain, upon its being limited by the phrase Padshah-i-Awadh, instead of Padshah, King, only, as proposed by his Majesty himself. He had prepared the way for this elevation a year before, by striking coin in his own name, instead of that of the King of Delhi—an invasion of the privileges of the Mogul which had not yet been committed even by the East India Company. This elevation was received with extreme indignation at Delhi, and was by no means acceptable to the Mohammedans, who saw in it an ungracious encroachment upon the rights of the representative of Timur by one who was bound by his office in an especial manner, as well as by the ties of gratitude, to protect them. The assumption of the royal title by the Vizir originated in the suggestion of the Governor-General, who had witnessed an act of humiliation imposed upon him by his nominal subordination to the throne of Delhi, and regarded it as inconsistent with his actual dignity and power. Two brothers

Oude. Their parties were joined, however, by similar gangs who haunted the British side of the Ganges.—Jud. Proceedings, MS.

of the King of Delhi resided at Lucknow, supported by allowances granted partly by the Company, partly by the Vizir. Notwithstanding their partial dependence upon the latter, etiquette assigned to them so decided a precedence, that when the Nawab encountered them in the street, the elephant on which he rode was made to kneel in token of homage as they passed. The Nawab was told that it rested with himself to throw off all such forms of servility to the Mogul; and upon his intimating a wish to adopt an equal title, his purpose was encouraged, provided it made no difference in the relations which connected him with the British government. It was, in the opinion of the Marquis of Hastings, a provident policy to sow dissension in this manner between the rival sovereigns of Delhi and Lucknow, in order to prevent the coöperation of the latter, through the bond of his allegiance to the former, in any hostile combination against the British interests, of which the King of Delhi should be the real or nominal head.[1] It may be doubted, should such a remote contingency arise, whether identity of religion and community of interest will not outweigh all other considerations, and whether the King of Oude will not be as willing as the Nawab Vizir to place his resources at the foot of the imperial throne. On the other hand, a material difference has been made in the political relations between the head of the government of Oude and his allies. He now holds his dominions in independent sovereignty,—as Nawab he exercised only

[1] Summary by the Marquis of Hastings of the operations in India, and their results. Printed for the Proprietors, June, 1824.

BOOK II. CHAP. XI. 1818. a delegated sway, which the British government, as representing that of Delhi, had the right to resume at its own discretion. Names are sometimes as real as things, and the King of Oude is not for any purpose the same potentate as the Nawab Vizir.

CHAPTER XII.

Internal Administration of the Marquis of Hastings.—Progressive Legislation.—I. *Civil Judicature.—Inefficiency of the Courts.—Injunctions of the Home Authorities to revert to Native Institutions.—Measures adopted in Bengal—at Madras and Bombay.—Result.* — II. *Criminal Justice and Police.—Reforms at the Presidencies.—Union of the Powers of Magistrate and Collector.* — *Extended Police Powers of the Revenue and Village Officers at Madras, and at Bombay.*—III. *Revenues.—Land Revenue.—Principles of Ryotwar Settlement to be universally adopted.—Perpetual Settlement prohibited.—Enactments in Bengal.—Village and District Native Accountants re-established.—Rules for Sale of Lands modified.—Settlement of ceded and conquered Provinces.—System of Village Settlement preferred.—Necessity of previous Inquiry.—Abuses to be remedied.—Fraudulent Transfers of Property extensive.—Discontent of the People.—Special Commission appointed.—Wrongs redressed.—Question of perpetual Settlement of the Western Provinces re-considered.—Deferred Periodical Settlements con-

tinued.—Nature of Inquiries to be instituted.—As regarding the Land.—As regarding its Occupants.—Regulation to give effect to the Arrangements.—Revenue Surveys commenced.—Great delay anticipated.—Still greater experienced.—Merit of the Government.—Madras Village Settlements closed.—Ryotwar resumed.—With Modifications.—Lands for Sale in the permanently settled Districts bought on Public Account.—Bombay Revenue Arrangements.—Based on Native Institutions.—Inquiry found necessary.—Revenue Commission.—Revenue Survey of Broach.—Its Objects.—Similar Surveys in Guzerat.—Village Accountants made public Servants.—Opposition of Heads of Villages.—Objections to the Arrangement.—Gradually relinquished.—Settlements of the Dekhin.—Combination of Village and Ryotwar Systems.—Survey commenced.—Other Branches of Revenue.—Opium.—Difficulties respecting Malwa Opium.—Measures adopted.—Salt.—Customs.—Duties on British Goods remitted.—Finance.—Augmentation of Revenues.—Of Charges.—Surplus of Local Receipts.—Home Charges and Commercial Advantages insufficiently provided for.—Loans raised.—Public Debt increased.—Separation of Territorial and Commercial Accounts.—Debt contracted to the East India Company's Commerce.—Sufficiency of Indian Revenues for Disbursements in time of Peace.—Prospect of Financial Prosperity.—Changes of Social Condition.—Calcutta an Episcopal See.—Bishop Middleton.—Difficulties of his Position.—His Proceedings.—Foundation of Bishop's College.—His Death.—Establishment of Scottish

Church.—Activity of Missionary Societies.—Increased numbers of Missionaries.—Attention turned to Native Education.—Defects of Native System.—Schools established.—Partly by Missionary Bodies.—Partly by Individuals for General Education; the latter assisted by the Government.—Censorship of the Press abolished.—Immediate Results.—Close of the administration of the Marquis of Hastings.

BOOK II. CHAP. XII. 1814—23.

THE many and important political events which signalised the administration of the Marquis of Hastings, were not permitted to divert the attention of the Indian Governments from the progressive duties of domestic regulation, and the amelioration of the condition of the people subject to their sway. The investigations which had preceded the last renewal of the Company's Charter, had exposed defects in the established Judicial and Revenue systems, of which the existence had been little suspected, and for which it was obviously imperative to provide early and adequate remedies. It was, however, as usual, more easy to discover imperfections, than to devise unexceptionable methods of correcting them; and the measures which were proposed for that purpose partook of the faults in which much that was defective had originated,—a more accurate conception of the ends than of the means, impatience to construct a complete system of law and justice, without waiting for its spontaneous growth and gradual development, and the want of due consideration not only for the past, but for the present condition of society, for the anomalous amalgamation of its indigenous and exotic, its Indian and Eu-

ropean, elements. Although, therefore, very great pains were taken to reform practices which were evidently amiss, and to substitute principles of a different tenor from those which had hitherto been received as unimpeachable; and although upon the whole an important advance was made in the business of progressive legislation, yet the system continued to be only progressive, and was far from reaching that maturity which the authorities, both at home and in India, earnestly desired to see it attain.

The continual accumulation of arrears in the decisions of the Courts of Civil Judicature, and the prolonged periods to which complainants had to look for redress, amounting to a virtual withholding of justice, were, as we have had occasion to notice, the prominent defects of that branch of the judicial system;[1] nor did the injury arising from the delay affect only those cases which were brought before the courts, as a still greater number of suits were kept back by the uncertainty whether they would ever be adjudicated; and persons aggrieved preferred submission to present wrong to the tedious process and remote chance of obtaining a sentence in their favour.[2] Part of this delay arose from the

[1] Between 1810 and 1815, the whole number of depending suits considerably decreased; those at the end of the former year being 135,553; and of the latter 108,286. There was an increase, however, in the Superior Courts, the arrears being respectively of the Sudder Adawlah 198 and 467, and of the Provincial Courts 2903 and 3705. In the Judges' Courts there was a decrease, the depending suits being severally 20,341 and 16,898. Taking the numbers of the latter period, the term required for clearing off the causes in arrear, according to the average duration of the proceedings of the Courts, was in the Sudder twelve years; in the Provincial Courts six years; and in those of the Zilla and City Judges five and a half. Tables showing the extent and operations of the judicial systems of the three Presidencies.—Commons Report, 1832. App. Judicial. Table, xvi. p. 504.

[2] Judicial Minute of the Earl of Moira. Comm. Report, 1832. App. Judicial.

1814—23.

novel and unsuitable forms which had been introduced to secure method and precision in the proceedings of the Courts; part was ascribable also to the extreme and often needless jealousy with which the Government regarded the judicial functionaries, the restricted powers with which they were entrusted, and the numerous checks to which the exercise of those powers was subjected; but very much was owing to unavoidable causes—to the increase of population, the advance of the people in wealth and prosperity, to the valuable interests which peace and security multiplied, and to the frequency with which the people resorted to the tribunals of the state. Whatever their imperfections, the natives saw that justice was administered in the English courts upon fixed principles, that as little as possible was left to the caprice or passions of the judge, and that, with occasional exceptions, his decisions were upright and just. They had not been accustomed to courts so constituted, to functionaries so impartial and honest; and notwithstanding the defects with which the Company's Courts were chargeable, it was clear from the very fact of their being overwhelmed with business, that they enjoyed to a considerable extent, the respect and confidence of the people: it was only necessary, in order to render them completely effective, to proportion their number and powers to the mass of duty with which they were overtasked. To increase the number of those presided over by European functionaries, a class of officers who, from the peculiarities of their situation were more than ordinarily costly, was impracticable from the expense which it entailed, and the necessity

of the case imposed upon the Government the delegation of judicial functions to Native officers to a greater extent than had hitherto been thought advisable. No doubts were entertained of their competency, but experience warranted a distrust of their integrity. It was hoped, however, that by investing them with greater consideration, by granting them more adequate compensation, and by maintaining a vigilant control over their conduct, they would be less disposed to abuse the authority entrusted to them, and would take that place in the distribution of justice among their countrymen, which it was natural and desirable that they should occupy. Consistently with these views, the main object of the measures proposed at this period for the improvement of civil judicature, regarded the extension, as far as might be requisite to meet the wants and necessities of the people of India, of the instrumentality of Native officers in the administration of civil justice.

The employment of Native Judges under the denomination of Munsifs and Amins, or of Native Commissioners, was no novelty at either of the Presidencies.[1] Their appointment had constituted an

[1] Judicial Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal, 9th November, 1814, printed among the Papers on Judicial Proceedings, printed by order of the House of Commons, 1st July, 1819, p. 33. In reporting their sentiments on the measures enjoined in the Court's Letter, the Judges of the Sudder Adawlat observe, in respect to this topic, "that the general administration of Civil Justice among the inhabitants of the populous and extensive provinces subject to our empire cannot be effected without the agency and assistance of the natives themselves, or without investing them with judicial powers, as well as those of arbitration is, we think, incontestable; on this point we entirely concur in the sentiments of the Honourable Court." "The sentiments of the Sudder Court," it is added, "upon the utility and necessity of employing native Commissioners in the administration of Civil Justice, have been repeatedly submitted to Government, and were particularly stated in a report from the senior and

1814—23.

element in the reformed system of 1793, and had been subsequently extended.[1] But their utility was neutralized, by radical counter agency. Extreme jealousy and manifest distrust embarrassed their acts and circumscribed their powers, and the niggardly spirit with which their services were requited generated the evils which were apprehended, and forced them to be corrupt to secure a livelihood. Little care was taken to ascertain the character of the officers appointed, and it rarely happened that persons of respectability would accept of situations which offered them neither consideration nor emolument. It was not to be wondered at, therefore, if the subordinate native Judges were ignorant, inefficient, or corrupt; or if, as they were paid by the fees levied on the institution of suits in their courts, they stimulated and encouraged litigation. Notwithstanding these defects, however, which were inherent in the principles of their constitution and for which the Government was responsible, they were found to be highly serviceable. They disposed of a vast number of causes, which, although for petty values, were of not the less importance to the poorer

second Judges on the 30th June, 1814. Letter from the Sudder Adawlat to the Government of Bengal, 9th March, 1818.—Papers on the Judicial System, Calcutta printed.

[1] By Regulation XL. of 1793, native Commissioners were appointed to act in the threefold capacity of Arbitrators, (Amins) Referees, (to decide suits referred to them by the Judges) and Munsifs or Judges in petty cases, affecting personal property of a value not exceeding fifty rupees, (5*l.*). Munsifs were originally appointed, especially to facilitate the recovery of rents due to the Zemindars by the Ryots, but this being otherwise provided for, a different class of persons with the same designation, was appointed by Regulation XIX. 1803, for more general duties, but with the like limitation of value. The same Regulation provided for the employment of Sudder Amin or Head Commissioner, with a jurisdiction in actions for real as well as personal property, not exceeding one hundred rupees, (10*l.*)

classes of the population; and as the appeals from their decisions to the European Judge of the district to whom they were appealable, were comparatively few, it might fairly be inferred, that the people were generally contented with the measure of justice secured to them by this channel.[1]

From the results thus ascertained, and the confident representations of some of the Company's most distinguished servants, especially Colonel Munro, who was an enthusiastic advocate of the advantages to be realised from the extensive use of native agency, an unqualified opinion was adopted by the Home authorities, and particularly by the Board of

[1] Mr. Stuart, Chief Judge of the Sudder, observes: "I cannot disguise from myself that it continues to be the studious policy of the Government, to reduce all their native officers to the lowest point of emolument and credit." Minute, November, 1815.—Judicial Papers, Calcutta, printed. Sudder Amins and Munsifs were paid at first from the fees imposed on the institution of suits; the former realised about seventy rupees, (7*l.*) a month; subsequently they were paid a fixed salary of one hundred rupees, (10*l.*) per mensem, Regulation XIII., 1824: the pay of the Munsifs was much less, and complaints of their corruption were so numerous, that it was thought to counterbalance their utility, and many of the Judges proposed their abolition. Judicial Letter from Bengal, 10th November, 1814. Papers printed by order of the House of Commons, July, 1819, p. 117. There is, however, high authority in favour of their usefulness even at an early period. Mr. Harington, a Chief Judge of the Sudder, observes, "all powers entrusted to the natives, especially without fixed and liberal allowances are liable to abuse, and it cannot be doubted that the Native Commissioners have, in some instances, perverted to purposes of self-interest, exaction, and oppression, the authority delegated to them for the more speedy and efficient administration of justice, but as far as an opinion can be formed from the proportion of appeals against their decisions, to the total number of causes decided by them in past years, their appointment appears to have been of considerable public advantage." The causes decided or adjusted by them, are computed by Mr. Harington at an annual average of 300,000; a number for which it would be impossible to provide by any other agency. Analysis of the Regulations I. 98, note. At a much later date this defect in the constitution of the Munsifs was still uncorrected; the Government of Bengal write in 1827, "it cannot be matter of surprise that instances of corruption and abuse should but too frequently occur in a body of public officers, whose fair emoluments are so disproportioned to the responsibility and powers which are vested in them."—Judicial Letter from Bengal, 22nd February, 1827.—Commons Report, 1832.—Jud. App. p. 78.

BOOK II. CHAP. XII. 1814—23.

Control, that the judicial system of 1793, was an unwise departure from the established usages of the country; that its insufficiency and unsuitableness had been proved by the experience of twenty years, and that the only remedy for the deplorable condition of the Judicial administration was to be found in a recurrence to native institutions.[1] Little regard was had to the change which the interval had wrought in the circumstances of Indian society, and in contemplating the evils of the existing system the good which it had accomplished was overlooked. The records of the past, both under Native and British rule, furnished ample testimony, that although justice was tardy and crime was still perpetrated, yet that property and person enjoyed a greater degree of security than was known when native institutions were in their full vigour, except when they were directed and controlled with more than ordinary ability and energy by the arbitrary authority of a powerful Zemindar, or officer of the State. It was no doubt true, that the native institutions had been too entirely set aside in the plan which had been devised for the distribution of justice; but the altered condition of society rendered it also doubtful, whether, in the state in which they survived, they could be reasonably expected to be as available for the objects of the Government, as they might have been under different circumstances. Entertaining, however, sanguine expectations of the great benefit to be derived from giving fresh vitality to the institutions of the country, the Home authorities earnestly recommended to the Indian Governments the immediate

[1] Letter from the Court, 9th November, 1814, as above.

adoption of measures for that object; and the fullest possible employment of the head-men of the villages, and of village courts, or Panchayats, in the adjudicature of civil suits occurring among the inhabitants of their respective jurisdictions. With these instructions the Government of Bengal declared it to be impossible to comply. The extent of the territory subject to the Presidency, and the immense number of villages among which it was divided, would render it necessary to vest judicial powers in an infinitude of individuals of questionable character and pretensions, over whom it would be impracticable to exercise an adequate superintendence. It was also affirmed, that in the districts where the permanent settlement had been formed, the village institutions had been destroyed, and that the persons occupying the stations of the ancient head-men, were usually the Gomashtas, or agents of the Zemindar, whom it was obviously inexpedient to arm with powers, which they would infallibly employ for the benefit of their principals and the further oppression of the Ryots. In the provinces, where the settlement had not been concluded, too little was known of the state of the prevailing institutions to render it advisable to recognise any set of individuals as public functionaries by virtue of their connection with the communities of which they were members.[1] The Bengal Government, therefore, until the exact nature of that con-

[1] Letters from the Judges of the Court of Sudder Adawlat of the 4th December, 1816, and 9th March, 1818, with the replies of the Provincial and City Judges from various parts of the country, to the Directors of the Court, in answer to the injunctions of the Court of 1814.—Judicial Papers, Calcutta, printed. On the information thus accumulated is based the Letter from the Bengal Government of the 22nd February, 1827, cited above.

1814—23.

nection should be accurately understood, suspended compliance with the orders from home, and hesitated to intrust the supposed heads of villages with public duties, or to recognise village Panchayats in any other capacity than that in which they had always been acknowledged,—local juries of arbitration, spontaneously formed at the wish and by the consent of the litigant parties. At the same time, the necessity of augmenting native agency was unreservedly admitted, as well as of simplifying the processes of the Courts, and modifying their constitution, and various regulations for these purposes were enacted.

The limit of value to which the decisions of Sud-Amins were restricted (fifty rupees) was extended, first to one hundred and fifty, and subsequently to five hundred; while that of the sums adjudicable by Munsifs was raised from fifty, first to sixty-four, and secondly to one hundred and fifty. The pay of both was improved, and that of the Amins was fixed independently of fees; and the judges of the District Courts were authorised to add to the number of the subordinate grade of native officers as circumstances might require.[1] Additional powers were also conferred upon the junior European officers, or registrars. Suits below or above five thousand rupees, which had been restricted severally to the courts of the district and the provincial courts, were allowed to be carried into either at the will of the parties; and the number of judges was raised from three to four, in each of the provincial courts.[2] The collectors of

[1] Bengal Regulations XXIII. of 1814, and II. III. of 1821, and XIII. of 1824.

[2] Bengal Regulations XXIV. XXV. 1814 and XIX. of 1817.

the revenue were also empowered to hear and determine summary suits for the rent and occupancy of land,[1]—disputes forming a great proportion of the business of civil judicature. These enactments necessarily alleviated the labours of the judges;[2] but they were far from accomplishing the object of their promulgation; and further arrangements were soon found to be indispensable.[3]

Instructions of the purport of those addressed to Bengal, had been previously communicated to the

[1] Bengal Regulation VII. of 1822.

[2] The Regulations of 1814, as far as affected the Munsifs, seemed to have diminished the causes brought before them. In 1814 the number was 125,491; in 1816, but 52,550; they then increased, and in 1820, were 108,000. On the other hand, the suits instituted before the Sudder Amins, steadily increased from 23,000 in 1814 to 46,000 in 1820. In 1814, Munsifs were allowed to try causes only which had originated within a twelvemonth from their institution. In 1817, Regulation XIX. extended the period to three years. The Court attributed the falling off to this limitation, but in the beginning of 1814, Stamps in Judicial Proceedings were substituted for fees on the institution of suits, and the amount due to the Munsifs in place of the fee was paid by the Zilla Judge. This innovation had probably some effect in reducing the number of suits brought before the subordinate Native Judges. Selections from Judicial Records printed by order of the Court of Directors, vol. iv. p. 33. The arrears of Civil Causes rapidly declined. In 1813 they amounted to 142,000; in 1817 to 92,000, showing a diminution in four years of 50,000 suits. The Sudder estimates the average annual decisions at 150,000.—Letter from the Judges of the Sudder, March, 1818.—Judicial Papers, Calcutta printed.

[3] In reply to a Letter from Bengal in 1823, requiring considerable additions to the European establishment, the Court observes "the Regulations passed by you in 1821 have our cordial approbation, and we were greatly pleased with the valuable memorandum which was then submitted to you by your Chief Secretary, Mr. Bayley, explanatory of the policy which had influenced the framing of those Regulations. "But though under the provisions there made, the powers of the Munsifs and Sudder Amins were increased, and their number may be increased indefinitely, we apprehend, from the large arrear of undecided causes, the number and powers of those functionaries are still inadequate. We are satisfied that to secure a prompt administration of justice to the natives of India, in civil cases, native functionaries must be multiplied so as to enable them to take cognizance, in the first instance *of all suits of that description*, and, as appears to us, *without regard to the amount at stake*, the decisions being of course liable to revision under appeal."—Judicial Letter to Bengal, 23rd July, 1824. Selections from the Records, iv. 29. It is but just to the Home Authorities to give them credit for originating principles scarcely yet fully carried into practice.

BOOK II. CHAP. XII. 1814—23.

Government of Madras,[1] and their execution was insured by the appointment of a commission, of which Colonel Munro, who was at the time on the eve of returning from England to Madras, was the head.[2] Although the native village functionaries existed in a much less mutilated state in the territories subject to the Madras Presidency, than in those of Bengal; yet the principal judicial and revenue officers at the former were, for the most part, opposed to the plan of employing them extensively in the administration of civil justice. As the Patels, or head-men of the villages, and the village Panchayats were not to receive any remuneration for the performance of the duties to be assigned to them, it was anticipated that they would either decline the obligation, or fulfil it with reluctance and indifference, and that little effective aid would be received from their unwilling exertions: connected also as they must be with the parties concerned in the cases before them, it was scarcely to be expected that they would perform their duties free from bias or partiality; and as it was part of the plan, that their sentences should not be subject to appeal, there was no security against their committing gross injustice. As also they were necessarily ignorant of the laws and regulations, their judgments could not be governed by any determinate principles, and their decisions could not fail to be capricious and contradictory.[3] The arguments of the Commissioners, backed by the positive

[1] Judicial Letter to Madras 29th of April, 1814.—Selections from the Records II. 236.

[2] Judicial Letter to Madras, 4th of May, 1814.—Selections II. 257.

[3] Minute of Mr. Fullerton, 1st January, 1816.—Selections II. 353.

injunctions of the Home Authorities, silenced all opposition; and a series of Regulations was enacted and promulgated in the course of 1816, based upon the principles which the orders from home had laid down.[1] By the first of these it was provided, that the Heads of villages should be Munsifs in their respective villages; and that they should have authority to hear and determine, without appeal, all suits preferred before them for personal property, not exceeding in value ten Arcot rupees, unless the parties entered into a bond to abide by the Patel's decision, when the limit might be extended to one hundred rupees. Registers of the suits decided were to be kept by the village accountant; and periodical reports of cases adjudicated and pending were to be regularly transmitted to the native judicial officer next in rank, or the District Munsif. The Village Munsifs were authorised, by the next regulation, to assemble Panchayats, or from five to eleven of the most respectable inhabitants of the village community to hear and try, with the consent of the parties themselves, suits for personal property, to an unlimited amount. Provisions were made for regulating the constitution of the Panchayats and their mode of proceeding. Their decisions admitted of no appeal, unless a charge against them of partiality and corruption could be substantiated. Reports of their proceedings were to be transmitted to the District Munsifs, whose appointment formed the subject of another regulation. These officers were substituted for the native Commissioners formerly employed, but their number was augmented, and powers en-

[1] Madras Regulations, IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. 1816.

BOOK II. CHAP. XII. 1814—23.

larged. They were authorised to decide causes for real as well as personal property, to the extent of two hundred rupees; and within certain limits their decrees were final. They were also empowered to assemble District Panchayats, whose proceedings and constitution were analogous to those of the Village Panchayats. Another measure, having the same object in contemplation, was the extension of the powers of Sudder Amins, the Law Officers of the District and Provincial Courts, to the trial of suits for real or personal property, not exceeding the value of three hundred rupees. When it is recollected that, by far the largest proportion of the causes brought before the courts, are for values of a limited amount, it will be seen that the principal share in the administration of civil justice was thus transferred to native functionaries. Still further to expedite the dispatch of civil justice, alterations were made in the laws affecting the processes of the Courts, and the course of pleading; and limitations were affixed to the privilege of appeal.[1] At a shortly subsequent date, the jurisdiction of the Sudder Amins and District Munsifs was severally extended to suits for the value of seven hundred and fifty and five hundred rupees,[2] and the Collector was instructed to hear and decide disputes relating to the rents and possession of land, which had previously been cognizable by the civil judge alone.[3]

The effects of the various regulations thus promulgated, very soon operated to lighten the duties

[1] Madras Regulations, XIV. XV. 1816.

[2] Madras Regulations, II. 1821.

[3] Madras Regulations, V. 1822.

of the judges, and to facilitate the determination of civil suits. Some of their results were, however, unexpected, and afforded an unanswerable proof that the sentiments of the natives of India are as liable as those of other natives, to vary with change of time and circumstances. The benefits so confidently anticipated from the public recognition of the Panchayat were not realised: the supposed boon granted to the people was rejected: they would make little use of an institution interwoven, it had been imagined, inseparably with their habits and affections. The Panchayats, it appeared, had been highly prized, only as long as nothing better was to be had. In the absence of all other tribunals the people were constrained to establish one for themselves and willingly admitted its adjudication of disputes which there was no other authority to settle; while, on the other hand, the most respectable members of the community, especially interested in maintaining property and peace inviolate, and being subject to no authoritative interference or protection, willingly discharged, without any other consideration than the influence which they derived from their discharge of such functions, the duties of arbitrators and judges. But a court, the members of which acknowledged no responsibility, and performed their functions only for such a term, or at such times, as suited their own convenience; who were guided by no light except their own good sense; who, even if uncorrupt, could scarcely be impartial; who had no power to carry their own decrees into effect; and whose sentences were liable to no re-

BOOK II. CHAP. XII. 1814–23.

vision: such a court must have been a very inadequate substitute for any tribunal, the proceedings of which were regulated by fixed rules, and which was presided over by a qualified officer, removed from personal influence, and subject to vigilant supervision. Whatever defects might still adhere to the administration of justice through individual judges, native or European, appointed by the Government, their courts continued to be crowded, while the Panchayats were deserted, their unpopularity being partly ascribable to their inherent imperfections, and partly to the indifference or dislike of the persons of whom they were ordinarily composed, who, from the moment that the Government attempted to regulate their proceedings, found themselves deprived of independence, and subjected to a gratuitous and irksome responsibility. The same causes brought the village Munsifs into disrepute: they were made amenable for partiality or corruption to superior authorities; and they reaped neither profit nor consideration from their unrequited labour. It was not to be expected that, under these circumstances, the Patels would become active and zealous magistrates, or that they would fail to take every safe occasion of remunerating themselves. They were mostly also ignorant and illiterate men, unable to read or write, and little qualified by superiority of knowledge or talent, to command respect for their decisions. Recourse was consequently rarely had to their judgments; and the chief increase of labour fell upon the Sudder Amins and District Munsifs, officers appointed by the State for the distribution of justice among the people, and

owing all their influence and authority to their public and functional character.[1]

1814—23.

The circumscribed extent of the territories, subject to the Presidency of Bombay, anteriorly to the Mahratta cessions and conquests, had required the services of a comparatively limited establishment which was modelled upon those of the other Presidencies, with the exception that the court of final appeal continued until 1820 to consist of the Governor and members of council. The establishments were for some time found competent to their duty; but the growth of population and property multiplied litigation, and in 1815 complaints of delay began to be heard. To provide for the augmented demand various arrangements were adopted, extending the powers of the subordinate European

[1] In 1817, the year following the enactment of the New Regulations, the number of civil suits decided rose from 46,909 to 71,051, of which 66,302 were adjudicated by Native Courts; of this great number no more than 112 were decided by district Panchayats, and 250 by village Panchayats. In 1818, the number of cases decided by these courts were respectively but 75 and 197, and in 1819, 33 and 99. On the 1st January, 1820, the suits on the files of the Native Courts were 21,058, of which no more than 35 were before the district Panchayats, and only 9 before those of the villages. The village Head-men as Munsifs, had cognizance of but 299, and the rest, exceeding 20,000, were all before the district Munsifs, "who to all intents and purposes were servants of the Government, stipendiary Native Judges, a new description of persons, unknown under the Native Government, not the native gentry of the country, nor having by their appointment any connection with the gratuitous labour formerly required by ancient municipal arrangements."—Minute of Mr. Fullerton, 7th June, 1820.—Selections iv. 46. See also Report of Sudder Adawlat, 21st September, 1818. Selections, ii. 610. The manner in which the work was done by the Munsifs was satisfactory. From 1816 to 1820 their decisions amounted to 183,530, the appeals from them to 3057, or about $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.—Ibid iv. 67. The Commissioners were obliged to admit the partial failure of this part of their scheme, "several causes have contributed to retard the progress of the system under the village Munsifs; the forms and length of the Regulation, the pains and penalties, and prosecutions which it announces, their fears of the European Courts, and their consequent reluctance to engage in anything likely in the most remote degree to bring them before those tribunals."—Report of Commissioners, October, 1818. Ibid. II. 629.

BOOK II. CHAP. XII. 1814—23.

judicial functionaries, and adding to their number; and a supreme court for the final adjudication of both civil and criminal cases, or a Sudder and Fojdari Adawlat was constituted in place of the hitherto objectionable assignment of judicial functions to the executive and legislative Government.[1] The operation of the Regulations was extended to the first cessions from the Gaekwar and the Peshwa, and to those districts conquered from the latter, which were contiguous to the Bombay territory; but, as has been noticed, the greater portion of the conquered country was placed under the management of Commissioners, and under them of Collectors, who were charged with the administration of civil and criminal justice, and the superintendence of the police, as well as with the realization of the revenue. The principle which guided their proceedings was the preservation of the native institutions, as far as was compatible with the ends of good government, and the paucity of European functionaries, together with the extent of their several jurisdictions, rendered them dependent upon native assistance. The means of obtaining it were more ample and perfect in the Mahratta territories than elsewhere, as the original institutions had not yet been interfered with, and were the only channels through which justice had hitherto been dispensed, and public tranquillity maintained. They were subjected to the superintendence and control of the superior European authority, but the Patel and the Panchayat continued to be for some time the chief instruments in the adjudication of civil suits.[2]

[1] Bombay Regulations, V. 1815. V. VI. and VII. 1820, and I. 1821.

[2] Mr. Elphinstone's Report on the Mahratta territories, 25th October,

The state of criminal justice and of the police had been pronounced by the investigations of the Parliamentary Committee of 1812 to be as unsatisfactory as that of the civil branch, and still more imperatively to demand reform. Instructions to that effect were accordingly addressed at the same time, to the Indian Governments, promulgated by the same authority which had especially biassed the opinions of the Board of Control, and founded upon the experience of Colonel Munro. The ruling principle of the proposed reform was an entire departure from that which had influenced Lord Cornwallis in his reformation of the existing system, and re-united what he had so carefully kept apart, the powers of the magistrate with those of the Collector, and the charge of the police with the collection of the revenue. Arguing, that the duties of the Criminal Judge prevented the same officer from duly attending to civil justice; that those of a judge were incompatible with the more active functions of a magistrate; that the establishment of Darogas and Thanas, while it was unfamiliar and obnoxious to the natives, was ineffective; and that the Collector in person, or through his revenue officers, was brought more than any other functionary into approximation with the people, the Home Authorities directed that the

1819.—Selections from the Records, iv. 198.—See also the Reports of his successor, Mr. Chaplin, 5th November, 1821, and 20th August, 1822. Ibid. 309, 453. In the latter he remarks, "It will be seen from my last report that in civil causes the Panchayat is still held to be the main instrument for dispensing justice, 490. Yet several of the officers under him speak doubtfully of its operations. Captain Briggs, the collector of Kandesh observes, that although upon the whole popular, the parties would prefer the decision of a European; that the members dislike the duty, that their proceedings are very slow, that they are not free from corruption, and that the whole system requires revision. Selections, iv. 246, 829.

1814—23.

Thanadari system should be abolished; that the Collector should be vested with magisterial as well as fiscal powers, and the same should be exercised under him by revenue officers, or Tehsildars, and the heads of villages: that where the Zemindari settlements prevailed, the Zemindars should be restored to a portion of their former authority over the police; and that measures should be adopted for the reorganization of the village watch on a footing of efficiency.

The same objections which had been urged in Bengal to the employment of the heads of villages in the duties of civil justice were repeated at that Presidency, in respect to their forming part of the new police system—namely, the disappearance of heads of villages, properly so considered, and their replacement by the servants of the Zemindar, who would be likely to abuse such powers in his favour to the injury of the people. It was admitted that no system of police could be effective without the support and coöperation of the Zemindars; yet it was considered unadvisable to entrust them with an authority, the notorious misemployment of which had originally occasioned their being deprived of it, and it was evidently impracticable to combine the interference of the Zemindars in the police with the existing arrangements of Thanas and Darogas. The association of magisterial and revenue functions was also strongly objected to, not only upon the principles already laid down, but upon the ground that the Collectors were already fully occupied, and would not be able to undertake the labours of the magistracy without neglecting their peculiar duties. It

was also urged, that although the Collectors might not be guilty of any abuse of their magisterial powers, yet it might be reasonably doubted whether the Tehsildars, and other native officers acting under them, would not pervert the authority vested in them for public purposes to the means of promoting a private end, or at least to the facilitating of the collection of rents and revenues by other modes of coercion than those sanctioned by the Regulations. It was further asserted, that the proposed innovations were unnecessary, as the existing Thanadari system under the established magistrates was as effectual as any that had been devised, falling little short of the best organized systems in Europe, in regard to the detection of crime and the apprehension of criminals, when under the direction of an able and active magistrate. Its imperfection as a preventive police was not so much imputable to any inherent defect, as to the absence of public spirit in the influential members of native society, who generally, although not universally, resenting the diminution of an authority of which they had shown themselves to be unworthy depositories, were backward in fulfilling the obligations of their station, and rather afforded protection to crime than aided in its prevention or punishment. As long as this was the case, it was unfair to expect the full development of the efficiency of the police. The village watch, on the other hand, was an essential part of the existing system; and although its organization might have been occasionally impaired, yet it was not only susceptible of revival, but had been the main engine of the success which had

attended that system in putting down great crimes and preserving the general peace and security of the country. Very much had been already accomplished; and all that remained to be done was, to induce individuals of wealth and influence in society to give that assistance which they were in a position to render, not only by imposing penalties for their neglect, but by recompensing their exertions with merited notice and distinction.[1]

Although dissenting from the detailed injunctions of the Home Authorities, the Government of Bengal recognized the necessity of making additional provisions for the more prompt and effective administration of criminal justice, and of the duties of the police. During the period of which we treat, repeated regulations for these objects were promulgated. Crimes of inferior magnitude, of which the cognizance had been restricted to the Courts of Circuit, were subjected to the decision of the City and Zilla Judges, or, at their discretion, to the judgment and sentence of their native law officers and Sudder Amins;[2]—and in like manner the Circuit Courts were permitted to hear and determine cases which had heretofore been reserved for the Sudder Adawlat. These limitations of jurisdiction, however indicative of a jealous care for the protec-

[1] The same documents as those which regard the state of Civil Judicature, are the authorities for the measures enjoined and adopted, or objected to in Bengal, in regard to criminal justice and police; viz. the Letter of the Court to Bengal, of 9th November, 1814,—Parliamentary Papers, printed July, 1819, p. 33, Letter from the Judges of the Sudder Adawlat, 9th March, 1818, Judicial Papers, Calcutta, printed.—Judicial Minute of Lord Moira, October, 1815, Parl. Papers, July, 1819, p. 139. Judicial Letter from Bengal, 22nd February, 1827, Commons' Report, 1832, App. Judicial.

[2] Bengal Regulations, XVII. of 1817, XII. of 1818, and III. of 1821.

tion of person—had occasioned a degree of uncertainty and delay wholly destructive of the benefit which results from the prompt infliction of punishment, and often subjected those who were accused and not convicted of crime to indefinite and unjust imprisonment. Records of the period during which prisoners had been detained were, therefore, to be regularly furnished at every jail delivery, and the Circuit Judge was authorised to require immediate decision upon every case of protracted detention. The same functionaries were empowered, without reference to the Nizamat, or Supreme Criminal Court, to admit to bail offences not usually bailable, when the accused had been long in confinement, and where competent security was tendered.[1] The enactments for the police were consolidated in one comprehensive Regulation,[2] which had especially in view the objects of giving energy and activity to the officers of the police, while guarding against any abuse of their powers. They were prohibited from inflicting fine or punishment of any kind, from extorting confession by any mode of torture, and from detaining any person apprehended above forty-eight hours without forwarding him to the magistrate with a full report of the charge against him. The village watchmen of every class were declared to be subject to the authority of the Thanadar; and Zemindars, their agents, heads of villages, and all persons entrusted with authority, judicial or revenue, were required to give immediate information of heinous offences, and of all loss

[1] Bengal Regulations, VI. and VIII. of 1817.

[2] Bengal Regulation, XX. of 1817.

1814—23.

of life, whether from accident or violence, within their knowledge, under penalty of fine and imprisonment. Although, as a general principle, the union of the magistracy with the collection of the revenues was resisted, yet it was allowed in special localities; and the Governor-General was empowered to employ a Collector as magistrate where he might think it advisable.[1] The power which had been entrusted to the Collector of deciding summary suits for rent, and disputes regarding occupancy, was expected to relieve the Criminal Judge of a very laborious part of his duties, by the prevention of affrays arising out of contested boundaries, which were always of a sanguinary description, usually attended with loss of life, and which, from the great number of persons concerned, demanded tedious and laborious investigation.[2] These enactments afforded some additional facility and precision in the attainment of the ends proposed; but they involved no material departure from the

[1] The Collectors in Ramgerh and the Jangal Mahals, and the Sub-collectors at Khurda, Balasore, and Pilibhit, and other officers at Moradabad, Etawa, Aligerh and Meerut, and in Bundelkhand, had been already made joint magistrates. The Commissioners at Delhi, Ajmer, in the Sagar and Nagpur territories, in Cuttack, Ramgerh and Rungpur, united Revenue and Judicial powers.—Letter from Bengal, February, 1827. Commons Report. Judicial Appendix, p. 109. The discretional power of appointing Collectors to act as magistrates was provided by Regulation VII. 1822. ch. xx.

[2] The Superintendent of Police in the Western provinces, reported that in the last six months of 1811, many affrays had taken place in the Benares district, in which 5,700 persons were concerned, of whom thirty were killed on the spot and sixty-nine wounded. At Zemania, opposite to Ghazipur, an affray took place notwithstanding the presence and prohibition of the Police, and the Zemindar, whose crop it was the object of one party to seize, was murdered, although he had taken refuge with the Police officers. The stronger party always found an advantage from his success, as owing to the delays of the Courts he was sure of remaining in possession for a prolonged period.—Letter to Bengal. Parl. Papers, July, 1819, p. 37.

system in force, and adhered, with but partial exceptions, to the principle of distinction between the judicial and revenue departments.

The orders addressed from England to the Government of Fort St. George, were of a more peremptory tenor.[1] It was declared, that any plan of criminal Judicature and Police, not based upon the ancient village system, was radically defective, and inadequate to the accomplishment of its intended purposes; and that experience had shown, that the feeble operation of a few Darogas and Peons, spread through a wide extent of country, and having no hold upon the respect or attachment of the people, was wholly insufficient for the preservation of social order and tranquillity. The immediate abolition of the Thanadari system was therefore enjoined; and it was directed, that the whole of the magisterial functions should be entrusted to the Collector, as well as the superintendence of the Police, his duties to be discharged through the agency of his subordinate European and native Collectors, the heads of villages, and the village watch. The circumstances of the Madras Presidency, and the greater completeness with which the village institutions in many parts of the country had survived political revolutions, were favourable to the introduction of the proposed arrangements; and it was further facilitated by the general impression that the Thanadari system was unsuited to the condition of the people, and was unable to check the progress of crime.[2] The leading authorities, there-

[1] The Letter above referred to, 29th April, 1814.—Selections, ii, 250.

[2] "The inexpediency of the system of Police under Darogas and Thanadars at Madras, appeared manifest at a very early period. A Committee was

1814—23.

fore, acquiesced in the general expediency of entrusting the duties of the Police to the officers of the revenue, the Collector, the Tehsildars, and, under them, the heads of villages, and the village watchmen. Objections were stated to the combination of Magistrate and Collector,[1] but they were held to be invalid by the Special Commission, and the Government acting in conformity to their opinions, it was resolved that the Collector should be charged with all the duties of the magistrate, except the visitation of the jails and personal attendance at the circuits. Accordingly regulations were enacted, constituting the Collectors of the several Zillas, magistrates also of their respective Zillas, and their assistants, assistants to the magistrates, in which capacity they were empowered to apprehend persons charged with offences against person and property; to commit them for trial when satisfied that there were grounds for their committal; and, in the case of minor offences, to hear and pronounce sentence, comprehending corporal punishment, imprisonment and fine within prescribed limits. The judges of the Zilla were appointed criminal judges for the trial of the cases sent to

appointed in 1805 to consider a general system of Police, and their report contained an express recommendation to continue the ancient system under the head inhabitants, and to place the superintendence of the Police under the Collectors. The same sentiments in regard to the village establishments have been expressed by the Second Committee. The decision of the Supreme Government against the transfer of the Police to the Collector, precluded the discussion of that measure by the Second Committee. The stipendiary Police Peons have, indeed, shown themselves incapable of acting but by the aid of the village police, and they have moreover proved a great annoyance to the inhabitants."—Mr. Fullerton's Minute, 1st January, 1816.—Selections, II. 365.

[1] Report of Board of Revenue, Madras, 18th December, 1816. Selection ii. 403.—Mr. Fullerton's Minute. Ibid, 369.

them by the magistrates, under certain limitations, beyond which they were referrable to the Court of Circuit at the usual periodical sessions. The appointment of Daroga was abolished, and the functions were transferred to the head-men of the villages, assisted by the Karnams, or village accountants, and the Taliaris or other classes of village watchmen, by Tehsildars, or native collectors, by Zemindars, Amins, and Kotwals. Their duties were principally the prevention of crime by seasonable interposition, or prompt information to superior authority, the apprehension of criminals, and their transmission to the proper officer within twenty-four hours of their arrest; and the adjudication of petty disputes and thefts with power to impose a trivial fine, and to award a brief detention in the village choltri, or the stocks. The village guards were declared to be hereditary, and entitled to an assignment from the Government of land, grain, or money, as might be convenient. In default of heirs, they were appointed by the Collector. Tehsildars were, *ex officio*, heads of Police in their respective districts, and, in addition to the subsidiary duties of investigation and committal, were authorised to hear and determine, and inflict punishment according to definite limitations. The Magistrate was permitted to appoint, at his discretion, any Zemindar, who should be desirous of the office, head of the Police within his own Zemindari; Amins of Police were also nominated for towns. Abuse of authority by any of these persons, was punishable by fine and imprisonment.[1] The powers of the subordinate function-

[1] Madras Regulations, IX. X. XI. XII. of 1816.

aries[1] were subsequently extended, and various regulations were passed to facilitate and expedite the decisions of the criminal courts.[2] As Colonel Munro, the main author of these innovations, was appointed Governor of Madras in 1820, he was enabled to superintend the full development of a system virtually abrogating that which had a few years earlier been pressed upon the Government of Fort St. George by the Government of Bengal, as affording the only solid basis on which the advance of the people in happiness and prosperity, the permanent preservation of private security and public tranquillity, could be established.[3]

The arrangements adopted at Madras for the union of the superintendence of Police and the functions of the Magistrate, with the duties of the Collector, were implicitly followed at Bombay, being recommended by the similar vitality of the native institutions. In the recently ceded and conquered territories especially they were in full vigour, and the agents of the Police and officers of criminal jus-

[1] Madras Regulations, IV., 1821.

[2] Regulations, III. 1817, and I. II. VI. of 1822.

[3] In a Letter from the Government of Bengal to the Government of Fort St. George, during the administration of Marquis Wellesley, and bearing his signature, it is asserted that "the system in force under the native governments, however well conducted, must necessarily produce oppression and abuse, as it provides no restraint upon the exercise of power sufficient to ensure the uniform, impartial, and general operation of the laws, and to inspire the people with a sense of confidence and security in the ordinary conduct of private transactions, and in the undisturbed exercise of private rights;" and his Lordship reprimands the Government for their tardiness in giving effect to the new system of instituting regular courts "adequate to secure the prompt and impartial administration of the established laws, the revenue officers, being disqualified by their revenue duties, for the discharge of judicial functions." The whole letter is a summary of the principles of 1793, which, at Madras at least, had in little more than twenty years become obsolete, and were regarded as mistaken and mischievous. Selections iv. 924.

tice were the same as those to whom the collection of the revenue had been intrusted.[1] The principle was carefully preserved, but the practice was modified by provisions calculated to limit the powers and control the proceedings of the native officers; and by the ample discretion necessarily vested in the European Collectors of the districts into which the new territory was distributed. Offences of a heinous nature were reserved for the decision of the Collectors; and in cases of capital punishment for the confirmation of the Commissioner.

The views entertained by the authorities, emanating chiefly from the Board of Control, adverse to the principle of the permanent settlement of the revenue, have been already adverted to.[2] The soundness of the principle was not professedly contravened, but the seasonableness of the practice was denied until a patient and laborious scrutiny of individual rights, a careful investigation of local peculiarities, and a minute and detailed survey of the extent, cultivation, and productiveness of the territory should have been instituted. An annual settlement with the actual cultivators on the Ryotwari system, was also considered to be more consistent with individual rights, as well as more profitable to the public revenue; and the introduction of such an arrangement was strenuously enjoined upon the Government of Bengal, in all cases where it might be practicable.[3]

[1] Bombay Regulations I. II. of 1818.

[2] Vol. VII. p. 452.

[3] Revenue Letters from the Court of Directors, 1st February, 1811. Selections i. ii. 15th January, 1812. Ibid. 1. 61. 29th January, 1813. Ibid. p. 75.

1814—23.

The local Governments of Bengal and Madras, on the other hand, as tenaciously adhered to the principle of permanency, and maintained that the interests of the Government and the expectations of the people, justified by previous promises and regulations, required that a settlement in perpetuity should be made, either immediately or after a brief interval. They were, however, positively prohibited from carrying the measure into effect without the previous sanction of the Court; and in obedience to these orders the arrangement was indefinitely deferred.

In Bengal, the existing settlement of the lower provinces precluded the consideration of the question of perpetuity, and the measures of the Government were restricted to the enactment of regulations intended to correct previous errors, or to provide for circumstances which had arisen out of the altered condition of the agricultural interests. In order to preserve a record of the changes constantly taking place in the distribution of the soil, the office of Kanungo in each Pergana, or district, was revived, whose duty it was to keep registers of all transfers of landed property, of the alteration of boundaries; of the prices of produce and rates of rent, and of a variety of subjects regarding the statistics of the cultivation and occupancy of the country; furnishing the particulars periodically to the Collector. To enable the Kanungo to collect and compile this information, the injunction which originally made it incumbent on the Zemindars to keep up the Patwaris, or village accountants, who were to supply the Kanungo with half-yearly details was reiterated. These latter offi-

cers had been maintained in various degrees of efficiency for the service of the Zemindar;[1] but the Kanungo had been abolished in the lower provinces, shortly after the conclusion of the perpetual settlement; and in Bengal, his services were missed as soon as inquiry was directed to those particulars, on which alone equitable assessments could be formed.[2] The institution had survived in the western provinces, and was there found of service, but it was not in the power of a mere enactment to reorganize a machinery elsewhere which had been suffered to fall into utter decay, and the renovation of which demanded time, opportunity, and diligent supervision.

Regulations were likewise promulgated for the levying of revenue from lands which were held rent-free, and which had not been so specified at the formation of the perpetual settlement, or included in the recognised limits of the extant Zemindaris; also for the assessment of waste lands, not comprised within the same limits, and since brought under cultivation: a special regulation[3] gave validity to a new species of tenure which had grown up under the prevailing system, derived from leases in

[1] Regulations II. 1816., II. XIII. 1817., and I. 1818, and XII. 1817. Zemindars had been ordered to maintain Patwaris in every village by Reg. VIII. 1793, ch. lxii.

[2] The office of Kanungo, which was universal under the Mogul Government, was abolished in 1802 by Lord Cornwallis, under a belief that all the particulars regarding the relative claims of Government, and of individuals had been recorded, and that the rights of the landholders and cultivators of the soil, whether founded on ancient custom, or on regulations which had originated with the British Government, had been reduced to writing, a belief which was wholly erroneous. Mem. by Mr. Secretary Mackenzie. Revenue Selections, iii. p. 41. See Correspondence on the appointment of Kanungos—the same volume, i. 52.

[3] Regulations XXIII. 1817, II. 1819.

1814—23.

perpetuity, granted by Zemindars, of portions of their estates, and of sub-leases again granted by the tenants,[1] defining also the nature of the property, and the mode of recovering arrears of rent. Enactments were likewise passed for the better regulation of sales of land for arrears of revenue, the objects of which were to render them more deliberate and public; to secure the validity of the transfer, and define the nature and extent of the rights transferred; to protect all parties concerned from the consequences of error, irregularity, or fraud in the proceedings, and to enable the Board of Revenue to cancel a sale when it might seem to be a measure of excessive severity. This regulation, which applied to the Ceded and Conquered provinces, as well as to Bengal, contained one important clause which altered materially the relative positions of the actual cultivator and the Zemindar. Unto this date, all under-tenures were annihilated by the sale of the Zemindari, and the purchaser was empowered to make what new engagements he pleased, and to dispossess any class of occupants. It was now enacted, that tenants holding the land in hereditary and transferrable property, or cultivators having a hereditary and prescriptive right of occupancy, should not be dispossessed as long as they paid the rents previously settled, and that those rents should not be augmented, except under specified circumstances. This was a most essential advance in the protection of the rights of the peasantry, which, by the perma-

[1] Regulation VIII. of 1819. The tenants in the first degree were known as Patnidars, leaseholders; in the second, Durpatni-dars, sub-leaseholders; in the third, Seh-patni-dars, or third leaseholders; the leases were at a fixed rent in perpetuity.

nent settlement, had been left in Bengal entirely at the mercy of the Zemindar.[1]

The principal Revenue measures of the Government of Bengal, however, regarded the more recently acquired territories, and as no final assessment of the revenue of the Western provinces had yet been effected; the question that called for determination was the principle to be adopted in respect to those provinces. Permanency had been positively prohibited by the Court, and the practice of temporary assessments, which had hitherto prevailed, was therefore still to be pursued; but it remained to be considered, with whom the settlements were to be made, and upon what conditions.

The settlement of the Western provinces early engaged the attention of the Earl of Moira. Although disposed to acknowledge the desirableness of a permanent limitation of the Government demands, the new Governor-General had brought with him different notions from those which had hitherto predominated in the Supreme Council, and early expressed his conviction, that the measure must necessarily be preceded by the most thorough investigation; and on his journey to the upper provinces in 1814, he called upon the several Collectors to meet him, and bring with them full reports on the state of their respective districts. The information then received, although presenting a progressive improvement in the revenue, exhibited a marked inequality in the rate of assessment,[2] and led to the conclusion, that

[1] Regulations XVIII. 1814, and XI. 1822. See also Revenue Letters from Bengal, 20th of July, 1823. Com. Rep. 1832. Revenue App. p. 194.

[2] The total land revenue of the Ceded and Conquered provinces amounted

BOOK II. CHAP. XII. 1814—23.

those who were most heavily assessed, could bear the burthen only because they were in possession of lands which had been withheld from all assessment whatever: it followed, therefore, that the statements upon which the calculations were founded were erroneous; that no dependence could be placed on the returns of the native revenue officers; and that the only safe criterion by which the Government claim could be accurately adjusted, was the actual measurement and survey of the ground, and a careful estimate of its average produce. The settlement of the revenue with the actual cultivators on the Ryotwari system, was declared to be inapplicable to Upper India, as involving a minuteness of inspection which was impracticable with the present European establishment, and which would necessitate the employment of an infinite number of native agents who, from the impossibility of an efficient control, would be likely to inflict unbounded extortion and oppression. It became necessary, therefore, to form engagements with middle-men of some class or other; and the Board of Commissioners appointed to the Upper Provinces sought to introduce the system of village settlements; contracting engagements with one or more of the members of the actual cultivating body, as the representative of

to more than two crores and eighty lakhs, (2,800,000*l.*) which was collected at a charge of about 6 per cent., and with a balance of about 3 per cent., the whole levied upon 3,57,40,598, recorded Bigas of cultivated land. In Shahjehanpur and Bareilly, the rate per Biga was seven and eight anas; in Moradabad, one rupee, twelve anas; between three and four times the rate of the preceding, although like them situated in the same province, Rohilkhand, and distinguished by no material difference in the fertility of the soil. Revenue Minute of the Governor-General, 21st Sept. 1815. Common's Report, 1832. Revenue App. p. 91.

each village community for the whole of the Government demand, and leaving the adjustment of the share of each individual cultivator to be settled among themselves, with an appeal to the arbitration of the civil courts. The principle of this arrangement generally was conformable to the existing institutions, and was satisfactory to the people.

Before, however, the settlement of the ceded and conquered provinces upon the principle proposed could be attempted, it became necessary to remedy the abuses which had followed upon the settlements previously made, by which a vast number of the cultivators and proprietors of the soil had been violently or fraudulently deprived of their hereditary possessions. During the first seven or eight years after the acquisition of the new territories, the native officers of Government, their relations, connections, and dependants, taking advantage of the novelty of the British rule, of the weakness and ignorance of the people, and, in some cases, of the culpable supineness and misconduct of the European functionaries, contrived to acquire very extensive estates by the injury and ruin of the legal possessors. This wrong was perpetrated chiefly through collusive and fraudulent sales for arrears of revenue, either where no arrears were due,[1] or where they were purposely incurred by indi-

[1] "I have known a case wherein the defendant has not only had his estate sold for alleged arrears of revenue, but been prosecuted separately for farther balance, and when by his own acts, acknowledgments, and pleadings, he must have been cast; yet when all his own and his pleader's ingenuity has failed, it has been found that the full revenue and more was collected, and the estate purchased by a portion of that which had been withheld." Letter from Mr. Fortescue, Judge and Magistrate of Allahabad. Com. Rep. 1832. Revenue App. p. 229.

BOOK II. CHAP. XII. 1814—23.

viduals who had been admitted to contract for the public revenue without having any claim or title to the lands, and who created a title either for themselves, or the Government officers in league with them, by the fact of a public sale. Private sales were also effected by the same pretended proprietors of estates, in which they had no fixed property, in favour of the officers of Government, their relations, or dependants. The persons thus injured—the village Zemindars—were for the most part ignorant and poor, and unacquainted with the forms of the British Courts or the principles of the Regulations, while those who defrauded them of their patrimony were generally men of wealth and rank, familiar with the British system, and enjoying considerable influence with the European functionaries.[1] Redress through the instrumentality of the judicial establishments was scarcely possible, and general discontent, often manifesting itself in affrays and bloodshed, pervaded the population of the Western provinces.[2]

Satisfied of the correctness of these statements, the Government resolved to adopt measures for securing redress to those whose rights had been

[1] In the Allahabad district, the principal purchasers were the Raja of Benares, a wealthy banker from the same place, and a former Amil, or Government manager, of Kota; these three, in the first few years after the cession, acquired by chicanery and collusion, estates yielding an annual revenue of 5,87,000 rupees, (or 58,700*l.*) being one-fifth of the revenue of the whole district.—Memorandum by Mr. Secretary Mackenzie. Ibid. 232. So Mr. Fortescue also writes. "Immediately after the cession in 1801, two very distinguished characters made their appearance from the contiguous province of Benares, in this district." Comm. Report, 1832. Revenue App. p. 228.

[2] Preamble to Regulation I. 1821, which enters fully into the nature of the frauds committed.—See also Minute of Mr. J. Stuart. Ibid. Reverue App. 224.

invaded, by means more immediately accessible than the ordinary course of justice; and a Regulation was enacted appointing a Mufassil, or Provincial Commission, for the following purposes:—Investigation of disputed claims on account of public or private transfers of land prior to 1810 within such limits as the Government should direct; annulling sales effected by fraudulent influence, or by maladministration, and restoring the estates to their rightful owners; upholding all genuine and valid sales, and making adequate compensation in the case of those cancelled, where the purchasers were not implicated in, or privy to, any dishonesty or deception. In communication with the Mofussil Commission, a Sudder Commission was established at Calcutta, to receive the reports of the Provincial Commissioners, to confirm or annul their decisions, and to receive appeals from their judgments.[1] The appointment of the Special Mofussil Commission was vehemently opposed by the Judges of the Sudder, on the ground of its supercession of the regular Courts, which were open to all injured parties, and of its liability to add a new set of wrongs to those complained of, by dispossessing many persons of rights originally acquired by fair and honest purchase, and undisturbed through a prolonged interval. The resolution of the Government was, however, persisted in, and the two Commissions continued to prosecute their investigation through a number of years, in which a great amount of hardship and injury was redressed, and a favourable impression was made upon the minds

[1] Regulations I. 1821, and I. 1823, IV. 1826.

of the people;—a considerable mass of information was also accumulated, regarding the tenures by which the lands in the Upper Provinces were held, an earlier acquaintance with which would have prevented the occurrence of that mischief which it was the work of many years entirely to repair.[1]

As the temporary arrangements made with the occupants of the land in the Ceded and Conquered provinces were to expire in 1822, it became necessary to reconsider the question of a final assessment, and its being settled for perpetuity was again brought under discussion, notwithstanding the opposition of the Home Authorities. A permanent settlement was strongly recommended by the Board of Commissioners, not only upon the advantages of the measure in a fiscal point of view, but because they considered that the faith of the Government had been distinctly pledged to its adoption, and that the mass of the population had long and anxiously expected it: it could no longer, therefore, in their opinion, be withheld without the greatest injury to the interests of the British Government in that quarter.[2] The same sentiments were expressed by the members of the Government;[3] and the result of their deli-

[1] Notes on the Proceedings of the Government of Bengal respecting the enactment of Regulation I. 1821, bringing down the proceedings to 1826; and Revenue Letter to Bengal, January, 1829.—Comm. Report, 1832. Revenue App. p. 269. The Mofussil Commission was abolished upon the appointment of Commissioners of Revenue and Circuit, to whom its duties were transferred.

[2] Report of Board of Commissioners for the ceded and conquered provinces, 27th October, 1818.—Selections iii. 143.

[3] See Minutes of Mr. Dowdeswell, Sir Edward Colebrooke, Mr. Stuart, and Mr. Adam. Sir E. Colebrooke maintained that the condition attached to Regulation IX. 1805, had been fulfilled, that the Western Provinces had attained in all the lands liable to assessment the maximum of cultivation, and that the Revenue was more likely to decline

berations was the communication of their unanimous opinion, that the system of a permanent settlement of the land revenue, either upon the principle of a fixed total payment, or of an assignment determinable by a fixed and invariable rate, ought to be extended to the Ceded and Conquered provinces, as soon as it should be practicable fully to ascertain and record the value and capabilities of the land, and the rights and privileges of the various classes having an interest in the land. They were almost unanimous, however, in concluding that the extension of a permanent settlement to the provinces in question, without a minute investigation of the nature specified, would involve the risk of a considerable sacrifice of revenue, and the still more serious evil of placing in jeopardy the rights and property of a large body of the population.[1] These sentiments called for a reiteration of the injunctions of the Court to abstain, not only from making any permanent settlement, but from taking any measures which might raise the expectation that a settlement in perpetuity would hereafter be formed.[2] The Home Authorities now apparently abandoned the principle alto-

than to improve. He also in a second minute asserted, that it was unnecessary to await the verification of tenures, as it would be sufficient to close permanently with the several villages, and to leave disputed claims to be adjudicated by the Courts. The expedience of immediate settlement for perpetuity was, however, questioned by his colleagues, who confined themselves to the view thus expressed by Mr. Adam. "It is agreed on all hands, in this country at least, and will not, I apprehend, be denied by the Honourable Court, that the Government is pledged to impose sooner or later, a limitation to the public demand from the land in the ceded and conquered Provinces."—Minutes of the Members of Government, 1819-20. Selections as above.

[1] Revenue Letter from Bengal, 16th September, 1820.—Selections iii. 141.

[2] Revenue Letter to Bengal. Selections iii. 213.

gether—a relinquishment immaterial, as has been argued, to the interests, and indifferent to the feelings of the people, as long as an enhancement of the calls upon them is not vexatiously repeated, and they entertain a firm trust in the durability, if not in the perpetuity, of moderate assessments.

Leaving this point for future consideration, the Government of Bengal determined to adopt active means for procuring the requisite materials for the formation of a definite settlement for a protracted period, and pending the duration of the periodical settlements for shorter terms, the revenue officers in the western provinces were ordered to institute minute inquiries, village by village, into the extent and produce of the lands, the manner in which the produce was collected and realised, the mode in which it was distributed, and the rights, privileges, perquisites, and tenures, of all parties deriving support or benefit from the soil; the inquiry resolving itself into two heads, as affecting the land itself, and the persons interested in the land.

No materials entitled to credit were in existence respecting the extent and productiveness of the lands in cultivation, or the proportion still uncultivated. Such statements as were on record depended chiefly upon the personal information of subordinate officers, always vague and inaccurate, and not unfrequently interested and untrue; or upon accounts and specifications imperfectly and irregularly kept, and not uncommonly garbled and falsified. The extent to which the rights of individuals had been overlooked or violated, has been already explained by the circumstances which gave origin to

the enactment of a regulation for their redress; but equal dishonesty on the one part, and ignorance and carelessness on the other, had in like manner vitiated much of the information that had been collected with regard to the distribution of the lands, and the demands to which they were justly liable. Under these considerations, the revenue authorities were instructed to ascertain, by the best available means, the extent of every village within the district, the state of its cultivation, the proportion of uncultivated or waste land, the different qualities of the lands, their situation and relative degrees of productiveness, the various kinds of crops, the mode of estimating or realising their value, and the disposal of their out-turn, the charges of cultivation, and the expenses incurred on account of the village community, with a variety of subordinate details, exhibiting in a clear and authentic manner, the agricultural resources of the country in relation to the amount of the public revenue. With regard to the people by whom that revenue was raised and paid, the Collectors were directed to determine the grounds upon which any individual assumed the character of a contractor for the Government revenue; how far he was to be treated as a proprietor of the land, or as an intermediate agent for the realisation of the public demand; in what mode the assessment of the less prominent factors was adjusted, and under what tenure they held,—whether as sole or joint proprietors, holding hereditary and transferable rights, and in what proportions, whether tenants either perpetual, having hereditary right of occupancy, or temporary and liable

1814—23.

to removal at the will of other classes or individuals, and whether mere labourers and servants of individuals or the community; in short, every kind and description of tenure was to be investigated and determined, and all advantages, obligations, and duties, connected with each, to be definitively ascertained and recorded. The investigation was to be conducted not with the object of increasing the public revenue, but in order to obtain an accurate knowledge of the real condition of the agricultural population, and the resources of the country, with a view to secure the prosperity of the people, as much as the equitable claims of the State. Personal inquiry on the spot, accessibility to all classes of persons, and a sedulous scrutiny of all information received through the native officers, were impressed on the European functionaries, and a long and laborious course of investigation was anticipated.[1] Actual surveys of several of the provinces were set on foot, but the revenue officers were instructed not to await their completion, and to conclude the settlement of the districts upon other grounds, if satisfactory.[2] A formal regulation was promulgated to give effect to these arrangements, and to arm the Collectors with additional powers for the adjudication of

[1] The objects to be kept in view in framing a settlement of the ceded and conquered Provinces are specified in copious and instructive detail in the Resolution of the Bengal Government, 22nd December, 1820.—Selections iii. p. 229.

[2] Upon a comparison with the Revenue Survey of Baroch, made by order of the Government of Bombay, and which in a district containing but one hundred and sixty-two villages required more than two years, it was estimated by the Surveyor-General of Bengal, that a similar survey of Furruckabad, one of the Zillas of the Western Provinces, would occupy nearly thirty-two years, at a cost of nearly five Lakhs of Rupees.—Selections iii.

disputed claims and titles to the lands.[1] A great and wise measure was thus commenced: its execution was retarded by unforeseen embarrassments; by the inability of the revenue officers to perform the duties assigned to them, partly from want of leisure, partly from want of activity and knowledge; by the frequent interruptions of the surveys; and by the intricacy of the subject, involving a complicated texture of rights and tenures, which almost defied unravelling. The principle, however, was sound. There may have been errors in the execution, as there were unavoidable delays in the accomplishment of the object proposed; but the Government was entitled to credit for wise and benevolent intentions, and for having acted, however late, upon the principle that knowledge should precede legislation.[2]

[1] Regulation VII. of 1822. It is printed in the Selections iii. 369, as well as in the usual Collection of the Regulations.

[2] Mr. Shore, whose opinions are entitled to the utmost deference, both from his experience, and from the rectitude of his feelings in behalf of the people of India, severely condemns the measures described in the text as being impracticable, and as tending to introduce a system virtually Ryotwar. It was impossible, he argues, that a Collector, a young man and a foreigner, without any knowledge of the value of lands, or the peculiarities of Indian tenures, should be able to ascertain and determine the extent and produce of the lands of at least three thousand villages, the average number of a district, or the rights and claims of an average population of nearly a million of individuals holding property under the most varied and complicated tenures; and could the plan succeed, the result would be to get rid of the principal farmers, and transfer their profits to the Government; leaving no opening for the accumulation of capital, and its consequent application to the improvement of the land. Such he declares to have been the result of the Regulation VII. of 1822. In those districts where it has been enforced, society, he asserts, is becoming rapidly impoverished and disorganised; there is no one to take the lead, or direct the people in anything which may tend either to benefit them or the Government. — Notes on Indian Affairs by the Honourable F. J. Shore, vol. i. Letter xviii. on the Revenue System. At the time at which those letters were written, 1832-3, some of the settlements for extended periods were actually perfected, and the value of the lands and tenures of individuals correctly ascertained. There is reason to think that

The measures which had been adopted at Madras as preliminary to the formation of a permanent settlement have been already adverted to, and it has been mentioned, that in those districts in which the Ryotwar settlement had been introduced, it had been abandoned in favour of village settlements for a period first of three, and then of ten years, at the close of which a permanent arrangement was to be established, based upon the experience of the preceding interval. The measure was absolutely condemned by the Authorities at home, and recurrence to the Ryotwar settlement commanded; but, in the mean time, engagements for a definite term had been entered into in the greater number of instances, and it was not until about 1820, that the village leases finally expired. The plan of adjusting the Government claim with the individual cultivators was then resumed with the advantage of being carried into operation under the eye of its great advocate, Sir Thomas Munro. Some important modifications were, however, introduced.

All compulsion or restraint upon the free labour of the Ryots was prohibited. The existence of various rights in the property of the land was recognised, and the investigation and ascertainment of all existing tenures was to precede the apportionment of the Government demand; the rates of the former assessment were considerably lowered; and the provision which had been formerly made for rendering the industrious and fortunate cultivator liable to be amerced for any default in the payments of a less successful, or less diligent Ryot, was can-

Mr. Shore's pictures, however faithful in the main, are occasionally somewhat too highly coloured.

celled.[1] Enactments were promulgated for the protection of the Ryots, both against the oppression of superior renters and the extortions of the Government native officers; and the Collectors were empowered to investigate and adjudge all cases of claims for rent, and all disputes respecting boundaries and crops.[2] The effect of these measures was favourable to the prosperity of those provinces of the Madras Presidency to which the Government settlement had not extended. In those also it was proposed to substitute gradually the Ryotwar system by purchasing, on the part of Government, the lands becoming saleable for arrears, and then settling directly with the cultivators of the soil.

The same limited extent of territory which rendered it unnecessary to construct at an early date, a complicated machinery for the administration of justice in the Bombay Presidency, retarded the full development of any system for the collection of the revenue. One advantage arising from this delay was the exemption of the Presidency from a precipitate imitation of the enactments of 1793; and the previous knowledge of the discussions to which they gave origin in regard to Bengal and Madras, prevented the subject of a permanent Zemindari settlement being prematurely proposed at Bombay.[3]

[1] Paper on the Land Revenue of India, by A. D. Campbell, Esquire. Madras Civil Service. Comm. Com. 1832. Revenue Appendix, p. 50. Minute of the Board of Revenue, 5th January, 1818. Ibid. p. 578.

[2] Regulations Fort St. George, IV. V. and IX. of 1822.

[3] Except on the Island of Salsette, where in 1801, the Government offered to the cultivators to convey to them an absolute proprietary right, on their agreeing to a fixed permanent rate of payment. Few of the occupants availed themselves of the offer.—See Bombay Reg. I. 1801, containing a review of the past revenue arrangements on this island.

BOOK II. CHAP. XII. 1814—23.

The arrangements there in force were, from the beginning, based upon the practice that had prevailed under the native governments; and for many years the revenue was collected from the villages through the agency of the Patels, according to annual assessments made by the native revenue officers subordinate to the Collector.[1] In the course of time, however, it was suspected that the Government was defrauded of its due, and that individuals were deprived of their property and rights by the malpractices both of the heads of villages and the native Collectors; and that justice to the Ryots, as well as the security of the public revenue, required that a more accurate knowledge than had yet been obtained, should be possessed, of the actual condition of the agricultural classes, whether paying revenue to the State, or holding lands exempted from the public demand. A revenue Commission was accordingly early appointed to inquire into the existing tenures, and to form settlements in the territories first annexed, in consequence of cession or conquest from the Mahratta Princes, to the Bombay Presidency, lying principally in Guzerat, or on its borders.[2] Among the recommendations of the Committee was the institution of a detailed and scientific survey of the district of Broach, by which its boundaries, extent, and divisions, and the extent of every village in it, and of every field in every village, were determined by actual admeasurement;—a like account was taken of the lands cultivated or waste, and of those paying

[1] A Collector charged with the realisation of the revenue, which had been formerly collected under the Nabobs of Surat, was first appointed in 1800. His duties were defined by Regulation XIII. of 1802.

[2] Comm. Com. 1832. Revenue App. 507.

revenue to Government as well as of those which were rent free. The qualities of the soil, the kinds of its produce, the mode of apportioning and of valuing the latter, and of realising the respective shares of the cultivator and of the State, were also defined, and a census of the population was taken with a verification of their individual claims, rights, and obligations.[1]

The survey was commenced in 1811, and was finished in rather more than two years, when the obvious value of the information which it brought to light induced the Government to sanction its extension to the other divisions of the Collectorate; and eventually to the other three Collectorates in Guzerat, Surat, Kaira, and Ahmedabad.[2]

Another arrangement, having for its object the ascertainment of the resources of the districts, and the record of private as well as public rights, was an alteration in the character of the native village accountants, who were made the servants of the Government. They had hitherto been paid by the village communities, but their duties had been indefinitely fixed, and irregularly discharged, and in many places they had ceased to exist. Arrangements were made to complete their number and define their duties, and they were placed under the immediate orders of the Collector, and were paid by

[1] The Collectorate of Broach comprised six Pergunas—Broach, Akhilesar, Hanskut, Jambusir, Ahmud, and Dehej; the first conquered from Sindhia in 1803; the others ceded by the Peshwa; comprising about 1,320 square miles, a population of 224,000, and yielding a revenue of rupees 19,57,000. Letter from Bombay, 5th November, 1823. Com. Committee, 1832. App. Revenue, 778.

[2] Report of Lieut.-Colonel Monier Williams, on the Survey of the Broach Collectorate, ibid. 783.

BOOK II. CHAP. XII. 1814—23.

him at a rated per centage on the amount of the collections. Unimportant as these changes might appear to be, they tended in reality to effect a complete revolution in the village system. The authority and influence of the Accountant supplanted those of the Patel, and of the district Collector, and brought each cultivating Ryot into immediate connection with the European Collector, constituting the characteristic feature of the Ryotwar system. Many of the Patels had the sagacity to foresee this result, and opposed the introduction of the innovation, but their opposition only accelerated the evil they sought to prevent, by compelling the European officer to dispense with their agency altogether, and conclude his assessments through his own assistants, with the individual cultivators. The Patels then relaxed their opposition and were allowed to resume their intermediate position, as it was the great object of the Bombay Government to maintain the village institutions of the country in entireness and efficacy. In proportion as the revenue surveys were completed, and accurate records of the possessions of each cultivator were obtained, the agency of the native village Accountants became less requisite, and the allowances granted them being fixed upon a less liberal scale, they ceased, in a great measure, to interfere with the integrity of the village system.[1]

[1] Regulations I. 1814, and II. 1816. "The greatest change with the least appearance, was wrought by the appointment of new Talatis. These officers are, all over India, hereditary functionaries of the village, subordinate to the Patel, to whom they serve as clerk and assistant. When on their best footing, they are generally in league with the villagers, and their accounts are often falsified to serve the purpose of the Patel. The new Talati is an officer direct from Government, and looked up to

As soon as a moderate degree of tranquillity was re-established in the conquered territories, arrangements were adopted for discovering the grounds on which equitable assessments could alone be formed, —the nature of the lands, and the rights of their occupants. In most places the village institutions were found in a greater or lesser degree of perfection,[1] and the settlements which were formed partook in various proportions of the nature of the Ryotwar. It was the object of the Government to combine the Ryotwar and the village systems, employing the Patel to collect the Government demand from the individual Ryots, while as the several property of each Ryot, or his share of the common property, with the liabilities attaching to it, were readily verifiable, any complaint of inequality or injustice could at once be inquired into, and any misconduct of the Patel corrected and punished. To obtain the means of such a check, however, a similar survey to those instituted in the Guzerat districts was indispensable; and a survey of the

by the village as its agent. He examines every man's condition and his tenure, and he is now employed to make the collections, and in a great measure to supersede the Patel in all his acts as an agent of the Government. There can be no doubt of the excellence of this regulation, as promoting the advantage of Government and the Ryots; but it must not be overlooked, that it has a tendency to extinguish the authority of the Patel, already much weakened by other parts of our management, and care should be taken when the necessary information has been acquired, to bring the Talati's power within its natural bounds, and to withdraw it from all interference with the immediate duties of the Patel." Minute of Mr. Elphinstone. Selections iii. 685.

[1] Except in the Southern Konkan, where tracts that had been originally farmed, had remained in the hands of the contractor's descendants, and had grown into a hereditary property, like the Zemindaris of Bengal on a smaller scale. These hereditary farmers had neglected, or destroyed the village settlements and overturned the ancient institutions. Their right by inheritance was, however, so clear, that it could not be disputed.—Answer of Mr. Elphinstone to Circular. Comm. Committee, 1832.. Papers subjoined to Evidence, vol. viii.

Dekhin was accordingly strongly urged by the Commissioner of the Mahratta territories and the Government of Bombay, and received the sanction of the Home Authorities.[1]

Although no material modifications of the other main sources of public revenue, the monopolies of Salt and Opium, or Foreign customs, took place, yet the progressive movements which occurred in the condition of society, and in the external relations of the British Government, rendered it necessary to revise the provisions by which they were severally regulated. The enactments regarding the cultivation of opium, prohibiting it absolutely in the Provinces, of Behar and Benares, except under special permission, and providing securities against illicit production and sale, were condensed in one general regulation;[2] but the more important arrangements arose out of the political changes in Central India, and the danger accruing to the Company's exclusive commerce from the opium cultivation in territories newly acquired, or subject to native princes. The cultivation of the poppy had been long carried to a considerable extent in Malwa, and opium of a very good quality largely manufactured—partly for

[1] Reports of Mr. Chaplin, Commissioner of the Dekhin, 5th November, 1821, and 20th August, 1822, with enclosures from the Collectors of Poona, Kandesh, Ahmadnagar, and Darwar. Selections from the Records, vol. iv. pp. 309, 453. "Being persuaded that the advantages of a Revenue Survey in the Deccan will much outweigh the inconvenience, and that the time is arrived when our Collectors may commence upon it without the dangers to which, at an earlier period, they would have been exposed, the Commissioner has been authorised to direct a gradual assessment and survey of the whole of the conquered territory."—Letter from Bombay, 5th November, 1823. Selections iii. 813. See also Mr. Chaplin's Circular Instructions, with rules for the Survey, 13th August, 1824. Ibid. 830.

[2] Regulation, XIII. 1816.

domestic consumption, and partly for export to Rajputana and Guzerat. The disorders which had been so fatal to agriculture and commerce had hitherto set limits to the production and checked the export, and little or none of the manufactured drug had found its way to the sea-side for exportation to the chief seats of the consumption of India opium,—the Eastern Islands and China, the markets of which had hitherto been exclusively supplied by the gardens of Benares and Bahar. The establishment of tranquillity opened to the inhabitants of Malwa a prospect of participating in the profits of this trade, and the native merchants soon began to export opium, not only to various places on the continent, but to ports on the western coast for shipment to the eastward. The interests of the British Government were thus placed in collision with the equitable claims of its allies, and even with the industry of its own subjects; and it became necessary, for the preservation of its monopoly, to limit, and, if possible, suppress, the growing traffic. This, however, was no easy task. Prohibitory duties were imposed at all the Presidencies upon all opium not made within the boundaries of the Presidency of Bengal imported into any of their dependencies, having in view especially the territories intervening between Malwa and Bombay. It was admitted, however, that the measures affecting the produce of Central India were attended in their operation with the most serious hardships to the monied, agricultural, and commercial classes, producing the ruin of many, and causing general dissatisfaction and distress, and that, at the same time, they were but par-

tially successful, as from the multitude of interests opposed to their execution, and the many and circuitous channels by which they might be evaded,[1] it was impracticable to prevent the augmentation of the illicit traffic. It was also evidently impossible to prevent the conveyance of the contraband article through the territories of the native princes; and it was scarcely to be expected that they would sacrifice without reluctance the industry of their people and their own emoluments to the commercial avarice of the British. They were, however, prevailed upon to make the required concession, and to prohibit the cultivation of the poppy and the sale and transit of opium through their states, upon receiving a pecuniary compensation for the loss of profits and duties derivable from the cultivation or the transit. The injury done to the merchants and cultivators, was overlooked for a time, but it was finally forced upon their attention, and it became necessary to revise the engagements into which they had entered. Arrangements were formed for the exclusive purchase of the Malwa opium by the Company's agents in the province, but they were not brought into full operation, nor were their consequences correctly appreciated, until a subsequent period.[2]

The rules prescribed for the exclusive manufac-

[1] One principal route was by Marwar and Jessalmar, across the desert to Karachi in Sindh, whence the Opium was shipped to the Portuguese Settlements Diu and Daman, in the gulph of Cambay, and thence exported to China in country or Portuguese vessels.

[2] Abstract of Correspondence relating to Malwa Opium. Comm. Committee, 1831. Third Report, Appendix iv. p. 927. The Opium sales in 1823-4, produced 1,380,000*l.*

ture and sale of Salt on the part of the Government, were consolidated and brought into one enactment,[1] into which provisions were introduced, prohibiting, in the most rigorous manner, the compulsory labour of the salt-manufacturers: no other measure affecting this branch of the revenue was instituted, and it continued to constitute an important article in the resources of the State.[2] The Customs had somewhat declined, but this arose from a measure adopted shortly after the renewal of the charter by which, in consequence of orders from home, the duties were generally lowered and a variety of articles, the produce or manufacture of Great Britain, wholly exempted from any charge upon their being imported into India. As similar immunities were not granted to the manufactures or products of India in the ports of the United Kingdom, this was a piece of selfish legislation in which the interests of the dominant country were alone consulted, and those of the subordinate dependency deliberately injured, the latter being not only deprived of a legitimate source of revenue, but being further exposed to an unequal competition under which native industry was already rapidly decaying.[3] Some compensation was made to the country by the augmentation of its commerce.[4] Besides the stimulus given to the mer-

[1] Regulation VII. 1829.

[2] The amount of the sales of Salt in 1823-24, was 2,400,000*l.*

[3] Commercial Letter to Bengal, 29th July, 1814.—Comm. Com. 1831. Third Report. First App. No. 19. Regulation Bengal IV. 1815.

[4] It might be argued, that India benefited by the reduced price of the commodities imported from Great Britain, in proportion to the amount of the duty remitted. But this was disadvantageous in another respect, as it rendered the articles of domestic production still less able to compete with foreign articles in the market, and further discouraged native

cantile enterprise of the United Kingdom by the abolition of the exclusive privileges of the Company, the return of tranquillity in Europe re-opened the Eastern seas to the traffic of the Continent; and the merchants of the European States,[1] of France especially, actively engaged in the interchange of their national fabrics with the valuable products of art and nature in Hindustan.

From these and other improved resources, the financial circumstances of the Indian empire had followed a progressive scale of improvement, and the amount of the public revenues at the close of the administration of the Marquis of Hastings, exceeded, by nearly six millions sterling, the amount realizable at the commencement of his government.[2]

A large portion of the increase arose from augmentations of a fluctuating character;[3] but the remainder was derived from the land revenue of the

industry. The competition was unfair. India was young in the processes of manufacture, and was never likely to improve, if her manufactures were to be crushed in their infancy. Could time have been allowed for the acquisition of experience, and the introduction of machinery, her cotton fabrics and her metals, would probably have been saleable in her own markets for a less cost than those of Europe. A native sovereign would undoubtedly have given India a chance by the imposition of protective duties.

[1] In 1811-12, the trade between India and Foreign Europe was a blank. In 1822-3, it presents a value of little less than a crore of rupees. Nor was this at the expense of Great Britain, as the trade with the United Kingdom increased from 3,560,000*l.* to 6,419,000*l.*, or nearly double. Lords' Report, 1830. App. C. The total trade in 1813-14 amounted to nearly fourteen millions sterling; in 1822-3 it exceeded nineteen millions.

[2] Revenues of 1822-23 £23,120,000
Ditto 1813-14 17,228,000
Increase £ 5,892,000
Lords' Report, 1830. App. C. No. 1.

[3] See Appendix 7, A.

old provinces, and of those newly acquired, and constituted a permanent source of public wealth. The charges had likewise augmented, but not in a like proportion, so that the receipts presented a clear excess over the disbursements of more than five millions, and of three, after providing for the interest of the public debt.[1] Nor was this a solitary occurrence. Every year of the administration of Lord Hastings had presented, after defraying the interest of the debt, an excess of the local receipts over the local disbursements,[2] although, during so many years, the exigencies of war imposed large additions to the ordinary expenditure of the military establishments, the cost of which could not be extinguished simultaneously with the cessation of their cause. It was also necessary to provide investments of goods or bullion to England, and to furnish supplies to the trade of the Company with China, the amount of which was intended to replace the charges incurred in England on behalf of the territorial expenses of the East India Company. The surplus of the local revenue was inadequate to meet

[1]

Receipts of 1822-23	£23,120,000
Charges of „	18,082,000
Surplus Receipt	5,038,000
Deduct Interest	1,694,000
Net Surplus	£ 3,344,000

Ibid.

[2] The military charges for the five years, from 1809-10 to 1813-14 inclusive, averaged annually 7,344,000*l.* In the two years, 1815-16, 1816-17, years of the Nepal war, the average annual amount was 8,840,000*l.*, or 1,496,000*l.* in excess of the former average. In the five years following, the season of the Mahratta war and its consequences, the average rose nearly a million more, being 9,770,000*l.* In 1822-3, they were reduced by 1,365,000*l.*, having fallen to 8,405,000*l.*—Lords' Report. Appendix C. No. 2.

1814—23.

these calls, and it became unavoidably necessary to have recourse to loans from the capitalists in India. An addition of rather more than two millions was, consequently,[1] made to the public debt, but by judicious financial arrangements, the demand for interest was not suffered to be materially enhanced; and some of the still remaining embarrassing conditions of former loans were further counteracted by the transfer of all outstanding loans, of which the principal and interest were demandable in England at the option of the holder, into one general loan, declared irredeemable during the continuance of the charter, after which payment of the principal might be demanded at home, the interest in the mean time being payable there also, only in the case of creditors residing in Europe.[2] The blended character of the Company, as sovereigns of territory and as merchants, had tended to perplex the character of their financial

[1] Debt bearing interest 1813-14 £ 27,002,000
Ditto do. 1822-3 29,382,000
Increase 2,380,000

The floating debt of the former date was 4,103,000*l.*, of the latter 7,457,000*l.* shewing a further augmentation of 3,354,000*l.*; but at the earlier date the cash balances of the public treasuries were extremely low. At the latter there was in hand, in cash and bills, an available sum exceeding twelve millions; there were also quantities of Salt and Opium undisposed of to the extent of 1,898,000*l.*, and above six millions in debts due to the Government, making a total bona fide amount of assets exceeding twenty millions.—Lords' Report, 1830. Appendix C. No. 4.

[2] The annual interest on the debt was, in 1813-14, 1,636,000*l.* In 1822-3, it was 1,762,000*l.*, or only 126,000*l.* more By the loan opened in February, 1822, creditors were entitled at the close of the charter to payment of the principal in England, at the exchange of 2s. 6d. the rupee, at twelve months' date. Actual residents in Europe were allowed bills for the interest at 2s. 1d. Of the old remittable loans, amounting to Sicca Rupees 11,54, 63,000, the whole was transferred, except 2,65,83,000, arrangements for the payment of which at home were made, and the amount was discharged in the course of 1823-4.—Financial Letters from Bengal, 18th February, and 20th June, 1822. Papers, Financial, printed for the Proprietors of East India Stock, 3rd March, 1826.

transactions, and to confound their territorial with their commercial transactions; the territorial revenues of India being applicable to the maintenance of commercial establishments, and to the purchase of investments for shipment to Europe; while, on the other hand, the profits realised from the sales of merchandise from India or from China constituted a fund whence the charges in England for territorial purposes, such as the purchase of military stores, the pay and pensions of officers on leave of absence or retired, the passage of troops to India, and other similar charges, besides the amount of bills drawn for the principal or interest of the Indian loans, were defrayed. Upon the renewal of the charter it was enacted, that the charges on territorial and on commercial transactions should be kept entirely distinct; and this practice was observed subsequently to 1814. The Indian governments looked with some apprehension to the consequences of a separation which threatened to deprive them of a valuable resource in times of pecuniary difficulty, and intimated their apprehension that events might arise calling for an expenditure for which the territorial resources would be inadequate to provide, in which case it would not be possible to make any advances for commercial investments. In ordinary seasons, however, they expressed their confident hope that the revenues of India would fulfil the expectations of the Legislature, and be found to answer all the disbursements of the Indian Government, both in England and in India, without any assistance from Great Britain. [1]

[1] Financial Letters to Bengal, 6th September, 1813, and 23rd Sept. 1817.

BOOK II. CHAP. XII. 1814—23.

The question of the adequacy of the territorial resources of India to provide for all her legitimate territorial charges, was more fully discussed at a subsequent period, with the advantage of more mature experience; and we need not therefore pause upon it here. It is sufficient to state that, during the period under review, the disbursements in England exceeded by a million and a half the remittances from India,[1] and were discharged by the surplus profits of the India and China trade; a sum of a million and a half from those profits was also remitted to India in 1818–19, to be applied, conformably to the enactments of the Legislation, to pay off a portion of the outstanding debts. There were also in India means of contributing to the same end to a very considerable amount, and no appeal to the national resources of Great Britain became necessary; on the contrary, the Government of India overcame all its temporary financial difficulties, and

In the latter the Court observe, "We must explicitly apprise you, that it is to India only, that we look for the supplies necessary to enable us to defray the home territorial charges, by the punctual repayment to the Commercial branch of all sums advanced by that branch for territorial purposes in England;" and again, "we cannot contemplate without alarm the possibility of the case assumed by you, however hypothetically, that eventually it would be your duty to shew, that however valuable India would still remain to England, even in a pecuniary point of view, as the source of lucrative commerce, and as paying a vast tribute in the returns of private fortunes; yet she demanded in return some aid from England to enable her revenues to bear the expenses necessary to preserve her." Divested of all circumlocution, this is an assumption that the people of this country should be taxed for the sake of supporting Indian commerce, and of enabling private individuals in India to acquire fortunes, an assumption which we are confident this country would utterly reject.—Financial Papers, p. 121.

[1] The balance due to Commerce on account of territorial charges, on 30th April, 1823, is stated at 1,564,000*l*. There was also an excess of payments on account of Interest Bills of above 700,000*l*., making the debt due to Commerce in the beginning of 1823, 2,264,000*l*.—Comm. Com. 1832. App. Finance. Territorial Branch in account with Commercial Branch, No. iii. Article 7.

upon the restoration of peace was provided with ample means to meet every demand. At no previous period in the history of the country was the credit of the British Government more firmly established, or was the prospect of financial prosperity more promising than at the commencement of the year 1823, when the Marquis of Hastings retired from the guidance of the pecuniary interests of India.

The same spirit of activity that had animated the civil and military transactions of the period, extended beyond the sphere of official administration, and was busily employed in introducing and developing innovations, the effects of which, although not without immediate influence, were, in a still greater degree, prospective, and constituted the germs of future and more important change. Among these may be reckoned the alterations which the last charter had sanctioned with regard to the advancement of the Church and the propagation of Christianity.

The persevering efforts of a powerful party wrung from the Ministers, and the Court of Directors, a reluctant assent to the improved organization of the Clergy in the service of the Company, by placing them under Episcopal supervision. The plan originally proposed and strenuously advocated was the formation of four dioceses, and the appointment of as many Bishops to Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, and Ceylon;[1] a plan eventually, but subsequently, carried into operation.

At the renewal of the Charter, it was thought

[1] Buchanan on the Expediency of an Ecclesiastical Establishment for British India, ix. The same scheme was also put forth by Dr. Bu-

BOOK II. CHAP. XII. 1814—23.

sufficient to form one Diocese of the whole of India, under the designation of the See of Calcutta, over which a Bishop was to preside, with the aid of an Archdeacon at each of the Presidencies. Dr. Middleton, a clergyman of distinguished piety and learning, was accordingly consecrated the first Bishop, and assumed charge of his diocese towards the end of November, 1814. The extent of his jurisdiction and the general nature of his powers were defined in Letters Patent from the Crown, authorizing him to perform all functions peculiar and appropriate to a Bishop, within the limits of the Episcopal See of Calcutta; to exercise jurisdiction, spiritual and ecclesiastical, according to the Ecclesiastical laws of England; to grant licences to officiate to all Ministers and Chaplains in India; to investigate their conduct and doctrine, and to punish and correct them according to their demerits.[1] On commencing, however, the discharge of his grave and solemn duties, Bishop Middleton soon found that the provisions under which he was to act were too vague, and too inappropriate to the circumstances of India, to furnish a clear and safe light for his guidance. He was in fact a Bishop with a See corresponding in name alone to a similar definition of Episcopal authority in the parent country. The whole of his clergy, amounting to no more than thirty-two, were scattered over a vast extent of territory, and fixed at a few very large stations many

chanan in a Memoir on Colonial Ecclesiastical Establishments, which was printed in 1812 by the Church Missionary Society.—Hough's Christianity in India iv. 190.

[1] See Letters Patent for the Bishopric of Calcutta, 2nd May, 1814.—Thornton's Law of India.

hundred miles apart.[1] Most of them were without churches or consecrated places of worship: the congregations were connected with the pastor by nothing approaching to parochial institutions, and were, in truth, wholly unrelated to him in any respect except community of faith and service. The chaplains were mostly military chaplains, subordinate to the authority of the officer commanding the station to which they were attached, and liable to a reprimand, or even to an arrest, for any infringement of military subordination. A few of the chief civil stations were provided with ministers, but these were as much subject to the orders of the civil Government as their brethren at a military station to the commanding officer. The Bishop had, consequently, no voice in their destination or employment, and his licences gave them no privilege of which they were not already possessed. His only control over the clergy was of an invidious character, but even that was of little effect; he could reprove or suspend from all clerical function for misconduct; but, at the distance at which he was situated, an accurate knowledge of the conduct of individuals was scarcely attainable, and his personal visitations were necessarily too rare to inspire much fear of his displeasure. His powers as a Bishop were, therefore, exceedingly limited, and his real position was little more exalted than that of the senior minister at the Presidency. The local Government would willingly have added to his consideration, and resigned to him the appoint-

[1] There were, on the arrival of the Bishop, fifteen chaplains in Bengal, twelve at Madras, and five at Bombay, but many were absent on the plea of sickness or on furlough. At Bombay there was but one chaplain present.—Life of Bishop Middleton by the Rev. C. Le Bas, i. 82.

BOOK II. CHAP. XII. 1814—23.

ment of the chaplains to their several stations; but the measure was disapproved of in England, and was after a short interval annulled.[1]

Although a man of high intellectual cultivation, and of a kind and amiable nature, Bishop Middleton appears to have wanted the faculty of adapting himself to circumstances, and of yielding as far as might conscientiously have been conceded, to the anomalous position in which he found himself placed. He consequently suffered himself to be annoyed by matters of light consideration, and the expression of his feelings on such occasions somewhat impaired his influence; but the rectitude of his intentions, his disinterested zeal, his high sense of the duties and dignity of the episcopal office, with his unquestioned worth and learning, secured him the personal respect of the Christian community, and obtained a ready conformity among the members of the Established Church to the new order of things which it had devolved upon Bishop Middleton to introduce. He laboured diligently and usefully, and, under his auspices, new churches were built in various parts of India; the number of chaplains was augmented, and their duties more regularly defined and discharged; and a character of order and unity was given to the Ecclesiastical Establishment which it had never before presented. This seems to be one main advantage of the Episcopal office in India; it consolidates the body of the clergy, and prescribes unity of action to individuals, who were else detached and unconnected, and incapable of combining for the credit and benefit of their ministry.

Notwithstanding what Bishop Middleton terms

[1] Life of Bp. Middleton, i. 140.

his struggles to maintain his ground, he was an active promoter of the interests of the Church, and particularly in connexion with the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, and the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel. At his suggestion, the latter of these two powerful bodies, assisted by the former, undertook to found and support a missionary college in Calcutta,[1] the objects of which are thus enumerated by its proposer,—to instruct Native and other Christian youths in the doctrines and discipline of the Church, in order to their becoming preachers, catechists, and schoolmasters; to teach the elements of useful knowledge and the English language to Mohammedans and Hindus, having in such attainments no object but secular advantage; to prepare and print translations of the Scriptures, the liturgy, and moral and religious tracts; to receive English Missionaries on their arrival from England; and provide them with instructors in the native languages. The foundation-stone of the college was laid by the Bishop on the 15th of December, 1820. It was not completed until after his death; but it was finished shortly after his decease, and stands an honourable monument of the enlightened piety of its founder. Bishop Middleton died on the 8th of July, 1822.[2]

[1] Each Society contributed in the first instance 5000*l.*, and a similar sum was granted by the Church Missionary Society. A fourth sum of like amount was contributed by the Bible Society, to be applied to the expense of Translations.

[2] Bishop's College has not yet fulfilled the objects of Bishop Middleton, and its actual condition may create a painful smile, when compared with his enthusiastic anticipations. "Can you," he writes to a friend, "forgive the feelings of a founder, if I tell you that the other day, as I listened to the woodman's axe employed in clearing the ground, I actually began to muse upon what might hereafter be the studies and the glories of the place."—Life, ii. 153. The slow advance of the institution may, perhaps,

BOOK II. CHAP. XII. 1814—23.

A proposal was made, as we have seen, in the House of Commons, to give a legislative sanction to the establishment of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland in India, concurrently with that of the Church of England; but it was rejected, as inconsistent to recognise two different systems as alike related to the state, and upon the understanding that the Company would provide for the religious necessities of the members of the Scottish Church.[1] A chaplain of that establishment was accordingly appointed by the Court to each of the three Presidencies, and churches were speedily constructed by the liberality of their countrymen in India. Questions of respective rights soon occurred, and especially with regard to the ceremony of marriage, which the Scotch minister maintained that he was entitled to perform according to the rules of his communion, while such marriages were held to be invalid under the Ecclesiastical law of England, conformably to which the See of Calcutta was bound to act. With a view to determine the question, the technical merits of which were involved in some obscurity, a petition was presented by the members of the Scotch Society to Parliament, praying that the privilege of being

be partly ascribed to the abandonment or neglect of that part of the original plan which proposed to open the College in one department to the merely secular English studies of Hindus and Mohammedans; the actual students being expected to prosecute studies chiefly of a religious character, with a view to become qualified as teachers of Christianity. It must, however, be recollected, that twenty-five years are but a short term in the existence of such an establishment, and that the system of which it is a part is still in its infancy.

[1] At a subsequent date the objection was overruled, and the act renewing the Company's Charter in 1833 contained a clause making it incumbent on the Company to maintain two chaplains of the Church of Scotland at each of the Presidencies.

married according to their own forms might be placed beyond a doubt;—on the other hand, the Bishop and English Clergy forwarded a counter-petition, praying that the law regarding matrimony might not be hastily altered, and representing the confusion which would unavoidably attend the hitherto untried experiment of two churches equally accredited by the same country and fully recognised by the same law. Neither of the petitions was presented; the subject had already engaged the attention of the Houses of Parliament, and a Bill was passed in June, 1818, legalising, both for the past and the future, all marriages performed in the customary manner by ordained ministers of the Church of Scotland officially appointed as chaplains in India, provided that one or both of the parties professed to be a member of the Scottish Church.[1]

The facilities afforded by the Legislature to the admission into the territories of the Company of persons undertaking to disseminate a knowledge of Christianity among the natives were speedily taken advantage of, and the several religious communities of the United Kingdom rivalled each other in their exertions to improve the efficiency of the missions formerly sent out, or to establish them where none had previously existed. In the south there were remains of the Tranquebar and Tinnivelly missions, originally encouraged and assisted by the Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, but sadly declined from their former flourishing condition. They were now, however, renovated by the patronage of the original promoters, and that of the

[1] Life of Bp. Middleton, i. 132. Thornton's Law of India, 218.

BOOK II. CHAP. XII. 1814—23.

Church Missionary Society. In Bengal, the Baptist Mission was very largely reinforced, but was no longer suffered to labour alone, the Church Missionary and London Missionary Societies supporting an equal number of instructors in Christian truth. Other communities were not idle; and even America sent forth auxiliaries to the cause in India, while more especially interesting herself in Ceylon and the Burman dominions. More than one hundred missionaries, besides schoolmasters and native catechists, were assembled in British India in 1823[1] for missionary purposes, in place of the scanty number who held a precarious footing there prior to the renewal of the charter.

Besides, however, the direct employment of missionaries, a variety of important accessories to the diffusion of the Gospel were set on foot; and Committees of the Bible Society and of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel were formed at each of the Presidencies, for the purpose of promoting generally the operations of the missionaries, and supplying the necessary aids to instruction, in copies of the Scriptures, and translations of them and of scriptural tracts into the native languages.

[1] By the General Survey of Missions in India, published in the Church Missionary Register for 1823, the following appears to be the number and distribution of the missionaries of the several associations.

	BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.
Christian Knowledge Society .	1	7	0
Church Missionary Society .	19	11	1
London Missionary Society .	11	14	3
Baptist . . .	30	0	0
Wesleyan . . .	0	3	0
American . . .	0	0	4
	61	35	8

Each of the principal missionary establishments was provided with a printing-press of its own, although none engaged so largely in the work of translating and printing as the Baptist Mission of Serampore, under whose superintendence, by the end of 1822, either the whole, or considerable portions of the Scriptures had been printed and circulated in twenty languages spoken in India, while translations into other dialects were in progress. These translations were hastily executed, and without adequate previous preparation; but they formed a groundwork on which improved versions might be conveniently executed, and led the way to maturer and more perfect performances.

Notwithstanding all this manifestation of energy, and the immense sums which were raised in England and in India for the great object of the conversion of the natives, the work went slowly forward. Few genuine converts were made, and of them fewer still were persons of consideration or rank.[1] Various causes contributed to retard the progress of Christian truth. There were real difficulties in the way of its being embraced by the Hindus, as its adoption involved not merely a profession of faith, or a departure from forms or ceremonies, but a change of the habits of a whole life, and a violent disruption of all social ties. It required a stronger love of truth than prevailed among

[1] In 1823 the Serampore missionaries estimated the number of natives in the Bengal province converted to Christianity by the union of the Churches, engaged in spreading the Gospel in India, at one thousand. The author of a work called "Queries and Replies," published in Calcutta, denied the accuracy of the estimate, and asserted that the full number did not exceed three hundred, it might be less.—Lushington's Institutions in Calcutta, p. 226.

1814—23.

the Hindus to persuade them to such a sacrifice. As subjects of speculation, the great doctrines of Christianity might have found acceptance; but it was scarcely to be expected that men grown old in a system which was part and parcel of their daily lives, and who were in a great degree indifferent to truth for its own sake, should assent to what their own feelings regarded as of little consequence, at the expense of everything they prized and every connexion which they cherished. This was the chief stumbling-block with the better classes. The learned were also rendered obdurate by the pride of knowledge, and by their proficiency in disputation, in which few of the missionaries could contend with them. The multitude were further impracticable through their ignorance and superstition, and their fondness for the pageantry of their social and religious ceremonies. With the Mohammedans the difficulty was of a different, but not less insurmountable, description. Hatred of Christianity was an article of their creed. The quarrel was twelve centuries old, and with the bigoted Musselmans of India it had lost none of its virulence.

These were the principal obstacles on the part of the natives, and they were found so formidable that many zealous and pious persons among the missionaries despaired of surmounting them. Instead, therefore, of addressing themselves exclusively to the Mohammedans and Hindus, they conceived that the Christian population equally demanded their care. At the Presidencies, and one or two chief military stations, a number of persons professing Christianity were, from the paucity of

accredited ministers, deprived, in a great degree, of the offices of religion, and gladly accepted the assistance of men who made religious teaching their duty, although not members of the regular church: hence an early result of the missions for the conversion of the heathen, was the extension of schism; and chapels were built and congregations were formed under the direction of separatists, who were more intent on establishing their own particular views among Christians, than on diffusing the great truths of Christianity among the followers of Brahma or Mohammed.

A less questionable departure from the plan of direct conversion, was the attempt to exercise a wholesome preliminary influence upon the minds of youth, through the medium of early education. The natives of India in general, although not without instruction, reaped little benefit from their national system. Those who were destined to follow learning as a profession, whether Hindus or Mohammedans, went through a long and arduous course of study, which, whatever its moral or religious tendency, was not unpropitious to intellectual development. Some of the sons of wealthy persons were occasionally carried beyond the mere rudiments of their own speech, and were accomplished Persian scholars, or were made to acquire some conversancy with English; but the mass of the people were either wholly untaught, or were instructed in the lowest possible amount of human knowledge. It is sufficiently illustrative of the defects of the system to observe that it did not comprehend the use of books: the boy learnt his letters by copying

1814—23.

them from a board before him, on sand or on palm leaves, and the same process taught him to write. He acquired some knowledge of spelling by reiterating the syllables aloud, as they were repeated aloud by the master or the monitor; and the rudiments of arithmetic were learned in the same manner. No faculty was exercised except that of the memory; and no opportunity was afforded him of acquiring a knowledge of useful facts, or of becoming imbued with those moral sentiments which are indirectly conveyed through fables and fictions suited to youthful imaginations. To correct this system—to substitute for it an education better meriting the name—to enlarge the mind—to ameliorate the feelings—to inculcate principles of morality, was felt by persons of all persuasions to be an indispensable prelude to the elevation of the national character, and a probable preparation for the more extensive dissemination of Christianity. The Governments at the three Presidencies took the lead in recognizing the necessity of raising the standard of education among the natives; and although deeming it to be impolitic, and incompatible with their obligations to their native subjects, to take an active share in those measures which combined religious with secular tuition, they liberally encouraged and assisted with funds the various schemes that were now set on foot for the improvement of native education.[1]

[1] The Baptist Mission, in 1824, had thirty schools under its charge, containing about three thousand children. A like number were taught in about twenty schools in the neighbourhood of Chinsura, under the conduct of missionaries of the London Missionary Society, but with the pecuniary aid of the Government. The Church Missionary Society, besides schools

The chief object of most of the schools which were thus established, was instruction in the language of the country through the medium of books compiled and printed for the purpose, in which sound principles of morality were inculcated;, the most interesting works of human skill and divine power were described; the leading facts of geography and history were narrated, and European methods of calculation were explained. In most of the Missionary schools translations of the Old and New Testaments formed part of the course of reading; but it was considered expedient in many places, even by the bodies representing in India the religious societies in England, to avoid adopting any arrangement which should inspire the natives with a suspicion of the ultimate object of the schools, and deter them from giving to their children the benefit of a course of instruction which could not fail to elevate their principles, at the same time that it insured them novel and beneficial information. In addition to those seminaries which proposed instruction in the knowledge of Europe,

in Calcutta and other places, had a number at Burdwan, where nearly two thousand boys were instructed; there were also in the same neighbourhood ten female schools. The Christian Knowledge Society established several schools in the vicinity of Calcutta. In Calcutta a School Society was formed of respectable natives conjointly with Europeans, to superintend and improve the indigenous schools in that city. A number of schools, containing about two thousand eight hundred boys, were brought under their supervision, and an English school was established, admittance to which was the reward of distinction in the native seminaries; to this the Government also liberally contributed. In order to supply all these different seminaries with books, a School Book Society was likewise formed for the printing of original or translated works of an elementary class suited to juvenile instruction. Many natives of talent and respectability engaged in the preparation of these works. The Government also contributed to the expense. At Bombay a Society of Europeans and natives was formed for promoting native education, and there, as well as at Madras and in Bengal, the Missionary Committees were active in forming and conducting native schools.

BOOK II. CHAP. XII. 1814—23.

conveyed through the vernacular dialects, the Government felt it to be equally a duty to encourage the studies of those among the natives of India, who followed the learning of the country as a literary class, and devoted their lives to the cultivation of Sanscrit and Arabic literature. Besides the obligation of compensating for the loss of that patronage which Maulavis and Pundits were formerly accustomed to receive from natives of wealth and power, whom the rule of foreigners had impoverished or annihilated, and the policy of gaining the good-will of the people by countenancing pursuits to which they attached almost exclusive estimation, it was thought prudent to acquire a direct influence over the national studies, with a view to improve the mode of their cultivation, to direct them to practical objects connected with the courts of justice, in which many questions were determinable according to the rules of Mohammedan and Hindu law, and to graft upon them, by degrees, the knowledge of the West, which could scarcely be communicated to the literary classes through any other channel. It was also anticipated, that, once masters of such information, the persons to whom literary occupation was a livelihood would be the fittest and most capable agents in its dissemination. With these purposes the existing native colleges were subjected to qualified European supervision; and the project of Lord Minto, of establishing colleges at Nuddea and Tirhoot, was commuted to the institution of a Sanscrit college in Calcutta for the tuition of Brahmans, and of youths of the medical caste. The college was not founded until after the

departure of the Governor-General from India; but the plan was matured, and the preliminary steps were taken during his administration.

Most of the Missionary establishments attempted the formation of an English school in connexion with their indigenous schools; and, in some cases, promotion to an English school was made the reward of diligence in the native seminaries. There prevailed, however, no very ardent desire to benefit by such opportunities; and very extensive distrust of the ulterior object of the English schools, of their being intended, under cover of instruction in English, to convert the youth to Christianity, deterred the people from having recourse to them. The amount of instruction sought for, was also of the very lowest description; and the great aim of those by whom the schools were attended, was to become qualified for the duties of a copyist, or a clerk in some public or private office. The want of tuition of a higher character became at last perceptible to the more respectable classes of the Hindus, and they displayed a readiness to make arrangements for its provision, which was only checked by the fear of endangering their national worship. To remove this source of apprehension, they were encouraged by several of the principal members of the British community to establish an English seminary on a liberal foundation, of which they should retain the entire direction in their own hands, and over which they should exercise undivided control: a joint committee of Europeans and natives was formed, to consider and determine the general plan of the establishment, after which the

BOOK II. CHAP. XII. 1814—23.

European members withdrew from all interference; the consequence was the foundation of the English College of Calcutta, an institution which promises to exert an important influence upon intellectual development in Bengal.[1]

The measures of the Government of Madras were confined during the period under consideration to the acquirement of information respecting the state of education in the provinces: the Collectors were directed to report the number of the schools and colleges in their respective Collectorates; but some interval necessarily elapsed before the receipt of their replies. The advance of native education was in a somewhat more forward state at Bombay, and a society was formed in 1815, for the promotion of the education of the poor, by which several schools were established with the aid of the Government. In 1822, societies were formed, having for their objects more especially the improvement of native education.[2]

[1] The leading Europeans on this occasion were the Chief Justice, Sir Edward Hyde East, and Mr. Harington, a member of the Supreme Council. According to Mr. Hough, (History of Christianity in India, iv. 393,) of these two gentlemen, the latter retired from the Committee at the desire of the Governor-General, apprehending that his appearance at the head of the college might be construed into an attempt of the Government to convert the natives. "Sir Edward also," he says, "out of respect to the Government, was induced to retire, to the great surprise and disappointment of all who had embarked in the work." These circumstances seem to rest upon misinformation. The author, with many others beside the two gentlemen specified, was included in the Committee, and the principle of their proceedings was from the first, the relinquishment of the institution to native management exclusively, as soon as the mode of conducting it, and the course of study to be pursued in it, was devised. Bishop Middleton's notice of the seminary is in accordance with the author's recollections. "The wealthy Hindoos have just set on foot a school or college, without any aid or countenance from the Government, who (very wisely, I think,) have wished the work to be done by themselves;" i. 391.

[2] For these and the foregoing particulars respecting the progress of education from 1814 to 1823,—see Lushington's History of Religious, Benevolent, and Charitable Institutions of Calcutta, Cal. 1814, Church Missionary Register,—Reports of Societies, and a valuable Memoir by Mr.

Another act originating with the Governor-General, was a departure from the cautious policy of former Governments in regard to the Press of India, and the removal of some of the restraints to which it had been subjected. In the early portion of its career, the Indian Press had been left to follow its own course, with no other check than that which the law of libel imposed. The character of the papers of early days sufficiently shew that the indulgence was abused, and that while they were useless as vehicles of local information of any value, they were filled with indecorous attacks upon private life, and ignorant censures of public measures. To repress so great a nuisance, Lord Wellesley, after sending one Editor to England, and intimidating others into a prudent reserve, established a censorship; and the journals were submitted on the eve of their issue to the perusal of an officer of the Government, by whom, what he considered objectionable matter, was struck out. This control, and the improving taste and feelings of the age, gave to the Indian chronicles a new character, and rendered them respectable, if not very authentic, vehicles of public information. The duties of the Censorship were leniently discharged, and little dissatisfaction was felt with the existing practice, when the Marquis of Hastings, entertaining exalted notions of the benefits of a free expression of the sentiments of the public, determined to relieve it from the only restraint under which it laboured. At the same time, the Press was by no means left to its own guidance, and

Fisher on the Establishment of Native Schools by the Local Governments of India,—Comm. Com. 1832, Appendix Public, i.

defined limits circumscribed its freedom. The Censor was removed, but the Editors were restricted from publishing animadversions on the proceedings of the Indian authorities in England; disquisitions on the political transactions of the local administration, or offensive remarks on the public conduct of the members of the Council, the Judges, or the Bishop of Calcutta; discussions having a tendency to create alarm or suspicion among the natives as to any intended interference with their religion; the republication from English or other newspapers of passages coming under the preceding heads, or otherwise calculated to affect the British power or reputation in India;[1] and private scandal, or personal remarks on individuals, tending to excite dissensions in society. The Editors were held responsible for the observance of these rules, under the penalty of being proceeded against in such manner as the Governor-General might think applicable to the nature of the offence. Subject to these limits and responsibilities, the Press was free, both to Europeans and to natives.

The establishment of a free Press in India was contemplated with very different feelings by different classes of persons; and, as usual in controverted topics, both the benefits and evils of the measure were greatly exaggerated. The main advantages, as stated by Lord Hastings himself,[2] were the salutary control which public scrutiny exercises over supreme authority; and the cheerfulness and zeal with which all ranks of society co-operate

[1] See the orders in the Asiatic Monthly Journal, June, 1820, p. 610.

[2] Answer to an Address presented by the inhabitants of Madras, 24th July, 1819. Asiatic Journal, Jan. 1820.

in measures, the motives and objects of which they understand, and in which they concur. This scrutiny and this concurrence, however, were wholly at variance with the circumstances of society in India, the bulk of which was formed of the salaried servants of the Government, already bound by their engagements to furnish it with information, and to execute its commands. The remainder of the Indian public consisted of a very few merchants, traders, or artisans, residing in India upon sufferance, having no acknowledged place in the constitution of the Government, no voice in its proceedings, no permanent stake in the welfare of the country, and little, if any, knowledge of its condition or relations. Much benefit could not be anticipated from the comments of a few hundred persons of this description, administered through conductors of journals, who were either public servants themselves, or were dependent for their privilege of dwelling in India upon the pleasure of the superior powers: the whole forming a body of no weight or influence, and in no essential point corresponding with a public, such as the term denoted in the parent country. The same circumstances, however, if they nullified the advantages of newspaper enlightenment, also counteracted its mischievous tendencies, and rendered the Indian Press incapable of embarrassing the purposes or proceedings of the State. It might become, as it had previously been, a source of annoyance to individuals, a vehicle of private calumny or malice; but, as far as the political interests of Great Britain and India were concerned, its influence was too insignificant to endanger their stability or

alter their relations. The Government, also, had full power to arrest any such mischievous attempts at their outset. The unbridled freedom of the native Press involved weightier consequences, as its lucubrations were addressed to vast, independent, and ill-instructed multitudes. Such an organ directed by hostile agency might misrepresent the acts and purposes of the ruling authority, and inspire the people with deep and dangerous discontent. That Press, however, had yet scarcely sprung into existence; and the system was too new and strange, too foreign to the habits and feelings of the people, to grow, by rapid steps, into a wide-spread and commanding influence. The Government had here, also, the remedy in its own hands, and the so-termed freedom of the Indian Press was, in reality, a matter of very little moment.

The first experience of the consequences of removing the supervision of the Censor was, however, calculated to confirm the apprehensions of those who were adverse to its abolition. The measure was followed by the establishment of a Journal,[1] which infringed the prohibitory rules that had been substituted for the censorship, lent itself to the utterance of morbid discontent and personal resentment, assailed the conduct of private individuals, impeached the acts of public functionaries, spread acrimonious dissensions through society, and defied, while it affected to deprecate, the displeasure of the Government.[2] Repeated intimations of that displeasure were communicated to the Editor

[1] The Calcutta Journal, of which the Proprietor and Editor was Mr. J. S. Buckingham, a gentleman permitted to reside in Calcutta by special licence.

[2] Letter from the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal to Mr.

through the usual official channels, and he was warned on more than one occasion that, unless he conformed to the regulations established for the guidance of the press, his licence to remain in India would be revoked, and he would be required to proceed to England. A probable consciousness of the incongruity of so severe a punishment with the eulogium which he had pronounced upon the expression of public opinion, as well as the genuine kindness of his nature, rendered the Governor-General reluctant to inflict the penalty that had been threatened, and he left India without having carried his menaces into effect. A more consistent course was followed by the firmness of his successor. Although, however, checked in the abuse of its nascent liberty, the press of Calcutta was liberated from the risk of needless and vexatious interference, and became, both in the English and native languages, a useful instrument in the dissemination of knowledge.[1]

The most important of the proceedings in England originating in the interval which has been reviewed, have already been described. Few others relating to the administration of affairs in India engaged the attention of Parliament or the Company. The thanks of both for the services of the Marquis of Hastings in the Pindari war were voted with general consent; but neither on these occasions, nor on that of the war of Nepal, did the Ministers or the Di-

Buckingham, 17th May, 1821, cited in the Statement of Facts, printed in Calcutta.

[1] The first Bengal newspaper, the Sambád Chandriká, or "Moon of Intelligence," was started in 1822. At present, 1846, there are five in Bengali and three in Persian printed in Calcutta, besides others at the different Presidencies. The circulation of each is but small.

1814—23.

rectors pronounce any sufficient commendation of the chief merits of Lord Hastings,—the soundness, foresight, and comprehensiveness of his policy, which were more remarkable even than the wisdom, skill, and energy of his military operations. A small but influential party in the Board, and in the Court of Directors, still adhered to the narrow and antiquated views of the days of Sir George Barlow, and affected to regret the extension of the British dominions in India. It was to the Commander-in-Chief, therefore, that the thanks were presented. In that capacity, also, a grant of sixty thousand pounds was voted to be vested in the hands of trustees for the benefit of the Marquis and his family.[1]

Notwithstanding these demonstrations of approval, which could not in justice or decency be withheld, the Governor-General, deeply mortified by the want of confidence exhibited in the correspondence of the Court relating to the Hyderabad affair, and indignant at the tone in which their sentiments were expressed, determined to relinquish his high office, and to rejoin his family in Europe. His resignation was tendered in 1821. It was then felt that the tribute due to his great services in peace, as well as in war, could no longer be deferred; and on the 23rd of May, 1822, a resolution of the Court of Directors was communicated to the Proprietors, expressing their deep regret at the resignation of the Marquis of Hastings, and offering him their thanks for the unremitting zeal and eminent ability with which, during a period of nearly nine years, he had administered the government of British India, with such high credit to himself, and advantage to

[1] May 15th, 1819.

the interests of the East India Company. The Court of Proprietors adopted the resolution; and, adverting to the previous acknowledgment which had passed the Court of the great military and political talents of the Governor-General, requested the executive body to convey to his Lordship the expression of their admiration, gratitude, and applause. The vote was just, though tardy. The administration of the Marquis of Hastings may be regarded as the completion of the great scheme of which Clive had laid the foundation, and Warren Hastings and the Marquis Wellesley had reared the superstructure. The crowning pinnacle was the work of Lord Hastings, and by him was the supremacy of the British Empire in India proper finally established. Of the soundness of the work no better proof can be afforded than the fact that there has been no international warfare since his administration. Rajput, Mahratta, and Mohammedan have remained at peace with each other under the shade of the British power. The wars in which the latter has been engaged have carried that power beyond the boundaries of Hindustan, but no interruption of internal tranquillity from the Himalaya to the sea has been suffered or attempted.

The Marquis of Hastings quitted his government on the 1st of January, 1823. Expressions of regret for his departure had previously poured in from every quarter, and there is reason to believe that they were sincere.

Lord Hastings had deserved well both of the European and native community. He was not indifferent to the good opinion of those subordinate to his station or subject to his authority, and sought

1814—23.

it not only by the splendour of his military triumphs, the comprehensiveness of his foreign policy, or the diligence, wisdom, and rectitude of his civil administration, but by consideration for the feelings, and anxiety for the prosperity and happiness, of every order of society. Whatever plan proposed the amelioration of the condition of the natives of India, whatever tended to their moral and intellectual elevation, received his hearty countenance and coöperation; and in the minor, but not unimportant article of personal deportment, Lord Hastings was ever scrupulously conciliatory and kind to every class of the native population. The example which he set was not in vain; and it was under his administration that even the respectable native inhabitants of the Presidency were first seen to associate on an equal footing with Europeans in devising and carrying out projects of public good. With the European portion of the society his habits were the same; and no sacrifice of personal comfort or convenience deterred Lord Hastings from promoting, by his participation and encouragement, whatever was projected for the diffusion of benevolence, the cultivation of knowledge, and the general good and happiness of the community.

The glories of the early administration of the Marquis of Hastings were heightened by the mild lustre of its close; and the triumphs of military success were justified by their application to the maintenance of universal tranquillity, the promotion of the welfare of the people, and the prosperity and consolidation of the British Empire in India.

APPENDIX.

I.

PAGE 67.

From Umur Singh and his sons, Ram Das, and Urjun Thapas, to the Raja of Nipal, dated Raj-gurh, 2nd March, 1815.

No. 1.

A COPY of your letter of the 23rd December, addressed to Runjoor Singh, under the Red Seal, was sent by the latter to me, who have received it with every token of respect. It was to the following purport:—"The capture of Nalapanee by the enemy has been communicated to me from Gurhwal and Kumaon, as also the intelligence of his having marched to Nahn: having assembled his force, he now occupies the whole country from Barapursa to Subturee and Muhotree. My army is also secretly posted in various places in the junguls of the mountains. An army under a general has arrived in Gorukpoor, for Palpa, and another detachment has reached the borders of Beejypoor. I have further heard that a general-officer has set off from Calcutta, to give us further trouble. For the sake of a few trifling objects, some intermediate agents have destroyed the mutual harmony, and war is waging far and wide: all this you know. You ought to send an embassy to conciliate the English, otherwise the cause is lost. The enemy, after making immense preparations, have begun the war, and unless great concessions are made

No. I. they will not listen to terms. To restore the relations of amity by concession is good and proper; for this purpose it is fit, in the first place, to cede to the enemy the departments of Bootwul, Palpa, and Sheeoraj, and the disputed tracts already settled by the commissioners towards Barah.[1] If this be insufficient to re-establish harmony, we ought to abandon the whole of the Turaee, the Doon, and the low lands; and if the English are still dissatisfied, on account of not obtaining possession of a portion of the mountains, you are herewith authorised to give up, with the Doon, the country as far as the Sutlej. Do whatever may be practicable to restore the relations of peace and amity, and be assured of my approbation and assent. If these means be unsuccessful, it will be very difficult to preserve the integrity of my dominions from Kunka Teestta to the Sutlej. If the enemy once obtain a footing in the centre of our territory, both extremities will be thrown into disorder. If you can retire with your army and military stores to pursue any other plan of operations that may afterwards appear eligible, it will be advisable. On this account, you ought immediately to effect a junction with all the other officers on the western service, and retire to any part of our territory which, as far as Nipal, you may think yourself capable of retaining. These are your orders."

In the first place, after the immense preparations of the enemy, he will not be satisfied with all these concessions; or if he should accept of our terms, he would serve us as he did Tippoo, from whom he first accepted of an indemnification of six crores of rupees in money and territory, and afterwards wrested from him his whole country. If we were to cede to him so much country, he would seek some fresh occasion of quarrel, and at a future opportunity would wrest from us other provinces. Having lost so much territory, we should be unable to maintain our army on its present footing; and our military fame being once

[1] Meaning the twenty-two villages on the Sarun frontier.

reduced, what means should we have left to defend our eastern possessions? While we retain Bisahur, Gurhwal is secure: if the former be abandoned, the Bhooteas of Ruwain will certainly betray us. The English having thus acquired the Doon and Ruwain, it will be impossible for us to maintain Gurhwal; and being deprived of the latter, Kumaon and Dotee will be also lost to us. After the seizure of these provinces, Achain, Joomlee, and Dooloo, will be wrested from us in succession. You say "that a proclamation has been issued to the inhabitants of the eastern kurats;" if they have joined the enemy, the other kurats will do so likewise, and then the country, Dood Koosee, on the east, to Bheeree, on the west, cannot be long retained. Having lost your dominions, what is to become of your great military establishments? When our power is once reduced, we shall have another Knox's mission, under pretence of concluding a treaty of alliance and friendship, and founding commercial establishments. If we decline receiving their mission, they will insist; and if we are unable to oppose force, and desire them to come unaccompanied with troops, they will not comply. They will begin by introducing a company: a battalion will soon after follow, and at length an army will be assembled for the subjection of Nipal. You think that if, for the present, the low lands, the Doon, and the country to the Sutlej, were ceded to them, they would cease to entertain designs upon the other provinces of Nipal. Do not trust them! They who counselled you to receive the mission of Knox, and permit the establishment of a commercial factory, will usurp the government of Nipal. With regard to the concessions now proposed, if you had, in the first instance, decided upon a pacific line of conduct, and agreed to restore the departments of Bootwul and Sheeoraj, as adjusted by the commissioners, the present contest might have been avoided. But you could not suppress your desire to retain these places, and, by murdering their revenue officer, excited their indignation, and kindled a war for trifles.

No. I.

At Jythuk we have obtained a victory over the enemy. If I succeed against General Ochterlony, and Runjoor Singh, with Juspao Thapa and his officers, prevail at Jythuk, Runjeet Singh will rise against the enemy. In conjunction with the Seiks, my army will make a descent into the plains; and our forces, crossing the Jumna from two different quarters, will recover possession of the Doon. When we reach Hurdwar, the Nuwab of Lukhnow may be expected to take a part in the cause; and, on his accession to the general coalition, we may consider ourselves secure as far as Khunka. Relying on your fortune, I trust that Bulbhudur Koonwur and Rewunt Kajee will soon be able to reinforce the garrison of Jythuk; and I hope, ere long, to send Punt Kajee with eight companies, when the force there will be very strong. The troops sent by you are arriving every day: and when they all come up, I hope we shall succeed both here and at Jythuk.

Formerly, when the English endeavoured to penetrate to Sundowlee, they continued for two years in possession of Bareh Pursa and Muhotree; but, when you conquered Nipal, they were either destroyed by your force, or fell victims to the climate, with the exception of a few only, who abandoned the place. Orders should now be given to all your officers to defend Choudundee, and Choudena in Bejypoor, and the two kurats, and the ridge of Mahabharut. Suffer the enemy to retain the low lands for a couple of years: measures can afterwards be taken to expel them. Lands transferred under a written agreement cannot again be resumed; but if they have been taken by force, force may be employed to recover them. Fear nothing, even though the Seiks should not join us. Should you succeed now in bringing our differences to an amicable termination by the cession of territory, the enemy in the course of a few years would be in possession of Nipal, as he took possession of the country of Tippoo. The present, therefore, is not the time for treaty and conciliation. These expedients should have been tried before

the murder of the revenue officer (in Gorukpoor), or must be postponed till victory shall crown our efforts. If they will then accede to the terms which I shall propose, it is well; if not, with the favour of God and your fortune and bounty, it shall be my business to preserve the integrity of my country from Khunka to the Sutlej. Let me entreat you, therefore, never to make peace. Formerly, when some individuals urged the adoption of a treaty of peace and commerce, I refused my assent to that measure; I will not now suffer the honour of my prince to be sullied by concession and submission. If you are determined on this step, bestow the humiliating office on him who first advised it. But for me, call me to your presence; I am old, and only desire once more to kiss your feet. I can recollect the time when the Goorkha army did not exceed twelve thousand men. Through the favour of Heaven, and by the valour of your forefathers, your territory was extended to the confines of Khunka, on the east. Under the auspices of your father, we subjugated Kumaon; and, through your fortune, we have pushed our conquests to the Sutlej. Four generations have been employed in the acquisition of all this dignity and dominion. At Nalapanee, Bulbhudur defeated three or four thousand of the enemy. At Jythuk, Runjoor Singh, with his officers, overthrew two battalions. In this place I am surrounded, and daily fighting with the enemy, and look forward with confidence to victory. All the inhabitants and chiefs of the country have joined the enemy. I must gain two or three victories before I can accomplish the object I have in view—of attaching Runjeet Singh to our cause. On his accession, and after the advance of the Seiks and Goorkhas towards the Jumna, the chiefs of the Dukhun may be expected to join the coalition, as also the Nawab of Lukhnow, and the Salik-Ramee-Leech.[1] Then will be the time for us to drive

No. I.

[1] It is not known who Umur Singh means by the Salik-Ramee-Leech; and some other of his names of places and persons differ from any in common use.

No. I. out the enemy, and recover possession of the low countries of Palpa, as far as Bejypoor. If we succeed in regaining these, we can attempt further conquest in the plains.

There has been no fighting in your quarter yet; the Choudundee and Choudena of Beejypoor, as far as the ridge of Muhabharut and Sooleeana, should be well defended. Countries acquired in four generations, under the administration of the Thapas, should not be abandoned for the purpose of bringing matters to an amicable adjustment, without deep and serious reflection. If we are victorious in the war, we can easily adjust our differences; and if we are defeated, death is preferable to a reconciliation on humiliating terms. When the Chinese army invaded Nipal, we implored the mercy of Heaven by offerings to the Brahmins, and the performance of religious ceremonies; and, through the favour of one and intercession of the other, we succeeded in repulsing the enemy. Ever since you confiscated the Jageers of the Brahmins, thousands have been in distress and poverty. Promises were given that they should be restored at the capture of Kangrah; and orders to this effect, under the red seal, were addressed to me, and Nin Singh Thapa. We failed, however, in that object, and now there is universal discontent. You ought, therefore, to assemble all the Brahmins, and promise to restore to them their lands and property, in the event of your conquering and expelling the English. By these means, many thousand worthy Brahmins will put up their prayers for your prosperity, and the enemy will be driven forth. By the practice of charity, the territory acquired in four generations may be preserved; and, through the favour of God, our power and dominion may be still further extended. By the extension of territory, our military establishment may be maintained on its present footing, and even increased. The numerous countries which you propose to cede to the enemy yielded a revenue equal to the maintenance of an

army of four thousand men, and Kangrah might have been captured. By the cession of these provinces, the reputation and splendour of your Court will no longer remain. By the capture of Kangrah, your name would have been rendered formidable; and, though that has not happened, a powerful impression has, nevertheless, been made on the people of the plains by the extension of your conquests to the Sutlej. To effect a reconciliation by the cession of the country to the west of the Jumna, would give rise to the idea that the Goorkhas were unable to oppose the English, would lower the dignity of your name in the plains, and cause a reduction of your army to the extent of four thousand men. The enemy will, moreover, require the possession of Bisahur, and after that the conquest of Gurhwal will be easy; nor will it be possible, in that case, for us to retain Kumaon, and with it we must lose Dotee, Acham, and Joomlah, whence he may be expected to penetrate even to Bheree. If the English once establish themselves firmly in possession of a part of the hills, we shall be unable to drive them out. The countries towards the Sutlej should be obstinately defended; the abandonment of the disputed tracts in the plains is a lesser evil: the possession of the former preserves to us the road to further conquest. You ought, therefore, to direct Gooroo Rungnath Pundit and Dulbunjun Pandeh to give up the disputed lands of Bootwul, Sheeoraj, and the twenty-two villages in the vicinity of Bareh, and thus, if possible, bring our differences to a termination. To this step I have no objections, and shall feel no animosity to those who may perform this service. I must, however, declare a decided hostility to such as, in bringing about a reconciliation with the English, consult only their own interest, and forget their duty to you. If they will not accept these terms, what have we to fear? The English attempted to take Bhurtpoor by storm; but the Raja Runjeet Singh destroyed an European regiment, and a battalion of sepoys. To the present day they have not

No. I.

No. I. ventured to meddle with Bhurtpoor again: whence it would seem that one fort has sufficed to check their progress. In the low country of Dhurma they established their authority; bnt the Raja overthrew their army, and captured all their artillery and stores, and now lives and continues in quiet possession of his dominions. Our proffers of peace and reconciliation will be interpreted as the result of fear; and it would be absurd to expect that the enemy will respect a treaty concluded under such circumstances. Therefore, let us confide our fortunes to our swords; and, by boldly opposing the enemy, compel him to remain within his own territory;—or, if he should continue to advance, stung with shame at the idea of retreating after his immense preparations, we can then give up the lands in dispute, and adjust our differences. Such, however, is the fame and terror of our swords, that Bulbhudur, with a force of six hundred men, defeated an army of three or four thousand English. His force consisted of the old Gourukh and Kurrukh companies, which were only partly composed of the inhabitants of our ancient kingdom, and of the people of the countries from Bheree to Gurhwal; and with these he destroyed one battalion, and crippled and repulsed another. My army is similarly composed: nevertheless, all descriptions are eager to meet the enemy. In your quarter you are surrounded with the veterans of our army, and cannot apprehend desertion from them;—you have also an immense militia, and many Jageerdars, who will fight for their own honour and interests. Assembling the militia of the low lands, and fighting in the plains, is impolitic: call them into the hills, and cut the enemy up by detail—(a passage here the sense of which cannot be discovered). The enemy is proud, and flushed with success, and has reduced under his subjection all the western Zemindars, the Ranas, and Raja of Kuhlor, and the Thakooraen, and will keep peace with no one. Howeyer, my advice is nothing. I will direct Ram Doss to propose to General Ochterlony

the abandonment, on our part, of the disputed lands, and will forward to you the answer which he may receive. All the Ranas, Rajas, and Thakooraen, have joined the enemy, and I am surrounded: nevertheless, we shall fight and conquer, and all my officers have taken the same resolution. The Pundits have pronounced the month of Bysakh as particularly auspicious for the Goorkhas; and, by selecting a fortunate day, we shall surely conquer. I am desirous of engaging the enemy slowly and with caution, but cannot manage it, the English being always first to begin the fight. I hope, however, to be able to delay the battle till Bysakh (April, May), when I will choose a favourable opportunity to fight them. When we shall have driven the enemy from hence, either Runjoor or myself, according to your wishes, will repair to your presence. In the present crisis, it is very advisable to write to the Emperor of China, and to the Lama of Lassa, and to the other Lamas; and, for this purpose, I beg leave to submit the enclosed draft of a letter to their address; any errors in it, I trust, will be forgiven by you; and I earnestly recommend that you will lose no time in sending a petition to the Emperor of China, and a letter to the Lama. No. I.

II.

PAGE 79.

Proposed Petition to the Emperor of China by the Raja of Nepal.

I yield obedience to the Emperor of China, and no one dare invade my dominions; or if any power has ventured to encroach on my territory, through your favour and protection I have been able to discomfit and expel them. Now, however, a powerful and inveterate enemy has attacked me, and, as I owe allegiance to you, I rely on No. II.

No. II. obtaining your assistance and support. From Khanka to the Setlej for a thousand kos war is waging between us. Entertaining designs upon Bhote, the enemy endeavours to get possession of Nepal, and for these objects he has fomented a quarrel and declared war. Five or six great actions have been already fought; but, through the fortune and glory of your Imperial Majesty, I have succeeded in destroying about twenty thousand of the enemy; but his wealth and military resources are great, and he sustains the loss without receding a step. On the contrary, numerous reinforcements continue to arrive, and my country is invaded on all points. Though I might obtain a hundred thousand soldiers from the hills and plains, yet without pay they cannot be maintained; and though I have every desire to pay them, I have not the means. Without soldiers I cannot repel the enemy. Consider the Gorkhas as your tributaries; reflect that the English come to conquer Nepal and Bhote, and for these reasons be graciously pleased to assist us with a sum of money, that we may levy an army and drive forth the invaders. Or, if you are unwilling to assist us with subsidies, and prefer sending an army to our aid, it is well. The climate of Dharma (Bhután) is temperate, and you may safely send an army of two or three hundred thousand men by the route of Dharma into Bengal, spreading alarm and consternation among the Europeans as far as Calcutta. The enemy has subjugated all the Rajas of the plains, and usurped the throne of the King of Delhi, and therefore it is to be expected that these would all unite in expelling the Europeans from Hindustan. By such an event your name will be renowned throughout all Jambudwip (India); and wherever you may command, the whole of its inhabitants will be forward in your service. Should you think that the conquest of Nepal, and the forcible separation of the Gorkhas from their dependence on the Emperor of China, cannot materially affect your Majesty's interests, I beseech you to reflect, that without your aid I cannot re-

pulse the English; that these are the people who have already subdued all India, and usurped the throne of Delhi; that with my army and resources I am quite unable to make head against them; and that the world will henceforth say, that the Emperor of China abandoned to their fate his tributaries and dependants. I acknowledge the supremacy of the Emperor of China above all the potentates on earth. The English, after obtaining possession of Nepal, will advance by the routes of Bhadrinath and Mansarowar, and also by that of Digarchi, for the purpose of conquering Lassa. I beg, therefore, that you will write an order to the English, directing them to withdraw their forces from the territory of the Gorkha State, which is tributary and dependent upon you, otherwise that you will send an army to our aid. I beseech you, however, to lose no time in sending assistance, whether in men or money, that I may drive out the enemy and maintain possession of the mountains; otherwise he will, in a few years, be master of Lassa. No. II.

III.

PAGE 79.

From the three Governors at Arzung, named, first, Shee-Chan-Chun, principal Vizir: secondly, Shee-Taran: thirdly, Kho-Taran. Let this letter be taken to the officer commanding at Rungpur, who, after opening it and ascertaining its contents, will forward it to his master.

This is written by the enlightened Vizir of his Majesty the Emperor of China, and by the two Vizirs who are Hakims of this place, namely, Shee-Taran and Kho-Taran. These three, of whom one has lately arrived from the capital, from the presence of the Emperor, and the other No. III.

No. III. two the Governors of Arzung, have agreed to write to the English gentlemen as follows:—

From a letter which was received from the Raja of Gorkha, addressed to the two Tarans, it was understood that the English had demanded of the Raja of Gorkha, and of Dhama Shanga, a free passage to this quarter, declaring that they had no intention of attacking those chiefs, and that they only wanted a free passage to Lassa, when it would be seen what would happen. It was stated also that the English proposed that the above-mentioned chiefs should pay to them the tribute which they now pay to China. A letter to the same effect was received from the Raja of Gorkha, addressed to the two Tarans at Lassa. The two Tarans of this place sent the original letter to the Emperor. The heart of his Imperial Majesty is as pure as the sun, and enlightened as the moon, and truth and falsehood are in all matters apparent to him. Not relying on the Raja of Gorkha's letter, he, in order to ascertain the truth of the circumstances, sent from his own presence Shee-Chan-Chun with a royal army: that person accordingly will soon arrive with the army at Tingari, and will inquire into your proceedings.

Such absurd measures as those alluded to appear quite inconsistent with the usual wisdom of the English. It is probable that they never made the declaration imputed to them: if they did, it will not be well. On a former occasion, when Thron-Tan came here to make war against the Raja of Gorkha, a letter was received from the English, addressed to Thron-Tan, asking assistance. The hostile course which, according to the Raja of Gorkha, they have now adopted, is, therefore, beyond measure surprising. An answer should be sent as soon as possible to Tingari, stating whether or not the English have made the absurd propositions imputed to them to the Raja of Gorkha and Dhama Shanga. It is probable that they did not. If they did not, let them write a suitable explanation addressed to Shee-Chan-Chun, that he may make a corre-

sponding communication to the Emperor, stating that the whole story is a falsehood of the Raja of Gorkha. Let the true state of the case be told, that it may be reported to the Emperor. The Emperor of China is just. Be it known to the English gentlemen that his Majesty of China is just and merciful. Send an answer as soon as possible. No. III.

Dated 23rd Jemadurs-sani, 1231. Hij. (23rd May, 1816.)

IV.

PAGE 309.

Substance of a Mahratta Proclamation issued on the 11th February, 1818, by the Honourable Mr. Elphinstone, Sole Commissioner for the territories conquered from the Peshwa.

From the time when Baji Rao ascended the Musnud, his country was a prey to faction and rebellion, and there was no efficient government to protect the people. At length Baji Rao was expelled from his dominions, and took refuge in Bassein, where he was dependent on the bounty of Kandi Rao Rastia. At this time he entered into alliance with the British Government, and was immediately restored to the full possession of his authority; the tranquillity that has been enjoyed since that period is known to all ranks of men. At Baji Rao's restoration, the country was laid waste by war and famine, the people were reduced to misery, and the Government derived scarcely any revenue from its lands: since then, in spite of the farming system, and the exactions of Baji Rao's officers, the country has completely recovered, through the protection afforded it by the British Government, and Baji Rao has accumulated those treasures which he is now employing against his benefactors. The British Govern- No. IV.

No. IV. ment not only protected the Peshwa's own possessions, but maintained his rights abroad. It could not, without injury to the rights of others, restore his authority over the Mahratta chiefs, which had expired long before its alliance with him; but it paid the greatest attention to satisfying his admissible demands, and succeeded, in spite of many difficulties, in adjusting some, and in putting others in a train of settlement. Among these were Baji Rao's claims on the Gaekwar. The British Government had prevailed on that prince to send his prime minister to Poona for the express purpose of settling those demands, and they were on the eve of adjustment with great profit to the Peshwa, when Gangadhar Sastri, the Gaekwar's Vakil, was murdered by Trimbakji Dainglia, the Peshwa's minister, while in actual attendance on his court, and during a solemn pilgrimage at Pundrapur. Strong suspicion rested on Baji Rao, who was accused by the voice of the whole country; but the British Government, unwilling to credit such charges against a prince and an ally, contented itself with demanding the punishment of Trimbakji. This was refused, until the British Government had marched an army to support its demands; yet it made no claim on the Peshwa for its expenses, and inflicted no punishment for his protection of a murderer: it simply required the surrender of the criminal, and, on Baji Rao's compliance, it restored him to the undiminished enjoyment of the benefits of the alliance. Notwithstanding this generosity, Baji Rao immediately commenced a new system of intrigues, and used every exertion to turn all the power of India against the British Government. At length he gave the signal of disturbances by fomenting an insurrection in his own dominions, and preparing to support the insurgents by open force. The British Government had then no remedy but to arm in turn. Its troops entered Baji Rao's territories at all points, and surrounded him in his capital before any of those with whom he had intrigued had time to stir. Baji Rao's

life was now in the hands of the British Government; but that Government, moved by his professions of gratitude for past favours, and of entire dependence on its moderation, once more resolved to continue him on his throne, after imposing such terms upon him as might secure it from his future perfidy. The principal of these terms was a commutation of the contingent, which the Peshwa was bound to furnish, for money equal to the pay of a similar body of troops; and, on their being agreed to, the British Government restored Baji Rao to its friendship, and proceeded to settle the Pindaris, who had so long been the pests of the peaceable inhabitants of India, and of none more than the Peshwa's own subjects. Baji Rao affected to enter with zeal into an enterprize so worthy of a great government, and assembled a large army, on pretence of cordially assisting in the contest; but in the midst of all his professions he spared neither pains nor money to engage the powers of Hindustan to combine against the British; and no sooner had the British troops marched towards the haunts of the Pindaris than he seized the opportunity to commence war without a declaration, and without even an alleged ground of complaint. He attacked and burned the house of the British Resident, contrary to the laws of nations and the practice of India, plundered and seized on peaceable travellers, and put two British officers to an ignominious death. Baji Rao himself found the last transaction too barbarous to avow; but as the perpetrators are still unpunished, and retain their command in his army, the guilt remains with him. After the commencement of the war, Baji Rao threw off the mask regarding the murder of Gangadhar Sastri, and avowed his participation in the crime by uniting his cause with that of the murderer. By these acts of perfidy and violence Baji Rao has compelled the British Government to drive him from his musnud, and to conquer his dominions. For this purpose a force is gone in pursuit of Baji Rao,

No. IV. which will allow him no rest; another is employed in taking his forts; a third has arrived by way of Ahmednagar, and a greater force than either is now entering Kandesh, under the personal command of his Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop; a force under General Munro is reducing the Carnatic, and a force from Bombay is taking the forts in the Konkan, and occupying that country, so that in a short time not a trace of Baji Rao will remain. The Raja of Sattara, who is now a prisoner in Baji Rao's hands, will be released, and placed at the head of an independent sovereignty of such an extent as may maintain the Raja and his family in comfort and dignity. With this view the fort of Sattara has been taken, the Raja's flag has been set up in it, and his former ministers have been called into employment. Whatever country is assigned to the Raja will be administered by him, and he will be bound to establish a system of justice and order; the rest of the country will be held by the Honourable Company. The revenue will be collected for the Government, but all property, real or personal, will be secured; all wuttun and enam (hereditary lands), warshásan (annual stipends), and all religious and charitable establishments will be protected, and all religious sects will be tolerated and their customs maintained, as far as is just and reasonable. The farming system is abolished; officers shall be forthwith appointed to collect a regular and moderate revenue on the part of the British Government, to administer justice, and to encourage the cultivators of the soil. They will be authorized to allow of remissions in consideration of the circumstances of the times. All persons are prohibited from paying revenue to Baji Rao or his adherents, or assisting them in any shape. No deduction will be made from the revenue on account of any such payments. Wuttundars, and other holders of land, are required to quit the standard of Baji Rao, and return to their villages within two months from this

time. The Zemindars will report the names of those who remain; and all who fail to appear at that time shall forfeit their lands, and shall be pursued without remission until they are entirely crushed. All persons, whether belonging to the enemy or otherwise, who may attempt to lay waste the country, or to plunder the roads, will be put to death wherever they are found. No. IV.

V.

Page 391.



NOTES FOUND AT ASIR-GERH.

1. *From Dowlat Rao to Jeswant Rao Lar.*

I send you the news: the Company and the Sirkar are friends, and have joined to annihilate the Pindaris and secure the roads. The Company have required Hindia and Hurda from the Sirkar, who replied "take them," and has written the necessary papers, and has also written a chor-chiti (a note authorising the quitting of the fort) to you. I write you the information of what has passed; but do you be in readiness, and keep your people, so that your manhood may be known to all, and that no trick or deceit may be in your jurisdiction. Be careful: do not keep your family or children with you, but send them to your house, or to some place of safety, so that no person may be acquainted with their residence. Have no incumbrances about you. Be ready. What is decreed will take place. Keep your heart steady to me. There is no need to write much; you will understand everything from this. No. V.

2. (*Written in Sindhia's own handwriting.*)

Obey all orders that may come from Srimant (the Peshwa). Plead not that I have given no orders, but

No. V. do exactly as Srimant may require you. Should you not do so, I shall be perjured. The people have written you from hence, so that you will know everything that is going on. Consider this note as equal to a thousand notes, and act accordingly.

VI.

PAGE 397.

Various properties and rights claimed by Raja Mulhar Rao Holkar in parts of Kandesh and the Dekhin, subject to the Peshwa as Desmukh, Head of a district, or as Patel, Head of a village.

1.

No. VI. DESMUKH'S RIGHTS IN THE PERGANA OF CHANDORE, ETC.

A house in Chandore.

Several villages in Jagir.

Seven per cent. on the Government revenue of the village of Mutád.

A certain quantity of grain from sundry villages.

One rupee per village for the Desmukh and for his Gomashta or agent.

Three and a half per cent. on all money coined in the mint of Chandore.

The customs taken at the four towns of Chandore, Devgaon, Raichur, and Búri, during two months in each year.

A sum levied from each village for the maintenance of a writer in attendance on the officers of the ruling power, on the part of the Desmukh.

Fees on all deeds conveying real property or vested rights, which require the Desmukh's signature.

A khelat, or dress of honour, by the revenue contractor or the jagirdar, on the settlement of the year's revenue

accounts, also requiring the counter-signature of the Desmukh. No. VI.

Various gardens, mango groves, and tanks, rent-free, in different villages and towns.

A fee, or present, from certain villages on the determination of their assessment, and its annual payment. A present from the same at the festival of the Dashara; and a present of one rupee from each, if visited by the Desmukh; and a similar fee on the appointment of a new Gomashta.

Right of free pasture in various places.

A present at marriages and births, where the villagers can afford it, however trifling.

Seven per cent. of the forage supplied by the village to the Government.

A full suit of clothes, value two hundred rupees, annually from the Customs of Chandore.

A certain quantity of sesamum and molasses from each village, on various occasions.

A portion of any fine imposed upon Brahmans, as an expiation of offence against Caste.

2.

PATEL RIGHTS IN VARIOUS VILLAGES IN THE PERGANAS OF NASIK, DHER, SANGAMNER, ETC.

A certain proportion of all crops when gathered.

An allotment of rent-free land in each village.

A piece of cloth from each family on occasion of a marriage.

A piece of cloth annually from each weaver's shop.

A betel nut daily from each grocer.

A blanket annually from each shepherd.

A proportion of sugar from every quantity manufactured.

A pair of shoes annually from each chumar, or worker in leather.

No. VI. A handful of every sort of vegetables daily from the sellers.

A certain quantity of oil daily from the makers.

3.

DESMUKH'S RIGHTS IN VARIOUS VILLAGES IN THE PERGANA OF GALNA.

Five per cent. per annum on the Government revenue.

Two rupees from the large, and one from the small villages per annum, for offerings to the Manes in the month Bhadon.

Two-thirds of a fourth of all customs and duties.

Money and food on occasion of marriages.

A share of the crops.

Half a seer of oil daily from every oil press.

A certain quantity of oil on the Desmukh's visiting a village.

Proportions of cane, molasses, and sugar from every field and mill.

Two seers of rice from every field.

A portion of the load of every Bunjara bullock that passes through the village.

A present of a rupee a-year from every village.

Two betel leaves from every load, and ten from each shop daily, and one betel nut daily from each grocer.

At fairs in the vicinity of a fort, a portion of every article—as a handful of grain from each load, or of vegetables from each basket: twenty-five mangoes from each cart-load, and twenty-five canes from a similar load of sugar-canes, &c.

A set of horse-shoes annually from every smithy.

Two bundles of straw annually from each village.

Shoes, blankets, cloth as before mentioned.

A cart-load of firewood annually from each village.

Five mango-trees in every hundred.

A tax of five rupees a-year on eunuchs, and on vagrants with bears or wild animals.

Portions of meat and spirits daily from butchers and venders of spirituous liquor, and a skin and a half annually from each village. No. VI.

Whatever platters (of leaves) or pots are required for devotional purposes must be supplied by the manufacturers, and free labour is expected from various castes, when required by the Desmukh.

Contributions, in money or kind, are also levied at the great Hindu festivals, the Dewali, Dasahara and Sankránt.

The whole of these, and of similar rights in other places, which were formerly valued at more than three lakhs of rupees annually, were valued in 1819 at little more than one, and of that the greater part was intercepted by the officers appointed to make the collections.

VII.

PAGE 560.

A.—*Comparative Statement of the Revenues and Charges of British India in the Years* 1813-14 *and* 1822-23. No. VII.

1813-14	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	Total.
Receipts	£11,172,000	5,297,000	759,000	17,228,000
Charges	£ 7,135,000	4,893,000	1,589,000	13,617,000
			Surplus Revenue	£3,611,000
			Deduct Interest on Debt £1,537,000	
			Supplies to England 116,000	
				£1,653,000
			Surplus in 1813-14	£1,958,000

1822-23.	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	Total.
Receipts	£14,168,000	5,585,000	3,372,900	23,120,000
Charges	£ 8,746,000	5,072,000	4,264,000	18,082,000
			Surplus Revenue	£5,038,000
			Deduct Interest	1,694,000
			Surplus in 1823-4	£3,444,000

No. VII.

ITEMS OF AUGMENTED RECEIPT.

	Bengal.		Madras.		Bombay.	
	1813-14.	1822-23.	1813-14.	1822-23.	1813-14.	1822-23.
Mint	£9,000	23,000	16,000	21,000	6,000	2,000
Post-Office	43,000	61,000	20,000	25,000	6,000	11,000
Stamps	16,000	150,000	31,000	62,000	,,	17,000
Judicial	104,000	54,000	20,000	19,000	6,000	8 000
Customs	322,000	477,000	190,000	218,000	108,000	158,000
Land Revᵉ.	3,928,000	4,488,000	893,000	877,000	37,000	130,000
Do. Ceded	2,271,000	2,411,000	,,	,,	206,000	360,000
Conquered	1,664,000	1,806,000	,,	,,	291,000	1,430,000
Nerbudda	,,	609,000	,,	,,	,,	,,
Salt	1,779,000	2,553,000	155,000	148,000	,,	,,
Opium	964,000	1,493,000	,,	,,	,,	1,158,000
Marine	31,000	33,724	9,000	8,000	40,000	21,000
Carnatic	,,	,,	1,131,000	1,464,000	,,	,,
Tanjore	,,	,,	436,000	459,000	,,	,,
Mysore	,,	,,	1,519,000	1,400,000	,,	,,
Nizam	,,	,,	685,000	669,000	,,	,,
Travancore	,,	,,	91,000	89,000	,,	,,
Cochin	,,	,,	32,000	23,000	,,	,,
Farms and Licences	,,	,,	62,000	100,000	53,000	74,000
Dutch Settlements	,,	,,	,,	,,	,,	,,

TOTAL INCREASE OF REVENUE.

1822-23	£23,120,000
1813-14	17,228,000
Increase	£5,892,000

Of which the increase in Bengal was	£2,991,000
Ditto ditto Madras	288,000
Ditto ditto Bombay	2,613,000
	£5,892,000

Increase in Salt—Bengal	£774,000
Ditto Opium—Bengal	529,000
	1,303,000
Ditto Ditto—Bombay	1,158,000
	£2,461,000

Increase on Land in Bengal:—		
Lower Provinces . .	£560,000	
Ceded Ditto . . .	140,000	
Conquered Ditto . .	142,000	
		£842,000

Revenue from the territories on the Nerbudda	£609,000
Ditto from the Mahratta conquered territory	1,839,000
	£2,448,000

Report Lords, 1830. App. Revenues of India.

B.—*Comparison of Receipts with Charges and Interest from* 1813-14 *to* 1822-23.

	Revenue.	Charges and Interest.	Local Surplus.
1813-14	£17,228,000	£15,154,000	£1,958,000
1814-15	17,231,000	15,684,000	1,547,000
1815-16	17,168,000	16,665,000	503,814
1816-17	18,010,000	16,849,000	1,161,000
1817-18	18,305,000	17,597,000	708,000
1818-19	19,392,000	19,224,000	168,000
1819-20	19,172,000	18,981,000	191,000
1820-21	21,292,000	19,423,000	1,869,000
1821-22	21,753,000	19,488,000	2,265,000
1822-23	23,120,000	19,778,000	3,342,000

Comm. Comm. 1832. App. Finance, No. 4, Art. 1.

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